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Abstract 
Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis is used to construct two 
different indices for financial instability: a long-term index (Long Term Financial 
Instability) and a short-term index (Short Term Financial Instability). The former 
focuses on the underlying fragility of financial structures of units in the economy 
while the latter focuses on more immediate developments and manages to 
follow turmoil – “a financial crisis” – in the economy. The interplay of the indices 
with each other, with economic growth and with Foreign Direct Investment, both 
in general and in the financial industry, is probed.  
In short, we find that long term financial stability, i.e. secure financial structures 
in the economy or a low level of Long Term Financial Instability, is sacrificed for 
maintaining short term financial stability. However, more Long Term Financial 
Instability is associated, as Minsky expected, with more fluctuations in Short 
Term Financial Instability: market turmoil is more common the more fragile 
underlying financial structures of units in the economy are. This signals that 
markets are ruled by short-termism. Economic growth is harmed by Short Term 
Financial Instability but the effects of Long Term Financial Instability are 
weaker. The common expectation that FDI activities strengthen financial 
stability is not confirmed. The relationship found hints rather in the opposite 
direction: FDI activities seem to cause financial instability.  
Based on the those investigations and a further empirical work using data from 
Iceland, Leigh Harkness’s Optimum Exchange Rate System (OERS) is 
developed further with the intention of solving “The Policy Problem” as 
described by Minsky. Insights from control theory are used. The OERS, along 
with public debt management as carried out by Keynes, is argued to have the 
ability to keep economic activity in the state of a permanent “quasi-boom”. The 
policy implications are that the OERS should be considered as a monetary 
policy as it permits a free flow of capital, thereby allowing economies to reap the 
possible positive benefits of foreign direct investment, while still conserving 
financial stability. 
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Introduction 
The main aim of post-Keynesian economics is to provide a clear 
understanding of how the economy works, by relating economic 
analysis to real economic problems. 
Philip Arestis (1996, p. 112) 
Financial stability and how to maintain it has got considerably more attention in 
the post-2008 world than before. In its 84th annual report the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS, 2014, p. 139) said that “[t]he global financial 
crisis underscored the crucial supervision for financial stability and the effective 
functioning of the policy framework.” Indeed, central banks increasingly turned 
their attention to maintaining asset prices and financial stability rather than 
continuing their old focus on keeping inflation at bay: keeping inflation down has 
now been recognised as not being enough to maintain financial stability (Bank 
of International Settlements, 2014). As the Great Moderation turned into the 
Great Recession, “macroprudential policy” became “[t]he new fad in central 
banking” according to the Wall Street Journal (Izzo, 2013).  
But that idea is old even if the term is new. Hyman Minsky, an American 
economist who died in 1996, had already realised many years ahead of most 
others that “macroprudential policy” was needed to control what he considered 
to be an endogenous and natural – in the sense that it was a normal and an 
expected part of the system – build-up of instability in the financial system. He 
called it “systemic regulation” (Kregel, 2014). So in a similar fashion to when 
Minsky (1987) realised the potential impacts of securitisation years before 
subprime mortgages were packaged, sliced and sold in tranches to anyone 
willing to buy them, he also anticipated the need for “macroprudential policy” 
long before it became “the new fad”. 
This work is driven by my personal experiences. I, having been a junior 
economist in an Icelandic bank before October 2008, had major problems 
understanding how the financial system of my home country collapsed in a 
fashion that I, and so many other economists, considered impossible at that 
time. A dumbfounded me, with a fresh BSc. degree in economics, understood 
that my understanding of the real processes of the economy was limited, to say 
16 
the least. The quest for understanding the real world in the wake of that event 
was a driving force during the time it took to get this work done. It will be in the 
future as well. 
To some extent, Iceland, my home country, has a more prominent role in this 
work than the reader may understand. It was the Icelandic financial crisis in 
2008 that sparked my interest in understanding financial instability. It was the 
Icelandic banks that performed the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in other 
countries that sparked my interest in understanding the effects of financial FDI 
on financial instability and the interaction there between. And it was Iceland, as 
the host country of FDI, especially in aluminium smelters, that sparked my 
interest in FDI in general and financial stability. Therefore, Iceland plays a larger 
role in this work than one might imagine from reading it.This thesis rests on the 
work of Hyman Minsky. This work is also, predominantly, an attempt to 
understand the real world as it is. Empirical work is at the heart of it and the 
proposed theoretical improvements to the current monetary system set forth in 
the fifth and the last chapter are based on observed behaviour of our monetary 
system. As such the work is, I hope, in accordance with the post-Keynesian 
chosen method of approach to forming and basing theories: relevant, 
representing reality and explanatory for the real world (Arestis, 1996) for “[p]ost-
Keynesian theory... begins with observation and proceeds to build upon 
‘realistic abstractions’ rather than ‘imaginary models’” (ibid, p. 116). 
What is post-Keynesian economics? 
[E]conomic theory [has] to explain why our economy is so given to 
fluctuations rather than being content with abstract arguments that a 
decentralised market system can yield coherence. Minsky (2008b, 
p.133). 
Post-Keynesian economics grew, predominantly, on the works of John 
Maynard Keynes.1 Keynes was stationed at Cambridge, England, and studied 
economics under Alfred Marshall, who was also a family friend. Marshall is 
today considered as one of the founders of the Neoclassical School of 
economics (Harcourt, 2012). 
                                            
1
 Another fundamental contributor to post-Keynesian economics was the Polish economist Michał 
Kalecki.  
17 
Keynes was “Marshall’s most distinguished pupil” and “driven by an intense 
seriousness: a desire to understand the real world, especially why it 
malfunctioned, and how to make it a better place” (ibid, p. 63). Driven by his 
“desire to understand the real world” Keynes rejected most of Marshall’s, and 
other neoclassical economists’, ideas about the workings of the economy. For 
Keynes (1936, p. 8), “the difficulty lie[d] not so much in developing new ideas 
as in escaping from the old ones” and he urged his fellow economists to open 
their eyes to what he was saying for “the ideas which are here expressed so 
laboriously are extremely simple and should be obvious” (ibid). Those ideas – 
which culminated in Keynes’s magnum opus The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money, published in 1936 – formed the outlines of 
the current post-Keynesian economic theory. 
It is important to repeat it here (Arestis, 1996, p. 116) that “[p]ost-Keynesian 
theory... begins with observation and proceeds to build upon ‘realistic 
abstractions’ rather than ‘imaginary models’”. For post-Keynesian economists, 
contrary to neoclassical economists such as Milton Friedman, “the starting 
point of theory [is] the nature of the real world” and that it is “crucial that there 
be some correspondence between a theory and the real world, something that 
Friedman denied” (Dow, 2001, p. 12).2 Post-Keynesian economic theory is 
“Economics without Equilibrium” (Arestis (1996, p. 115), referencing Kaldor 
(1985)) in the neoclassical-economics sense and post-Keynesians have long 
rejected the existence of neoclassical equilibrium. Joan Robinson e.g. wrote 
(Robinson, 1980, pp. 227-228): 
We must throw out concepts and theorems that are logically self-
[contradictory], such as the general equilibrium of supply and 
demand, the long-run production function, the marginal productivity 
of capital and the equilibrium size of firms... In commodity markets, 
prices fluctuate under the influence of changes in the relations of 
supply to demand, without ever tending towards stability. 
                                            
2
 Dow was referencing Friedman’s words that the quality of theories should be deemed on their predictive 
value rather than their realism or structure (Friedman, 1953). 
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Instead, the post-Keynesians consider the economy as being non-ergodic3 and 
a collection of dynamic subsystems (ibid). In fact, the concept of equilibrium in 
post Keynesian economics has a different meaning than in neoclassical 
economics: it “refer[s] to stable states rather than the market clearing and 
satisfaction of expectations that characterize the orthodox concept of 
equilibrium” (Dow, 2001, p. 13). In other words, “equilibrium” in post-Keynesian 
economics does not mean that the supply and demand are equal, i.e. that the 
“market clears”. Rather, “market clearing” is only a specific case that is a part of 
the general case: normally, one side of the market, supply or demand, is 
inadequate compared to the other and prices do not automatically adjust so 
that the market clears. Rather, in post-Keynesian economic theory, the theory 
of price formation is built upon the real-world phenomena of firms’ mark-up on 
top of the cost of production (Lee, 2004) and conventions, where current price 
levels are projections of the most recent ones. Prices, in post-Keynesian 
theory, are not a market-clearing mechanism for the simple fact that in the real 
world, they are not. 
Following Keynes (1936, 1937) a great emphasis is put on the passing of 
historical time – i.e. “where the past is immutable and the future is uncertain 
and unknowable” (Arestis, 1996, p. 115) – and the fact that industries are not 
perfectly competitive. This leads to the conclusion that regular equilibrium 
analysis with well-behaved supply and demand is not applicable to the real 
world: in fact, the supply curve does not exist (Dow, 2001; Keen, 2011a). 
Exactly because of the existence of uncertainty and time, money, its existence 
and creation, are taken seriously. Post-Keynesian theory, following Keynes’s 
approach, focuses on the money-value of production: production theory, i.e. the 
theory of real activity, must be based on the monetary theory of real activity 
(Tily, 2010). Money is not a “veil” on real economic activity, the quantity of 
which does nothing in the long run but to determine the price level, but a non-
displaceable part of the economy and a necessary building block of any 
realistic approach to economic theory. Banking, financial institutions and their 
effects on the economy must consequently be taken seriously. As Minsky 
(1977, p. 141), as quoted by Dymski and Pollin (1992, p. 28), put it: 
                                            
3
 A process, such as time series of employment, GDP or interest rates, is considered ergodic if its 
statistical characteristics can be derived from a single long-enough sample. A process that moves in an 
erratic and unpredictable manner is non-ergodic. Post-Keynesians reject the assumption of neoclassical 
economists that the economy is an ergodic process. 
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In our economy the behaviour of “Wall Street” is a determinant of the 
pace and direction of investment. A model of the economy from the 
perspective of “Wall Street” differs from the standard model of 
economic theory in that it first sees a network of financial 
interrelations and cash flows and then a production and distribution 
mechanism. A “Wall Street” paradigm is a better starting point for 
theorizing about our type of economy than the “barter” paradigm of 
conventional theory. 
Furthermore, institutions and the “rules” guiding economic behaviour in the 
economy are considered important as they can determine the path that the 
economy takes. The fact that institutions chance, and with them “the rules of 
the game”, makes it difficult to draw direct comparisons between different time 
periods if the “rules” or units’ economic behaviour have changed. Economic 
models must consider this fact, otherwise risk being useless at best, 
misdirecting or harmful at worst. A case in point is the perceived trade-off 
between unemployment and inflation – the Philips curve – which, according to 
Minsky, writing in 1986, (Minsky, 2008, p. 321)  
only existed for a brief period after World War II and that there is 
little, if any, evidence to support the idea that it still exists. Yet 
because this trade-off is built into the economic theory and the 
econometric models of the policy-advising establishment, the 
problems of policy are phrased in its terms. 
What all this means is that post-Keynesian economic theory applies inductive 
reasoning rather than a deductive one. Werner (2005, p. 17-18) explains what 
this means from the scientific point of view when it comes to how post-
Keynesian economic theory is formed compared to neoclassical economic 
theory: 
[The inductive] approach examines reality, identifies important facts 
and patterns, and then attempts to explain them, using logic, in the 
form of theories. These theories are then tested and modified as 
needed, in order to be most consistent with the facts of reality. This 
methodology is called inductivism. All the natural sciences and most 
scientific disciplines use this approach. Inductivism is not only 
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dominant in science, it also describes how we learned as infants 
about this world. When we touched the hot stove in the kitchen and 
burnt our fingers we learned inductively that doing so again would 
also hurt again. 
... 
Unhindered by economic reality, deductive economists [such as 
neoclassical economists] can start with their preferred axioms, which 
do not need to be supported by facts – such as the axiom that 
individuals only care about the maximization of their own material 
benefit. Additional unrealistic assumptions produce the theories that 
are so removed from reality. 
Finally, for a view of Keynes, who lends both his name and ideas to the post-
Keynesian school of thought, and how accurate and realistic his theories were, 
even in their heydays, compared to other schools of thought, we can go to 
Bruce Bartlett, an American (right wing) historian. His words are admirable for 
the simple fact that they describe the view of a person who has carefully 
reconsidered his opinion in the light of historical and empirical facts – and as 
Keynes (1924, p. 345) himself pointed out: “after all there is no harm in being 
sometimes wrong – especially if one is promptly found out.”  In the article 
“Revenge of the Reality-Based Community”, published in The American 
Conservative, Bartlett writes (Bartlett, 2012): 
I had written an op-ed for the New York Times in 2007 suggesting 
that it was time to retire “supply-side economics” as a school of 
thought. Having been deeply involved in its development, I felt that 
everything important the supply-siders had to say had now been fully 
incorporated into mainstream economics...I said the supply-siders 
should declare victory and go home. 
I decided to write a book elaborating my argument. I thought I had a 
nice thesis to put forward... 
[For my research for the book] I hit upon the idea of ignoring the 
academic journals and looking instead at what economists like John 
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Maynard Keynes, Irving Fisher, and others said in newspaper 
interviews and articles for popular publications... 
After careful research along these lines, I came to the annoying 
conclusion that Keynes had been 100 percent right in the 1930s. 
Previously, I had thought the opposite. But facts were facts and there 
was no denying my conclusion. 
The construction of the thesis and its contribution to knowledge 
There are five major chapters in this thesis. Together, they are intended to form 
a comprehensive and coherent whole: “together we stand, divided we fall”.  
Chapter one acts as an introduction, in the form of a literature review, to FDI. 
Some of the adherent issues to FDI  are focused on. Those are FDI and 
economic growth, FDI and other types of international capital flows, FDI and the 
balance of payments and, what is most relevant to the chapters to come, FDI 
and financial stability.  
In short, based on the literature, we conclude that FDI can, albeit not with 
certainty, increase economic growth, in particular FDI in Greenfield investments 
rather than via mergers and acquisitions. But FDI can also negatively affect 
economic growth and, indeed, we find that inward FDI flow in the financial 
sector can harm real GDP growth (see tables 4.14 and 4.15), a result that clings 
well with the literature: surges in FDI in the financial sector have been identified 
with serious fluctuations in the economic growth (Reinhardt & Dell’Erba, 2013). 
Importantly, more FDI may not always be better. FDI is concluded, on the basis 
of the literature, to have a very complicated relationship with other capital flows 
where the former may act as a substitute or a complement to the latter. The 
relationship between the balance of payments and FDI is equally not 
straightforward either. Albeit FDI may prove to be helpful in the times of need 
(of foreign capital) and in the short term, the long term effects of FDI may 
actually be detrimental to the balance of payments in the form of exported 
profits and losses of foreign exchange. And, finally, the relationship between 
FDI and financial stability may be equally complicated. Clearly, it is important to 
have no preconceived and immovable ideas in mind when the effects of FDI on 
the economy are discussed and each case should be carefully addressed and 
investigated. 
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In chapter two, we turn our focus more on FDI in a particular sector: financial 
services. Special interest is given to banking services and banks’ activities in 
the economy are probed into in order to better understand the processes that 
are under the bonnet. FDI in banking and its relationship with economic growth 
and financial development are discussed. It is also argued that FDI in financial 
services has unique effects on the economy due to the centre-like place of the 
financial system in the modern economy. All other economic activity and all 
other sectors in the economy are greatly influenced by FDI in financial services 
because of this. That is unique. Therefore, FDI in financial services must be 
properly understood in order to better comprehend the effects of it on economic 
development. This is especially relevant when it comes to financial stability. 
Chapters one and two are one set of foundations for chapter four. Chapter three 
is the other leg of the foundations for chapter four. In chapter three we turn our 
attention to what financial stability is. Financial stability, it is argued, is important 
for the long-term growth prospects of the economy. To understand it, measure 
it, monitor it and maintain it should therefore be of utmost importance. This, as 
already noted, has indeed got more attention in the post-2008 world than 
before. 
We carry out a short literature review of past attempts to define and measure 
the subject. Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) is the 
centrepiece of the work developed in chapter three. The development of 
financial instability, according to Minsky’s FIH, is retold to gain perspectives of 
how to use the theory to measure financial instability. It is argued that two time 
horizons are needed when attempting to measure financial instability following 
the FIH: a “long term” and a “short term” view. In doing so, an attempt is made 
to focus on the underlying development of fragility to financial structures of units 
in the economy on one hand and the bursts, or outbreaks, of severe financial 
panics on the other. The severity of panics should be more prominent the more 
fragility – in the sense that cash-flow mismatches may form – there is in balance 
sheets of economic units. Some clues provided in chapter four do point in this 
direction. 
In chapter four, we make an attempt to quantitatively follow the development of 
financial instability in two economies, the US and the UK. The impact of 
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financial instability on growth is confirmed to be negative. Insights are provided 
that Minsky was right: structurally fragile financial structures – here measured 
with a high value of Long Term Financial Instability (see chapter 4) – do lead to 
more common outbursts of financial turmoil: this is one of numerous insights 
derived from the Financial Instability Hypothesis. To use a parable given by 
Steven Fazzari: the more stress there is put on the bar, the likelier it is that it will 
break (Fazzari, 2014). The relationship between FDI activities and financial 
instability are neither fully confirmed to be positive nor negative. Nevertheless, 
the results do hint towards there being a negative impact on financial stability 
from FDI activities. Therefore, even if FDI may be more stable than other capital 
flows, as discussed in chapter one, the net effects of FDI activities on financial 
stability may still be negative. 
Chapter five is the last chapter. It offers further empirical work, in addition to the 
work done in chapter four, and this time the focus is certain empirical effects of 
credit expansions which, not only according to Minsky’s FIH but empirically as 
well, are the main reasons for decreasing financial stability. Relying on literature 
and own empirical work based on data from Iceland, a policy recommendation 
is made on how to structure the monetary system such that Minsky’s 
identification of the “policy problem” is recognised (Minsky, 2008, p. 328): “The 
policy problem is to devise institutional structures and measures that attenuate 
the thrust to inflation, unemployment, and slower improvements in the standard 
of living without increasing the likelihood of a deep depression.” Offering a 
theoretical solution, based on empirical investigations, to the policy problem is a 
sound contribution to post-Keynesian economic theory. 
The essence of the institutional structure of the system is to recognise the 
capitalistic economy as a non-equilibrium system: this is the post-Keynesian 
approach to economics. Insights from engineering, control theory to be specific, 
are used to set up automatic governors on banks’ credit creation and credit 
allocation such that the effects of credit expansion are automatically responded 
to. A fail-safe is incorporated in the system in the form of focused deficit 
expenditures by the government in case the governors do not work as 
theorised. The financing of an Employer of Last Resort program is but one 
possible public expenditure policy. The existence of those deficit expenditures 
by the government not only acts as a fail-safe but as an encouragement for the 
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banks, on which the governors of the system are applied, to fulfil the economic 
goals of the nation. The reason is simple: within the system as proposed, deficit 
expenditures impair their ability to expand the credit in the economy, thereby 
hurting their profits. 
Some of the contributions to the literature in this thesis are therefore the 
following: 
- A focused literature review is provided on FDI and its relationship with 
economic growth, other types of capital flows, balance of payments, and 
financial stability. Theoretical arguments are given for why FDI, 
especially in financial services and banking in particular, can be a 
catalyst for financial instability and the transfer of financial shocks. 
- It is argued, on the basis of Minsky’s FIH, that measuring financial 
instability must be done with, at least, two time horizons in mind. 
- Empirical quantification of financial instability is provided with the 
previous point in mind.  
- Using the quantification of financial instability in the previous point, an 
empirical investigation is made into the causal relationship between FDI, 
both in general and in financial services, and financial stability. 
- The effects of FDI on financial stability are not to be expected to be 
strictly positive. Rather, they are negative. This opinion results from the 
empirical work done in chapter 4. 
- The causal relationship from financial instability onto economic growth is 
confirmed to be negative. But high economic growth also spurs fragility to 
build up and instability to form. This empirically supports the insights of 
Minsky in his FIH. 
- Empirical work is provided on the effects of credit expansion in Iceland. 
In short, it is found that credit expansion causes a) the exchange rate to 
fall, b) a deficit on the current account, c) inflation to increase and d) the 
depletion of foreign exchange. 
- A theoretical case is made for institutional changes in the monetary 
system such that, using insights from control theory, credit creation and 
allocation are improved such that the economy reaches and stays close 
to the economic goals of high employment, low inflation and a flexible yet 
stable nominal exchange rate. 
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I, humbly, hope the current work fulfils the standards set for it. I also hope that 
this work is a genuine contribution to economic theory, as it dives into empirical 
investigations and makes a theoretical contribution, the post-Keynesian way, to 
understanding how the “policy problem”, as Minsky described it, can be solved. 
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Chapter 1 - Foreign Direct Investment: a focused literature review 
[Foreign] direct investment is a category of cross-border investment 
associated with a resident in one economy having control or a 
significant degree of influence on the management of an enterprise 
that is resident in another economy... Immediate direct investment 
relationships arise when a direct investor directly owns equity that 
entitles it to 10 percent or more of the voting power in the direct 
investment enterprise...  
International Monetary Fund (2011, pp. 100-101) 
The definition of FDI comes from the International Monetary Fund: 10% 
ownership or more of a foreign party in a domestic corporation. This 
distinguishes FDI from other capital flows such as portfolio flows which are 
“defined as cross-border transactions and positions involving debt or equity 
securities, other than those included in direct investment or reserve assets” 
(International Monetary Fund, 2011).  
It is Multinational Corporations (MNC) – defined by Encyclopædia Britannica 
(Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013)4 as “a corporation that is registered and 
operates in more than one country at a time” – that mainly carry out FDI 
projects which can be, in general terms, either horizontal or vertical.  
Horizontal FDI is when the whole production process is copy-pasted between 
economies; the production facilities are set up with the aim of servicing that 
specific economy. Horizontal FDI is therefore often used instead of exports to 
get past trade barriers such as import tariffs (Helpman, Melitz, & Yeaple, 2003). 
Vertical FDI on the other hand is where the production process is broken down 
in stages between economies. Each economy takes care of only a part of the 
whole production process of the relevant good and the outputs are then 
transported to their final assembling place. Vertical FDI can be used to gain 
from international differences in price of inputs, such as labour (Helpman, 
                                            
4
 The full definition: “multinational corporation (MNC), also called transnational corporation, [is] any 
corporation that is registered and operates in more than one country at a time. Generally 
the corporation has its headquarters in one country and operates wholly or partially owned subsidiaries in 
other countries. Its subsidiaries report to the corporation’s central headquarters.” 
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1984), although the empirical records for this proposition are mixed (Braconier, 
Norbäck, & Urban, 2005). 
The definition of FDI has not always been the same. The 10 percent threshold 
was used in 1993 in the 5th edition of IMF’s Balance of Payments manual:  
A [foreign] direct investment enterprise is defined… as an 
incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which a direct investor, 
who is resident in another economy, owns 10 percent or more of the 
ordinary shares or voting power (for an incorporated enterprise) or 
the equivalent (for an unincorporated enterprise). 
IMF (1993) 
This slowly became the globally accepted version as other global institutions, 
such as the OECD, adopted it. Nevertheless, in 1996, OECD still defined FDI 
without mentioning the 10 per cent benchmark:  
Foreign direct investment reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting 
interest by a resident entity in one economy (‘‘direct investor’’) in an 
entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor (‘‘direct 
investment enterprise’’). The lasting interest implies the existence of 
a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the 
enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the management 
of the enterprise. Direct investment involves both the initial 
transaction between the two entities and all subsequent capital 
transactions between them and among affiliated enterprises, both 
incorporated and unincorporated. 
OECD (1996, pp. 7-8) 
Besides the unavoidable opaqueness of what is a “long-term” relationship – 
Kalecki (1971) held the position that the long-run was “but a slowly changing 
component of a chain of short-period situations; it has no independent entity” – 
the 10% benchmark is debatable as well: why not 5% or any other ratio? Both 
IMF and OECD recognise this issue but “to ensure statistical consistency” it is 
recommended to apply it without exceptions: 
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In practice, effective control or influence may arise in some cases 
with less than these percentages. These definitions should be used 
in all cases, however, for international consistency and to avoid 
subjective judgments. 
International Monetary Fund (2011) 
Foreign direct investment reflects the objective of establishing a 
lasting interest by a resident enterprise in one economy (direct 
investor) in an enterprise (direct investment enterprise) that is 
resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor. The 
lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship 
between the direct investor and the direct investment enterprise and 
a significant degree of influence on the management of the 
enterprise. The direct or indirect ownership of 10% or more of the 
voting power of an enterprise resident in one economy by an investor 
resident in another economy is evidence of such a relationship. 
Some compilers may argue that in some cases an ownership of as 
little as 10% of the voting power may not lead to the exercise of any 
significant influence while on the other hand, an investor may own 
less than 10% but have an effective voice in the management. 
Nevertheless, the recommended methodology does not allow any 
qualification of the 10% threshold and recommends its strict 
application to ensure statistical consistency across countries. 
OECD (2008, pp. 48-49)5 
Even the term “foreign” can be obscure, especially in a world with trade blocs 
and different regulations depending on the origin of the investor. This is perhaps 
best explained by an example.  
In 2010, a Canadian energy company, Magma Energy (today: Alterra Power), 
wanted to make an investment in Iceland by buying an Icelandic energy 
company, HS Orka. The catch was that non-EU companies must follow a 
                                            
5
 The definition of FDI as a long lasting relationship gives rise to the fact that intercompany debt can be 
defined as FDI like equity ownership as long as there is a direct investment relationship between the 
companies in question. Furthermore, affiliate relationships, subsidiaries, and fellow enterprises make their 
mark on the measurement of FDI as well. Those issues will not be covered here. Further information on 
the matter can be found in IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual, 6th edition. 
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different and stricter set of regulations than EU companies when investing in 
Iceland, which is a part of the EU common market through its European 
Economic Area membership. Magma Energy tried to circumvent this obstruction 
by setting up a Swedish holding company, with very limited operations, and 
channel the ownership recording through Sweden, an EU country, rather than 
directly from Canada. It worked: Magma Energy Sweden A.B. has, in 2013, a 
66.6% stake in HS Orka.6 This story is an example of how definitions regarding 
the origin of the investor can be slippery to apply and circumvented in the real 
world.7 
Worldwide foreign direct investment has grown significantly in the last decades. 
In 2012, nearly 1.4 trillion USD flowed out of the world’s economies, first and 
foremost from developed ones.  
Figure 1.1 – Outward Gross FDI Flows (trillion of USD, 2012 prices)8 
 
The main destination of those funds was, for the first time, not the developed 
economies themselves but developing economies.  
                                            
6
 According the company’s website: www.hsorka.is (HS Orka, 2013) 
7
 For an introduction to the “Magma málið“ in Iceland, see e.g. Vísir (2010).  
8
 Data comes from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD. They are 
presented in2012 prices (using CPI of USA (data from OECD, author’s calculations)).. This applies to 
figures 1.1 – 1.4. See also Appendix 3.3. 
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Figure 1.2 – Inward Gross FDI flows (trillion of USD, 2012 prices) 
 
However, although the developing economies were in 2012 the main receivers 
of FDI flows, the gross inward stock of FDI is mainly concentrated in the 
developed economies of the world (figure 1.3).9 In fact, at the end of 2012, 62% 
of the world’s gross FDI was stationed in developed economies. At the same 
time, almost 80% of world’s gross FDI originated from those same economies 
(figure 1.4). 
                                            
9
 On a net basis it is the developing countries that receive the FDI coming from rich developed countries, 
see Appendix 3.3 
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Figure 1.3 – Inward Gross FDI Stock (trillion of USD, 2012 prices) 
 
Figure 1.4 – Outward Gross FDI Stock (trillion of USD, 2012 prices) 
 
Getting into the general characteristics of FDI, Markusen (2002) provides a 
taster list. According to Markusen, there are 13 points to be made: 
1. FDI flows have increased substantially. Consequently, so have the 
stocks of FDI. We see from the figures above that since Markusen’s 
article, this development has continued. 
2. FDI flow has historically been to a large extent between developed 
countries but not from rich countries to poor. This is “The Lucas Paradox” 
(Lucas, 1990). However, Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011) 
show that this “paradox” can be explained by the Linder hypothesis 
(Linder, 1961): like trade, FDI between economies is related to 
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similarities in demand-preference structures which again hinge to a large 
extent on the level of income in the economies. Building on this 
hypothesis, we can speculate that the reason why developing economies 
are getting a larger share of the global FDI flows than before is because 
their demand structure, due to e.g. higher income, has become more 
similar to the one in developed economies where most of the FDI flows 
from. 
3. Pairs of developed countries have commonly large FDI flows between 
them, even within the same industry. 
4. Most of FDI seems to be horizontal although this observation depends on 
how “thick” each stage of the production process of goods and services 
is defined. Thinly defined production stages lead us to conclude that 
many subsidiaries of multinational corporations produce very specific 
inputs for another company in the overall production process (Alfaro & 
Charlton, 2009). In other words, horizontal FDI can be considered 
vertical FDI if the definition of a stage of the production process is made 
slimmer. 
5. Intra-firm trade of MNCs stands behind a “large” share of total world 
trade.10 Intra-firm trade is a larger share of total trade in the case of rich 
economies than poor (Lanz & Miroudot, 2011). FDI and trade do show 
some signs of having a positive causal relationship (Bajo-Rubio & 
Montero-Muñoz, 2001; Dritsaki, Dritsaki, & Adamopoulos, 2004; Xiaming 
Liu, Wang, & Wei, 2001). 
6. In the light of how much of FDI is horizontal, it should not be surprising 
that FDI seems to be positively correlated with labour skills in the host 
economy. This has been empirically confirmed and the human-capital 
variable seems even to have become more important than before 
(Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef, 2001). 
7. Political unrest and instability scare off potential foreign direct investors 
(Schneider & Frey, 1985). Corruption correlates negatively with FDI 
inflows (Habib & Leon, 2002) and democracies attract more FDI than 
autocracies (Guerin & Manzocchi, 2009; Jensen, 2003). Generally, 
uncertainty about political policies and the commitment to property rights 
                                            
10
 According to Lanz and Miroudot (2011) it is unclear how large exactly, both due to lack of data and the 
definition regarding what ownership level is needed to mark a trade transaction as “intra-firm”.  
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has a negative impact on foreign direct investment (Henisz, Mansfield, & 
Glinow, 2010). 
8. FDI is not prominent in all industries. Within the OECD countries, at year 
end 2011, 52% of inward FDI positions were in services, of which 
financial intermediation represented 20% of the total FDI inward 
positions. At the same time, FDI inward positions in agriculture and 
fishing hardly registered (0.1% of total FDI inward positions).11 
9. FDI is prominent in industries 
a. where research and development is important 
b. where demand for skill-abundant labour is high (high ratio of 
professionals compared to total workers) 
c. in which high-tech goods and services are produced and sold. 
This generally applies to any “high-tech” good at all, let it be 
something tangible or not. In this manner e.g. a legally 
complicated good or service may be considered “high-tech” since 
it needs a professional (a lawyer) to be produced. Financial 
services are another example. This underlines point b. 
d. in which a wide range of products is sold and/or produced, with 
high level of advertising. 
10. The value of intangible assets, as a proportion of the value of total 
assets, has the tendency to be higher in the case of firms carrying out 
FDI than in other firms. 
11. FDI can lead to economies-of-scale that might be impossible to reach 
without the FDI activity, e.g. due to a small home market. This improves 
the use of resources but also makes it possible that FDI corporations 
may never become too large since, in that case, larger is better. 
Economies of scale in a multinational corporation can be achieved 
through the common use of e.g. advertising material, product design 
(“blueprint sharing”) and cheaper per-unit cost of input, due to e.g. bulk 
discounts (Davidson, 1980).  
12. Generally, firms seem to have to grow up to a certain size before FDI 
becomes feasible. However, although most FDI, by value, is carried out 
by large MNCs the share of small and medium sized MNCs of total FDI 
                                            
11
 Data from the OECD online database, extracted 31 July 2013. 
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grows significantly when looking at the absolute numbers of FDI projects 
(Fujita, 1995). 
13. Trade barriers can encourage FDI in the sense that companies will 
simply choose to carry out (horizontal) FDI rather than export to the host 
economy (Brainard, 1993). The development of the 90s, perhaps 
especially in Europe with the progress of the single market, when freer 
trade and FDI increased at the same time, does not need to contradict 
this. That apparent paradox can be explained in two ways: non-EU 
countries enter the EU via FDI, and use the receiving country as an 
export hub to the rest of EU, and M&A activity over borders is 
encouraged as trade costs fall (Neary, 2009). 
It is not the plan to discuss here every aspect of the effects of FDI for that would 
be too large a task. For the purpose of this literature review, we will focus on 
merely four themes: FDI and economic growth; FDI and other types of capital 
flows; FDI and the balance of payments; and FDI and financial stability. 
1.1 FDI and economic growth 
One of the arguments for FDI is that it should increase economic growth in the 
host economy (Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, & Sayek, 2010; Mencinger, 
2003) and even be more effective in boosting economic growth than domestic 
investment (Borensztein, De Gregorio, & Lee, 1998). The ways foreign direct 
investment should have positive effects on economic growth in the host 
economy are five, given the “appropriate host-country policies and a basic level 
of development” (OECD, 2002, p. 5): FDI can facilitate the transfer of 
technological advances and know-how; it can increase competition; human 
capital can be improved by it; it can integrate the economy towards the world 
economy; and it canpush for more positive development of firms. 
But FDI can also negatively affect economic growth. Moura and Forte (2009) 
point out that although, as OECD (2002) states, there are five channels through 
which FDI can have positive effects on economic growth there are five channels 
through which FDI can have negative effects on economic growth. Four of them 
are the aforementioned channels mentioned by OECD through which FDI can 
positively affect economic growth, except the positive development of firms. 
Additionally to those four, FDI can also negatively impact the implementation of 
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domestic economic policies. Furthermore, Mencinger’s (2003) study pointed out 
that funds raised through the FDI flows in the form of M&A activity can simply 
be spent on imports. Profit repatriation comes on top of that. This can have a 
negative impact on the balance of payments and, following Thirlwall’s Law, 
have a negative impact on the long term economic growth of the country. 12  
Overall, FDI does seem to have positive effects on GDP growth (Iqbal, Shaikh, 
& Shar, 2010; X. Li & Liu, 2005; Moura & Forte, 2009) although the effects may 
be questioned when it comes to their strength (Alfaro et al., 2010). The effects 
of horizontal FDI are also stronger than vertical FDI (Beugelsdijk, Smeets, & 
Zwinkels, 2008) and developed economies benefit more than developing ones, 
where the effects can be insignificant (ibid). Some evidences show that FDI 
does not always increase economic growth and can even decrease it. In 
chapter 4 of this work (see 4.2.1 Annual data), a negative Granger-causality link 
from FDI to economic growth is established and, rather, the relationship 
between those factors hints that economic growth draws in FDI. To find a 
neutral or a negative relationship between FDI and economic growth is not 
unique. In a recent paper, Ocaya, Ruranga and Kaberuka (2013) used Granger 
causality tests to test the relationship between FDI inflows into Rwanda and 
economic growth. They conclude that they are independent of each other. 
Mencinger (2003) looks at eight Central and East European Countries and finds 
a negative correlation between FDI and economic growth. Eller, Haiss & Steiner 
(2006) were stimulated by Mencinger and deduced that (p. 305) “FDI might not 
have an unlimited positive impact on growth, but presumably there is a certain 
threshold from which on negative effects [such as crowding out of domestic 
investment] dominate”13 – so more is not always better. They find this position 
holds in the case of financial sector FDI in nearly the same set of countries as 
Mencinger looked at.  
The approach to the question seems to matter as well: microeconomic-level 
studies have the tendency, rather than macroeconomic-level ones, to find that 
                                            
12
 Thirwall’s Law links together long term economic growth of a country to world economic growth and 
the income elasticity of demand for the country’s export and imports. Outflow of capital in the form of 
royalties to foreign corporations would decrease the long term economic growth of the country according 
to Thirlwall’s Law. 
13
 The answer to the question whether FDI crowds in or out domestic investment is inconclusive. Some 
research tilts towards the “out” answer (Agosin & Machado, 2005; Mišun & Tomšk, 2002) while other 
answer it with “in” (Mišun & Tomšk, 2002) or that they cannot reject the hypothesis that FDI crowds out 
domestic investment (Kim & Seo, 2003). 
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FDI does not increase economic growth. Furthermore, the micro-level studies 
often find that the acclaimed spillovers between foreign and domestic firms do 
not seem to be prominent (Carkovic & Levine, 2005). Other studies have said 
the supporting evidence for spillovers is “limited” (Görg & Greenaway, 2003) 
and still others have pointed out that the causation link between FDI and 
economic growth may not necessarily be only from the former to the latter: 
economic growth can cause FDI to come into the economy and the causation 
may also run both ways (Chowdhury & Mavrotas, 2006; Xiaohui Liu, Burridge, & 
Sinclair, 2002). 
It seems that it is not enough to simply attract the FDI and expect it to have 
automatically positive effects on economic growth. Blomström, Lipsey & Zejan 
(1992) and Beugelsdijk et al. (2008) found that rich economies benefitted more 
from FDI than poorer ones. Gallagher and Zarsky (2006) simply put it “[t]he 
poorer the country, the more likely is the FDI impact negative.” Borensztein et 
al. (1998) show that FDI can have a negative impact on economic growth in 
countries with low level of human capital, a result they find “puzzling”. 
Somewhat similar effects seem to be in place in Alfaro et al (2010) and Choong 
(2012) where linkages are found between the development of the host 
economy’s financial system and the positive effects of FDI on economic growth: 
economies with more developed financial systems reap more benefits. This can 
help explaining the results of Blomström et al as rich economies have normally 
more developed financial systems.  
Borensztein et al (1998) hold the position that the host economy must have an 
“absorptive capability” when it comes to absorbing the spillovers that the FDI 
brings: the application of more advanced technologies brought over by FDI 
projects calls for a sufficient level of human capital to use them, education being 
an important part of that factor. Therefore, if the capability to absorb the 
spillover – a sufficient quantity of human capital – is not in place, FDI is not 
effective in promoting economic growth. The quality of education matters as 
well (Wang & Sunny Wong, 2011).  
The education factor is not only a determining factor when it comes to the 
absorptive capabilities of the economy but it also stimulates more FDI to come 
into the country (Noorbakhsh et al., 2001). Institutions also matter: the better the 
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institutions – especially property rights – the higher the FDI will be (Ali, Fiess, & 
MacDonald, 2010). The institutional factor can in fact be interpreted as a part of 
the “absorptive” capabilities of the host country and should therefore not be 
surprising in the light of Borenztein et al.  
Also, how the FDI is done matters: the host country’s capital stock does not 
develop as much when the FDI is in the form of mergers and acquisitions 
compared to when a “Greenfield” investment – i.e. when the foreign corporation 
actually constructs the new facilities connected to the FDI instead of buying 
existing ones – takes place (Harms & Méon, 2012). Given that capital stock is 
used in the production of goods and services we could expect economic growth 
to be lower in the wake of an M&A FDI activity compared to a Greenfield FDI 
activity. Wang and Sunny Wong (2009) found similar differences in the impact 
of FDI on economic growth depending on whether it was a Greenfield 
investment or M&A activity: the former encouraged economic growth while the 
latter only did if there was enough human capital in the host country prior to the 
FDI inflow. They also explain the ambiguity regarding the effects of FDI on 
economic growth with the explanation that in most FDI investigations there is no 
distinction made between Greenfield and M&A related FDI. 
Mencinger’s (2003) study somewhat lends support to the view of Wang and 
Wong. According to him, mergers and acquisitions were the most prominent 
form of FDI into the sample of Central and East European Countries he had and 
the money so raised was used to finance imports and consumption rather than 
investment which would have had more positive effects on economic growth. 
On top of the Greenfield/M&A factor comes the question of the sector in which 
the FDI takes place. FDI in primary sectors does not seem to have positive 
effects on economic growth while the opposite is the case when it comes to 
manufacturing. The results for the service sector are unclear (Alfaro, 2003). 
Alfaro looked at 47 countries and later, Cifticioglu, Fethi and Begovic (2007) 
found supporting evidences for Alfaro’s view when they looked at nine CEE 
countries. They held the view that Alforo’s results were worth taking “seriously”. 
1.1.1 Technological spillovers and growth  
Technological spillovers and know-how is often quoted as one of the positive 
side effects of FDI as it should improve economic growth. The way this should 
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happen is through quicker innovation and general improvements in the rate of 
development. Eaton and Kortum (1996) show, using a growth accounting 
approach, that within a sample of OECD countries most of innovation came 
from only three of them: USA, Japan and Germany. FDI, perhaps especially 
from these countries, should increase the level of technology in the host 
economy. These technological spillover effects have been empirically confirmed 
although there is a lack of consensus on how strong they really are and what 
determines them (Blomström, Globerman, & Kokko, 1999; Crespo & Fontoura, 
2007). 
But, according to Moura and Forte, technological spillovers can negatively affect 
growth through the host country becoming dependent on technologies 
introduced by the foreign firm. This dependency is linked to the fact that a 
“substantial” part of world’s research and development is done by international 
corporations (Borensztein et al., 1998). An example is the payment of royalties 
from the host economy to the foreign firm for the use of their technology as 
Moura and Forte mention. This would negatively affect the balance of payments 
and therefore economic growth through Thirwall’s Law. 
1.1.2 Increased competition and economic growth 
Dragging FDI into an industry with a low level of competition can be an incentive 
for other firms in the industry to innovate faster and lead to improved allocation 
of resources. Together it can lead to positive effects on economic growth due to 
FDI-fuelled competition (Fortanier, 2007).14 
On the other hand, increased competition from a large and significantly more 
efficient international corporation can negatively affect economic growth through 
bankruptcies of domestic firms. Bankruptcies of domestic firms lead again to a 
more concentrated industry where the MNC dominates, possibly even 
monopolising the host economy’s market. That sort of monopolisation can lead 
again to economic rents, deterioration in the allocation of resources and a slow-
down the rate of competition-induced innovation (Fortanier, 2007). Somewhat 
                                            
14
 Competition can increase total factor productivity, which would increase growth (endogenous growth 
theory). Werner (2005), who is a skeptic towards foreign investments in general, including FDI, and 
states that they are “usually... unnecessary” (p. 217), traces the ultimate reason for economic growth to 
credit creation. 
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contradictory, the entry of a foreign firm into the market can therefore, in the 
end, decrease the level of competition in the market.  
However, the FDI activity of a foreign company in a particular industry can 
increase competition, and general development, in other industries in the host 
economy as well (Markusen & Venables, 1999). The way this can happen is 
through “backward” and “forward” linkages with other industries. Backward links 
act through any inputs that the FDI-industry needs, creating incentives for 
(domestic and foreign) firms to enter and develop the industry that produces 
that input. The forward link works if the output of the FDI industry is used as an 
input in another. The increased competition in the FDI industry and potential 
improvement of the produced good lowers the price and improves the quality of 
any goods that use it as an input.   
Also, the presence of foreign firms may not only bring previously nonexistent 
know-how, which can spur growth of domestic firms in that same industry 
(Mottaleb & Sonobe, 2011), but also be supportive in providing better inputs, 
which were previously unavailable or substandard, to that industry and even 
others (Lin, 2012).  Focusing on the FDI-receiving industry is therefore not 
enough when the competition effects of FDI on economic growth are analysed.  
1.1.3 Labour force and economic growth 
FDI is one of the channels that can improve the level of human capital in the 
host economy, again through spillovers and on-the-job training (Ozturk, 2007). 
Improving the human capital level, FDI can therefore boost economic growth. 
The way FDI can have a negative impact on economic growth through the 
labour force is through the higher use of technology in FDI performing firms 
(Moura & Forte, 2009). Such usage of technology can lead to layoffs, having 
potential negative impact on overall demand in the economy as wage income 
can decrease. Lack of demand can again lead to lower economic growth. The 
possible positive spillovers that FDI performers have on the level of human 
capital in the host economy are therefore potentially counterweighted by this 
decrement in demand for labour. 
However, weighing against this come the effects on demand for labour if the 
FDI performer is carrying out investments in the economy, especially those that 
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create new real-capital. Often, FDI is found to have a positive impact on 
employment levels (Subramaniam, 2008) although its impact on job creation 
cannot be taken for certain (Seyf, 2000). Furthermore, wages in foreign-owned 
companies have been found to be higher than in domestic firms (Griffith & 
Simpson, 2003) although it is not certain that there is a causal relationship 
between higher wages and a foreign ownership, i.e. there may be correlation 
but causality is unclear (Martins, 2004).  
1.1.4 FDI, trade and economic growth 
FDI and trade can be either substitutes or complements. Vertical FDI where 
production of the good is split into stages is likely to stimulate trade while 
horizontal FDI is more likely to be a substitute for trade (Markusen & Maskus, 
2001). However, Neary (2009) points out that (horizontal) FDI and trade can go 
together if liberalization within trade blocs draws outside companies to set up an 
affiliate in only one area of the trade bloc and export to the rest of it from there. 
Potential chances for increased economies of scale, resulting from a larger 
market as trade costs are eliminated, can also spur M&A activity across borders 
as companies seize new opportunities in sharing technologies and 
strengthening their place in the market. Collie (2011) uses a Cournot duopoly 
model to explain how trade liberalisation and increased FDI can increase at the 
same time.  Horizontal FDI and trade are therefore not necessarily substitutes. 
Increased trade caused by FDI can have a positive impact on economic growth 
(Makki & Somwaru, 2004). But this channel can also negatively affect economic 
growth. A shock in one economy can translate into a lack of demand for another 
country’s exports or higher price of imports, leading to lower and/or more 
variable economic growth than before. 
However, even if this impact is not unrealistic in some short-term periods, the 
long-term effects of FDI on economic growth through the integration into the 
international economy seem to be positive in many cases  (Dritsaki et al., 2004; 
Makki & Somwaru, 2004; Zhang, 2001a) although it strengthens the positive 
effect on economic growth through trade when export-oriented FDI is 
encouraged and the trade regime liberalised in general and not only in the FDI-
receiving industry (Zhang, 2001a). 
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1.1.5 Domestic policies and economic growth 
Finally, there is the possible negative impact FDI can have on the execution of 
domestic economic policies and so economic growth. OECD (2002, p. 6) writes 
that “some host country authorities perceive an increasing dependence on 
internationally operating enterprises as representing a loss of political 
sovereignty.” The fact of the matter is that foreign firms invest considerable time 
and effort in influencing regulations and policies in the host economies, often 
reaping some harvest for their struggles (Desbordes & Vauday, 2007; Huang, 
2005). Foreign firms holding a large stock of FDI in a country can not only gain 
control over significant share of the local assets but also jobs, thereby gaining 
political power to influence national policies towards their aims (Zhang, 2001b). 
An example of this problem has developed in Iceland where heavy-industries, 
most notably foreign-owned aluminium smelters, consume 80% of all produced 
electricity in the country.15 The prominent role of the aluminium companies (Rio 
Tinto Alcan, Alcoa and Century Aluminum) has put them in a monopsonist 
position, making it possible for them to influence the price of electricity 
downwards. This hurts the largest energy company in Iceland, state-owned 
Landsvirkjun, by lowering its profits. This also puts Landsvirkjun and the 
Icelandic government – there is a government guarantee on Landsvirkjun – in a 
tough negotiation position as Landsvirkjun has entered into debts to build up the 
energy production facilities. The aluminium companies can therefore have 
serious influence on the national policies of the Icelandic state, possibly running 
against national interests – such as preserving the environment – and economic 
growth. 
1.1.6 Attracting FDI 
Despite the perhaps uncertain benefits of attracting FDI, numerous countries 
have actively done so (Hanson, 2001). Tax concessions – similar terms include 
“tax incentives”, “investment incentives” and “tax holidays” – are one way of 
doing so. Others are e.g. image building, investor facilitation and servicing, 
investment generation and policy advocacy (Rajan, 2004).  
                                            
15
 On the per-capita scale, Iceland is the largest electricity manufacturer in the world: 53,000 kWh 
compared to 26,000kWh in the case of #2, Norway (author’s calculations, based on CIA World Factbook 
data). 
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African countries have used tax holidays to attract the FDI while Western 
European countries have instead allowed faster depreciation of capital or 
investment allowances (Morisset & Pirnia, 2000). The argument is, of course, to 
attract FDI with offers of a low tax burden, or other attractors, and hope that the 
positive impact of the FDI will outweigh any potential costs in offering such 
preferential policies. 
Despite its initial attractiveness, this argument seems to have limited support in 
practice. True, lower taxes seem to attract FDI (de Mooij & Ederveen, 2003) 
although the effects are stronger in the case of developed countries than in 
developing ones (Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez, & Zhang, 2011). But the 
costs are high enough to make it questionable whether this strategy should be 
adopted. Blomström and Kokko (2003) point out, as previously discussed, that 
since the positive spillovers of FDI do not happen automatically, then it is not an 
efficient way to improve national welfare to naively divert public policies only 
towards attracting foreign firms: the host economy must be able to reap the 
whole benefits, such as by having a high enough level of human capital 
(“absorptive capacity”). The cost of such attractions can indeed be significant. In 
the case of Eastern Caribbean Countries, the tax concessions ranged between 
9.5% to 16% of GDP during the 1996-2000 period (Chai & Goyal, 2008). Chai 
and Goyal therefore ask if such a high cost of tax concessions is worth it, 
proposing rather pushing for better infrastructure and labour productivity.  
Hanson (2001, p. 14) argues that “the only justification for favouring FDI [with 
e.g. tax concessions]... is the existence of market failure that is specific to 
multinational production.” Such market failures could perhaps be the positive 
spillovers that FDI would bring but Hanson (p. 2) also notes that  
[s]pillovers associated with FDI are supported by casual evidence 
from many countries, but their existence and magnitude are... difficult 
to establish empirically. Indeed, micro evidence from large samples 
of manufacturing plants in developing countries fails to support the 
existence of positive productivity spillovers related to FDI. 
Therefore, favouring FDI with tax concessions is debatable and it is perhaps 
more appropriate to emphasise building up fundamentals (education, 
infrastructure, legal framework, etc.) that will benefit all industries rather than 
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focus solely on a single one or a set of specific investments (Görg & 
Greenaway, 2003). 
Overall, based on the review done here, we can cautiously conclude that FDI 
does seem to have somewhat positive effects on economic growth. However, 
the positive effects are more prominent in richer countries where “absorptive” 
capabilities of the economy are larger (Blomström et al., 1992; Borensztein et 
al., 1998; Gallagher & Zarsky, 2006), where the financial system is more 
developed (Alfaro et al., 2010; Choong, 2012), when the FDI takes place up to a 
certain degree (Eller et al., 2006) and when it is in the form of Greenfield 
investments rather than M&A activity (Harms & Méon, 2012) although a high 
level of human capital can improve the positive effects of M&A FDI (Wang & 
Sunny Wong, 2009). Using tax concessions to attract FDI may work (de Mooij & 
Ederveen, 2003) but such policies can be fruitless or suboptimal (Blomström & 
Kokko, 2003; Görg & Greenaway, 2003). Furthermore, the possible influence of 
FDI performing firms on national policies (such as taxation and regulation) must 
be kept in mind (Desbordes & Vauday, 2007). 
1.2 FDI and other types of capital flows 
An important issue on foreign direct investment is its connection to portfolio 
flows and other flows, international bank-lending in particular, between 
economies. One stance of the literature argues that FDI and other capital flows 
are substitutes for each other. The other argues differently: FDI and other 
capital flows are complementary to each other.  
This difference matters for FDI flows are normally considered less volatile than 
portfolio-type flows. Volatile international capital flows that may leave the 
country at the first sign of economic problems will only intensify them; capital 
flows that are procyclical instead of countercyclical can increase economic 
instability (see e.g. Stiglitz (2000)). So if “cold” FDI flows act as substitutes for 
“hot” flows, then we can argue that macro-wide financial structures, where FDI 
stocks are relatively prominent, are more stable than when the balance sheets 
are ripe with volatile portfolio-flows stock. Indeed, Frankel and Rose (1996) note 
that currency crashes are less likely when the ratio of FDI to debt is high, 
underlining the importance of the substitutes/complements issue. Just as 
importantly, if FDI acts as a stimulus for portfolio flows, then it can possibly have 
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a negative impact on the overall stability of the economy even if the FDI stock 
itself may be illiquid and FDI flows possibly even countercyclical, thereby 
smoothing out the performance of the economy. 
Claessens, Dooley & Warner (1995) look at the interaction between (net) “long 
term”,  “short term”, portfolio equity and FDI flows in the case of some 
developed and developing countries.16 They find that the correlation between 
the flows is negative and comment (p. 172) that “[different] capital flows are... 
highly substitutable.” 
Ruffin and Rassekh (1986) make an empirical test on the hypothesis that FDI 
flows and portfolio flows are substitutes. They use US data. Their conclusion is 
“that every dollar of U.S. FDI results in one less dollar being invested in foreign 
portfolio investment. Thus, the way [multinational corporations] finance their 
operations may be irrelevant to the net flow of capital between countries.” 
(Ruffin & Rassekh, 1986, p. 1126). Ruffin’s and Rassekh’s methodology can be 
questioned though as they assume the US economy is a small economy, 
allowing them to treat foreign (i.e. non-US) interest rates as exogenous in their 
model and not under any influence of US capital flows. Although they point out 
(p. 1128) that US net capital outflow is “about 1 or 2 percent of the total world 
capital market” it is questionable to assume that the world’s largest economy is 
“small”.17 But Werner (1994) looks at Japanese data and finds support for the 
hypothesis of substitution between indirect foreign investment and direct foreign 
investment as well. 
Looking from the institutional point of view, one can argue that portfolio flows 
and FDI flows should be substitutes, especially in the case of a corrupt 
receiving country. Papaioannou (2009) points out that corrupt countries have 
problems attracting FDI which means that they will have to rely on international 
(bank) lending instead. This observation can be connected to the “Original Sin” 
problem of developing countries. In this case, one can argue that if the 
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 Their definitions of “short-term” and “long-term” flows are based on IMF classifications. Short-term 
flows: change in bank deposit claims, change in bank deposit liabilities, change in other short-term 
claims, change in other short-term liabilities, change in short-term official claims, change in official 
liabilities. Long-term flows are everything else, save FDI and portfolio equity. Errors and omissions are 
ignored. 
17
 Magee, Yoo, Choi & Lee (2007) would probably disagree as they say that the US economy is not a 
large country in world trade since its market share is not high enough and it cannot change world prices 
by applying protection. 
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countries were not as corrupt as they are, they would be able to attract FDI 
instead of portfolio flows which often will be directed through the nation’s 
banking system – especially if the banks have an explicit government 
guarantee, making it safer for international investors to lend to the banks. Wei 
and Wu (2001, p. 20) find that “corruption in a capital-importing country tends to 
tilt the composition of its capital inflow away from foreign direct investments and 
towards foreign banks loans.” Therefore, decreasing corruption and 
consequently, hopefully, improving the inflow of FDI can lessen the need for 
foreign lending. In that case, FDI flows and portfolio flows could be considered 
substitutes. One must however contrast Wei and Wu’s result with Albuquerque 
(2003) but he notes that economies where the government has a low credit 
rating, which is negatively correlated with corruption (Depken & Lafountain, 
2006), have a higher share of FDI in their capital inflows than economies with a 
high credit rating, the reason being that due to intangibility of some FDI assets, 
such as human capital, they are more alienable than other assets, making them 
harder to expropriate. This gives FDI assets a lower default premium, making 
them the preferred type of capital flow when entering a lowly rated country. 
Albuquerque’s conclusion can be interpreted as the different flows being 
substitutes, at least for these lowly rated countries, but he comments (p. 380) 
that FDI is simply “all that they can get.” The implication seems to be that if a 
country’s credit rating is improved, it will receive more of both flows although 
FDI’s share of total inflows drops as their credit rating improves. 
Finally, there is the “information-based trade off” (I. Goldstein & Razin, 2006) 
between investing in an enterprise via direct investment or portfolio investment. 
If an investor decides to invest in a company via a direct investment link (FDI) 
then (s)he will acquire superior information about the company, information that 
may not be publicly available or simultaneously available to other investors. But 
this knowledge comes with a cost according to Goldstein and Razin: an investor 
that holds an FDI investment in a company risks running into a “lemon” 
problem: if the investor does not have full information about the company when 
(s)he decides to acquire an FDI-share in it, (s)he risks that the company is a 
lemon and if the investor wants then to resell the company after having bought it 
in the first place, the market realises it is a lemon and demands a large cut in 
the price. Minimising this information problem is costly. A larger share of the 
46 
company – an FDI-share rather than a smaller portfolio share (less than 10% of 
equity) – is also less liquid so the investment cannot be easily disinvested if the 
investor changes his mind. Therefore, the investor may in the beginning decide 
not to enter the company as a direct investor but merely via a portfolio 
investment. In this respect, the FDI and the portfolio investment are substitutes 
as well.  
But the substitution-story may not be so robust in all cases. Dasgupta and 
Ratha (2000) looked at developing countries and found that private portfolio 
flows, which they define (p. 12) “as the sum of commercial bank loans, bond 
financing from private creditors and private equity flows”, increased along with 
FDI flows into the economies. This can hardly be interpreted in favour of the 
“substitutes” view but it does not reject it either since there may be another 
factor that is driving FDI and other capital flows at the same time.18  
Dasgupta and Ratha explained why the FDI flows had a positive impact on the 
portfolio flow by simply pointing out (p. 13) that “FDI adds to the liquidity of the 
[financial] system in the short-term and improves the medium-term outlook on a 
particular sector or the economy as a whole.” Other authors have highlighted 
this conclusion of Dasgupta and Ratha as well (Bird & Rajan, 2002). A study 
conducted by the United Nations found that foreign credit was positively 
connected to foreign direct investment in the case of Central and Eastern 
Europe countries (Krkoska, 2002). Bosworth and Collins (1999)19 reach the 
“complements” conclusion as well, although their conclusions can be scrutinised 
by the fact that the positive correlation coefficients between FDI flows and 
portfolio flows are statistically insignificant (Bird & Rajan, 2002).  
It seems then that international private portfolio flows can gravitate towards the 
FDI receiving economy, simply because it is doing better: FDI flows stop being, 
as Albuquerque would perhaps phrase it, “all that they can get.” All this rhymes 
well with a Keynesian “Beauty Contest” basis of foreign capital flows: 
international capital flows follow each other, constantly seeking “the prettiest girl 
in the paper”. 
                                            
18
 Werner (2005) identifies credit creation as a causal factor of both. See also, in relation to this, Kouri 
and Porter (1974). 
19
 Comment from Reinhart 
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Then there is the final thought that there need not be any certain correlation 
between the flows, i.e. they need not be either complementary all the time nor 
substitutes all the time. Reinhart (1999) points out that if it is the case that 
different types of capital flows respond differently to factors, they need not co-
vary at all. This basically means that any possible correlation, negative or not, 
between different types of capital flow can perhaps be a “spurious regression” 
and may not necessarily be a stable relationship. A reason for this possible 
neutrality, according to Reinhart, can be the fact that portfolio flows are 
influenced by factors such as international interest rates while FDI flows are not 
so much, the reason being that FDI is more focused on economic fundamentals 
than portfolio flows.20 Therefore, portfolio flows can move for different reasons 
than FDI flows and not be affected by the FDI flows themselves. The argument 
goes the other way around as well; FDI flows may not be influenced by portfolio 
flows, either positively or negatively. In this regard though, there have been 
some arguments for the case that interest rates of the home region can affect 
the FDI flows from it: higher rates of interest in the US and in Europe reduce the 
outward FDI from these areas (Levy Yeyati, Panizza, & Stein, 2007). So we 
cannot argue that FDI flows are not affected at all by international interest rates. 
With this in mind, we need to remember the difficulty of correctly identifying 
capital flows. Bird and Rajan (2002) highlight that the issue whether a capital 
flow is of FDI nature or not is not clear cut. Furthermore, in the case of 
Malaysia, they explain how FDI flows can turn into portfolio flows later: “bolted 
down” equipment, financed with pre-years’ FDI inflow, can be used as collateral 
in the host-economy financial market and the credit so raised moved out of the 
country, registering as portfolio flows on the way out. Albuquerque (2003) draws 
attention to this as well, reminding us that capital flows can change labels. It is 
interesting to connect this story to that told by Werner (1994), previously 
mentioned above, where he connects land-collateralised bank loans in Japan 
and the outflow of capital. 
Besides the problem of identifying the label of capital flows, the issue of 
“complements-or-substitutes” between FDI flows and other capital flows is 
                                            
20
 Fernández-Arias (1996) estimates, looking at some emerging and developing countries, that 86% of 
portfolio flows are explained by moves in foreign and not domestic interest rates, a phenomenon he calls 
“push” influence. Montiel and Reinhart (1999) conclude that interest rates have no statistical significance 
in determining FDI flows. 
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unresolved. Statistically, “substitutes” seems to come out on top. It is perhaps 
possible to reconcile the two views to some extent by looking at the problem 
from a dynamic point of view.  
It might be possible to reconcile the two views above by arguing that FDI flows 
and portfolio flows, in their widest sense and including bank loans, are 
complements in the short run but substitutes in the long. Bandwagon effects 
and herd behaviour can be influential factors in the short run, explaining why 
FDI flows and portfolio flows can be complements rather than substitutes while 
investors are under the spell of the “beauty contest”. However, more sober 
thinking may compel investors to favour one flow over the other.21 The more 
favoured flow can then become dominant and the capital needs of the economy 
will be dominantly serviced by that type of inflow alone. This can apply in the 
long run. In this context, it is interesting to see that in 1993-1994 portfolio flows 
were a very prominent share of the private capital flowing into Latin America. 
But during 1999-2001, the capital inflow was mainly in the form of FDI (Levy 
Yeyati et al., 2007): FDI flows had substituted portfolio flows as time passed.  
It is also possible that FDI flows continue based on long-term possibilities of the 
economy while portfolio flows are more based on short-term perspectives. 
Although in some periods the long-term possibilities and the short-term 
perspectives may go hand in hand, leading to a high correlation between 
inflows of FDI and other types of capital, giving the impression that the flows are 
complementary to each other, the situation can change such that short-term 
perspectives turn sour and portfolio flows turn around. However, long-term 
possibilities can still be in order, staying attractive for FDI to continue to flow in. 
Therefore, the substitutes-complements effects between FDI and other types of 
flows may turn out to be time-period dependent. 
Those propositions – that FDI flows and portfolio flows can either be 
complements in the short run but substitutes in the long run or complements in 
one time period but substitutes in the next – need however further research 
which is outside the scope of this text.  
                                            
21
 This potential switching behaviour is not impossible and has been found in other economics related 
issues: Frankel and Froot (1987) found that the JPY/USD exchange rate was under bandwagon effects in 
the short run but the contrary in the long run.  
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1.3 FDI and the balance of payments 
The relationship between FDI, the balance of payments and capital flows is not 
straightforward. 
The reasons for this are mainly two. First of all, although FDI inflow shows up 
on the financial account of the balance of payments, it is not necessarily true 
that an actual capital flow takes place. The reason is that the FDI can be 
financed with domestic funds from within the host economy itself.22  
Second, FDI is often mentioned as a good way of financing a current account 
deficit as such financing makes the current account deficit more sustainable 
(Fischer, 1997; Roubini & Wachtel, 1999) and less open to a “sudden-stop” 
crises of inflow of capital (Calvo, 1998). But FDI can in fact worsen the current 
account deficit in the long-run through repatriation of profits. This is so 
especially if the original FDI was financed with host-economy funds, possibly 
leading to the situation where there is only outflow of capital (in the form of 
repatriation of profits) from the host economy. 
1.3.1 The origin of funds for FDI 
MNCs have more possibilities in financing their investment than domestic 
corporations as they can raise funds in both the host and the home economy 
(Marin & Schnitzer, 2011).23 MNCs may also have better access to international 
capital markets which can lower their cost of raising capital compared to purely 
domestic firms. They can furthermore use internal debt between the mother 
company and its subsidiaries to make use of possible tax incentives and 
opportunities (Desai, Foley, & Hines, 2004). The choice of how to finance the 
FDI project is influenced by those factors.  
An early observation that domestic savings seemed to be highly connected to 
total domestic investment, carried out by domestic and foreign investors alike, 
was made by Feldstein and Horioka (1980). Their point – there is a high positive 
correlation between domestic savings and domestic investment – raises the 
impression that domestic savings are used by investors to invest in that 
economy rather than transporting the funds between economies. Feldstein 
(2000) states that FDI is “often” financed from the host economy. Marin and 
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 This, obviously, links to the substitution thesis of international capital flows. 
23
 See previous footnote.  
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Schnitzer (2011) argue that FDI is “frequently” financed from the host economy. 
They also point out that if the FDI is financed from within the host economy, it 
can lead to portfolio inflows from other multinational investors into the economy, 
the reason being that the portfolio inflows are used to buy host-economy issued 
financial instruments used to locally finance the FDI. This can then lead to net 
capital inflow in the form of more liquid portfolio flows even though those 
portfolio flows are used to finance an FDI. The actual capital flow is however not 
in the form of FDI although the investment is. This relates to Werner’s (1994) 
point that FDI in a country may not mean that the capital flow, if it takes place in 
the first place, towards that economy is of the same type as well since the FDI 
may be financed with local funds. If that is the case, which is “often” or 
“frequently”, there is FDI in place but not necessarily any capital flow. 
The effects of foreign firms raising the funds in the host economy can be 
negative for other firms. Harrison and McMillan (2003), using data from the 
Ivory Coast, report that if foreign direct investors rest heavily on the domestic 
banking sector it can have a negative impact on the borrowing constraints of 
other companies. But that may not always be so. Harrison, Love, and McMillan 
(2004), looking at 39 countries, estimated that FDI inflows lessen the financing 
constraint for other firms in the host economy. That paper, however, does not 
take into the account where the funds are raised. 
The topic of why MNCs choose one economy as the source of financing rather 
than another has been probed into. Desai et al. (2004) find that external 
financing, rather than internal financing from the mother company, is less used 
when the affiliate is stationed in an economy with weak creditor rights or 
underdeveloped capital markets. Hooper (2004), looking at US and UK 
multinationals, shows that MNCs prefer to use host-economy debt in case of 
high political risk in the host economy. In the case of high political risk, financing 
is sought both from host-economy’s banks and governments, practically to get 
them “on board” the FDI project. The thought behind such financing, one is 
inclined to guess, is to lessen the risk that the FDI assets will be expropriated 
(because they are already on board it through their debt financing), which has 
happened in both democracies and autocracies (Q. Li, 2009), in case of political 
turmoil. Another part of the reason seems to be that in order to lessen exchange 
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rate risk MNCs try to borrow in the weak currency of a high political-risk country, 
i.e. the host economy.  
It is certainly worth mentioning Marin and Schnitzer (2011) in this respect. First, 
they concluded that high exchange rate risk increases the use of local bank 
credit. Second, FDI tends to call for an actual capital flow between economies – 
FDI is not financed from the host economy – whenever managerial problems in 
the host economy are low. If corruption or political risks are high, (local) bank 
credit is used to incentivise the manager to show all returns of the investment 
project rather than funnel some of them for himself. The reason is that in that 
case, the local bank must be repaid the credit, or it will liquidate the investment 
– and the manager of the FDI project loses his job. Therefore, the manager has 
the incentive to show all returns of the FDI rather than funnelling them to his 
own pocket. The lesson is that in order to attract actual FDI-capital flow into the 
economy corruption of managers and political risk should be low.  
An empirical example even exists for the possibility of the financing of an M&A-
type FDI not only coming from the host economy but from the operations of the 
target corporation itself.  
In 2009, the Canadian firm Magma Energy Corp. (today: Alterra Power) bought 
a 32% share in HS Orka in Iceland (through a subsidiary in Sweden, Magma 
Energy Sweden A/S) off Reykjavik Energy. The total price of this FDI was 12.3 
billion ISK (100 million USD) and Magma paid 70% of the investment with a 
single-payment bond. The bond was issued by Magma Energy Sweden A/S and 
transferred into the ownership of Reykjavik Energy, the seller of the share. The 
collateral of the bond was the stock in HS Orka itself, i.e. the 32% share that 
was changing hands. 
In this case, no funds were raised for this part of the total payment. The 
ownership of HS Orka was transferred off the books of Reykjavik Energy onto 
the books of Magma Energy Sweden and instead, Reykjavik Energy got 3.7 
billion ISK in cash and held a single-payment bond issued by Magma Energy 
Sweden.  
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Of course, Magma Energy Sweden could essentially finance the cost of the 
bond to a large extent with the profits of HS Orka itself; accumulated profits of 
HS Orka 2009-2012 amounted to 7.3 billion ISK.24  
Only a small part of these profits were paid out in dividends25 however but this 
example serves the purpose of showing the possibility of financing the cost of 
FDI with the operations of the target company itself, especially since most of the 
contractual cash flows of the bond have not matured and there is still time to 
extract profits out of the company to be used to service the cost of the original 
FDI.26 
1.3.2 The effects on the balance of payments 
We have seen that FDI is claimed to be the most advantageous way of 
financing a current account deficit. There exists the possibility however that the 
net effects of FDI on net receipts of foreign funds can be negative: although the 
money can flow into the economy through the capital account in the balance of 
payments they can later flow out through the current account.  
The reason is not only repatriation of profits but the possible impact the FDI can 
have on the nature of international trade: if the FDI is into an export industry, it 
is less likely that the net effects on the net receipts of foreign funds will be 
negative than if the FDI is of the horizontal type, the reason being that profits 
from horizontal non-export FDI can be made locally but siphoned out of the 
economy (Brouthers, Werner, & Wilkinson, 1996). The risk of negative net 
impacts on the receipts of foreign funds is also prominent if the FDI is financed 
from the host economy itself, calling for no net capital flows through the capital 
account in the beginning. Mencinger (2008) asserts that the outflow of capital 
can be accelerated by the entry of an MNC to an economy but claims at the 
same time that sudden stops in the inflow of FDI can cause an exchange rate 
crisis. He therefore calls FDI inflows “addictive”. Levy Yeyati et al. (2007) point 
out that since the surge in FDI flows has been so “spectacular”, a sudden stop 
in FDI inflow can have “consequences” for receiving emerging markets and their 
finances. 
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 According to company records.  
25
 2013 was the only year HS Orka paid out a dividend since 2009, 150 million ISK in total. 
26
 Some sources for the FDI of Magma in HS Orka: (Gunnarsson, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c) 
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The net effects of FDI on the balance of payments are an empirical issue for 
theoretically, the balance of net receipts of foreign funds can tilt both ways. 
Studies focusing on the overall net effects of FDI on the net receipts of foreign 
funds seem to be scant.27 Studies focusing on the effect of FDI on the current 
account are more numerous however and many of them reach either an 
inconclusive or a negative conclusion. 
Hailu (2010) finds that FDI in some African countries28 has a negative impact on 
the balance of trade, which is a “major component” of the current account. N. 
Campos and Leal (2013), looking at Brazil, reach inconclusive results regarding 
the net effects of FDI on the trade balance: FDI inflow boosts both export and 
imports in the short run – foreign-owned exporters can have the need to import 
inputs – but only exports in the long run. The net effects on the trade balance 
are uncertain. In India, inward FDI has a negative impact on the current account 
(Sarode, 2012). And in the case of China, Zhang and Song (2001) find that 
inward FDI boosted China’s net exports. 
The inflow of FDI into the economy can also affect the current account through 
the exchange rate. FDI inflow, like general inflow of capital, strengthens the 
exchange rate and can divert domestic spending towards imports rather than 
domestic production. This would lead to negative impacts on the current 
account. 
1.4 FDI and financial stability 
The connection between financial stability and FDI has conventionally been 
investigated in relation to capital flows and their nature. The reason why is that 
financial crises have often been connected with capital flows and their reversals 
(Fernández-Arias & Hausmann, 2000). The usual view is that since FDI flows 
are “cold” the risk of sudden flow reversals leading to balance-of-payments 
crisis is lower than in the case of “hotter” portfolio flows. Sudden hot money 
movements are also supposedly due to interest rate differences and expected 
exchange rate changes while FDI is more based on long-term profit incentives 
(Sarno & Taylor, 1999). Therefore, the conventional view is that if a country 
                                            
27
 One study claimed the overall effects of FDI on balance of payments and the earnings of foreign 
exchange to be negative (Gallagher & Zarsky, 2006). 
28
 Burundi, Cameron, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Tunisia, Togo, Uganda and Zambia.  
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wants to reduce the financial instability arising from capital flows reversals, FDI 
should be increased as a share of total capital inflows (Bird & Rajan, 2002). 
Furthermore, if a country is running current account deficits, they should be 
financed with FDI inflows rather than portfolio inflows due to the former’s 
relative irreversibility. We should, however, remember that financing the current 
account with FDI inflows can be “addictive” (Mencinger, 2008). 
Empirically, FDI flows have been shown to be more stable than other flows. 
Lipsay (2001) looked at three famous financial crises (Latin America in 1982, 
Mexico’s Tequila Crisis in 1994 and East Asia’s problems in 1997) and found 
that inflows of direct investments had been more stable than portfolio or other 
types of inflows. Albuquerque (2003) has similar results and Wei (2006) finds 
out that FDI flows (as a ratio of GDP) are less volatile than bank loans (as a 
ratio of GDP), especially in emerging markets.  
The apparent difference in the volatility between FDI flows and portfolio flows 
can be explained by investment irreversibility. FDI – especially Greenfield 
investments – is fixed (real capital assets), has sunken costs that call for further 
inflow of funds to finish the investment (a half-finished manufacturing site is 
practically useless and worthless except for scrap) and cannot be picked up and 
taken out of the country. In the meanwhile, portfolio flows can be more easily 
liquidated, as they are often in the form of marketable financial assets, and the 
proceeds taken out of the economy. Even a psychological argument can be put 
forward for why FDI flows are more stable than portfolio flows. It is well known 
that humans suffer from “sunk cost effects” which can be described as the 
tendency to continue an investment which money, time and effort has been put 
into although new information reveal the investment not to be as profitable as 
previously assumed – and even not profitable. This has also been called “to 
throw good money after bad” symptom (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Garland, 1990; 
Navarro & Fantino, 2005). An FDI performing investor which experiences a 
financial crisis or a general deterioration in the investment outlook is subject to 
the sunk cost effects. This is so especially if the FDI is in a Greenfield 
investment project which is only partially finished when the crisis happens and 
new information about the profitability of the investment and the macro 
environment are revealed. Rather than cutting his losses and stopping the 
investment – rationally thinking on the margin – the FDI investor can decide, 
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perhaps wrongfully and under the spell of sunk cost effects, to continue the 
investment. The FDI inflow therefore continues despite the weakened outlook. 
In the meanwhile, the portfolio investor leaves the economy, turning his 
previous inflow into an outflow. All this can have the effects of FDI flows coming 
out as a more stable capital flow than other more marketable investments that 
are not as strongly influenced by the sunk cost effects.29 
On the connection between FDI flows and financial stability, we have already 
mentioned Frankel and Rose (1996) and their finding, looking at emerging 
markets, that there is a less risk of a capital-flow induced crisis if the FDI is 
larger as a share of the total inflow of capital. But this result does not seem to 
be entirely robust and even country specific. Fernández-Arias and Hausmann 
(2000, pp. 8-9) find that although for developing countries “non-FDI exposure 
appears to increase the probability of currency crisis while FDI appears to be 
neutral and, if anything, seems to lower it” this does not apply to industrial 
countries: “the evidence suggests that FDI is safer than non-FDI only when we 
restrict the sample to developing countries.” And Babecký et al. (2013, p. 12), in 
looking at leading indicators for crises in developed countries,  find that “[t]he 
inflow of foreign direct investment turns out to be associated with the severity of 
crises as well. According to our results, countries which have enjoyed an 
abundance of FDI inflows tend to suffer more in crises.” 
Notice also that Fernández-Arias and Hausmann (2000) and Nitithanprapas and 
Willett (2000) point out that the high-FDI ratio of total external liability exposures 
is connected to currency crises. But financial instability30 can break out in other 
forms than in a currency crisis. Examples are e.g. banking crises and unstable 
asset prices in the wake of excessive credit expansion. 
This leads us to ask an important question: although FDI flows can have a 
positive effect on the occurrence of a currency crisis, does the same happen to 
be the case in other types of financial instability? The answer to this question is 
not straight forward. 
                                            
29
 To the author’s knowledge, this potential link between FDI inflows, their stability and psychological 
sunk cost effects has not been researched.  
30
 See chapter 3 regarding the definition of financial instability. 
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First, it should be recognised that although FDI flows are more stable than other 
types of capital flows, the variability in their levels is considerable. Interestingly, 
the variability is often higher in the case of developed economies than in 
developing economies. Figure 1.5 is based on the data from UNCTAD. It shows 
that the variability of FDI inflows into developed economies has been larger on 
many occasions than into developing economies. This variability in FDI flows 
brings in itself instability, just as unstable portfolio flows can have adverse 
effects on the economy. 
Figure 1.5 – FDI inflows’ variability 
 
Second, FDI inflows may act as complements to other flows. This has been 
probed into in earlier sections in this chapter. But by attracting other less stable 
capital flows into the economy, FDI inflows indirectly lead to instability. In other 
words, if FDI is “smart money” which is channelled to economies only after a 
careful consideration of the economy’s prospects – rather than “dumb money” 
which is more subject to ever-changing crowd sentiment – FDI flows can act as 
a signal to other investors that it is safe to invest in the economy. These 
signalling effects can not only drag in other FDI flows, as Sarno and Taylor 
(1999) point out, but other types of capital flows as well, less stable in nature. 
Therefore, FDI flows can indirectly increase the instability of the economy by 
complementing other less stable capital flows just as the FDI flows themselves 
can be destabilising. 
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Third, as Bird and Rajan (2002) point out, FDI flows can flow in under the label 
of FDI but flow out in the form of portfolio flow when the capital assets are used 
as a collateral to raise funds in the host economy which are then exported 
through the capital account. The actual stickiness of FDI inflows can therefore 
be questioned, perhaps especially so in developed economies with highly 
developed financial sectors where one can find the experience in and the 
supply of financial goods and services (such as derivatives, forward contracts, 
options, etc.) which can be used to more easily collateralise real capital assets 
which have been built up with FDI inflows in the years before. The stickiness of 
FDI can therefore, potentially, be dependent on the development level of the 
banking system which can have an impact on the real economy, especially after 
the banking system has reached the stage where its liabilities are considered a 
final payment in commerce.31 
Fourth, FDI can have  – with some notable limitations as previously discussed 
(see 1.1 FDI and economic growth) – a positive impact on economic growth in 
the host economy. This should improve the foundations of the economy and 
make the general populace better off. However, if FDI has a positive impact on 
growth and that leads to excessive private credit growth in the economy – which 
can have a negative impact on financial stability (International Monetary Fund, 
2004; Keen, 1997; Minsky, 1984, 2008a, 2008b; Werner, 2005) – the risk is that 
FDI will have a negative impact on financial stability despite its possible positive 
impact on economic growth. And FDI can have a boosting impact on the rate of 
growth of credit in the economy. Bird and Rajan (2002, p. 200) claim that it is a 
“fact that FDI tends to be accompanied by an increase in bank loans.” Hegerty 
(2009) found that FDI inflows, as well as non-FDI inflows, encouraged credit 
growth in Bulgaria over the time period 4Q97-1Q08. FDI can also boost the 
overall sentiment of economic players in the economy and improved belief in 
the economy can boost credit growth, both through consumer credit (Lamdin, 
2008) and investors’ “animal spirits” (Keynes, 1936), which can later lead to 
financial crises (Minsky, 1984, 2008a, 2008b). Improved investor sentiment can 
also lead to stock-market booms and busts, especially in “countries culturally 
more prone to herd-like behaviour and overreaction and countries with low 
efficient regulatory institutions” (Zouaoui, Nouyrigat, & Beer, 2011, p. 745). 
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 See e.g. Chick (1986) on the evolution of the banking system and its impact on the real economy. 
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Finally, FDI has been found to contribute to aggressive investment growth in the 
host economy (Henry, 2000). Although such investment growth can be 
considered advantageous the risk is always that it develops into “euphoria” as 
Minsky highlighted in his Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1984).32 
Fifth, especially if the FDI is financed from within the host economy, which is 
often the case (Feldstein, 2000),33 the risk is that once the profits of an FDI 
project are repatriated home, the balance of payments of the host economy will 
suffer in the long run. Related to the effects on the balance of payments is the 
impact FDI inflow has on the current account. Since the inflow of capital can 
strengthen the exchange rate it can divert domestic spending towards imports 
rather than domestic production. This can affect the stability of the economy as 
such developments would have a negative impact on the current account and 
the net earnings of foreign exchange (Gallagher & Zarsky, 2006; Hailu, 2010; 
Sarode, 2012). 
Sixth, it is not certain that FDI flows are in fact FDI flows or even capital flows 
between countries in the first place. IMF (1998, p. 82) mentions that “questions 
may be raised about the reliability of data that distinguish [foreign] direct 
investment from other capital flows”. Furthermore, the FDI can be financed from 
within the host economy itself (Feldstein, 2000; Marin & Schnitzer, 2011; 
Werner, 1994) so there is potentially no capital or a limited amount of it flowing 
between economies although FDI activity takes place. This can misinform policy 
makers into assuming that the underlying external position of the economy is 
better than it actually is. Market participants can also be misinformed, leading to 
wrong policy and commercial decisions based on incorrect information. 
Potentially, this can have unfavourable effects on the financial stability of the 
economy. 
Seventh, Geršl & Hlaváček (2006) make the point that if the FDI is not financed 
from within the host economy but through the MNC itself, it can lead to less 
demand by large, international companies in the host economy for bank loans 
from the domestic bank sector. This, according to Geršl & Hlaváček, can slow 
down the development of the host economy banking sector and potentially hurts 
its profits, the reason being that the banks do not find any secure borrowers like 
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 Financial instability will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 3 
33
 This can be interpreted in favour of the substitution thesis. See also Werner (1994). 
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the MNCs. The banks can be tempted to respond to this lack of credit-demand 
from international companies by increasing their extended credit to domestic 
corporations, which may well be riskier borrowers than the geographically better 
diversified MNCs. Therefore, credit risk of loans lent out by domestic banks can 
increase. Geršl & Hlaváček then join this with the point that FDI can, like other 
investment, go through a life-cycle where the final stage is a relocation decision 
of the MNC: the FDI is wound down. This relocation, especially if small, 
domestic firms were servicing the FDI investor, can hurt the host economy and 
the banking system as well when the domestic firms, previously servicing the 
FDI investor, lose income. The credit risk subsequently materialises. Therefore, 
through this channel, FDI can adversely affect financial stability. 
Notwithstanding all this, financial stability can, theoretically, also be improved by 
FDI. 
First, if FDI flows into an economy during a period of financial stress, the foreign 
capital so received may be much welcomed. This is particularly so if other 
foreign capital is flowing out of the economy during an episode of a currency 
crisis. In that case, the FDI inflow can provide much needed foreign exchange 
into the currency market, dwindling the fall of the local currency. Nevertheless, 
despite this positive side of FDI, the “fire-sale” aspect of such FDI inflows at 
times of crisis should be kept in mind. Krugman (2000, p. 44) asks the question: 
“[A]re foreign corporations taking over control of domestic enterprises because 
they have special competence, and can therefore run them better, or simply 
because they have cash and the locals have not?”34 The fear of foreign 
influences can be present as Krugman shows when he quotes (p. 44) the prime 
minister of Malaysia during the Asian crisis in 1998, Mahathir Mohamad: “We 
must realize the great danger facing our country. If we are not careful, we will 
be recolonized.”35 The possibility of such opinions developing into political 
instability is not nonexistent. 
                                            
34
 Krugman gives two different answers to this question. One is when foreign firms are indeed more 
efficient than domestic ones and should and do control them through FDI. The other – “the financial 
panic point of view” (p. 55) – is where the domestic firms are liquidity constrained and the foreign firms 
only get involved when a crisis hits. 
35
 The Associated Press (Joshi, 1998) quotes him: “We know there are attempts to recolonize us.”  
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Second, opening up the possibility of FDI may stabilise asset prices as it opens 
up the possibility of increased liquidity (Krugman, 2000). Therefore, liquidity 
crises may be averted. This would improve financial stability. 
Third, if the FDI helps diversifying the economy towards less economic 
dependence on one prominent sector, it can help building up resilience against 
any shocks in that sector; it is wise not to put all one’s eggs in the same basket. 
FDI has, as an example, been found to support export diversification in 
developing countries (Iwamoto & Nabeshima, 2012). This strengthens the 
diversification of the relevant economies as they become less dependent on 
one single type of exports. 
Fourth, if FDI activity stimulates gross investment, this may provide wage 
income for workers, especially in the Greenfield-FDI case (the contrary may in 
fact be the case in M&A FDI due to temporary layoffs). This would improve 
household income, making it easier for them to service debt. We can therefore 
assume that this strengthens financial stability. 
Fifth, opening up and welcoming FDI may increase the economy’s access to 
foreign capital, i.e. it can complement other flows (see 1.2 FDI and other types 
of capital flows). This is not only important in situations such as those described 
by the first point here above but in non-crisis environments as well. Increased 
liquidity and access to capital can lower the rate of interest. Since high rates of 
interest are an important reason for why financial instability can develop (Keen, 
1997; Minsky, 1984; Tily, 2010)36 we can think FDI to have positive impact on 
financial stability through this channel. 
Sixth, as already mentioned, if – it is far from certain, see 1.1 FDI and economic 
growth – FDI improves management and productivity of inputs in production 
processes then this improvement can have a positive impact on financial 
stability via improved allocation and usage of resources.  
Finally, the other side must be mentioned as well: what are the effects of 
improved financial stability on FDI? Naturally, we should expect the relationship 
to be positive. Indeed, one merely needs to take a glimpse at figure 1.1 to see 
                                            
36
 Low interest rates can induce instability, especially if they are accompanied by strong credit growth. 
But then, the ultimate problem is not the low rate of interest but the too easy access to credit (Tily, 2010). 
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that FDI flows between economies fell sharply around the recent episodes of 
financial instability in the 2000s. However, it is possible that FDI inflows can, at 
least in certain cases, increase in the wake of a financial crisis or general 
slowdown in the business cycle. The most obvious candidate is of course “fire-
sale FDI” (Krugman, 2000) which would flow into an economy to buy existing 
assets for cheap prices due to a financial crisis and a consequential drop in 
asset prices. Such FDI is not necessarily positive – the foreign parties are not 
inevitably better at running the companies, their dominant advantage is that 
they have cash to pay for the asset while nobody else does – and it is hard to 
imagine that it would be a smart policy to induce a financial crisis merely to 
attract such FDI into the economy.  
Furthermore, it would be unwise to trust blindly that FDI inflows would come or 
continue at times of financial crises and assist in stabilising or restarting the 
economy. In a recent paper, Solomos, Papageorgiou and Koumparoulis (2012) 
find that FDI inflows were procyclical and not countercyclical in the case of the 
European Monetary Union during 1996-2011. Alas, the possible procyclical 
nature of FDI inflows can be a source of instability on its own. Ahmed and 
Martinez-Zarzoso (2013) concluded that FDI inflows into Pakistan were 
procyclical and destabilising. But FDI does not need to be procyclical as 
Contessi, De Pace and Francis (2013) found out. They in fact stated that FDI 
inflows were the only type of inward capital flows that was not procyclical in 
emerging economies.37 We can therefore not securely claim that FDI inflows are 
either pro- or countercyclical.  
Overall, as evident from the discussion above, there is a considerable ambiguity 
whether FDI will lead to improved financial stability or not. Not only is there 
ambiguity in the net effects in any given time period but we cannot rule out the 
possibility that the net effects will change between time periods: an FDI project 
that has a positive/negative impact on the level of financial stability in one time 
period may not necessarily do so in the next. A potential example is easy to 
imagine: during the construction of a Greenfield FDI project the capital inflow 
provides foreign exchange receipts and the investment itself demands labour 
which receives wage income, strengthening the cash flows of the economy. 
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 The following emerging economies are in their study: Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, 
Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey. They use quarterly data, 1992-2005. 
62 
Later, when the construction is finished and profits are repatriated, the economy 
experiences both increased unemployment and lower foreign earnings. Initial 
positive influences of FDI on financial stability have turned negative.  
Conclusion to chapter 1 
So far, we have focused on only four aspects of FDI. Its impact on economic 
growth has been discussed. We can, cautiously, state that FDI can increase 
economic growth but it will not do so with certainty. Certain conditions, such as 
a developed financial system, a high level of human capital and FDI in the form 
of Greenfield investments rather than mergers and acquisitions, improve the 
effects. Furthermore, more FDI may not always be better: the economy needs 
time to absorb it. Despite the perhaps illusive positive effects of FDI, many 
countries have actively tried to attract it. The costs of such policies may not 
always be justified. 
FDI’s relationship with other types of capital flows was also probed into. This 
relationship can be very dynamically complicated and the issue of whether FDI 
flows and other types of capital flows are complements or substitutes is 
unresolved.  
The connection between FDI and the balance of payments was investigated. 
FDI can alleviate balance of payments pressures by providing foreign exchange 
at the time of need. However, through the leakage of profits back to the home 
country and potential import-oriented effects of FDI, the net long-term effects of 
FDI on the balance of payments can be negative. 
Finally, the complex effects of FDI on financial stability were discussed. FDI can 
have both negative and positive effects on financial stability. Negative ones 
include e.g. the variability in the FDI inflows themselves, their uncertain 
stickiness which can give the false feeling of stability and the possible stimulus 
FDI flows can have on the development of an investment boom. Positive 
impacts include diversification of the economy’s industries, welcome foreign 
capital in times of capital flight and stabilisation of asset prices. However, there 
is ambiguity in which effects will come out on top and it is furthermore possible 
that the net effects can change between periods.  
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There is furthermore an important aspect that must be kept in mind: are the 
effects of FDI on financial stability the same no matter which industry the FDI 
takes place in? 
In next chapter, we will focus on one sector in particular – the financial sector – 
and argue that the nature of the effects of FDI on financial stability is different in 
that industry compared to others. 
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Chapter 2 – FDI in financial services and its uniqueness 
And I sincerely believe, with you, that banking establishments are 
more dangerous than standing armies; and that the principle of 
spending money to be paid by posterity, under the name of funding, 
is but swindling futurity on a large scale.  
Thomas Jefferson, 3rd President of the USA (Jefferson, 1816) 
It is not by augmenting the capital of the country, but by rendering a 
greater part of that capital active and productive than would 
otherwise be so, that the most judicious operations of banking can 
increase the industry of the country. 
Adam Smith (1776, p. 307) 
2.1 What do banks do? 
Before we get into discussing the specifics of FDI in banking it is best to make it 
clear immediately what banks do. This discussion will not cover the full depth of 
the topic but merely clarify the most important parts.  
2.1.1 Banks and the payment system 
Most money that is used in a modern economy is bank deposits, making banks 
an important link in the payment system.38 When a payment is done with a bank 
deposit – say from a deposit account in Bank A to a deposit account in Bank B 
– Bank A asks the central bank to transfer reserves from its reserves account to 
the reserves account of Bank B. At the same time, Bank B gets information 
informing it that the transfer of the reserves is due to a payment into one of its 
customers’ deposits account. Banks A and B then update the customers’ 
deposit accounts accordingly (Ryan-Collins, Greenham, Werner, & Jackson, 
2011). This transfer of banks’ reserves – a central bank liability – as an 
accepted means of payment, not only between private individuals but towards 
and from the state as well, is a common practice: “In modern sovereign nations 
                                            
38
 Werner (2005, p.161) points out the banks’ importance in the payment system, practically calling them, 
and the central bank, the payment system itself: “[L]ess than 5%, most likely between 1% and 2%, of all 
transactions takes place in cash. The rest is settled as non-cash transfers. Since even non-bank financial 
institutions, such as credit card companies, ultimately settle their accounts through the banking system, 
virtually all non-cash payments are settled in the accounts of banks (and the central bank).” He was 
speaking especially about Japan but the argument can be applied to most economies. 
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with their own domestic, floating, currencies, [the money accepted in payment 
of taxes] is always an inconvertible, high powered, money (liabilities of the 
treasury and central bank)” (Wray, 2007, p. 11). The payment of a certain 
amount is best described with a simple flow-chart, see figure 2.1 (based on 
Figure 12, p. 61, Collins, Greenham, Werner, & Jackson (2011)) where the 
payment of a certain amount from Frank to Abe using a bank deposit, e.g. 
because Frank bought a used mobile phone of Abe, is described.39 Do note that 
this describes a domestic transfer of a payment (£ in the UK, $ in the US, ¥ in 
Japan, etc.). 
Figure 2.1 The payment of 100 money units of account from Frank to Abe 
 
                                            
39
 We ignore the possibility of any netting out between banks of their gross liabilities before the reserves 
are moved between the reserve accounts, i.e. this is a Real-Time Gross Settlement payment and not a 
Deferred Net Settlement. See e.g. Dent and Dison (2012) for an introduction to the UK payment system. 
The Central Bank
Frank's Bank's Reserve 
Account, -100
Subtracts 100 from 
the reserve account 
of Frank's bank, adds 
100 to the reserve 
account of Abe's bank
Abe's Bank's Reserve 
Account, +100
Frank's bank to the 
Central Bank: "Please 
move 100 from our 
reserve account to the 
reserve account of Abe's 
bank. Tell Abe's bank that 
it is for Abe's account and 
sent by Frank"
The Central Bank to Abe's 
Bank: "We updated your 
reserve account, we 
added 100 to it. The 
reason: Frank is paying 
Abe 100. Please update 
your books accordingly 
and let Abe know"
Frank's Bank Abe's Bank
"Please move 100 from 
my account to Abe's 
account in Abe's bank"
"Frank just paid you 100. 
Your account balance has 
been increased 
accordingly."
Frank
Abe to Frank: "Thank 
you for the payment 
into may bank 
account, nice doing 
business with you!"
Abe
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We see here that payments between individuals, using bank deposits, are in 
fact settled with the movement of central bank reserves from the reserve 
account of the payer’s bank to the reserve account of the payee’s bank.  
The steps are similar when an international payment is made except an 
additional layer comes on top. We can, as an example, take the case where US 
dollars are transferred from one country to another. Wray (2012, loc. 2814) 
explains: “The domestic central bank [of the payer’s country] will have a Dollar 
account at the US Fed. When payment is made to a foreigner, the central 
bank’s account [at the US Fed] is debited, and the account of some other 
foreign central bank’s account [at the US Fed] is credited (unless, of course, the 
payment is made to the United States).” With this in mind, we can amend figure 
2.1 with a foreign payment in US dollars in mind, see figure 2.2. 
One note is in order however. Although it is depicted in figure 2.2 that the 
domestic banks will go through their relevant central banks to clear the payment 
this is not always the case. Instead of going through the relevant central banks, 
which then go to the US Fed, the banks can to their foreign “correspondent 
banks” instead. The correspondent banks are banks that operate in the state 
where the relevant currency is issued and have a reserve account at the 
relevant central bank. The banks of the payer and the payee have an account at 
their correspondent banks, denominated in the relevant currency of that state 
(Ásgeirsson, 2003).  
In our case the domestic bank of Frank, the payer, would have a US dollar 
account at its correspondent bank in the US instead of going through its 
domestic reserves account at Central Bank A. Likewise, the domestic bank of 
Abe, the payee, would have another (or perhaps the same) correspondent bank 
in the US with a US dollar account in its name as well – and its reserves 
account at the Central Bank B would be untouched. The correspondent banks 
would then have reserves moved between them at the US Fed, similar to a 
domestic payment as explained in Figure 2.1. See figure 2.3 for this version of 
how international payment is carried out.  
It is left unsaid here which settlement process of international payments is more 
common but going through correspondent banks is, according to Ásgeirsson 
(2003), “traditional”. 
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Figure 2.2 An international payment in US dollars, $, following Wray (2012) 
 
Central Bank A's $ 
Reserve Account, -100
Central Bank B's $ 
Reserve Account, +100
Central Bank A Central Bank B
Frank's Bank Abe's Bank
Frank Abe
The US Fed
Subtracts $100 
from the reserve 
account of 
Central Bank A, 
adds $100 to the 
reserve account 
of Central Bank B
Abe to Frank: "Thank you for the 
international payment into may bank 
account, nice doing business with you!"
Frank's bank to the Central Bank: "Please 
pay $100 into the reserve account of the 
central bank of Abe's bank at the US fed. 
Deduct the amount from my reserve 
account I have with you at the prevailing 
exchange rate. Tell the US Fed that this is 
a payment into Abe's account at his bank 
and sent by Frank."
Central Bank A to the US Fed: "Please 
deduct $100 from my reserve account 
and pay into Central Bank B's reserve 
account. Tell Central Bank B that it is a 
payment from Frank into Abe's account 
at his bank."
The US Fed to Central Bank B: "We 
updated your $ reserve account, we 
added 100 to it. The reason: Frank is 
paying Abe $100. Please update 
your books accordingly and let Abe's 
bank know."
The Central Bank to Abe's Bank: "We 
updated your reserve account, we 
added the worth of $100 at the 
prevailing exchange rate to it. The 
reason: Frank is paying Abe $100. 
Please update your books 
accordingly and let Abe know"
"Frank just paid you $100. Your 
account balance has been increased 
accordingly at the prevailing 
exchange rate."
"Please pay $100 into Abe's account in 
Abe's bank. Deduct the amount from my 
account with you at the prevailing 
exchange rate."
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Figure 2.3 An international payment in US dollars, $, following Ásgeirsson (2003) 
 
So banks have an intermediary role in the payment system, both on national 
and international level. They also have an important role in the creation of 
credit. Next section clarifies this in more detail.  
Correspondent Bank A's $ 
Reserve Account, -100
Correspondent Bank B's $ 
Reserve Account, +100
Correspondent Bank A Correspondent Bank B
Frank's Bank Abe's Bank
Frank Abe
"Please pay $100 into Abe's account in 
Abe's bank. Deduct the amount from my 
account with you at the prevailing 
exchange rate."
"Frank just paid you $100. Your 
account balance with us has been 
increased accordingly at the 
prevailing exchange rate."
Abe to Frank: "Thank you for the 
international payment into may bank 
account, nice doing business with you!"
The US Fed
Subtracts $100 
from the reserve 
account of Corr. 
Bank A, adds $100 
to the reserve 
account of Corr. 
Bank B
Correspondent Bank A to the US Fed: 
"Please deduct $100 from my reserve 
account and pay into Correspondent 
Bank B's reserve account. Tell 
Correspondent Bank B that this is a 
payment from Frank into Abe's account 
at his bank."
The US Fed to Correspondent Bank 
B: "We updated your $ reserve 
account, we added $100 to it. The 
reason: Frank is paying Abe $100. 
Please update your books 
accordingly and let Abe's bank 
know."
Frank's bank to its correspondent bank in 
the US: "Please pay $100 into the reserve 
account of the correspondent bank of 
Abe's bank at the US fed. Deduct the 
amount from my $ account I have with 
you. Tell the US Fed that this is a 
payment into Abe's account at his bank 
and sent by Frank."
Correspondent bank B to Abe's 
Bank: "We updated your $ account, 
we added $100 to it. The reason: 
Frank is paying Abe $100. Please 
update your books accordingly and 
let Abe know"
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2.1.2 On money, credit and banks 
Money is defined by what the state accepts as payment for tax debts (Wray, 
1998). Money is, in other words, “a creature of the state” (Wray, 1998, p. 7). 
Since bank deposits are, in many if not all countries, accepted, by the state, as 
payment for taxes bank deposits are money: banks’ debts, i.e. bank deposits, 
are money. This definition, this Chartalist approach to money, is adopted here.40 
According to the endogenous view on money, money is created parallel to the 
creation of bank credit. The theory of endogenous money contrasts with that of 
exogenous money. Wray (1992) provides an excellent discussion on the matter. 
In short, according to the exogenous view, money is exogenously determined 
by the central bank or a public institution: “exogeneity really refers to the ability 
of the government to control the quantity of money” (Wray, 1992, p. 1152). The 
first step taken in the process of determining the total supply of money is taken 
by the central bank according to the exogenous view when it decides how much 
reserves (“high powered money”) it should supply into the economy. The supply 
of “loanable funds” – the savings curve – is a function of the time preference of 
consumption today versus later. Banks act as intermediaries between savers 
and borrowers, utilising the money multiplier, which is exogenously determined 
by the central bank via its reserve requirement ratio, to “relend” the same 
money again and again: deposits lead to loans. The investment curve is 
determined by the marginal product of capital which again is determined by 
changes in the technology level of real capital. The real equilibrium rate of 
interest then adjusts to equate the demand and supply of loanable funds. 
Changing the money supply, such as if the central bank “prints” more reserves 
or changes the reserve requirement ratio, will only affect real variables in the 
economy if people are subject to a “money illusion” or if prices are sticky in the 
short run. In the long run, changes in the nominal money supply will only 
increase prices accordingly. The money supply is vertical in the money-interest 
space (Wray (1992) referencing Moore(1988)).  
The endogenous view is quite different. Banks create, by simply writing it down 
on their balance sheets, the spendable bank deposits, i.e. money, for the 
borrower at the same time as the borrower agrees to owe the bank the same 
                                            
40
 For discussion about the Chartalist approach compared to other approaches to what money is (such as 
commodity-money) see e.g. Wray (1998), Graeber (2011) and Arestis and Sawyer (2006). 
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amount, written on the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet, plus interest 
(Keen, 2009a). Contrary to the exogenous view, it is the banks which act first in 
the money creation process: “new loans create new deposits” (Howells & 
Hussein, 1999, p. 441), i.e. loans lead to deposits. This, that loans lead to 
deposits and not the other way around like the exogenous view claims, has 
been shown to be empirically true (Werner, 2014). Then, once the creation of 
money has taken place alongside the granting of the loan, if the banks must 
meet reserve requirements they will buy or rent the needed reserves on the 
interbank market and if supply on that market is short, the banks will seek the 
needed reserves from the central bank. The central bank will simply create the 
reserves accordingly at a price (such as a rate of interest in a repurchasing 
agreement) solely chosen by the central bank itself (the policy rate). If the 
central bank refuses to create and supply the reserves it will create a liquidity 
panic in the interbank market and force banks to liquidate illiquid assets to raise 
cash or reserves to meet their liquidity needs. This can force prices of banks’ 
assets down, seriously impacting the level of equity of banking institutions and  
create financial instability. Therefore, if the central bank does not want to create 
instability in the financial system, it will have to supply the reserves when 
needed (Wray, 1992).  
The rate of interest in the endogenous view is determined by other factors than 
in the exogenous view. There are generally two different opinions on the 
determination of the rate of interest (Wray, 1992). One view, originating from 
Moore (1988), is that the rate of interest is exogenously decided by the central 
bank through the price of reserves to banks. Another view, coming from Keynes 
(1936), is that the rate of interest is endogenously decided by the liquidity 
preference which is influenced by uncertainty about the future.  
According to Wray, the most important contribution of the endogenous 
approach to money is the realisation that “spending must be financed and that 
deficit spending is closely tied to credit creation” (Wray, 1992, p. 1156). It is 
worth quoting Wray at length (p. 1156, original emphasis): 
It is this recognition, that money is privately created [by banks] to 
allow spending to grow, that separates the horizontalist position from 
the neoclassical synthesis [exogenous view]. In the ISLM framework, 
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it is possible to analyze the effects of an increase in spending while 
holding the money supply constant, or vice versa. This dichotomy is 
rejected by the endogenous money approach: all spending must be 
financed; most finance in any modern capitalist economy is privately 
supplied by banks; growth of spending is always closely tied to credit 
expansion; and in modern economies, credit is money. In capitalist 
economies, money does not enter the economy through actions of 
the central bank, but through the actions of private agents who decide 
to deficit spend.41 
There is a matter regarding which part of the credit market – demand or supply 
– is more determining. Wray comments that  for a given rate of interest banks 
will “meet all loan demand at that interest rate by passively creating money” 
(Wray, 1992, p. 1154). This is the extreme “horizontalist” approach: “banks 
simply take the exogenously determined overnight rate set by the central bank, 
and then add a mark-up to determine the lending rate—with the supply of credit 
through bank loans infinitely elastic at that rate” (Wray, 2015, p. 3).42 This 
implies that credit, i.e. money, is demand-determined rather than supply-
determined. But other authors (Minsky, 2008b; Rochon, 2012a; Werner, 2005) 
have pointed out that supply can be the limiting factor. Minsky argued that “the 
supply of finance can become less than perfectly elastic as lending rates rise 
(Wray, 2015, p. 3). Indeed, in 1986 he was of the opinion that “[a]cceptable 
financing techniques... depend upon the subjective preferences and views of 
bankers and businessmen about prospects (Minsky, 2008b, p. 237).43 Rochon 
comments that credit, i.e. money, “can be supply-constrained only in the sense 
that banks may not want to lend, but not because they cannot lend” (Louis-
Phillipe Rochon, 2012a, pp. 296-297, emphasis added). This is not the same as 
the supply of credit being constrained by “loanable funds” (savings) but banks’ 
willingness and capabilities to create the credit. This is the exact opposite to the 
                                            
41
 Although Wray writes that “money does not enter the economy through actions of the central bank” 
this does not need to be so as the central bank is also a creator of credit and can equally supply it into the 
economy, just as banks can and do (Werner, 2005). However, Wray is describing the modern monetary 
system in where, as we will see, banks create the majority of credit, i.e. money. We can, as Werner points 
out, organise the system in a different way. But we will not dwell deeper into any such propositions as of 
yet but let them wait until chapter 5. 
42
 To do Wray full justice, it should be noted here that he does not agree with this position. 
43
 The standards which determine the supply of bank-finance are subject to change: “[S]uccess breeds a 
disregard of the possibility of failure; the absence of serious financial difficulties over a substantial period 
leads to the development of a euphoric economy in which increasing short-term financing of long 
positions becomes a normal way of life” (Minsky, 2008b, p. 237). 
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exogenous view where the supply of credit is supply constrained by the supply 
of savings and the central bank’s reserve requirement ratio. Werner (2005, p. 
58) holds the position that demand for credit is always large, and points out that 
banks shun away some of the people that try to take out a loan. Banks, in other 
words, will not, as horizontalists argue, “meet all loan demand at [a given] 
interest rate by passively creating money”. Banks, according to Minsky, Rochon 
and Werner, not only restrict the supply of credit, compared to the demand for it, 
but they make allocative decisions for it as well, selecting the credit-demanders 
that actually get credit; they “cherry pick” the borrowers (we find later in this 
chapter that this is a recurring issue with foreign banks as they enter another 
economy). And the rate of interest will not be effective in controlling the creation 
of credit, not because of possible influences of the rate of interest on demand 
for credit but because it would not be sensible from the suppliers’ (banks’) point 
of view. Rather than increasing the rate of interest (price) of credit, and 
therefore the borrower’s default risk, they limit the quantity of credit and allocate 
it to the best potential borrowers, leaving some demanders of credit with nothing 
(ibid). 
Empirically, the case for endogenous money creation is stronger than that of 
exogenous money: bank loans do lead to bank deposits and not the other way 
around (Caporale & Howells, 2001; Howells & Hussein, 1998; Palley, 1994; 
Werner, 2014). And in case one wanted an opinion “from the front line” of the 
monetary system, one is to be found in the 2014/1 Quarterly Bulletin of Bank of 
England (McLeay, Radia, & Thomas, 2014, p. 12). 
Most of the money in circulation is created, not by the printing 
presses of the Bank of England, but by the commercial banks 
themselves: banks create money whenever they lend to someone in 
the economy or buy an asset from consumers. And in contrast to 
descriptions found in some textbooks, the Bank of England does not 
directly control the quantity of either base or broad money. 
That on its own is not enough to properly support the endogenous theory for the 
theory also predicts that causation of money creation runs from economic 
activity to money – and not the other way around (Werner, 2005). Howells and 
Hussein (1998, p. 329, emphasis added) point out: “[i]f money is endogenous, it 
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is because causality runs from bank lending to deposits and because the 
demand for bank loans [i.e. credit] is strongly influenced by trends in nominal 
output.” Werner (2005, p. 192) puts forward a similar question: “In the present 
framework, money (defined as deposit aggregates) is always endogenous – 
namely to the creation of credit. As we saw, the amount of deposits can only 
increase if banks create new credit. The more interesting question is whether 
credit creation is endogenous or exogenous [to economic activity].” It is 
therefore the second part of Howell’s and Hussein’s words that is interesting: is 
credit, i.e. money, endogenous to economic activity? 
Traditionally, the validity of the endogenous view with regards to the proposition 
that “demand for loans is strongly influenced by trends in nominal output” has 
been empirically tested with GDP as a proxy for economic activity (Howells, 
2000; Howells & Hussein, 1999). This has yielded unfavourable results so the 
validity of this part of the endogenous theory can be questioned as Werner 
(2005) points out. 
But the reason for the apparent invalidity of this part of the theory may be due to 
the use of GDP as a proxy for the economic activity that the credit creation 
should be accommodating for. Howells and Hussein (1999) show that the total 
transactions in the economy – and not only those related to the GDP – are 
better related to the demand for credit than spending on final output alone. 
Werner (2005, p. 198) is of a similar opinion: “...we must expect causation to 
always run from the credit variable (C) to the transaction variable (PQ) or its 
components [which are GDP-related and non-GDP-related transactions]”.44 
Howells (2000) argues that the demand for credit has changed from what it 
was: no longer is credit needed only for economic activity but for asset 
transactions as well, i.e. speculation processes. He further notes that 
“[w]hatever people are borrowing for, it is this borrowing which creates deposits 
and the desire for the borrowing still originates with other developments in the 
economy, whether it is booming asset prices or industrial production” (Howells, 
2000, pp. 10-11). This is closely connected to what has been called the 
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 This opinion comes from Werner’s (2005, p. 190) Quantity Theory of Credit. Instead of money (M) he 
represents economic activity in the MV=PQ style as CV=PQ, where C is credit, resting on the fact that 
money (M) is credit (C). He then breaks PQ, i.e. the value of transactions in the economy, into GDP-
related (R) and non-GDP-related (F), i.e. speculative, so that CV=PRQR+PFQF. Credit (C) can, in other 
words, be used to finance GDP-related activities (PRQR) and speculative activities (PFQF). 
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“Walras-Schumpeter-Minsky Law” (Keen, 2011b): aggregate demand has three 
sources, namely income earned from sales of goods and services, which mainly 
finances consumption (Walras), new credit to entrepreneurs, which mainly 
finances investment in real capital (Schumpeter) and credit to speculators who 
buy existing assets (Minsky) without any direct impact on GDP.  
It seems that this – that credit finances not only GDP-related transactions – was 
realised by Keynes himself. His realisation is in the “improved” liquidity 
preference theory which Keynes developed after the General Theory where the 
liquidity preference theory first appeared – and it should be noted that money 
was endogenous and an unmistakable part of the General Theory (Tily, 2010). 
The improvement was the addition of the “finance motive” which was not a part 
of the three motives that Keynes identified in the General Theory (which were 
the transactions, precautionary and speculative motives).  
Wray (1992) argues that the “finance motive” – the fourth motive for holding 
liquidity and developed post General Theory – was omitted in the General 
Theory almost by mistake judging from Keynes’s own words. According to Wray 
(1992), Keynes (1973a) knew well that the demand for credit arose not only due 
to current spending on output but current and planned spending on much more 
than only output – “any type of spending” – such as speculation with existing 
assets, as Howells (2000) and Keen (2011b) argue. Wray (1992, p. 1158), 
quoting Keynes (1973a, p. 220), writes (original emphasis): 
Keynes argued that his "finance" is not identical with "investment 
funding" because any type of spending may give rise to a need for 
finance, including consumption spending or spending on the stock 
exchange. The finance demand for money was then added to the 
other motives for holding money in Keynes's liquidity preference 
theory: "I should not have previously overlooked this point [an 
increase of planned activity will increase the demand for money], 
since it is the coping-stone of the liquidity theory of the rate of 
interest. I allowed, it is true, for the effect of an increase in actual 
activity on the demand for money. But I did not allow for the effect of 
an increase in planned activity, which . . . may sometimes be the 
more important of the two." 
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With this in mind, Howell’s and Hussein’s (1999, p. 453) conclusion that “the 
demand for credit is better related to a measure of total transactions than it is to 
spending on final output” should not be surprising. The explanatory power of 
Werner’s (2005) model, where he disaggregates credit creation based on what 
it is used for, i.e. speculative or real economic activity, should not be surprising 
either in light of this. Keynes himself expected this to be the case. 
Furthermore, based on this, empirical investigations that find no or limited 
causality between the total creation of credit and changes in GDP do not 
invalidate the endogenous view on money when it comes to the theory’s 
implication of a very close relationship between credit creation and economic 
activity. This is especially since “it is now abundantly clear that the demand for 
credit rests very heavily upon asset (‘speculative’) transactions which have 
grown much more rapidly than GDP. Changes in the quantity of money no 
longer reflect prior changes in the level and cost of production” (Howells, 2000). 
It should be highlighted that the proposition of the endogenous school that 
deposits (money) creation is endogenous to credit creation is not disputed – 
and has a better track record than exogenous money creation theories. 
Whether money creation is entirely endogenous to economic activity is not 
empirically ascertained yet however. For as Werner (2005) points out: if credit 
supply is the determining side of the quantity of credit created, and not credit 
demand, which can be, as Keynes points out, due to planned activity as well as 
actual activity, then credit creation is not endogenous but exogenously decided 
by the suppliers of credit. 45 This implies that credit creation is not endogenous 
to actual and planned economic activity – because banks exogenously decide 
which planned economic activities are indeed financed.  
But credit creation could still be endogenous to actual economic activity, i.e. 
total transactions in the economy, for once banks have accepted to create the 
credit for a certain economic activity, be it the construction of a house or 
speculation on the equity market, that credit creation is endogenous to that 
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 “Next we need to determine which of demand and supply is more likely to be the ‘short’ quantity, that 
is, whether the credit market is more likely to be demand- or supply-rationed. The question is whether the 
credit supply is more important (in which case credit would be exogenously determined by the credit 
creating institutions) or whether credit demand is more important (in which case credit would be 
endogenous)” (Werner, 2005, p. 194, emphasis added). His answer: the credit market is supply 
constrained, ergo, credit is not endogenous. See also next footnote.  
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activity. But until the credit is granted, it is exogenous and, if Werner (2005) is 
right about there always being plentiful demand for credit, limiting. Indeed, both 
Werner (2005) and Howells and Hussein (1999) agree that credit and total 
transactions (economic activity) are closely related.  
Indeed, logically, credit creation is endogenous to actual economic activity even 
if credit is, as Minsky, Rochon and Werner hold, limited by the banking sector. 
As it is the banking system that decides which economic plans will be financed 
and which will not the banks are exogenously deciding the amount of economic 
activity when they decide who gets financed and who not. Then, they finance 
that activity and in fact, it is not an activity until it is financed and paid for! It is 
therefore perfectly logical to state that credit creation is endogenous to actual 
economic activity because that activity would not happen unless it was financed 
– and that financing comes from the banking system. Ergo, credit creation is 
endogenous to actual economic activity: they are two sides of the same coin. 
We conclude that banks are creators of credit which is used to finance any kind 
of spending, both GDP related and speculation based. Deposits, i.e. money, are 
created at the same time as banks create the credit, i.e. the creation of money 
is endogenous to the creation of credit: (bank) loans lead to deposits. Credit 
creation also seems endogenous to actual economic activity but exogenous, 
and limiting, to some planned (“...crank entrepreneurs with high-risk ideas...”) 
economic activity.46 As long as banks are willing and find, in their opinion, 
creditworthy borrowers demanding credit for whatever purpose they see fit, the 
credit will be created and supplied. And finally, this credit is accepted as final 
payment for goods and services: money is credit.  
2.1.3 Banks as intermediaries 
That said, banks’ role as intermediaries between savers (non-spenders) and 
borrowers is not non-existent. It does exist in the form of being intermediaries 
between suppliers of foreign currencies and domestic borrowers, such as in the 
form of foreign exchange loans. Indeed, banks often play a central role in 
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 The quote is from Werner (2005, p. 195, emphasis added). Some other relevant passages are: “The 
actual demand for credit is... always relatively large [compared to supply] (even if from crank 
entrepreneurs with high-risk ideas). Faced with the reality of many high-risk borrowers and imperfect 
information about their true intentions or the viability of their projects, banks would be unwise to raise 
interest rates until credit demand equals supply. ... Put simply, since demand for money or credit is very 
large (perhaps infinite), the supply is the short side, which determines the [credit] market outcome.” See 
also previous footnote. 
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intermediating cross-border capital flows as a sizeable portion of those flows go 
through the banking sector (Brunnermeier et al., 2012) 
Banks can, according to endogenous money creation, like in the case of 
domestic-currency-denominated loans, create credit in other currencies as well. 
An Icelandic bank could write down on its balance sheet that it has an 
obligation, an IOU, to pay dollars on behalf of its customer in the payment 
system, just as it can do so in the domestic currency, Icelandic krona. But, if we 
follow the “traditional” way of how international payments are carried out (see 
section 2.1.1 Banks and the payment system, especially Figure 2.3), the 
Icelandic bank would need a US dollar deposit in its correspondent bank in the 
US in order to be able to actually carry out the US dollar payment on behalf of 
its customer. The IOU could also be converted into US dollar bills, i.e. cash, in 
which case the Icelandic bank would need actual US dollar bills to be present in 
its vault at the time of conversion of the IOU into cash.  
This poses a liquidity problem for the bank as it would be a serious liquidity risk 
for the Icelandic bank to offer to pay certain amount of US dollars, i.e. create an 
IOU denominated in US dollar, when it has no US dollars available. And the 
bank could not trust in finding liquidity in US dollars at the domestic central 
bank, the reason for that being that contrary to domestic reserves, on which the 
domestic payment system rests, the domestic central bank cannot create 
foreign currency at will: the Central Bank of Iceland cannot create any US 
dollars reserves in case the Icelandic banks run into liquidity problems in US 
dollars, or any other foreign currency for that matter (a problem that was very 
acute before the collapse of the Icelandic banking system in 2008). The only 
currency that a central bank can create freely at will is its own currency; only the 
US Fed can US dollars reserves, and only the Central Bank of Iceland can 
create Icelandic krona reserves. Nor can the domestic central bank supply 
endless amount of bills in foreign currency. Only the relevant central bank can 
do that, e.g. the Federal Reserve in case of the US dollar.47  
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 Of course, if there is a cooperation agreement in effect between central banks, international swap lines 
can be set up between them. See e.g. (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2014). But to assume such 
swap line to be in place is heroic. There was e.g. no swap line in place between the Icelandic Central 
Bank and the Federal Reserve in 2008. 
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Domestic banks must therefore find the liquidity in foreign currency somewhere 
else, effectively intermediating funds from a foreign party to the domestic 
borrower. Of course, the domestic bank could borrow the foreign currency from 
a foreign bank – and the foreign bank would create that (foreign) money 
endogenously to the creation of credit as Werner (2005)48 points out – and then 
relend it to the domestic borrower who wanted the foreign currency loan. The 
domestic central bank can also be an intermediary of foreign currencies to 
domestic banks. This intermediation could come from the central bank’s foreign 
reserves. Or it could be in direct cooperation with other central banks, hence 
e.g. the liquidity swap lines between central banks that they set up in order to 
provide each other the capacity to supply funding to financial institutions that 
may need liquidity in foreign currencies (The Federal Reserve, 2012). But the 
domestic central bank cannot create the reserves in foreign currency, only the 
foreign central bank can. Banks therefore intermediate foreign currencies, both 
in the international payment system as we previously saw and when domestic 
parties borrow in foreign currencies. 
The intermediation processes of the banking system between domestic and 
foreign parties can have various implications for the economy. First, by 
borrowing foreign currencies and relending them at home, banks are avoiding 
the domestic monetary policy, dampening its effectiveness (Chen, 2012). Also, 
this can impact the external balance of the economy. In Mexico, before the 
Tequila crisis of 1994-1995, the foreign capital that flowed into the economy 
was not only to finance investment in productive facilities. “Foreign capital 
flowed through the banking system, and bank lending financed purchases of 
luxury imports as well as capital goods” (Eichengreen, 2004, p. 187). The 
imports contributed to a pressure on the current account which created a 
pressure on the exchange rate. Somewhat similar development took place in 
South East Asia before the crisis there only a few years later since a large 
share of the capital inflow was denominated in foreign currencies, most notably 
in yen and dollars (Eichengreen, 2004). Icelandic banks, during the “golden 
years” of Icelandic banking, also issued foreign-currency denominated bonds 
and channelled the funds to the domestic corporate sector, which used them for 
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 “Why borrow from abroad and pay back interest and the principal in foreign currency, when one can 
create the money for free at home? After all, the foreign banks are also merely creating the money ‘out of 
nothing’ through the process of credit creation (Werner, 2005, p. 217, emphasis added). 
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both domestic and foreign investments: nearly three quarters of corporate loans 
(excluding holding companies) in Iceland were “foreign currency loans” in 
September 2008.49 Interestingly, it is possible that the Icelandic banks were 
financing Icelandic capital outflows, at least a part of them, with domestic credit 
creation in Icelandic krona. In other words, they were not only intermediating 
foreign funds, via their foreign bonds issuances, but also creating domestic 
credit that led to capital outflows on top of that. This was possible because 
foreigners were willing to hold krona-denominated assets. This would chime 
with the development in Japan during the 1980s where banks’ domestic credit 
creation led to capital outflows, i.e. foreign investments (Werner, 2005).50  
Both Eichengreen (2004) and Kraft and Jankov (2005) point out that the moral 
hazard for systemically important banks, which will have a government backing 
in case of problems, can lure them into taking on too much foreign-currency 
denominated debt. This applies especially when the economy operates under a 
de facto or a de jure currency peg that is not realistic to hold, something that 
Kraft and Jankov call “a bad peg.” By borrowing too much abroad and re-
lending the capital to domestic parties, banks play down the importance of 
possible currency devaluation: although they may have limited net exposure to 
exchange rate changes their debtors do not. Home-currency devaluation will hit 
the borrowers hard and via domino effects the banks themselves. In such cases 
the banks carry out the intermediary process in an economically suboptimal 
way: they take on too much foreign-currency debt. 
Finally, banks act as intermediaries, in all currencies, via their brokerage 
services in e.g. bond and stock markets. They furthermore offer consulting and 
advisory services, intermediating information that they may have processed in 
one way or the other. An example is market and economic research, for 
commercial purposes, carried out by banks. Banks also have an important 
intermediary role in the payment system, as previously discussed. 
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 Data from Central Bank of Iceland. An important note is necessary here. A considerable portion of 
“foreign currency” loans in Iceland were in fact not in foreign currency but loans in Icelandic krona but 
linked to the exchange rate. The Central Bank of Iceland nevertheless counted them as “foreign currency 
loans”, making it impossible for us to know exactly how much of the total credit to corporations, and 
households (“foreign-currency” mortgages and car loans became increasingly popular after 2006), was in 
fact in foreign currencies. The “foreign currency loans”, i.e. ISK credit with the principal linked to the 
exchange rate, were, generally, deemed illegal with a series of court rulings starting from 2009, resting on 
laws from 2001 (no. 38/2001) amongst others. Complications apply that will not be discussed here. 
50
 More on this in Appendix 1. 
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Now that we have made it clearer what banks do, we can turn our attention to 
specific issues regarding FDI in the industry. 
2.2 Specific issues on FDI in banking 
The general interest in FDI in banking surged after the most recent financial 
crisis hit. Relying on Google internet searches, Figure 2.4 shows how Google 
searches for “FDI + banking” developed.  
Figure 2.4 – Worldwide development of Google searches for “FDI + banking” 
 
Source: Google Trends. Time period: 2004-Aug. 2013. 100=period’s max value 
The increase in the interest in FDI in banking in the wake of a great economic 
shift seems to be nothing new. Interest in general financial-FDI accelerated 
notably after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the increase of foreign 
ownership of banks in areas such as Central and Eastern Europe (Goldberg, 
2004). That of course does not mean that the topic of multinational banking has 
not been probed into before. Aliber’s (1984) survey was, according to Goodman 
who wrote an attached comment on the paper, the first of that kind of a survey 
on multinational banking. Aliber points out that the theory of banking-FDI has, to 
a great extent, been built on the theory of FDI. Indeed, Peek and Rosengren 
(2000b) discuss some of the issues of banking-FDI that seem familiar to those 
discussed regarding FDI in general, including the effects on competition, know-
how spillovers, economic growth, access to international capital, the balance of 
payments and the transfer of economic developments. 
However, it is not certain that answering the same questions posed in the 
general FDI literature is the proper way forward when it comes to multinational 
banks. The reasons for this will be discussed later and we will focus our 
attention in particular on its connection with financial stability. Before we get 
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there however, we must outline some of the topics that are prominent in the 
research on FDI in banking.  
2.2.1 FDI in banking, financial development and economic growth 
FDI in banking can be viewed as a part of the financial development of an 
economy. The entry of a foreign bank into an economy can enhance the 
efficiency of the domestic financial sector (Levine, 2001). Therefore, the 
relationship between FDI in banking or financial services in general is closely 
related to the subject of financial development and economic growth. 
As Levine (1997) pointed out, economists do not completely agree on whether 
the financial system makes much difference for economic growth or not. 
Mainstream models do not consider money as important, look at it as merely a 
“veil” on real economic activity. Other schools, such as post-Keynesians, differ 
and consider and include money in their models in much more depth. 
Consequently, the view is similar on financial development. However, empirical 
work seems to confirm that financial development does affect economic growth. 
Levine (2001, p. 692), discussing the literature, notes that “(1) domestic banking 
system development has a large causal impact on economic growth; and (2) 
domestic banking system development influences growth primarily by affecting 
total factor productivity growth.” 
Later research seems to confirm this with one addition though: the effects of 
financial development on economic growth dwindle the richer the economy is. 
Bittencourt (2012) looks at Latin American countries and finds evidences for the 
Schumpeterian prediction that a well-functioning banking system is needed to 
finance real capital investment and thereby push growth onwards.51 Hassan, 
Sanchez, and Yu (2011) find, using a neoclassical growth model, long-run 
linkages between economic growth and financial development in developing 
economies. Interestingly, the causality there between seems to run from growth 
to finance in the early stages of general economic development. Later on, the 
causality becomes two-way: growth and finance support each other. But others 
do not entirely agree. Fung (2009), separately looking at low-, middle- and high-
income countries, concluded that the reinforcing effects between financial 
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 “Schumpeterian” because Schumpeter (1934) argued that the banking system created non-existent 
purchasing power for entrepreneurs who would (dutifully) use it to invest in improving production 
processes. 
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development and economic growth were only so in the beginning. Once the 
economy became a high income country the strength of the effects of financial 
development on economic growth diminished. Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-
Foulkes (2004) have a similar story to tell. Levine’s (2001) previously quoted 
statement should be amended with this more recent research in mind. 
Looking directly at FDI in banking and economic growth, rather than financial 
development and economic growth, the link is supposedly mainly through the 
improved efficiency link. And on the link between foreign banks and efficiency, 
Levine (2001, p. 697) writes concisely on the arguments for it: 
[E]asing restrictions on foreign bank entry may improve the quality, 
pricing, and availability of banking services directly and indirectly. 
Foreign banks may directly bring new and better skills, management 
techniques, training procedures, technology, and products to the 
domestic market. Foreign banks may indirectly enhance domestic 
banking efficiency by stimulating competition in domestic financial 
markets. This intensified competition could put downward pressure 
on profits and overhead expenses. Furthermore, foreign banks may 
accelerate the development of ancillary institutions that promote the 
flow of information about firms. For instance, foreign banks may 
encourage the emergence of better rating agencies, accounting and 
auditing firms, and credit bureaux that acquire and process 
information. Furthermore, foreign bank presence may stimulate 
improvements in domestic supervision and regulation. 
Earlier, Levine (2001), while discussing financial intermediaries, notes that if the 
functioning of the domestic banking system benefits from international financial 
integration it could have large growth effects. Demirgüc-Kunt, Levine, and Min 
(1998) found no direct link between foreign bank activity and economic growth 
but claim that the link is indirect – through improved functioning of the financial 
system – and positive. They used both foreign banks’ share of total domestic 
banking assets and the number of foreign banks as a share of total number of 
banks in the domestic market to measure foreign bank activity. J. Wu, Jeon, 
and Luca (2010), looking at emerging economies, have a similar story to tell. 
They found that the increased presence of foreign banks improved the effects of 
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real capital investment on growth. But Owen and Temesvary (2012), explaining 
themselves with a reference to the argument about necessary “absorptive 
capacity” (Borensztein et al., 1998), found that the effects of foreign banks on 
economic growth depended on the level of development. Furthermore, even if a 
high level of development was in place, the effects of foreign banks were only 
“insignificant” instead of “detrimental”: foreign banks actually lowered economic 
growth in economies with an inadequately developed banking system. Eller et 
al. (2006), already mentioned in chapter 1, hold that the effects of FDI in 
financial services on growth are hump-shaped: some FDI is positive but more is 
not always better. 
Finally, since foreign banks increase the competition in the domestic banking 
industry (Jeon, Olivero, & Wu, 2011), a notable input was made by Cetorelli and 
Peretto (2012). Using a theoretical model based on Cournot oligopoly they 
reach the conclusion that increased competition in the banking sector improves 
economic growth if “intrinsic market uncertainty” (p. 967) is low.52  
The reason was that increased competition incentivised banks to cut back on 
costly (personal) relationship services between banks and investors – a 
phenomenon empirically confirmed by Unite and Sullivan (2003). The qualitative 
part of information about the borrowers was harmed because the banker did not 
know them personally anymore. We can speculate that the trust relationship 
between the borrower and the banker changes as well. Basically, banks cut 
back what Cetorelli and Peretto called the quality of loans, i.e. the banker’s 
personal relationship with the borrower. Instead, banks, as competition 
increases, become first and foremost concerned about the quantity of loans and 
stop caring so much about making sure to make and maintain a personal 
contact with the borrower, because that is expensive and time consuming. But 
increased quality of loans – the personal relationship – reduces the “intrinsic 
market uncertainty” problem. Therefore, increased competition, leading to 
worse quality of loans (because maintaining personal relationships with the 
borrowers is time consuming and expensive), actually reduces bank lending in a 
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 By “intrinsic market uncertainty” they refer to the general uncertainty that any entrepreneur, in need of 
purchasing power which he raises via e.g. a bank loan, must meet. They refer especially to uncertainty 
about the timing of cash flows and the threat of cash-flow mismatches, leaving entrepreneurs, even if they 
are carrying out an investment project with a positive net present value, bankrupt as they run into liquidity 
problems. This is, in general, closely related to “uncertainty” as Keynes spoke of the matter (Keynes, 
1936, 1937). 
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market with “intrinsic market uncertainty”. Consequently, economic growth 
slows down. This theoretical finding can be related to the fact that the potential 
positive effects of financial-FDI on credit availability are stronger when 
information on borrowers is more readily available, such as via shared 
databanks on credit rating (Houston, Lin, Lin, & Ma, 2010; Jappelli & Pagano, 
2002).53 In that case, “intrinsic market uncertainties” are low since information 
about the prospective borrowers is more readily available and there is less need 
to establish close personal relationships with them in order to decrease the risk 
of lending. 
We can conclude that the entry of a foreign bank may contribute to the financial 
development of a country: competition increases and positive spillovers are in 
place on other domestic banks (Jeon et al., 2011), interest rate spreads are 
lowered and more attention is paid to risks based on e.g. credit ratings and 
general accounting information and not personal relationships between 
borrowers and bank managers (Unite & Sullivan, 2003) to name just a few 
influences. However, while this may be the case, it is not certain that the 
presence of foreign banks will increase the economic growth of the country.  
2.2.2 Some reasons why banks go abroad and where they go 
To cover the whole literature on why banks go abroad would be too great a task 
for the purpose of this work. However, some selective discussion on the most 
prominent factors is in order. 
As already mentioned, one of the first comprehensive reviews on the theory of 
multinational banking is Aliber (1984). Having discussed different views on what 
“international” banking is,54 he moves into discussing why some banks expand 
abroad and others not. He notes that since banks are highly leveraged 
companies, any slight advantages that some banks may have, due to e.g. 
superior operational or regulation advantages, will quickly transform into higher 
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 The connection between financial-FDI, information and credit availability will be dwelled deeper into 
in 2.3.5 Financial-FDI, credit availability, credit stability and capital flows. 
54
 “International banking” is not the same as “multinational banking”. The issue is discussed by Williams 
(2002). The difference between an “international” and a “multinational” bank is that the “multinational 
bank (MNB) is simply a bank that owns and controls banking activities in two or more countries” 
(Casson, 1990, p. 14) while an international bank does not. A bank can therefore be “international” but 
not “multinational” or as Williams (2002, pp. 129-130) points out: “[banking] activities that are 
international, but not necessarily multinational, include trading in foreign currencies, the provision of 
trade finance and ownership of securities issued by foreign firms.” It should be noted that some authors 
do not seem to strictly follow this distinction, e.g. Batten and Szilagyi (2011). An effort has been made to 
make this distinction in this work. 
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profits for the bank(s) in question. He therefore wonders if it is perhaps banks’ 
different abilities to attract relatively cheap capital, either from home or abroad, 
that decides which banks will become multinational and which will stay behind. 
Thornton (1992) found that the cost of capital did have an impact in the case of 
the expansion of Japanese banks and Moshirian (2001) confirmed it for UK, 
German and especially US banks. This low-cost-of-capital advantage is one of 
the microeconomic reasons for why banks go abroad. Generally, those firm-
specific factors can be grouped into comparative advantages, efficiencies, 
strategic reactions and (geographical) risk diversification (Herrero & Simón, 
2003). However, there are other factors that influence banks to go abroad than 
advantages in the form of lower costs and access to capital. The following are 
amongst the most notable ones. 
The “Defensive Investment”/”Follow the client” argument 
A key proposition in the literature is that banks follow their client abroad when 
they expand. The possible advantages are in place for both the client himself, 
who may e.g. want to limit the exposure of its financial information by continuing 
dealing with the same bank as before, and the bank which, by following its client 
abroad, will defend its current relationships with the client and possibly be able 
to expand them further. This has been called Defensive Investment or Follow-
the-client (DI/FC) hypothesis (Aburime, 2011; Lensink & Haan, 2002; Williams, 
2002) and can apply to both FDI activities of other firms and other general trade 
activities. Williams (2002) traces the theory back to Brimmer and Dahl (1975). 
Empirically, the theory of DI/FC has yielded somewhat mixed results. In his 
extensive literature review on the subject, Williams (2002) notes that there are 
four possible relationships between general multinational corporations and 
multinational banks. First of all, there is the DI/FC relationship: an MNC entry 
into an economy is followed by an entry of a bank which has already 
established commercial relationships with the MNC. Second, it is possible that 
the multinational bank takes the first step and the MNC then follows, due to e.g. 
improved access to finance through the now-present multinational bank. Third, 
it is possible that there is no relationship between the multinational bank and the 
MNC. Finally, the causation may run both ways. Williams (2002) then notes that 
it has not been “entirely possible” to empirically tell which of the theories is most 
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appropriate. Correlation between trade and the presence of MNCs on one hand 
and multinational banks on the other has been found but causation is not 
certain (Lensink & Haan, 2002). 
Since Williams, others have tried to decipher the relationship. In the case of 
emerging economies, more trade, per se, with the rest of the world does not 
seem to encourage banks to make a move to them (Reinhardt & Dell'Erba, 
2013). The relationship between non-financial FDI and financial FDI is more 
complicated. Cazzavillan and Olszewski (2012) say the relationship is both 
ways: non-financial and financial FDI have positive effects on each other. Wesel 
(2004), looking at German banks, does not conclude that trade has any 
significant influences on their decisions to expand abroad but he does find non-
banking FDI to have an impact. Specifically, German banks follow their 
customers to Asia but they need not be following their customers when they, the 
banks, invest in other geographical areas, they might then be front running their 
non-financial MNC customers. Japanese banks follow their customers abroad 
(Ruhr & Ryan, 2005). Some European banks said they had followed their clients 
into central and eastern European countries before they started focusing on 
local companies (De Haas & Naaborg, 2005). But Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005, 
p. 2461), using a probit model on 260 banks from the OECD countries, 
conclude that although the presence of other non-banking FDI has an impact, a 
theory “possibly grounded on the search for profits in the presence of barriers to 
entry in foreign markets, seems more suitable than the ‘‘follow-the-client’’ 
hypothesis to explain the pattern of bank internationalization”. In accordance 
with this proposition, Molyneux, Nguyen, and Xie (2013) find that in the wake of 
the South East Asian crisis in the 90s, banks’ interest in entering the area was 
not driven by a DI/FC incentive. What they were rather interested in was local 
profit opportunities such as lending to domestic firms and inefficiencies in the 
local banking sector.55  
Overall, it seems that the DI/FC motive is in place. However, it is certainly not 
the only reason why banks seek to establish their presence in other economies. 
                                            
55
 Although Molyneux, Nguyen, and Xie do not mention it, the application of Krugman’s (2000) “fire-
sale FDI” argument should not be outright ruled out. Further investigation is however needed to decide 
whether that argument was truly applicable in this case or not. 
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Macroeconomic factors influencing banks to expand abroad 
Herrero and Simón (2003) pointed out that macroeconomic theories on why 
banks expand abroad are thin from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. 
Since their input however, there has been work put into explaining this part of 
banks’ expansion. It is worth, especially given its recent expansion, looking 
further into this realm. Following Herrero and Simón, we will branch the factors 
into “push” and “pull”, i.e. “home” and “host”, macroeconomic factors. 
 Push factors 
Push factors include the home-country economic cycle, low rate of interest at 
home and the exchange rate. Other push factors can also be international ones 
instead of those specifically connected to the home country, such as the 
general development of international capital markets (Brana & Lahet, 2011). 
Herrero and Simon note that there is no clear consensus on what the effects of 
an economic slowdown in the home country should be. Low economic growth 
can both limit the financing possibilities of FDI (because profits are generally 
lower in a low-growth environment) and push firms to try and expand abroad 
instead of at home. The principle should be the same in the case of financial-
FDI but (p. 19) “no literature exists yet”. Since then, however, Hryckiewicz and 
Kowalewski (2010) show that relatively low growth in the home country pushes 
banks abroad. But they also show that during global economic slowdowns, 
multinational banks are more conservative in their expansion. Other 
researchers have confirmed this and even consider this factor to be more 
influential in determining financial FDI than in the case of non-financial FDI 
(Reinhardt & Dell'Erba, 2013). 
When it comes to interest rates in the home economy and banks expanding 
abroad, Herrero and Simon again comment that the financial-FDI literature is 
limited but given that high interest rates normally hamper outward general FDI 
the same should be expected for the specific case of financial FDI. The 
literature is still limited. However, low cost of capital has been shown to have an 
impact on banks’ expansions abroad (Moshirian, 2001; Thornton, 1992) and this 
can perhaps be related to the positive effects of low rates of interest on FDI. 
Nevertheless, these papers deal with the overall cost of capital for banks and 
not specifically the rate of interest at home: the capital used to finance an 
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expansion may be raised in some other markets than the home market. It is 
worth keeping in mind in this regard that a low rate of interest does stimulate 
general FDI as Herrero and Simon noted. Later research has reached similar 
conclusions (Dabla-Norris, Honda, Lahreche, & Verdier, 2010). 
Then there are the effects of the exchange rate of the home currency on 
outward FDI. Stronger home currency increases the relative wealth of firms 
owning assets in that currency, making it easier for them to buy foreign-
currency denominated assets. This was empirically confirmed in the case of 
Japanese banks: appreciation of the yen incentivised banks to increase their 
outward FDI (Ruhr & Ryan, 2005). This is mirrored by the weak exchange rate 
of the host economy acting as a pull factor. 
Pull factors 
Pull factors include high (expected) economic growth in the host economy, high 
per capita income56 and economic volatility, or lack thereof (Herrero & Simón, 
2003). The exchange rate of the host economy’s currency can be interpreted as 
a macroeconomic pull factor as well. 
High economic growth, or expectations of it, serves to increase the inward 
banking FDI (Focarelli & Pozzolo, 2005). They also found out that low per capita 
income encouraged banking FDI, being a proxy for upcoming profit 
opportunities as the host economy would converge towards other economies. 
This is perhaps in accordance with the classic idea of higher return on invested 
capital – and therefore an incentive for investors to enter the economy – in a 
low-income country, where capital levels are low, but it is contrary to what many 
other prior works found out as Buch and DeLong (2008) note. And although 
Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) apply the Linder hypothesis on FDI in general, it is 
tempting to consider the possibility that something similar applies to financial-
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 Herrero and Simón rank income per capita as an institutional factor. The current author disagrees with 
this ranking and proposes ranking it with macroeconomic factors instead. Not only can we find per capita 
figures ranked as a macroeconomic variable (Haselmann, 2006) but it is also hard to see that income per 
capita has anything to do with the definitions of “institutional” (The Free Dictionary, 2013): 
1. Of or relating to an institution or institutions. 
2. Organized as or forming an institution: institutional religion. 
3. Characteristic or suggestive of an institution, especially in being uniform, dull, or 
unimaginative: institutional furniture; a pale institutional green. 
4. Of or relating to the principles or institutes of a subject such as law 
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FDI specifically, i.e. financial-FDI is drawn from high-income countries to other 
high-income countries due to similarities in supply and demand for financial 
services between the home and the host economies. 
But the explanation power of income may not be so strong, one way or the 
other. Wesel (2004) holds that per capita income has no particular effects when 
he looks at German banks expanding to emerging markets in Latin America, 
Asia and central and eastern Europe.  Wesel (2004) also mentions that German 
banks prefer to go to countries with low risks, backing up Herrero’s and Simon’s 
argument that banks are pulled into an economy by a stable economic 
environment. A negative economic outlook is a warning sign for banks to stay 
away. 
A high rate of interest in the host economy works also as a magnet for foreign 
banks (Molyneux et al., 2013). Galac and Kraft (2000) asked foreign banks what 
was attractive about the Croatian economy. High interest spreads between 
loans and deposits – which can signal low levels of efficiency and competition in 
the financial sector (Chortareas, Garza-García, & Girardone, 2012) – was one 
of the answers. The power of this explanation variable for foreign bank entry 
can be questioned though. Both Wesel (2004) and Hryckiewicz and Kowalewski 
(2010) show that although the impact of this variable is positive, as Molyneux et 
al. conclude, its importance may not be significant and the reason for foreign 
banks’ presence may be another, such as low (macroeconomic) uncertainties 
(which can lead to low rates of interest), development levels of financial markets 
and non-bank FDI entries (i.e. the DI/FC argument). 
FDI in banking and regulation 
Regulation has an important impact on banks’ ability and willingness to expand 
abroad. The regulation can be in various forms, including direct entry and exit 
limitations, restrictions on allowed activities and interest rate limitations to name 
just a couple. In very short we can say that the freer the regulation, the more 
FDI in banking will take place.  
An example of regulation that hinders financial FDI is restrictions of all sorts. 
Restrictions on foreign currency lending are an example of regulation that 
discourages inflow of financial FDI (Reinhardt & Dell'Erba, 2013). In the 
meantime, Thornton (1992) cited deregulation in Japan and the enlargement of 
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the set of permissible activities abroad as major reasons behind the expansion 
of Japanese banks. In that instance, deregulation increased outward banking 
FDI. Lensink and Haan (2002) look at the entry of foreign banks into transition 
economies and find out that political freedom and economic reforms, such as 
interest rate liberalisation, international trade and exchange rate liberalisation, 
and increased prominence of the private sector in comparison to the public 
sector, in transition host economies will attract foreign banks. Lack of 
deregulation in many Asian countries is one of the reasons why foreign 
banking-FDI is not nesting as much there as in other more deregulated Latin 
American countries of similar developing status (Moshirian, 2001). In Nigeria, 
stricter regulation regarding a minimum domestic ownership of domestically 
operating enterprises, foreign and Nigerian, effectively pushed banks out that 
had already set up operations there (Aburime, 2011). Regulation can therefore 
influence both outward and inward banking FDI. 
Changes in regulation of banking institutions can have a significant impact on 
the financial sector and on where banks channel their investments. Stiroh and 
Strahan (2003) report that there is more competition amongst banks in the wake 
of deregulation. The best banks gain market share while other more inefficient 
banks exit the market or are taken over by efficient competitors. Jayaratne and 
Strahan (1998) report similar findings after restrictions on bank branching within 
the US were eased: the best banks grew fastest while the less efficient banks 
were left behind. Although the topic of Stiroh and Strahan (2003) and Jayaratne 
and Strahan (1998) is banking within the US it is tempting to conclude that 
something similar is in effect when it comes to multinational banks. Not only did 
Aliber (1984) point out that due to high leverage in the banking industry the 
most efficient banks would quickly end up on top of the rest but he also argued 
that nation-specific regulatory frameworks, such as differences in capital and 
liquidity requirements, could create cost-structure advantages for domestic 
banks that could quickly be applied in multinational banking. Indeed, regulatory 
changes can affect the economies of scope in banking (Gropper, 1991), leading 
to changes in the set of profitable investments – both international and 
domestic.  
This influence of regulation on profits and investment activity in banking leads to 
the possibility of a “race to the bottom” where banks can “shop” for the 
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regulatory environment that fits them best by moving their headquarters (Pistor, 
2010). The European passport in banking where banks can domicile 
themselves within one European Economic Area country and expand their 
operations into other EEA countries from there has introduced the possibility of 
a race to the bottom in banking regulation within the area, even though some 
minimum standards must be met (ibid). Empirical work on whether banks 
actually move their headquarters based on some race-to-the-bottom regulation 
seems to be in short supply however. Sometimes, the banks do not need to 
move as they simply threaten to move to encourage the domestic policy makers 
to make amendments in the direction of creating a profitable business 
environment. As an example, it was discussed pre-2008 to move the 
headquarters of the Icelandic banks to another EU economy. But the low tax on 
corporate profits was a strong incentive for the banks to stay put and the wages 
and tax income was an incentive for the government to keep them in as well 
(Vísir, 2007). So they stayed. Banks also funnel their investment flows to less 
regulated countries, especially if the host economy has well developed 
institutional factors such as property and creditors rights (Houston, Lin, & Ma, 
2012).  
But the EEA banking passport also introduces the risk of domestic taxpayers 
actually paying for the mistakes of foreign banks. An example is when the 
Icelandic banks collapsed and the British government stepped in with a GBP 
2.35 billion bail-in to recompensate depositors at Landsbanki’s Icesave deposit 
scenario (Aldrick, 2013). Although the final cost for the British taxpayer ended 
up being much lower and the normal depositor lost much less than originally 
expected, thanks to the Financial Emergency Act (law no. 125/2008) in Iceland 
that put depository claims ahead of all other claims in the bankrupt estate of 
Landsbanki, the whole Icesave spectacle showed that banks that operate a 
branch in another EEA country can create a considerable spillover if and when 
they get into trouble. The case when they operate a subsidiary can be different 
as the Icelandic case shows. In that case, Landsbanki was operating a branch 
(Icesave) that followed the regulatory guidance of the Icelandic Financial 
Supervisory Authority and was running under the deposit insurance scheme of 
the Icelandic deposit insurance fund. Kaupthing bank, on the other hand, was 
operating in the United Kingdom through a subsidiary (Singer & Friedlander) 
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which was supervised by the British FSA and covered by the British deposit 
insurance scheme. As such, the deposits of British domiciled depositors in 
Kaupthing Edge (the depository scheme of Kaupthing in multiple EEA countries, 
including the United Kingdom) were covered by the UK deposit insurance 
system already while the Icesave deposits were covered by the Icelandic 
deposit insurance fund. However, the Icelandic deposit insurance fund was as 
good as empty in comparison to the vast deposits that were snowing in through 
Icesave: the total assets of the Icelandic deposit insurance fund were GBP 59 
million at end of September 2008 (Special Investigation Committee, 2010a). 
This compares to the GBP 2.35 billion bail-in of the British government. The 
Icesave debate was all about whether the Icelandic government was legally 
obliged to guarantee the payment of the Icelandic deposit insurance scheme. 
The EFTA court ruled that it was not the case (EFTA Surveillance Authority, 
2013). 
The connection between multinational banking and its regulation is also a 
question of the most appropriate quantity of regulation and the standardisation 
of it across countries. The race-to-the-bottom issue and possible limitations on 
applying the most appropriate mix of regulation are mitigated if the regulation is 
centralised over the whole multi-country area that multinational banks operate in 
(Buck & Schliephake, 2013). But centralising the regulation does not eliminate 
any possible conflict of interest, such as different preferences or needs for 
amount of regulation, nor is the cost of failure in the regulation process equally 
distributed unless the markets are fully integrated (Pistor, 2010). Moreover, 
banks can also enter the economy and influence the effective regulatory 
environment once they are in (Hermes & Lensink, 2004) making the argument 
about a possible race to the bottom all but more serious, especially as 
deregulation can increase banks’ appetite for risks, depending on factors such 
as their risk profile (Klomp & Haan, 2012), market power and type of regulation 
(Agoraki, Delis, & Pasiouras, 2011).57 That can have serious consequences for 
the economy as riskier banks tend to lead to more economic instability (Minsky, 
1984). Interestingly, there exists the possibility of international spillover effects 
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 Specifically, Klomp and Haan show that regulation is more effective on high-risk banks than low-risk 
banks. Agoraki et. al show however that stricter capital requirements are more effective in lowering the 
risk of banks with high market power, perhaps due to the effect of low market power pushing banks to 
take risks in order to gain larger share of the market. Regulation that directly limits banks’ activities 
(Glass-Steagall-type regulation) is effective on the risk taking of all banks, no matter their market power. 
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of regulatory changes: stricter regulation in one country can have the effect of 
banks that originate from that economy to become riskier in other economies 
where they operate, the reason being that the more restrictive home-regulation 
pushes them to “search for yield” in other geographical areas where they 
operate (Ongena, Popov, & Udell, 2013).  
Becoming too big to fail: it pays to be big! 
An interesting theme which has been livelily debated since the most recent 
financial crisis is the banks’ willingness to seek and profit from a too-big-to-fail 
(TBTF) status: being and becoming systematically too important for the financial 
system and the economy can get banks an explicit or an implicit guarantee from 
the state, meaning that they will be bailed out in case of serious problems. The 
Squam Lake Report (French et al., 2010, pp. 19-20) offers an excellent extract 
of the main problems behind too big to fail: 
Too-big-to-fail policies offer systemically important firms the explicit or 
implicit promise of a bailout when things go wrong. These policies are 
destructive for several reasons. First, because the possibility of a 
bailout means a firm’s stakeholders claim all the profits but only some 
of the losses, financial firms that might receive government support 
have an incentive to take extra risk. The firm’s shareholders, 
creditors, employees, and management all share the temptation. The 
result is an increase in the risks borne by society as a whole.  
Second, these policies encourage smaller financial institutions to 
expand, or to become more closely interconnected with other firms, 
so they move under the too-big-to-fail umbrella. Firms have an 
incentive to do whatever it takes to make policymakers fear their 
failure, creating the very fragility the government wishes to avoid. 
Belief that a government rescue will protect a financial institution’s 
creditors in a crisis also gives a firm a competitive advantage, 
lowering its cost of financing and allowing it to offer better prices to its 
customers than its fundamental productivity warrants.  
Third, inefficient firms that cannot compete on their own should fail. 
Otherwise, firms have less incentive to become and stay efficient. A 
government policy that props up inefficient firms is wasteful and 
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destructive. Allowing these firms to fail frees up resources and 
provides opportunities for more efficient and innovative competitors to 
flourish.  
Fourth, and most generally, capitalism is undermined by policies that 
privatize gains but socialize losses. 
Reaching a too big to fail status can benefit a bank, giving it an unfair 
competition position (O'Hara & Shaw, 1990). One estimate showed that US 
banks are willing to pay a notable premium in merger deals for reaching what 
could be considered a TBTF status: a 15 billion USD premium on merger deals 
that push the agglomerated balance sheet of the bank above a commonly 
viewed threshold (100 billion USD) to be viewed as a systematically important 
bank (Brewer III & Jagtiani, 2013). Both the stock and the bond market react 
positively to such mergers, pushing the capital cost of the TBTF bank lower, as 
French et al. point out. Warburton, Anginer, and Acharya (2013) estimate, for 
the time period 1990-2010, that the worth of the implicit TBTF subsidy for large 
US financial institutions is on average 28 basis points. Araten and Turner (2013) 
look at US bank holding companies, over the period of 2002-2011, and estimate 
that the subsidy is equal to 18 basis points on interest-bearing funding. 
It is worth putting this in relation to the fact that banks can quickly put such 
advantages to use to expand further, including abroad (Aliber, 1984; Moshirian, 
2001; Thornton, 1992). Effectively, a bank may not be expanding abroad 
because it is more efficient but because it can use the TBTF subsidy to lower its 
cost of capital in comparison to other banks, “allowing it to offer better prices to 
its customers than its fundamental productivity warrants” as French et al. put it. 
The high leverage in the banking industry then works with them to overtake 
other banks faster. TBTF banks can also benefit from their status in the form of 
depositors trusting them better, minimising the risk of such banks suffering a 
bank run (Oliveira, Schiozer, & Barros, 2011). This is so despite the fact that 
TBTF banks tend to take on more risk than other banks (Afonso, Santos, & 
Traina, 2014; Ennis & Malek, 2005). An obvious example of TBTF banks being 
rewarded for being so is when the three main Icelandic banks were, temporarily, 
awarded an Aaa credit rating by Moody’s in 2007. The reason: the rating 
agency expected the state to bail out the banks in case of any problems (18 
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months later they were all bankrupt and they proved to be too big to save). 
Becoming and being a TBTF bank can therefore be quite beneficial. 
Figure 2.5 – The Icelandic banks’ credit rating by Moody’s (May 99 – Apr. 08) 
 
Source: Margeirsson (2008) 
Although Brewer III and Jagtiani (2013) focused on US banks, the TBTF issue 
is certainly alive and well in multinational banking. They point out that already in 
1984 the TBTF issue was prominent in multinational banking when the 
Comptroller of the Currency implied in a testimony before the US Congress that 
banking agencies could not unwind any of the largest 11 multinational banks 
without it having a significant effect on the financial system in the US.58 Today, 
there is even a list of 28 officially accepted “Global Systemically Important 
Banks” (Financial Stability Board, 2012). Gulamhussen, Pinheiro, and Pozzolo 
(2012) pointed out that multinational banks should be geographically more risk 
diversified, thereby decreasing their risk, but their large balance sheet and 
complexity in unwinding them gives them a TBTF status, influencing them to 
take on increased risks instead. They find clear evidences for the latter effects 
to be stronger during the seven years before the financial crisis that began in 
earnest in 2008: of 384 listed commercial banks from 56 countries (mainly 
Japan (17.0%) and US (9.4%)) with assets worth more than 100 million, 
internationally diversified banks were riskier than domestic-only banks. Their 
results were the same using two different risk measures (Expected Default 
Frequency (EDF) and Z-score). 59 
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 An event that O'Hara and Shaw (1990) used to show that the market reacted by favouring those 11 
banks over others the day after this comment. 
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Although Brewer III and Jagtiani (2013) showed that US banks are willing to pay 
for becoming too big to fail, no empirical work seems to have been made on 
other banks such as those that originate from Europe. Furthermore, whether 
banks actively push for getting a TBTF status by expanding abroad, and not 
only domestically as Brewer Ill and Jagtiani looked at, is still unresolved 
empirically. Nevertheless, given that banks know that a TBTF status can be 
very beneficial for e.g. their capital costs and competition against other banks, it 
would be simple and careless to outright deny the possibility that banks try to 
get such a status by becoming multinational or further expanding their position 
as a multinational bank, especially as their multinational presence can make 
them TBTF, given the complexity of liquidating them in case of bankruptcy. 
Needless to say, given the preceding discussion, such activity and its 
repercussions, such as increased risks within the TBTF multinational banks, 
could have a negative impact on financial stability. Attempts are being made to 
counter this risk, such as planned demands for officially global systemically 
important banks to have an increased loss absorption capability (Financial 
Stability Board, 2012). It is yet to be seen however how effective that will be in 
watering down the TBTF problem. 
Greenfield or M&A? 
We will, in the end of this section, mention briefly the different entry modes into 
foreign countries. Banks, like other corporations, stand in front of a choice 
whether to enter an economy via building up their operations from scratch 
(Greenfield FDI) or to take over an existing domestic company, i.e. merger and 
acquisition approach (Haselmann, 2006). It turns out that the choice of entry 
can have different effects. 
Clarke, Cull, Peria, and Sánchez (2001) comment that an important reason for 
M&A activity in banking is scale economies, especially with developments in 
technologies which can decrease the operational complexities in back-office 
operations of banks. This includes payment technologies and electronic 
banking. Such developments can increase the access to bank services, 
including for small customers. But this, they note, does not hinder the possibility 
that huge banking agglomerates will shun small businesses when it comes to 
credit supplementation. However, other smaller banks can potentially step up 
and supply the credit. 
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The effects on credit are different when it comes to Greenfield FDI (Clarke et 
al., 2001). In that case, the newly established bank is trying to get a foothold in 
the market as quickly as it can (when it takes over an existing bank, the 
customer base is already there). Young banks tend to lend more to smaller 
businesses than old and big ones (DeYoung, Goldberg, & White, 1999). A 
newcomer in the financial system that enters it by setting up a Greenfield FDI 
operation is therefore more likely than other “old players” to supply credit to 
smaller businesses, simply because it wants to gain a foothold in the market.  
This may give the impression that a Greenfield FDI has more effects on, or at 
least different effects to, the host economy than M&A FDI. Not only is there a 
larger number of active players lending to borrowers but one of them, at least, is 
actively trying to get a larger piece of the action than it had before, i.e. some 
piece instead of none. It turns out that this is true. When a foreign bank enters 
another economy via a Greenfield FDI it has stronger effects on credit 
supplementation, especially to smaller businesses, and interest rates than when 
the entry is via M&A (Claeys & Hainz, 2013). 
2.3 The Unique Effects of Investment Activity in Financial Services  
At the end of chapter 1 we argued that we needed to focus especially on the 
banking and the financial sector when discussing the effects of FDI on financial 
stability. This argumentation will now be done in five parts. 
2.3.1 The central position of the financial sector in the economy 
An important reason why FDI in the banking and financial sector can have 
different effects on financial stability than FDI in other sectors is the position of 
the financial sector in the economy. Most payment flows go through it. This 
central importance of the financial sector to general commerce is unique and 
therefore, the effects of FDI in this sector must be thoroughly understood. 
2.3.2 The unique use of banks’ product (credit) 
The financial industry is also exceptional due to the unique use and demand for 
one of its most prominent products, i.e. credit. This product is widely used in 
investment projects as external financing and can either be directly 
intermediated, through e.g. pension and mutual funds and banks (via borrowing 
abroad), or directly created by the banking system itself. This bank-credit is then 
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used as money in the economy. A large majority of the money in the economy 
is so created, i.e. by the banking system. In Iceland, as an example, the 
proportion of existing money created by the banking system has fluctuated 
between ca. 97-99% of the total M3 since 1994. Similar ratios are in place in 
other economies (Ryan-Collins et al., 2011). 
Figure 2.6 – The ratio of bank-created money of the total M3 supply in Iceland 
 
Data: Central Bank of Iceland, author’s calculations 
No other firms in the economy issue money units as banks do every day 
through their lending decisions. Banks furthermore lend to anybody that they 
deem creditworthy at given point in time (Louis-Phillipe Rochon & Rossi, 2013).  
The decision of banks about whom and how much to finance via the creation of 
credit will affect the overall investment other firms in the economy, and hence 
their profits, given that profits equals investments (in a Kaleckian (Kalecki, 
1969) skeleton model of the macro economy). This is why FDI in financial 
services may  be felt through the whole economy on a much wider scale than 
FDI in other industries since the good in question – credit – is used every day, 
everywhere in the economy as general commerce is carried out and externally-
financed investments made.60  
2.3.3 The (possible) unique self-supporting mechanism of banking-FDI 
Another reason why it is worth looking at FDI in banking and its effects on the 
economy and financial stability in particular is the fact that it, theoretically, can 
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be self-sustaining. The possible self-sustainability arises from the fact that bank 
credit is normally supply-determined, not constrained by the supply of savings 
and there are, normally, willing borrowers around (Louis-Phillipe Rochon, 
2012a; Werner, 2005) except perhaps during balance sheet recessions when 
borrowers’ main objective is to deleverage as fast as they can (Koo, 2009). 
The unquenchable demand for credit gives banks the opportunity to step into an 
economy and create the credit which can support their entry into the economy 
in question. The credit supplementation of banks, new and old, supports asset 
prices and even raises them, expanding the pool of available collateral which 
can be a limiting factor in banks’ willingness to supply credit, especially in a 
non-relationship based banking (Binks & Ennew, 1996) which foreign banks 
tend to be more focused on due to comparative disadvantages related to 
distance (culture, agent enforcement costs, unfamiliarity with local businesses 
and legal framework, etc.) (Mian, 2006). By increasing the price of collateral, the 
credit expansion feeds on itself.61  
The effect of lending in foreign currency, which a foreign bank has an easier 
access to than a domestic bank (e.g. because it operates in the foreign 
currency area and has direct access to the central bank), must be kept in mind 
as well. FDI in the financial sector has been associated with credit expansion 
(and bust) in foreign currency in the host economy (Reinhardt & Dell'Erba, 
2013). The effects of this are self-reinforcing. Brunnermeier et al. (2012) tell a 
story similar to the following. A foreign bank lends its home-economy currency 
to a host-economy local borrower who then exchanges it for the host-economy 
currency, which consequently strengthens. That appreciation of the host-
economy currency shows up on the borrower’s balance sheet as lower liabilities 
measured in the local currency. The borrower’s assets, denominated in the local 
currency, have an unchanged nominal value. His equity increases due to the 
appreciation of the local currency. Since the borrower has now greater equity 
than when he borrowed the foreign currency this shows up as lower risk for the 
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 The reader is reminded of Rochon’s words, see previous discussion in 2.1.2 On money, credit and 
banks: the supply of money is “credit-led and demand-determined; it can be supply-constrained only in 
the sense that banks may not want to lend, but not because they cannot lend” (emphasis added). The 
supply of credit is not constrained by savings but banks’ willingness to create the credit when they lend 
money to their customers. If banks are fighting for a market share it is not heroic to assume that it has 
effects on their willingness to supply the credit: they may want to create more credit and, given the 
assumption of credit demand being in place, the credit, i.e. the money, will therefore be created. 
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lender: the borrower is more creditworthy due to his higher book-valued equity. 
That frees up equity on the foreign bank’s balance sheet, creating capacity to 
lend further: the foreign bank has self-sustained, with the help of some local 
currency appreciation, its ability to lend into the host economy. Of course, the 
capacity to lend contracts if/when the local currency depreciates and so the bust 
happens even quicker than it would happen if the credit boom in the beginning 
had been in the local currency. 
The credit allocation can also be qualitative instead of quantitative or currency 
based. By “cherry picking” the best borrowers in the economy – e.g. by offering 
them a better deal than a local bank does and snatching them – the foreign 
bank pushes other banks out of the high-quality section of the group of 
borrowers, pushing them to take on increased credit risk to maintain their 
businesses. If the domestic banks do increase their exposure to low-quality 
borrowers, they risk being hit by an economic slow-down harder than the 
foreign banks as their loan portfolios are of a lower quality. This will then make it 
easier for the foreign bank to outright take over the domestic bank, increasing 
its market share and even becoming a TBTF bank for the host economy, or use 
its superior balance sheet to extend credit to the best borrowers of the domestic 
bank. Slowly, the domestic bank loses ground. Badly developed domestic 
banks that expand their loan portfolio in response to a foreign bank entry can 
also introduce financial instability into the system as credit risk increases. If, 
however, the domestic bank does not respond to the cherry-picking of the 
foreign bank in the beginning the bank will contract immediately, losing market 
share. Either way, the chances are that the domestic bank is in a lose-lose 
situation. Its only way to endure is to become more efficient, something that FDI 
in banking can be a catalyst for.  
Foreign banks that cherry pick the largest domestic firms and the multinationals 
in the host economy are also self-supporting their existence in that economy by 
increasing the competitive position of the cherry-picked firm. By providing low-
interest credit relative to other (smaller) low-quality firms the foreign banks are 
increasing the competitiveness of the best borrowers, making it possible for 
them to expand further, both domestically and internationally. This growth of the 
best borrowers calls for more credit, which will be provided by the foreign bank. 
Therefore, by initially focusing on the best borrowers, the foreign bank is self-
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supporting its existence in the host economy by tipping the balance in the 
favour of its very own picked borrowers. 
This can put the SMEs in the economy in a tight spot. As their larger 
competitors get easier and cheaper funding their relative development can slow 
down. This can have serious overall economic consequences as SMEs can be 
more than 90% of the total firms in the economy, generating more than 50% of 
the labour demands and representing more than half of total value added by 
businesses (Cárdenas, Graf, & O’Dogherty, 2003; EU-Commission, 2013). 
There are therefore some potentially serious repercussions for the economy 
that arise from foreign banks’ possible self-supporting credit creation in the host 
economy. Empirically, this proposition – foreign banks support their market 
entry by simply creating and providing enough credit – has never been directly 
tested. However, some signs of the effects of foreign bank entry can be 
observed in some cases. 
First and foremost, foreign banks have been found to have higher loan growth 
than domestic banks: in Argentina and Mexico during the mid and late 90s 
(Goldberg, Dages, & Kinney, 2000), in Chile and Colombia during the same 
time period (Crystal, Dages, & Goldberg, 2002) and in south-eastern Europe in 
the beginning of the 21st century (Haas, Korniyenko, Pivovarsky, & 
Loukoianova, 2012). Foreign banks have also introduced new credit 
instruments that assisted in their growth in the host economy, such as credit 
cards in Spain (Levine, 2001). 
That foreign banks may have a faster loan growth than domestic banks is open 
for scrutiny for two reasons. First, small loan portfolios are easier to expand 
proportionally than large ones. Second, the fact that foreign banks are 
expanding their loan portfolios in new markets might be due to the fact that 
lending is much more profitable in that market than in others due to higher 
interest spreads than in other more developed financial systems in which they 
operate (Domanski, 2005).  Therefore, the banks may not be intentionally 
thinking of self-supporting their growth in the new market but merely thinking of 
profiting from the larger interest spreads. 
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Second, when foreign banks enter an economy, both interest spreads and 
interest rates have been found to decrease. This has been interpreted as a sign 
of foreign banks being more efficient than domestic ones. However, this can be 
taken as a sign for the pessimistic view of banks supporting their own entry via 
lowering the interest rate spread on deposits in the banking system and thereby 
fighting to get a share of the market as quickly as they can. Werner (2005, p. 
231) makes the point that at the introduction of competition62 in the banking 
sector, “players are likely to respond by initially focusing their optimisation 
behaviour on market-share competition, even at the short-term neglect of profit 
maximisation (as such behaviour maximises their long-term profits).” In the case 
of financial FDI, players, foreign and domestic, fight for the market share by 
decreasing their risk aversion (lower quality of credit screening) and by 
generally having “a larger appetite to extend loans” (ibid).The simultaneous 
lower rate of interest and high credit growth spurred by foreign banks seems to 
have been the case in central and east Europe (Hilbers, Otker-Robe, 
Pazarbasioglu, & Johnsen, 2005).  
Third, cherry-picking seems to be a recurring matter. Cárdenas et al. (2003) 
take a short look at then-recent research and claim that the evidence so far 
implies that foreign banks allocate a lower share of their loan portfolio to SMEs. 
Earlier, Stiglitz (2002) reported that in Argentina, before the 2001 crisis, foreign 
banks seemed to focus their lending to multinationals and large domestic firms. 
Small and medium sized corporations complained about not getting access to 
credit from foreign banks. Recent research seems to further back up this claim: 
foreign banks do cherry pick the best borrowers, such as those that they can 
get the most hard-information on, such as high-quality balance sheet and cash 
flow data (Detragiache, Tressel, & Gupta, 2008; Gormley, 2010; Mian, 2006). 
This problem does seem to be more prominent in poor and developing 
economies, perhaps due to less developed infrastructure in providing a general 
way of gathering information on the creditworthiness of borrowers, which makes 
them “informationally difficult” (Mian, 2006) for banks. Therefore, banks cherry 
pick those that are easiest to find credit information on and focus their attention 
on economies where credit information is easy to find. Tsai, Chang, and Hsiao 
                                            
62
 He considers (p. 231) especially the abolishment of cartels but the argument can be used in general for 
any increase in the banking sector for any reason at all – including financial FDI. 
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(2011) found that banks preferred to expand to economies where availability of 
credit information was high, limiting their information screening costs. 
The cherry-picking can in fact in some cases lower the total availability of credit 
to firms (Detragiache et al., 2008; Gormley, 2010) because the high-quality 
borrowers are “cream-skimmed” away from the aggregate pool of borrowers by 
the foreign banks. The “skimmed” rest has to pay a higher rate of interest, not 
only depressing SMEs’ willingness to borrow but even lessening the readiness 
of banks to supply credit to them due to higher default risks. If this happens, it 
can slow down economic development since SMEs are such a large share of 
the total economy. That said, the opposite seems empirically possible as well as 
one could expect if domestic banks seek new borrowers as they lose their best 
ones to the foreign banks. In Hungary, Bonin and Ábel (2000) found evidence 
that not only had foreign bank presence pushed for much welcomed 
development in the banking sector (such as ATMs expansions and bank cards) 
but credit to SMEs did not contract either. On the contrary, domestic banks 
seem to have increased their supply of credit to local SMEs exactly because the 
foreign banks cherry-picked the best borrowers and the domestic banks had to 
move their focus on SMEs. Giannetti and Ongena (2012) found the same 
effects in 13 emerging economies (European ex- Communist regime countries, 
including Hungary): domestic banks reached out to firms that previously had no 
or very limited banking relationships as foreign bank lending increased. 
The entry of foreign banks into an economy is therefore special from the point of 
view that they can self-support their existence in the host economy by simply 
providing more of the product that they provide, i.e. credit, which is always in 
demand. Not only is this quite likely a unique function of FDI in banking 
compared to other sectors of the economy, arising from the unique use of bank-
credit as money and the supply-determined quantity of it, but this can also 
influence macroeconomic structures and affect financial stability in much wider 
scale than other forms of FDI. 
2.3.4 Contagion risks from financial-FDI 
Another reason for looking in particular at the effects of financial FDI on 
financial stability is the increased contagion risk that comes with it. Arguably, 
this risk is in place in other sectors as well: if the parent company of a branch or 
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a subsidiary working in a host economy gets into trouble and needs to close or 
contract its operations in the host economy, this can have negative contagion 
effects on the latter, such as on labour demand, via the FDI link. However, 
because banks are in the centre of the economy, produce most of its credit and 
money supply and are a link in most of today’s commerce making use of bank-
deposits as a means of payment, the overall macroeconomic effects are likely 
to be more severe if/when a foreign bank goes bankrupt than when e.g. a 
foreign manufacturing firm closes down. This is especially so if the foreign bank 
is a TBTF bank in the host economy. Indeed, Reinhardt and Dell'Erba (2013, p. 
ii) “show that while FDI surges occur across all sectors, only surges in FDI in 
the financial sector are accompanied by a boom-bust cycle in GDP growth.” 
Their possible explanation (ibid): “the expansion of credit in foreign currency 
that typically accompanies these flows, which might amplify the transmission of 
external shocks under the presence of collateral constraints.” They also 
comment that capital flows, which can be destabilising, are more influenced by 
global and contagion effects in the case of financial FDI than non-financial FDI. 
All this makes it worth looking at the contagion risks that can develop in the 
financial industry and affect both the host and the home economy. 
Theoretically, it is easy to picture the contagion risk and how the banking-FDI 
link can set up a possible conduit of contagion. F. Allen and Gale (2000) 
showed that, theoretically, the most stable (national) banking system against a 
liquidity shock is a banking system where all banks have a connection with each 
other: instead of asking only one bank at a time for liquidity assistance, it 
increases the system’s resilience to a certain shock if a bank in need of liquidity 
can ask all the other banks at the same time. The liquidity shock is in that way 
more equally carried by the whole financial system instead of creating local 
“pockets” of shocks that can possibly spread later in a contagion-like sense.  
It is easy to extend Allen and Gale’s nation-wide financial system into a 
multinational banking system. In figure 2.7 there are four Allen-and-Gale 
complete (national) systems in the sense that all the banks in each have a 
connection with each other which allows them, theoretically, to disperse a local 
liquidity shock evenly over the whole system instead of burdening only a sub-
set of the whole national financial system. However, some of the banks, such as 
2.4 and 3.1, have a connection between them, such as in the form of a cross-
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border loan or banking-FDI. In the case of financial fragility in e.g. bank 2.4 it 
can decide to seek liquidity from bank 3.1. If the financial situation of bank 3.1 is 
such that it needs to disperse this shock to other banks, they may need to find 
liquidity somewhere else, such as with bank 4.3 in the case of bank 3.4. 
Figure 2.7 An Allen-and-Gale incomplete multinational financial system 
 
Allen and Gale complete (national) financial systems but incomplete multinational financial system. A 
local national financial shock in any of the national systems can have a contagion effect on others, 
possibly causing them to experience a period of financial instability. 
This way the incomplete multinational banking system can cause a contagion 
effect between national banking systems, even if each and every national 
banking system is complete in the Allen-and-Gale sense. Note that the link 
between the banks need not be an FDI link. It can e.g. be an international bank 
loan, something that has shown itself to be not altogether a robust external 
financing method of economies. An example can be found in the withdrawal of 
Japanese banks from lending to South-East Asian countries in the wake of the 
Thai devaluation, an act that had a negative impact on particularly Indonesia, 
Malaysia and South Korea (Kaminsky & Reinhart, 2001). Spillovers of changes 
in monetary stances in one economy can also spread to the next economy via 
this link, especially in the case of multinational banks (Correa & Murry, 2010). 
Lack of foreign currencies, such as because international banks loans need to 
1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2
1.4 1.3 2.4 2.3
4.1 4.2 3.1 3.2
4.4 4.3 3.4 3.3
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be repaid or refinanced, is one reason for instability as well and the connection 
in figure 2.7 can be depicted as such.63 
Now, of course, the reality is that external financing of economies exists in one 
image or another. Ring-fencing the whole economy totally off from any possible 
contagion risks in cross-border capital flows may have a negative net impact on 
the country’s ability to develop. The question then becomes not to forbid cross-
border claims outright but to encourage those that are more stable than others 
while dissuading the rest.  
This topic was covered in considerable depth, as mentioned briefly in chapter 1, 
by Eichengreen (2004). He proposed, when opening up the economy for foreign 
capital inflows, that policy-makers should allow FDI inflows to take place first, 
portfolio flows second and foreign bank loans last. This can be transferred onto 
financial FDI in particular: financial FDI should be allowed to take place first 
before cross-border bank loans are allowed. Banks that borrow from abroad 
open up a potentially more serious contagion channel for the financial system 
than foreign banks that directly operate in the economy via an FDI link 
(Schnabl, 2012).64 Foreign banks, operating via an FDI link, can provide funding 
to the local economy and as such substitute the more unstable funding that 
otherwise would have come via an international bank loan to a domestic bank 
(Brana & Lahet, 2011). But the FDI link can also complement other capital 
flows.  
It can be argued that if an economy wants to protect itself from possible 
contagion effects of foreign banks with FDI links in it the following should be 
done: favour secure and well capitalised banks over others and favour banks 
from economies with low and stable economic growth. 
The reason for the first part of that argument is that a shock in the parent 
company or the home economy can spread to the host economy via the 
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 This has been responded to by central banks as they try to maintain liquidity in the financial system. 
The Federal Reserve in the US has e.g. foreign exchange swap agreements with many of the biggest 
central banks in the world, which are “designed to improve liquidity conditions in global money markets 
and to minimize the risk that strains abroad could spread to U.S. markets, by providing foreign central 
banks with the capacity to deliver U.S. dollar funding to institutions in their jurisdictions” (Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, 2014). 
64
 Schnabl finds that foreign-owned banks are more resilient to international shocks to liquidity than 
domestic banks that finance themselves abroad. As one could have expected, locally funded banks open 
the least serious contagion channel for foreign shocks. 
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banking-FDI link. Dedola, Karadi, and Lombardo (2013) present a theoretical 
model where, via global financial integration, a shock to either the quality or the 
valuation of capital, or both, in an international financial intermediary causes a 
global-wide contraction of credit. Empirical results back this up. Brana and 
Lahet (2011) show that foreign bank lending via local operations (via FDI) in 
CEE countries is notably under the influence of parent bank factors: if the 
parent bank is putting aside a lot of provisions for bad loans, lending in its 
banking-FDI connections contracts. Similar results are found by de Haas and 
van Lelyveld (2006): bad health of the parent bank – they used loan loss 
provisions to net interest revenues as a proxy for that factor – had negative 
effects on the lending activities of its foreign affiliations. They confirmed this 
result eight years later (De Haas & Van Lelyveld, 2014). Furthermore, better 
capitalised banks are able to grow faster than badly capitalised banks. 
Therefore, well capitalised and healthy banks should be welcomed into host 
economies if local policy makers want to minimise any contagion effects from 
the parent bank on the local supply of credit. 
The reason for the second part of the argument – banks from economies with 
low and stable economic growth should be favoured over banks from other 
economies – is that it would improve the willingness of the foreign banks in 
question to supply credit in the host economy. Moshirian (2001) and de Haas 
and van Lelyveld (2006) found that strong economic growth at home damped 
the credit growth of banks operating via a banking-FDI abroad. Brana and Lahet 
(2011) report not only that the bad health of the parent bank negatively 
influences the credit supply of its foreign subsidiaries but increased profits of the 
parent bank reduces lending (p-value significant at the 90% level) in host 
economies via the FDI operations. Duenwald, Gueorguiev, and Schaechter 
(2005, p. 13) report that the then-recent credit growth in Bulgaria and Romania 
was pushed by foreign banks since “[m]any of the banks’ foreign owners are 
domiciled in less profitable mature markets, so parents have encouraged their 
subsidiaries and branches to pursue aggressive loan portfolio expansion to gain 
market share and improve consolidated results, thereby contributing to the 
acceleration of credit [in Bulgaria and Romania].” In other words, low economic 
growth at home led the parent banks to push their foreign subsidiaries “to 
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pursue aggressive loan portfolio expansion”.65 But the home economy must be 
stable as well: Hryckiewicz and Kowalewski (2011) use an empirically based 
probit model to show that a crisis in the home country encourages parent banks 
to close foreign subsidiaries. Peek and Rosengren (2000a) have a similar story: 
when Japanese banks experienced a crisis in the 90s, they contracted their 
supply of loans in the US, which had a real economic impact there. Therefore, a 
crisis at home calls banks home just as high economic growth does. So in order 
to encourage the foreign banks to supply credit in the host economy the home 
economy’s economic growth should be low (profit opportunities are higher in the 
host economy) and stable (a crisis at home makes the parent bank “call its 
troops home” so to speak). 
This effect of the home market and the parent on the credit supply of 
subsidiaries can perhaps be explained with an opportunity-cost explanation 
similar to Moshirian’s (2001): banks have a certain balance sheet (and a certain 
pool of consolidated equity to leverage via e.g. credit creation wherever they 
operate) but comparatively best information and customer relationship in the 
home economy, making it operationally cheaper and more secure to lend out to 
home customers compared to foreign customers. In short, multinational banks 
are naturally home-country biased: if economic growth and credit demand at 
home are strong, causing strong profits in the parent bank, why risk valuable 
equity in expanding abroad? Also, if there is a crisis at home and the parent 
company needs all its financial power, such as equity and liquidity, to stay alive, 
the foreign offices will pay the price.  
Taken together, these empirical findings could lend support to arguments of 
policy-makers of host economies where they reason that well capitalised 
(“healthy”) banks from economies with low and stable economic growth should 
be favoured over other banks that want to enter the economy. For if the policy-
makers open their borders for an ill-capitalised bank that will turn back when 
economic growth returns or crashes at home, the host economy risks opening 
up for a bank that may cause more destabilisation in the supply of credit than 
                                            
65
 Of course, in and of itself this “aggressive loan portfolio expansion” can lead to financial instability in 
the host economy according to Minsky’s FIH. But that is a matter which is strictly not the topic here, i.e. 
the possibility of contagion effects on the credit supply in the host economy via the banking-FDI link with 
regards to the home economy’s economic growth and the health of the parent bank. 
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not. However, it is not certain that such “cherry picking” would perfectly comply 
with international regulations on equal access and opportunities to businesses. 
Finally, the contagion risk is an issue for the home economy as well, as the 
contagion channel can be a two-way street. As Herrero and Simón (2006, p. 16) 
point out, not a lot of work has been put into analysing the effects of banking-
FDI on the home economy, with the results that “the effects that it may have on 
the home country are virtually unknown”. Contagion risk is one of those factors 
but, as Herrero and Simón point out, others include classic home-country 
impacts of FDI outflow in general such as financial, production, employment and 
structural influences. Some scarce work on the contagion front can be 
highlighted though and new work added.  
The work so far seems to first and foremost focus on the entry mode of the 
foreign bank, especially with regard to whether the bank chooses to enter the 
host economy via a branch or a subsidiary. The difference, as Brunnermeier et 
al. (2012) explain, is that if a bank sets up a branch, it is responsible for any 
problem that may arise in that office. But if a subsidiary is set up, the contagion 
from the foreign office onto the parent bank can be limited, simply by dumping 
the subsidiary as some foreign banks did in Argentina (Hryckiewicz & 
Kowalewski, 2011). Earlier, the same authors had shown that foreign banks 
choose to set up branches only in more developed (and stable) economies. 
Only a handful of foreign-bank branches were set up in emerging markets 
before the crisis in 2008 and no foreign bank used that entry method after the 
crisis started (Hryckiewicz & Kowalewski, 2010).  
The method of financing a multinational bank is also a factor that influences 
potential contagion risks from abroad to home. Brunnermeier et al. (2012) point 
out that multinational banks that are funded by long-term liabilities and a stable 
deposit base pose less risk than those funded with wholesale or interbank 
funds, no matter if they operate subsidiaries or branches since, as F. Allen et al. 
(2011) point out, banks can transfer resources between their subsidiaries and 
parent “relatively fast”.  
F. Allen et al. (2011) also briefly mention the case of Icelandic banks, which is 
an excellent example of outward banking-FDI opening up a contagion channel 
that in the end had catastrophic effects on the home economy.  
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Icelandic outward financial-FDI flow was more than 37% of GDP in the peak 
year of 2007. It had practically been nonexistent only four years earlier, see 
figure 2.8. Outward financial-FDI stock was at the same time higher than in any 
other industry and represented 38% of total outward FDI stock. No foreign bank 
was or is operating in Iceland. 
Figure 2.8 – Total outward financial-FDI flows as a share of GDP 
 
Data: Central Bank of Iceland, Statistics Iceland. Author’s calculations 
Figure 2.9 – Outward FDI stock as a share of GDP, selected industries 
 
Data: Central Bank of Iceland, Statistics Iceland. Author’s calculations 
This outward financial-FDI was, as F. Allen et al. (2011) point out, to a large 
extent financed with wholesale and interbank loans (see also Appendix 1). 
Deposits increased their prominence in the funding base after the “Geyser 
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Crisis” in 2006 when foreign analysts highlighted the Icelandic banks’ 
dependence on wholesale and interbank funding (see e.g. Thomas, Alamutu, 
and Lewis (2006) and Ashby and Henriques (2006)). The banks responded, 
most notably Kaupthing with its “Edge” and Landsbanki with its infamous 
“Icesave” internet-only banks. The banks then shifted the deposits so raised 
between the foreign offices and the parent banks, especially at the height of the 
crisis and during the final days of their lives when they were scrambling together 
whatever resources they had to stay alive. This money-shifting in fact reached 
such an alarming rate that the British government applied the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 against the then-failed Landsbanki to stop it from 
being able to shift deposits from its UK Icesave branches to anywhere 
(Braithwaite, Barker, Peel, & Burns, 2008; Donaldson & Vina, 2008; Roy & 
Watts, 2008). 
When liquidity on wholesale markets diminished in the wake of the subprime 
bubble bursting in the US – Icelandic banks had minute direct exposure to US 
subprime loans66 – the banks got into trouble funding themselves. They turned 
to the government and the central bank that tried to step in. Glitnir bank was 
first to turn to official assistance when it asked for an emergency loan in foreign 
currency from the central bank, effectively asking it to be a lender of last resort. 
The bank did not get the loan but an equity injection of EUR 600 million from the 
state (Vísir, 2008a). When Kaupthing turned up, hat in hand, on the central 
bank’s step it got a EUR 500 million emergency loan. Its Danish subsidiary, FIH, 
was accepted as collateral (Vísir, 2008b). All three banks had before that 
received liquidity assistance in the form of “Love Letters” (i. ástarbréf) from the 
Central Bank, which were practically extra-easy REPO agreements.67 The total 
outstanding REPO agreements skyrocketed during the months before the final 
crash in October 2008, see figure 2.10. 
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 Kaupthing Bank had some exposure to it, probably around 80 billion ISK, which an attempt was in fact 
made to hide by moving the subprime loans onto the asset site of a holding company which then took a 
loan from Kaupthing, thereby hiding the direct exposure for the bank (Herbertsdóttir, 2009). 
67
 The “Love Letters” were bonds that the Icelandic banks issued to each other and the central bank made 
eligible as collateral in REPO agreements – on 17 January 2008, see Central Bank of Iceland (2008) – 
when the banks had run into serious liquidity needs. All other more creditworthy collateral, such as 
government bonds, was already used by the banks in their REPO agreements with e.g. the ECB from 
where they got euros, which temporarily alleviated their liquidity needs in foreign exchange. When the 
banks went bankrupt, the Central Bank was left with the Love Letters as worthless collateral. The 
Icelandic National Audit Office estimated that the total loss of the Love Letters was ISK 400 billion, 27% 
of 2008 GDP (Vísir, 2009). 
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Figure 2.10 – Central Bank of Iceland, outstanding REPO agreements 
 
Data: Central Bank of Iceland 
Prior to the collapse of the Icelandic banks the currency had depreciated rapidly 
as well. From end of June 2007 to 1st of October 2008 the price of the USD had 
gone up 74% measured in Icelandic kronas. This currency collapse, to a large 
extent fuelled by the problems of the Icelandic banks, introduced a great burst 
of financial instability into the Icelandic financial system as foreign currency 
loans and inflation-indexed mortgages increased in nominal terms. Borrowers’ 
debt burden increased sharply. When the banks finally collapsed the turmoil 
reached its height and there was even an old fashioned bank run but the 
Central Bank responded by putting increased cash and coins into circulation, 
alleviating the instability due to the bank run considerably (figure 2.11). 
Furthermore, since the emergency lending to the banks had gone south, both in 
the form of now-worthless Love Letters and special assistance such as the EUR 
500 million loan to Kaupthing, the equity of the central bank took a hit. The state 
responded by issuing a government bond to the central bank, thereby 
rejuvenating its equity base but also increasing the public debt by 270 billion 
ISK (19% of GDP 2008).  
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Figure 2.11 – Iceland, coins and notes in circulation during the October 2008 crash 
 
Data: Central Bank of Iceland 
The story of the Icelandic banks is an excellent example of contagion risks that 
financial-FDI can introduce.68 Not only did the home country suffer substantially 
from the contagion of subprime loans onto the Icelandic banks – a contagion 
that would not have had been as prominent had the Icelandic banks not 
expanded abroad – but host economies of the banks were hit as well as the 
parent banks were going bankrupt and branches and subsidiaries were left 
hanging. Had the Icelandic banks expanded more slowly, used more long-term 
financing and tested their methods in more rigorous ways instead of expanding 
fast by any means necessary, it is well possible that not only would they have 
made positive contributions to financial development in their host economies but 
they would not have introduced as much contagion risk to their home economy 
either. It is safe to say that Murphy’s Law was in its prime concerning the 
financial-FDI of Icelandic banks. 
2.3.5 Financial-FDI, credit availability, credit stability and capital flows 
In continuation of the discussion of possible contagion risks of financial-FDI 
comes the issue of possible benefits such capital inflow may bring. Specifically, 
is financial-FDI associated with a) more credit availability, b) more stable credit 
availability and c) changes in the nature of capital flows? Regarding the last 
issue we should, having the potential financial-FDI effect on financial stability in 
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 The failed outward financial-FDI of German bank Hypo Real Estate Bank when it acquired Irish bank 
Depfa Bank in 2007 seems like another prime example of introducing contagion risks onto the home 
economy, see e.g. The Irish Times (Scally, 2013). 
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mind, specifically ask: does financial-FDI act as a substitute or a complement to 
other types of capital flows? 
Financial-FDI and credit availability 
Making credit more available can have a positive impact on economic 
development. Access to credit, in the Schumpeterian sense, can be the 
purchasing power needed for investments and general development, leading to 
increased production capabilities, less poverty, more income equality and 
economic growth. Access to credit and other general “financial inclusion” can 
therefore be interpreted as a positive aspect of financial and economic 
development (Beck & Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008).  
At first, we could expect the entry of a foreign bank to increase the credit 
availability in the economy, especially since we have seen that foreign banks 
can have faster growth of credit than domestic ones (Crystal et al., 2002; 
Goldberg et al., 2000; Haas et al., 2012). The subject of credit availability is also 
closely connected to that of availability of information on the borrower in order 
for banks to be able to perform credit screening. Petersen and Rajan (2002) 
point out that greatly improved information technology has allowed banks to 
carry out banking services over longer distances than before. Multinational 
banks, operating over longer distances than domestic ones, benefit significantly 
from this development. Multinational banks can also have easier access to 
foreign capital in general, easing possible constraints that the host economy 
may have on accessing foreign capital markets (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Huizinga, 1998). Therefore, we could expect the entry of multinational banks to 
improve credit availability in the host economy. The empirical record is however 
not straight forward, not least because of the risk of “cherry picking” by foreign 
banks due to lack of information that can help banks doing the screening of the 
potential borrowers (see 2.3.3 The (possible) unique self-supporting mechanism 
of banking-FDI).  
The topics of credit availability and information availability have shown 
themselves to be closely related. Jappelli and Pagano (2002) looked at 49 
countries and found that in those where there was some sort of (public or 
private) credit-information sharing mechanism between lenders, lending was 
higher, credit risk lower and default rates lower. Houston et al. (2010) looked at 
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69 countries and made a connection between greater information sharing on 
one hand and higher bank profitability, lower bank risks, higher economic 
growth and lower likelihood of financial crisis on the other. Here, we can argue 
that the arrival of a foreign bank would improve financial stability, if the sharing 
of information is improved or if its arrival in any way improves the availability 
and the quality of data. Levine (2001) pointed this out, as we have already 
seen. 
In light of this research it seems that the presence of a multinational bank is not 
necessarily what improves the availability of credit but rather improved 
information gathering and sharing on borrowers. This seems to be confirmed by 
De Haas and Naaborg (2005) who report that multiple multinational banks focus 
first on large borrowers, either from their own home economy (“Follow the 
Client” model) or the host economy, but gradually move towards host-economy 
SMEs as information on them becomes available. Examples include ABN 
AMRO, HVB/BA-CA, ING and Raiffeisen banks in central and east European 
countries. However, multinational banks’ impact on e.g. information systems 
and credit screening should not be ruled out since we should, especially with 
Petersen and Rajan (2002) in mind, expect multinational banks to be in control 
of highly productive information technologies which can make improved use of 
the available information and even have spillover effects on domestic lenders.69 
Financial-FDI and credit stability 
As in the case of credit availability, the empirical record of the impact of 
financial-FDI on credit stability seems to be ambiguous. 
On host-economy influences, de Haas and van Lelyveld (2010) used panal data 
to empirically investigate the matter. They find that when there is a host-
economy downturn or even a crisis, subsidiaries of foreign banks do not 
contract their lending as much as domestic host-economy banks since the 
foreign banks can rely on support from the parent company. In Latin America, 
including Argentina and Mexico, foreign banks have been recorded having a 
stronger loan growth, a firmer response to asset deterioration and a greater 
ability to absorb losses, having the net result of improving the functionality of  
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 As an example, KBC bank developed and implemented new credit-score techniques for 
microentrepreneurs in the Central and East European countries after it entered the market (De Haas & 
Naaborg, 2005). 
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the financial system as a whole (Crystal et al., 2002). Previously, however, 
Goldberg et al. (2000) had reached the conclusion that although foreign banks 
had higher and more stable credit growth than their domestic counterparts it 
was not the ownership (state, private domestic, foreign) that was important but 
the health of the banks in question. They looked at Argentina and Mexico as 
well. They hold the position that foreign banks, due to their better health, have 
improved financial stability in the countries in question. From the study of 
Detragiache and Gupta (2006) we learn that foreign banks in Malaysia were 
unevenly hit by the Asian crisis. The crucial difference was how concentrated 
they were in the area and, unsurprisingly, if they were operating in the asset 
bubble sections of the economy. So not only do the foreign banks need to be 
healthy, they need to be diversified as well if they are to bring improvements to 
financial stability. Too much concentration will simply cause them to be hit as 
hard as domestic banks. If they are hit too hard, they may just pick up and 
leave, causing the volatility in credit stability to increase rather than decrease. 
International and home-economy influences have effects as well and not just 
the health and the diversification of the banks. We can see that a slowdown 
external to the host economy may have adverse effects on credit stability. In 
Taiwan during the subprime recession – an international troublesome period – 
foreign banks cut lending to domestic SMEs (Shen, Chu, & Wang, 2012). And 
while de Haas and van Lelyveld (2006) note, as they did four years later, that 
foreign banks can support credit creation in the host economy during recessions 
they also highlight that the subsidiaries of multinational banks are dependent on 
the health of their parent bank – something Peek and Rosengren (2000a) 
pointed out in the case of Japanese banks in the US and de Haas and Lelyveld 
did themselves in the case of the financial crisis of 2008-2009, especially if the 
banks were relying on wholesale funding rather than local deposits (De Haas & 
Van Lelyveld, 2014). 
Bottom-line then, the final effects on credit stability of financial-FDI in the host 
economy seem uncertain: although the foreign banks may seem more immune 
to host-economy shocks, thereby positively contributing to credit stability, they 
also open the host economy up for exogenous shocks, thereby negatively 
contributing to credit stability. The net effects are unclear but as is discussed in 
2.3.4 Contagion risks from financial-FDI, if host economies want to at least 
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partially protect themselves from exogenous shocks on the domestic supply of 
credit from multinational banks, they should prefer well capitalised banks from 
economies with low but stable economic growth. However, as will be explained 
in next section, although financial-FDI can introduce contagion risks into the 
host economy it should be preferred over general inflow of cross-border bank 
lending, at least from the point of view of maintaining financial stability.  
Financial-FDI and capital flows 
As already mentioned, Eichengreen (2004) recommends that FDI should be let 
first into an economy when liberalising the capital account. Bank loans, i.e. 
cross-border claims, should be let in last. Therefore, to maintain financial 
stability and avoid capital-flows crisis, specifically a capital flight, FDI should be 
preferred (although, as we argued in chapter 1, it is not impossible to see FDI 
flows flee as well).  
There are two issues that arise from this. First, we must investigate whether the 
empirical record of financial-FDI and cross-border bank loans is according to 
Eichengreen’s expectations, i.e. is the former more stable than the latter. 
Second, we should look into whether the financial-FDI acts as a substitute for 
cross-border claims, preferably not limiting ourselves to bank loans only but 
portfolio flows in general. 
On the stability issue, financial-FDI inflow does seem to linger around more than 
cross-border bank loans. F. Allen et al. (2011) point out that due to possible 
regulatory framework there can be restrictions on multinational banks when it 
comes to drawing liquidity out of their subsidiaries back home to the parent 
bank. This is not so in the case of cross-border bank lending where the debt in 
question may even be “putable”70 within a certain limit, making it possible for the 
lender to withdraw the liquidity much faster than if it were “stuck” in the host 
economy with a subsidiary subject to host-economy regulatory restrictions.71 
Schnabl’s (2012) paper should be re-mentioned here as he showed that 
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 A “putable” security is one which’s holder can demand immediate payment from the issuer of the 
security. A demand deposit is “putable” in this respect as the owner of the demand deposit can demand 
immediate payment whenever (s)he likes. Putable debt instruments have the benefit of normally carrying 
a lower rate of interest, exactly because its owner can demand immediate payment. 
71
 Chatfield and Moyer (1986) reported, using Moody’s Bond Survey, that 68 out of 90 putable corporate 
bonds were issued by banking and financial institutions. On top of that come bank deposits which can be 
putable (i.e. withdrawn) under certain circumstances. Putable cross-border bank liabilities are therefore 
not unlikely to exist to some extent. 
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domestic banks intermediating cross-border bank loans were harder hit by 
capital withdrawal than domestic subsidiaries of multinational banks. McCauley, 
McGuire, and Von Peter (2010) have similar results: local lending of 
multinational banks funded with local funds (via banks’ local offices) was more 
stable than cross-border lending, particularly so in the case of emerging 
markets, during the subprime turmoil.  
So financial-FDI is more stable than cross-border claims, which rhymes with 
Eichengreen’s advice. The reason why this is so is perhaps best explained by 
F. Allen et al. (2011, p. 4) in the case of Central and East European economies 
during the subprime crisis (emphasis added): 
The CEE countries experienced a less severe reversal of capital 
flows than other regions of the emerging world... This can be 
attributed to foreign bank presence through subsidiary structure. 
Specifically, many foreign banks were ‘locked in’ because their local 
subsidiaries had given long-term loans in the host countries that 
could not be recalled. 
The “locked in” reason for a multinational bank to sustain capital flows, rather 
than quickly pull out, seems also to have been confirmed by De Haas and Van 
Horen (2013) who noted that not only was it influential for a multinational bank 
to have a subsidiary in the host economy but how entangled they were with 
other host-economy lenders mattered as well: close integration into the network 
of other lenders discouraged multinational banks’ retrenchment from that 
economy. Long experience in the host economy also encouraged them to stick 
around.  
So not only does financial-FDI seem to be more stable funding than cross-
border bank lending but it seems to substitute it as well, although that is not 
entirely certain. Going back to the regulatory framework point of Allen et al. we 
can understand it as bank subsidiaries being substitutes for cross-border bank 
lending: rather than lending to a bank in economy X, the bank simply sets up its 
own subsidiary there. Brana and Lahet (2011), in their study on CEE countries, 
note that not only is the presence of foreign banks a substitute for cross-border 
lending but it also encourages local-currency lending rather than foreign-
currency lending in which the cross-border lending is often denominated in 
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(following the “Original Sin” problem). Therefore, cross-border bank lending and 
financial-FDI seem to be substitutes. 
But going outside the relationship between financial-FDI and cross-border bank 
lending, we find evidences that financial-FDI is a complement to equity flows. 
Portes and Rey (2005) show that one of the most notable explanations for 
cross-country equity flows is the presence of a multinational bank in the host 
economy.72 Multinational banks use their local offices as information hubs, 
increasing cross-country asset trade as information flow between the home and 
the host economy is improved. Following J. T. Harvey (2009), we can argue that 
increased equity flows are destabilising for the current account and exchange 
rates, having the potential to harm international trade (as exchange rate 
forecasting becomes harder) and introduce elements of financial instability into 
the economy. And we have also mentioned that the entry of a foreign bank into 
an economy can ease the access to foreign capital markets. Surely, in that 
case, financial-FDI is not a substitute but a complement to capital flows – at 
least it should encourage them. 
Therefore, although financial-FDI may be preferable over cross-border bank 
lending when it comes to financial stability, its complementary nature to equity 
flows, and even portfolio flows in general, can counter such positive effects if 
Harvey is right on increased capital flows having destabilising effects on the 
economy. The net effects are unclear. 
Let us now quickly draw some main points of the discussion so far together. 
Financial FDI deserves a special focus due to the centre-like role of the sector 
in the economy. FDI in banking and financial services has been shown to affect 
the interest spread on loans (Unite & Sullivan, 2003) and the rates of bank 
lending (Claeys & Hainz, 2013), especially since financial-FDI can feed of itself. 
It can also increase the competition in the industry (Jeon et al., 2011) and 
generally affect the overall supplementation of credit; foreign banks’ cherry 
picking can risk the soundness of the local banks and increase the chances of 
credit expansions as banks fight for market shares. This can lead to credit 
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 From a strict point of view we cannot write “portfolio flows” instead of “equity flows” here since 
Portes and Rey look explicitly at only the latter. However, they also note (p. 272, emphasis added) that 
“the equity portfolio flows that we study are a very significant component of international capital flows.” 
It would therefore not be a heroic assumption to consider as true, until proven wrong, that the presence of 
multinational banks is also complementary to portfolio flows in general.  
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booms and busts (Claessens & Horen, 2012; Rashid, 2011). Financial-FDI can 
also affect the currency composition of credit which can affect the overall 
development of financial stability (Reinhardt & Dell'Erba, 2013). Despite this 
though, financial FDI can also relieve pressures on emerging economies to find 
funding in foreign currencies as financial FDI can ease the access to credit in 
local currency, acting as a substitute to foreign currency bank loans (Brana & 
Lahet, 2011). However, financial FDI can also act as a complement to other 
portfolio flows into the economy, such as into the local securities market (Portes 
& Rey, 2005), which can have negative effects on the stability of the exchange 
rate and consequently financial stability (Harvey, 2009). All in all, the effects of 
financial FDI on financial stability are complicated. Theoretically, the net effects 
of financial FDI on financial stability are unclear and each case will only be 
settled via empirical investigation. 
2.4 A focus case:  Standard Chartered 
In a series of reports, written for the multinational bank Standard Chartered, 
Kapstein and Kim (Kapstein & Kim, 2010, 2012, 2013) investigated the impact 
of the bank’s operations in a number of African countries (Nigeria, Zambia, 
Kenya, Ghana) and Bangladesh. The reports are predominantly firm-level in 
nature and do not investigate many of the possible effects that an international 
bank can have as it enters an economy. Nevertheless, some of the effects, and 
the characteristics of the bank’s operations, are certainly worth highlighting in 
the light of the discussion in this chapter. 
First, we can see that the bank has considerable gross effects on employment, 
although we do not know whether the net effects are substantial. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, the bank supports roughly 1.9 million jobs, directly and 
indirectly. In Bangladesh the figure is almost 470,000 jobs, excluding the bank’s 
lending activities to other banks.  
The bank has also used its international network to provide foreign capital to the 
host economies, implying that its presence has eased access to foreign capital. 
In Bangladesh, that foreign capital was used to invest in power and 
telecommunication infrastructure. In Africa, the bank, in 2012, channelled USD 
3.5 billion from international capital markets to the region. 
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The bank’s influence on the development of financial markets is certainly worth 
highlighting. In a number of its host economies, the bank is an active participant 
in secondary markets of financial assets, thereby deepening them and 
improving the pricing of products. The bank was a pioneer in the use of 
derivatives in Bangladesh. It provided the first Automatic Teller Machines, ATM, 
in Bangladesh, Uganda and Kenya.  The first credit card in Bangladesh, the first 
internet banking for businesses in Tanzania, and the first currency hedges in 
Ghana all came from the bank as well. It assisted in the development of the 
electronic payment system in Ghana and provided education on derivative and 
risk management in Nigeria. The bank also played a role when Bangladesh got 
its first sovereign credit rating (in 2010). Numerous former employees of the 
bank have also assisted in spreading know-how in the financial sectors of the 
countries where the bank is stationed, including four alumni of the bank that are 
CEOs elsewhere in the Ghanaian banking sector. There are therefore strong 
qualitative evidences for the case that the bank has assisted in financial 
development in its host economies.  
There are evidences for cherry-picking the biggest and best borrowers – the 
least “informationally difficult” ones – as well. Wholesale banking, i.e. dealing 
with larger institutions, is the main driver of the bank’s business in African 
countries: 70% of its revenues in the region come from wholesale banking. Only 
a small fraction of on-shore lending goes to SMEs: 7% of the Kenyan loan 
portfolio goes to SMEs. The similar figures for Zambia, Ghana and Nigeria are 
5%, 4% and 2% respectively. This must be considered small compared to the 
local banking industry’s average exposure to SMEs. In Kenya, 50% of all bank 
lending goes to SMEs and in Zambia the figure is 18% (Calice, Chando, & 
Sekioua, 2012). 
We saw earlier in this chapter that improved information about potential 
borrowers improve the credit screening process of banks, allowing them to 
better solve the problem of asymmetry of information. One way of knowing 
more about the potential borrowers is to gain experience in the economy, 
another is to improve information systems related to e.g. repayment capabilities 
and past borrowing. Indeed, as Standard Chartered has learned more about the 
host economy and developed its local credit screening and customer 
relationships it is in it has been able to expand its credit supplementation 
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process to other customers than in wholesale banking. An example of this: the 
bank’s retail operations in Kenya and Zambia are more developed than in 
Nigeria, where it has not been stationed as long as in the other two economies. 
It should be noted here that the bank left its banking operations in Nigeria, due 
to political reasons, in 1996 but then returned to the economy in 1999 (Standard 
Chartered, 2014).  
Conclusion to chapter 2 
We began this chapter with the aim of arguing why financial-FDI should be 
focused on in particular when the effects of FDI on financial stability are 
investigated. Having explained the role of banks in the economy as both main 
creators of credit and intermediaries we showed how they are structurally in the 
centre of it: most commerce in today’s modern economy is done with some sort 
of bank products.  
On top of banks’ role as the main creators of credit and intermediary roles in 
commerce we saw how financial-FDI can introduce contagion risks into the host 
economy. At the same time, given that most economies have some sort of 
international trade of one type or the other, closing the economy completely 
from foreign influences and capital may be suboptimal and hurt welfare. 
Financial-FDI’s effects on credit stability, credit availability and capital flows 
were investigated and found to be ambiguous and potentially harmful to 
financial stability. Overall, we cannot tell for certain whether financial-FDI will be 
advantageous or not for financial stability, either in the home or in the host 
economy. 
We have so far spoken of financial instability in an abstract way. Before we can 
make further investigations into the relationship between FDI, financial-FDI and 
financial (in)stability we must focus in more detail on what the term includes and 
how we should go along in measuring such a phenomenon. That will be the 
subject of chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3 – Financial stability 
Thus, the overall fragility-robustness of the financial structure, upon 
which the cyclical stability of the economy depends, emerges out of 
loans made by bankers. 
Hyman Minsky (2008b, p. 261) 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss and clarify what “financial stability” is. The 
purpose is to edge ourselves closer to a measurement of the phenomenon 
which will in continuity be used to investigate the relationship, if any, between 
FDI in general and financial-FDI on one hand and financial stability on the other 
in order to empirically support the discussion in chapters one and two regarding 
the effects of the former on the latter. This chapter serves as a bridge between 
chapters one and two on one hand and chapter four on the other. 
The outline of this chapter is therefore as follows. First, we will shortly mention 
past attempts at defining and measuring “financial stability”. Second, we will ask 
ourselves why it is important to reach and maintain financial stability. Third, we 
will focus on a specific hypothesis concerning the formation of financial 
instability, the antithesis of financial stability. Fourth, and finally, building on that 
specific hypothesis we will justify how we could go along measuring financial 
stability (or its evil cousin, financial instability). This work, along with that of 
chapters one and two, will then support that of chapter four. In that chapter we 
will create a measurement of financial instability, following the discussion in this 
chapter, and investigate the connection between financial instability and FDI, 
making a connection between chapters one, two and three. 
3.1 Defining and measuring financial stability 
3.1.1 Defining financial stability 
It is best breaking out the bad news immediately: contrary to e.g. FDI (see 
chapter 1) there exists no universally accepted definition of financial (in)stability 
(other related terms are e.g. “financial stress”, “financial fragility” or “financial 
crisis”). Often the antithesis of financial stability – i.e. financial instability – is 
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used to convey the meaning of what the former is. The following are examples 
of proposed definitions:73 
Financial stress is defined as the force exerted on economic agents 
by uncertainty and changing expectations of loss in financial markets 
and institutions. Financial stress is a continuum. 
Illing and Liu (2006, p. 243) 
[F]inancial stability [is] the prevalence of a financial system, which is 
able to ensure in a lasting way, and without major disruptions, an 
efficient allocation of savings to investment opportunities. How close 
an economy is to the break point, exceeding which would impair the 
efficient allocation of savings, could be labelled the degree of 
financial fragility. This definition is very broad and - in my opinion - 
intellectually convincing. Due to the focus on the resilience of the 
financial system it would not classify each individual bank failure or 
each large swing in an asset price as proof of financial instability. 
Issing (2003, p. 1) 
A financial system is in range of stability whenever it is capable of 
facilitating (rather than impeding) the performance of an economy, 
and of dissipating financial imbalances that arise endogenously or as 
a result of significant adverse and unanticipated events.  
Schinasi (2004, p. 8) 
Thus we define episodes of financial instability as episodes in which 
a large number of parties, whether they are households, companies, 
or (individual) governments, experience financial crises which are not 
warranted by their previous behaviour, and where these crises 
collectively have seriously adverse macro-economic effects. In other 
words, a distinguishing feature of episodes of financial instability is 
that innocent bystanders get hurt. 
W. A. Allen and Wood (2006, pp. 159-160) 
                                            
73
 Those definitions mentioned are only a small sample of the whole. See Houben, Kakes, and Schinasi 
(2004) for a more detailed list. 
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A financial crisis is a nonlinear disruption to financial markets in 
which adverse selection and moral hazard problems become much 
worse, so that financial markets are unable to efficiently channel 
funds to those who have the most productive investment 
opportunities. A financial crisis thus results in the inability of financial 
markets to function efficiently, which leads to a sharp contraction in 
economic activity. 
Mishkin (1996, pp. 17-18) 
Arguably, it is not optimal to discuss something that is vaguely defined. At least, 
in the case of foreign direct investment, there exists a quantitative definition that 
has been agreed upon by international institutions and policy makers, and 
therefore common and standard quantification methods have been developed. 
When it comes to financial (in)stability, no such thing exists as the above 
definitions show. 
This does not rule out quantifying the phenomenon as multiple researchers 
have made an attempt to do (see 3.1.2 Measuring financial (in)stability). In fact, 
as W. A. Allen and Wood (2006) point out, there is no universal definition of 
“price stability” either; central banks have different views of which price index to 
focus on and how and when to carry out their inflation targeting. Nevertheless, 
despite this lack of standardised definition of price stability, inflation targeting is 
widely carried out by the monetary powers in the world without any definite 
agreement what degree or measurement of inflation is “correct.” Analogously, 
despite the somewhat fuzzy definitions of what it is, measuring financial stability 
on the basis of some sort of quantification should not be ruled out by definition. 
Finally, two more characteristics of financial instability should be highlighted. 
First, it has gradations as Chant (2003, p. 8) notes: 
Financial instability is not an all or nothing condition; it has 
gradations. A financial crisis is an extreme degree of financial 
instability, where the pressures on the financial system are sufficient 
to impair its function significantly over a prolonged period. But 
financial systems can be subject to stress well before a crisis takes 
hold. 
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Furthermore, financial instability is macroeconomic and system-wide in nature. 
The characteristic of “episodes of financial instability” is that they hurt innocent 
bystanders (W. A. Allen & Wood, 2006). What Allen and Wood called “micro 
financial crises” – only one economic agent is harmed by either its own dim-
witted investments, general lack of financial prudence or simple bad fortune – 
should, from a Schumpeterian “creative destruction” point of view, not be 
stopped. Issing (2003) furthermore points out that the failure of a single bank or 
serious asset prices movements should not always be taken as a sign of 
serious financial instability. We should, however, not forget that it is the 
system’s reaction that matters. A failure of a single too-big-to-fail (TBTF) 
financial institution, as an example, can bring the whole financial system down 
and create a serious “episode of financial instability.” This of course gives TBTF 
banks their name. 
3.1.2 Measuring financial (in)stability 
Multiple attempts have been made to measure financial stability, or its 
antithesis, despite a vague definition of the phenomenon. The old way was to 
monitor indicators that former empirical research had identified as valuable in 
giving an early warning on an upcoming financial crisis, i.e. Early Warning 
Indicators (EWI). Other similar terms include “Early Warning Systems”, “Early 
Warning Models” and “Early Warning Signals”.74 
Relying on Yucel (2011) we see that the first EWIs focused on the micro-scale, 
specifically corporate bankruptcies (Altman, 1971; Altman & Loris, 1976; Moyer, 
1977; Ohlson, 1980). The macro side received its interest somewhat later and 
then focused in particular on exchange rates and potential debt rescheduling of 
sovereign debt for developing countries (Eichengreen, Rose, Wyplosz, Dumas, 
& Weber, 1995; Feder, Just, & Ross, 1981; Fisk & Rimlinger, 1979; Folks Jr. & 
Stansell, 1975; Morgan, 1986). A noticeable surge in macro-focused 
contributions took place after the Tequila and  Asian Tigers crises and this time 
the focus was moving onto “crises” in general and not only exchange rates and 
sovereign defaults (Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky, Lizondo, & 
Reinhart, 1998; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999; Miller & Luangaram, 1998). 
                                            
74
 EWI exist in other professions as well, such as engineering and medical sciences. As an example, 
Eidson, Kramer, Stone, Hagiwara, and Schmit (2001) discuss the use of dead birds as an EWI for the 
West Nile virus. The interest in EWI in finance and economics related fields came from their performance 
in engineering (Yucel, 2011) 
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The offspring of the EWI literature were financial (in)stability indices, perhaps 
more formally known as “composite quantitative measures” or “composite 
quantitative indicators of financial instability”. In those indices a group of 
underlying measures are joined together into a continuous measure and often 
presented in a graphic form. This approach has become quite popular, 
especially amongst central banks (due to their frequent legal mandate of 
maintaining financial stability), as such an index can a) improve the monitoring 
of financial stability, b) help anticipating causes of financial crises and c) give a 
better idea of the effects of financial crises (Gadanecz & Jayaram, 2009).75 
The underlying indicators that are joined together in an index can be numerous 
and reflect different emphasis of the purpose of the indices created. Commonly, 
the indices are constructed of inputs from different sectors of the economy, i.e. 
the real (fiscal, households, corporations), external (e.g. exchange rate, balance 
of payments, reserves) and financial (e.g. bank profits, capital ratios) sectors 
along with indicators from the financial market (e.g. equity & bond prices), see 
table 3.1 (Gadanecz & Jayaram, 2009). 
An early contribution on quantifying financial stability with a composite 
quantitative measure – an index – was Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock (2002). 
They used annual data to construct an “Index of Financial Conditions” and 
stretched it back more than two centuries. Variables were only four: bank failure 
rate, business failure rate, (ex post) real interest rates and yield spread between 
low-quality and high-quality bonds. All of them have an equal weight in the 
index. 
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 Freedman’s (1994) work on a “Monetary Condition Index” deserves a mention here. Although its only 
components were the short term interest rate and the exchange rate it was arguably one of the first 
“composite quantitative indicators” that were developed to assist policy-makers. Those that came later 
mainly focused on financial conditions in general rather than monetary conditions specifically. 
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Table 3.1 – Some indicators in monitoring fin. conditions (Gadanecz & Jayaram, 
2009) 
 
Sector Measure Signalling properties
GDP growth
Low/negative values indicate a slowdown. High 
values can signal unsustainable growth
Public debt (deficit/outstanding 
debt)
High values can mean unsustainable fiscal position
Inflation
High values can signal structural weaknesses and 
indebtedness. Low levels can increase risk appetite
Leverage
High values can signal (upcoming) weakness in 
meeting cash flow oblications
Earnings as a ratio of debt burden Signals potential  debt problems
FX exposure
High currency mismatch can be problematic when/if 
exchange rates change
Corporate defaults
High values signal cash flow problems, can lead to 
problems in the banking sector
Household assets Low(er) values can signal balance sheet problems
Household debt High value can lead to cash flow problems
Net household income Low value can lead to cash flow problems
Consumption
Low value can be a sign of lack of net income. High 
values can signal increased indebtedness
Household debt burden
High interest and principal payments can lead to 
cash flow problems
(Real) exchange rates
Over-,under- or fluctuating valuation can lead to 
lack of trust in the currency
FX reserves
Low reserves can impact the trust in the economy & 
currency
Current/capital account
High trade deficits can need unsustainable capital 
flows
Maturity/currency mismatches
Can expose the economy when/if the exchange rate 
changes
Monetary aggregates Too much growth can signal inflationary pressures.
(Real) interest rates
Can make debt/GDP ratio explosive. Can signal cash 
flow problems. Too low can signal problems for 
banks to attract deposits
Growth in bank credit
Can signal greater risk appetites, higher leverage 
ratios, unsustainable growth
Financials' capital ratio Low levels can lead to crisis if loan losses increase
Liquidity ratio
Low ratio can lead to l iquidity squeeze, can signal 
high risk appetite
Credit ratings Can influence banks' funding costs
Sectoral concentration
Can give an estimate of how quickly a shock will  
spread
Equity prices Price growth-above-trend can be a sign of a bubble
House prices Price growth-above-trend can be a sign of a bubble
Bond spreads
Spikes in yield differences between different types of 
bonds can be a sign of changes in risk appetite
Volatil ity
Volatile price movements can be a sign of 
uncertainty, lack of trust, changes in risk appetite
Financial 
markets
Real
Corporate
Household
External
Financial 
institutions
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Another noticeable contribution was Illing and Liu (2003) (which became Illing 
and Liu (2006)). They used surveys (40 questionnaires) sent to policy-makers 
and economists to establish the most severe financial instability bursts. They 
then chose variables, available on a daily basis, to construct the index with the 
purpose of using it as a “timely” indicator of a build-up of stress in the system, 
including bank-share returns compared to the share returns, the foreign 
exchange rate and bond yield spreads. Their total number of indicators is six. 
When it comes to the actual construction of the index they note that (Illing & Liu, 
2003, p. 18; 2006, p. 255) “[t]he choice of how to combine the variables (the 
weighting method) is perhaps the most difficult aspect of constructing [a 
financial stability index].” They settle for the methodology that gives them the 
best forecasting ability (least Type 1 and Type 2 errors) when comparing the 
resulting index to the answers to the 40 questionnaires. 
A Type 1 error is to forecast “no crisis” when the actual outcome is a crisis. A 
Type 2 error is to forecast “crisis” but the outcome is no crisis. “Crisis” in this 
instance is to show up as a significant event in answers to the questionnaires. 
“Crisis” is therefore totally subjective as Illing and Liu (p. 243 in 2006, p. 1 in 
2003) note is normally the case: 
Financial stress is a continuum, measured in this paper with an index 
called the Financial Stress Index (FSI), where extreme values are 
called financial crises. The literature on financial crises devotes little 
attention to actually measuring the contemporaneous severity of 
these crises. In fact, crises are most often measured by simple binary 
variables. 
Of course, their measure for a “crisis” is subjective as well: what is an “extreme” 
value? Ishikawa et al. (2012, p. 6) highlight this problem as well: “There is no 
quantitative consensus... on how to determine which conditions merit the 
overheated or overcooled labels [of financial activity].” Issing (2003), previously 
noted, has a similar point: the failure of a single institution should not always be 
considered a serious episode of financial instability. It looks as if the term 
“financial crisis” will always be subjective – like “high inflation”. 
The problem of how to combine the indicators in the index has lead to a number 
of different methods, none of them definitely the “most correct”. There are 
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generally two approaches: a weighted-sum approach and a principal-
component approach (Hatzius, Hooper, Mishkin, Schoenholtz, & Watson, 2010) 
although some want to categorise them as five: a common factor analysis, 
representative-weights, sample cumulative distributions, macroeconomic 
simulations and the variance-equal method (Gadanecz & Jayaram, 2009). The 
most favourable methodology of aforementioned Illing and Liu is to use credit 
weights when constructing the index. It is an example of the weighted-
sum/representative-weights method (Illing & Liu, 2006, p. 255):  
[The] approach weights the variables [in the index] by the relative size 
of each market to which they pertain. The larger the market as a 
share of total credit in the economy, the higher the weight assigned to 
the variable proxying stress in that market. Therefore, the weights 
have some economic meaning. Since the relative size of each market 
varies over time, a chain-linked weighting scheme is used. Total 
credit in the economy is measured by the sum of bank credit, 
corporate bonds, government bonds, equities and U.S.-dollar credit. 
U.S.-dollar credit is the amount of loans to, and bonds issued by, 
Canadian residents denominated in U.S. dollars. 
The thought behind the use of weighted sums is, as Illing and Liu mention, that 
they “have some economic meaning.” The principal component analysis (PCA) 
method rests on another argument. The advantage of such an approach is that 
it captures the interconnectedness of the indicators used. The more interrelated 
a specific indicator is with the rest, the higher its weight will be in the overall 
index. This means that a small deterioration in an indicator with a lot of weight in 
the index can signal a substantial increase in financial fragility. The principal 
component analysis therefore assigns indicators with weights which should 
represent their systemic importance, an importance that is signalled by the 
(historical) data itself (Brave & Butters, 2010). Since the interconnectedness of 
the indicators can change between time periods, it is not certain that the 
weights of the indicators in the index will stay the same when the sample of 
historical data used to evaluate the principal component changes. This 
introduces flexibility into a PCA-evaluated index, hopefully making its 
construction follow the development of the economy, its financial stability and 
the potentially changing interconnectedness of its components quite closely. 
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Examples of PCA approaches include Hakkio and Keeton (2009) and Hatzius et 
al. (2010). 
It should be highlighted that the approach how to decide the weight of the 
indicators in the index being constructed is not standardised. Although we can 
see some commonly used indicators in the literature (see Table 3.1) the issue 
of how to combine them is still open to discussion. It is not unlikely that there 
will be many contributions on this topic until there is a stronger agreement on 
which methodology is most appropriate.  
3.2 Why is financial stability important? 
In as short space as possible: financial stability is important because it supports 
the long-term growth prospects of the economy. If the financial system is 
unstable, i.e. in the state of “financial instability”, its capacity to support the 
“real” economy can be impaired. 
Traditionally, examining how important financial stability was involved 
estimating the shock that financial crises or instability had on factors such as 
the fiscal deficit, the labour market or GDP. Examples include C. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) and Furceri and Mourougane (2012). However, Joyce and Nabar 
(2009) pointed out that aggregate GDP growth and the shock it experiences 
due to financial turmoil may not be the crucial or the best way of estimating the 
long term costs of financial instability. The reason was that exports may pick up 
in the wake of e.g. a currency crash, thereby maintaining GDP levels to some 
extent and hide the real in-depth damage – like putting a band-aid on an 
infected wound. Instead the focus should be on investment levels. 
Maintaining investment levels is important not only to add to the production 
capabilities of the economy, via an expanding and improving capital stock, but 
to maintain employment levels.76 But as Hyman Minsky emphasised, exactly 
appropriate and stable investment levels are hard to attain and maintain. 
                                            
76
 “Capital stock” can generally include different kinds of goods-creators such as real capital, education, 
learning-by-doing experiences and other physical and non-physical inputs for the creation of output. 
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3.2.1 Investment levels and financial stability 
Economic agents use two different sources of funds for investment activity in 
capital stock that is meant to create positive present-value cash flows and 
therefore net profits: internal and external (Minsky, 1984, 2008b). 
Internal funds are the agents’ own assets or source of income, e.g. cash from 
sales or highly liquid financial claims with a well-known market value that can be 
raised in a quick and smooth manner in efficiently working markets. The 
nominal value of internal funds is rather well known, i.e. it is not subject to large 
assessing uncertainties, they are assumed to be easy to access and most 
importantly they are raised by the activity of the economic agent himself. Net 
cash and income after taxes are examples of internal funding. 
External finances are on the other hand purchasing power which is mainly in the 
form of credit. An example is a bond or any other sort of a loan that a 
contractual cash flow is needed to serve. 
Credit, i.e. external funding, is to a large extent created by banks or supplied by 
financial intermediary vehicles, such as pension funds. While a loan from a non-
bank financial institution, such as a pension fund, is a transfer of existing 
purchasing power, the same does not apply in the case of banks. When a bank-
loan is extended, money is created at the same time, thereby expanding the 
money supply within the economy by the same amount (Minsky, 1984; Werner, 
2005, see also Chapter 2).  
Minsky argued that the money supply is a decisive factor for the price of capital 
stock. That further impacts the demand for and supply of investment and 
therefore the general process of investment activity. 
Minsky (1984, p. 134) describes the basic relationship as follows. 
For a given state of uncertainty and stock of real capital assets, the 
greater the quantity of money, other outside assets, and protected 
assets, the greater the price of units in the stock of real capital. 
Investment consists of producing substitutes for items in the stock of 
real capital; the price of the units in the stock is the demand price for 
units to be produced. 
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So investment activity, given a certain level of uncertainty, hinges on the growth 
of money supply. And that growth as we have seen hinges on the growth of 
credit. The money supply is a function of the will of the banking system to 
expand the money supply by creating loan contracts with investing economic 
agents that seek external funding, credit, in order to carry out their investment 
endeavours. This makes the functionality of the banking system a key factor of 
influence when it comes to investment activity, growth of capital and prosperity 
in the economy. A banking system in the state of financial instability would not 
be fully capable of supporting this development. 
Financial instability has another negative impact on the level of investment in 
the economy than through the potential link via the banking system. That is via 
the connection between financial instability, uncertainty and liquidity preference. 
Financial instability inherently creates uncertainty about the future. Excessive 
fluctuations in the price of assets, in different rates of interest and in 
expectations about the future, to mention just some of the characteristics of 
episodes of financial instability, lead to elevated uncertainty about the future. 
Such uncertainty will, as Minsky highlighted, following the argument of Keynes, 
lead to sometimes abrupt changes in liquidity preference. Economic units will 
consequently adjust their asset portfolios towards more liquid assets. 
Investment levels in capital stock and other illiquid asset classes, such as 
buildings, can decrease in the wake of such a shift in peoples’ preference for 
holding more liquid assets. Lower investment levels lead to lower employment 
levels, which harms the general cash flows to workers and other firms in the 
economy as workers have less spending power from lower wage-income than 
before when investment levels were higher. Lower investment levels will also 
hold back the addition of productive capital in the economy, thereby harming the 
economy’s long term production prospects. 
Therefore, financial stability is important to achieve and to maintain because it 
affects the ability of the banks and the financial system as a whole to carry out 
the credit creation and intermediary services between savers and investing 
borrowers it is meant to fulfil, thereby nurturing normal investment activity and 
consequently the growth prospects of the economy. Financial instability adds to 
the uncertainty for banks when they try to screen the best borrowers from the 
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pool of potential borrowers because the instability makes it harder to estimate 
the development of borrowers’ cash flows and price of collateral (and assets in 
general). A vicious cycle sets in as banks cannot screen borrowers and supply 
of credit declines, which negatively impacts the economy and feeds back onto 
other potential borrowers. In a similar fashion, financial instability adds onto the 
uncertainty for the borrower herself, making it harder to make reliable 
investment plans, thereby deferring capital investment. Similar opinions have 
been expressed by others (Barrell, Davis, & Pomerantz, 2006; Davis & Stone, 
2004; Joyce & Nabar, 2009; Minsky, 1984, 2008b; Werner, 2005).  
Finally, from a more humane rather than economic but equally important point 
of view, financial instability can impair the structure and the health of society 
itself. Financial crises bring unemployment and uncertainty about the future for 
today’s households. Such factors can have a negative impact on individuals’ 
overall health, social status and even mortality rate (Dorling, 2009; Paul & 
Moser, 2009). Knowles, Pernia, and Racelis (1999, p. 60) found that the 
financial crisis in Asia during the late 1990s had serious social effects “because 
the poor typically have fewer and more limited coping options available to them 
[to counter the negative effects of the financial crisis], the ones they use tend to 
be more harmful than those used by middle-income and upper-income groups.” 
Examples of more harmful options included (ibid) “borrowing to maintain current 
consumption, selling productive assets, delaying needed medical care, and 
withdrawing children from school.” If this applies to other financial crises in 
general, it means that the poorest can be relatively harder hit by turmoil and 
financial instability than the rich. Financial instability can therefore increase the 
inequality of income and assets between the poor and the rich, further 
destabilising the social profile of society and possibly leading to health and 
social issues such as obesity, increased teenage pregnancy, higher suicide 
rate, violent crimes rate and more (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). 
3.3 The origin of financial instability: Minsky’s view 
Minsky (1984, p. 125) argued the following on why financial crises happen: 
Financial crises take place because units need or desire more cash 
than is available from their usual sources and so they resort to 
unusual ways to raise cash. 
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Two comments are in order. First, “unusual ways” to raise cash are not 
“unusual” from the market point of view but from the units’ own points of view, 
especially with recent history or their expectations in mind. Exempli gratia, 
selling an asset to raise cash in order to service some cash outflow which had 
previously been serviced or anticipated to be serviced with other sources of 
cash inflows could in this sense be categorised as “unusual” because the unit in 
question had to do something differently than he had done before or had 
anticipated to doing. Of course, this sale of an asset to raise cash is not unusual 
from the aggregate point of view: the unit would be just one of number of other 
units that partake in the asset market.  
Second, notice that Minsky traces the cause of financial crises to different 
factors than e.g. Mishkin (1996). Rather than tracing the cause to the inability of 
financial markets to deal with adverse selection and moral hazard, like Mishkin 
does, Minsky seeks the cause in the form of cash flow problems.  
Minsky’s intuition was that episodes of high financial instability take place 
because economic units need or want more cash (or highly liquid quasi-cash, 
such as bank deposits and Treasury bonds) than their regular cash flows, of 
whatever nature or sources they were, are supplying them with. This need, or 
desire, originates from the realisation, gradual or sudden, that the units’ 
contractual and/or expected cash flows do not fit the actual cash flows as they 
are realised as time passes; expectations about the (uncertain) future turn out 
to be wrong. As long as cash flows are adequately according to expectations or 
it is possible to find secondary types of cash flows that do not bring serious 
disruptions to other units’ cash flows, financial stability should not be seriously 
harmed. Minsky (1984, p. 128) further explains the causes of financial instability 
as follows (original emphasis): 
Financial instability occurs whenever a large number of units resort to 
extraordinary sources of cash. The conditions under which 
extraordinary sources of cash have to be tapped – which for financial 
units means mainly the condition in which positions have to be 
liquidated (run off or sold out) – are the conditions that can trigger 
financial instability. The adequacy of cash flows from income relative 
to debt, the adequacy of refinancing possibilities relative to position, 
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and the ratio of unprotected to protected financial assets are 
determinants of the stability of the financial system. The trend or 
evolution of the likelihood of financial instability depends upon the 
trend or evolution of the determinants of financial stability. 
Judging from these words – that financial instability is a cash-flows-mismatch 
problem that develops into unusual ways to raise cash, rather than a Mishkinian 
moral-hazard/adverse selection problem – it seems that the trick to maintain 
financial stability is pretty easy; make sure that economic units can, in general, 
a) pay their debts with the income they receive from income operations such as 
work, sales of goods and services etc., b) refinance their non-income-covered 
debt positions whenever needed without trouble and c) keep the amount of 
protected assets, i.e. those assets that are valid as collateral in repurchase 
agreements with cash-unlimited institutions such as central banks, high in 
relation to other unprotected assets.  
One could therefore argue, following Minsky, that to maintain financial stability 
is to maintain adequacy in units’ cash flows and keep them according to the 
expectations of the investing economic units. But Minsky himself pointed out 
that this would be easier said than done. 
Box 1 – Hyman P. Minsky 
Minsky was a student of Schumpeter at Harvard University. Despite 
being his student, Minsky was not a ‘Shumpeterian’ any more than 
Keynes was ‘Marshallian’. Minsky drew many insights from the work of 
Keynes and argued that Keynes had been grossly misrepresented 
and misunderstood (Minsky, 2008a). Or as Dymski and Pollin (1992, 
p. 29) put it: “Any understanding of Hyman Minsky should begin with 
John Maynard Keynes because Minsky regards his own work, above 
all else, as an interpretation and extension of Keynes.” It was 
specifically Keynes’s insights on the concepts of uncertainty and 
‘animal spirits’ that Minsky used as building blocks in his Financial 
Instability Hypothesis. Other notable influencers were Fisher (debt 
deflation theory), Schumpeter (the use of external finance to finance 
investment) and Kalecki’s principle of increasing risk (Keen,1997, 
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2011a).  
Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis, FIH, rather than anything 
else, is introduced and used here for many reasons. First, it is 
applicable to the sub-prime crisis and the ‘Great Recession’ that 
started in 2008 (see e.g. Cassidy (2008)). It is also more 
comprehensive than e.g. Werner’s (2005) Quantity Theory of Credit 
for Minsky did not only focus on the impact of credit on the economy 
but interest rates and other cash-flow inducing parameters as well. He 
also considered relative values of different qualities of financial assets 
in the economy and the nature of borrowers, nothing of which Werner 
considers. Furthermore, not only has Minsky’s FIH been shown to be 
mathematically sound (Keen, 1997), even if Minsky did not use 
mathematical models to explain it, but it also, as pointed out by Keen 
(2011a) meets the criticism of Blatt (1983) when it comes to economic 
models: the FIH, contrary to most economic frameworks, does have 
an equilibrium which is unstable.77 The reason why is that it directly 
incorporates the financial sector, money and business confidence in 
its framework. This means that the model can, and does (Keen, 1997, 
2011a), accommodate cyclical behaviour, as is the characteristic of a 
capitalistic economy with a developed financial system. Therefore, the 
FIH is both comprehensive and exceptionally realistic. 
Despite this financial stability indices relying explicitly on Minsky’s 
approach and FIH have not been a great focus of research before. It is 
therefore deemed both appropriate and worthwhile to explore this 
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 Blatt (1983, p. 6) was clear on his opinion on equilibrium analysis in economics: “No progress can... be 
made by continuing along the road that economists have been following for two hundred years. The study 
of economic equilibrium is... little more than a waste of time”. He considered the economy to be like the 
weather: the equilibrium state is not stable but open to constant and both endogenous and exogenous 
fluctuations; it is “essentially dynamic”. This meant that the equilibrium state of the economy was even 
more unstable than e.g. that of the ocean. There, the equilibrium state is at least stable (flat and waveless) 
and there is a tendency towards that equilibrium state. Nevertheless, that equilibrium state is almost never 
reached and even if it is it is only for a short period of time. Therefore, according to Blatt, economic 
theories should be so that their equilibrium state is “essentially dynamic” for the simple reason that it is 
the most realistic approach to understanding the economy. Minsky’s FIH fulfils this requirement as Keen 
(1997, 2011a) shows. 
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venue further. 
It should be noted and emphasised here that despite the fact that 
Minsky perceived financial instability as being a “normal”78 part of a 
capitalistic economy with developed financial system, he did not 
consider a financial crisis inescapable. A crisis, according to Minsky, 
can be avoided if the public powers design policies and the 
institutional framework of the economy such that cash-flows and asset 
prices will be supported in case of a debt deflation gaining pace in the 
economy. At the same time, that overall framework should not be too 
comprehensive or a catalyst for financial speculation that would end 
with a debt-driven deflation. This, according to Minsky, was the policy 
problem (Minsky, 2008, p. 328): “The policy problem is to devise 
institutional structures and measures that attenuate the thrust to 
inflation, unemployment, and slower improvements in the standard of 
living without increasing the likelihood of a deep depression.” Those 
“institutional structures” included organising the corporate tax system 
so that it did not encourage debt financing, regulating finance (“finance 
cannot be left to free markets” (Minsky, 2008b, p. 324)), encouraging 
growth via consumption rather than capital investments and securing 
wage-income for workers by offering last-resort employment in case of 
redundancy (Minsky, 2008b, 2013). 
Minsky’s FIH has received criticism, see e.g. Louis-Philippe Rochon 
(2012b). Firstly, it is built on microfoundations – the behaviour of a 
single bank or a single borrower – that may not be fully representative 
of the macroeconomic picture. An example of this is that although the 
debt/income ratio of a single unit may increase during economic 
expansions, the same may not be the case for the macroeconomy. In 
other words, the FIH is open to the risk of Fallacy of Composition. 
Also, although interest rates should rise for the single unit as his 
debt/equity ratios rises, on the macroeconomic level the central bank 
can influence the interest rates in the economy towards different 
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 “To be exact, our economic leadership does not seem to be aware that the normal functioning of our 
economy leads to financial trauma and crises, inflation, currency depreciations, unemployment, and 
poverty in the midst of what could be virtually universal affluence – in short, that financially complex 
capitalism is inherently flawed” (Minsky, 2008b, p. 320, emphasis added). 
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levels. 
3.3.1 Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis 
Narrating Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) and how it describes 
the development of financial instability is in order before continuing.79 
The FIH is depicted in a (dynamic) capitalistic economy with developed financial 
institutions. The story begins at a point in time when financial structures of 
economic units within the economy are conservative, i.e. the use of leverage is 
limited and the ratio of equity in financing economic activity is high.80 The 
reason for this is that the economy has recently been through a slump, or even 
an economic disaster, and people have a recent and strong memory of the 
recent hardship. They therefore want to be careful in their financial decisions. 
Both bankers and investors have a high-equity preference. However, although 
the general sentiment leans towards the limited use of leverage in financing 
economic activity, the financing structure of economic units is not homogenous. 
Some are more leveraged than others, although they may have more 
conservative financial structures than they would like to or used to have. 
Due to the limited leverage the general operations of economic units are 
resilient to any unforeseen shocks: even though some barriers, entirely 
unforeseen or not, may appear in the way as investment and other general 
economic activity is carried out the ample use of equity provides resilience to 
the financial structures of economic units. Bankruptcy rates are therefore low 
and profits, although they can be small, are generally realised. The general 
realisation of profits makes both investors and bankers think that the ample use 
of equity is non-warranted: had they used a higher leverage, their return on 
equity had been higher. Those economic units that had used most leverage 
profited most (measured by return on equity) and by the word of mouth and via 
the news, this becomes public knowledge.  
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 See Minsky (Minsky, 1984, 2008a, 2008b) for detailed accounts of his theory. For an excellent 
recountal of the FIH, see Keen (1997). 
80
 “The natural starting place for analyzing the relation between debt and income is to take an economy 
with a cyclical past that is now doing well... Acceptable liability structures are based upon some margin 
of safety so that expected cash flows, even in periods when the economy is not doing well, will cover 
contractual debt payments.” (Minsky, 1984, p. 65) 
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Investors and bankers alike therefore realise that “it paid to lever... As a result, 
over a period in which the economy does well, views about the acceptable debt 
structure change” (Minsky, 1984, p. 65). The preferences for leverage will be 
revised upwards. Time has also passed and at least a part of the industrial 
leaders that had experiences from past economic cycles has retired and a 
younger generation, which possesses lesser real-life familiarity of leadership 
through booms and busts, has entered the stage. Especially amongst those 
newcomers the attractive profitability of using high leverage is rediscovered. 
Since it is assumed that both investors and bankers live in the same economic 
landscape and are under the influences of the same news flow of profit 
realisations, they both share the opinion that leverage could be increased 
without any serious risks. Consequently, since investors’ appetite for leverage 
increases they demand more credit from the banking system. The banks will be 
happy to provide that credit and “’[t]his increase in the weight of debt financing 
raises the market price of capital assets and increases investment. As this 
continues the economy is transformed into a boom economy” (Minsky, 1984, p. 
66). Furthermore, credit expansion takes place via increasingly more 
“adventuresome” ways (Minsky, 2008a, p. 125):81  
[S]uccess breeds daring, and over time the memory of the past 
disaster is eroded. Stability – even of an expansion – is destabilizing 
in that more adventuresome financing of investment pays off to the 
leaders, and others follow. Thus an expansion will, at an accelerating 
rate, feed into the boom.  
The increased application of leverage increases the general amount of 
purchasing power in the economy since bank credit (money, i.e. purchasing 
power) is created alongside the increase in leverage. This newly created 
purchasing power is used to finance investment and speculation activities in all 
sorts of assets, both financial and real capital: “Increased availability of finance 
bids up the prices of assets relative to the prices of current output, and this 
leads to increases in investment” (Minsky, 1984, p. 66). The increased 
investment in real capital calls for increased labour. Economic growth and 
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 The reader is reminded of the endogenous process of credit creation, see chapter 2. The supply of 
money is “credit-led and demand-determined; it can be supply-constrained only in the sense that banks 
may not want to lend, but not because they cannot lend” (Louis-Phillipe Rochon, 2012a, pp. 296-297, 
emphasis added) 
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economic activities increase. As this happens, profits will be realised yet again 
according to expectations and the use of leverage will be rewarded further. This 
pushes for more debt-financing of units’ investment and speculation activities as 
“success breeds daring”.  The boom feeds on itself.  
By now, the previously rather credit-conservative tone amongst economic units 
has turned into a “euphoric atmosphere” where “optimistic views of the future 
prevail” (Minsky, 2008a, p. 86). The macroeconomic level of leverage increases 
still further as “others follow” the leaders.  
However, people always had, have and will only have an uncertain knowledge 
about the future. Despite this, people will be “compelled” to act (Keynes, 1937, 
pp. 213-214): 
[B]y “uncertain” knowledge... [we mean that] there is no scientific 
basis on which to form any calculable probability whatsoever. We 
simply do not know. Nevertheless, the necessity for action and for 
decision compels us as practical men to do our best to overlook this 
awkward fact and to behave exactly as we should if we had behind us 
a good Benthamite calculation of series of prospective advantages 
and disadvantages, each multiplied by its appropriate probability, 
waiting to be summed.  
This uncertainty about the future, in good times and bad, is individually dealt 
with by convention in our decision processes (Keynes, 1937, p. 214):  
We assume that the present is a much more serviceable guide to the 
future than a candid examination of past experience would show it to 
have been hitherto... We assume that the existing state of opinion as 
expressed in prices and the character of existing output is based on a 
correct summing up of future prospects... [or] we endeavour to fall 
back on the judgment of the rest of the world which is perhaps better 
informed. 
The euphoric mood, the optimistic views of the future, the over-confidence in 
investment opportunities, and the recent profits, now generally firmly believed to 
be a mere taste of the future riches, weigh heavier in the decision process of 
investors than the distant less prosperous past. This leads people to gradually 
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adjust their liquidity preferences downwards. Short term debt becomes 
increasingly popular as it carries a lower rate of interest than long term illiquid 
assets yield: the yield curve is upward sloping and a carry can be made on the 
difference between the short term interest rate cost and the long term return on 
illiquid assets. An increasing number of people will want to profit from this 
spread between short term and long term returns, especially as the price of long 
term assets is likely to go up and some investors will want to buy the asset 
before it rises even further: certain bandwagon effects are to be found. Due to 
the euphoric atmosphere and the general prevalence of optimism about the 
future debtors believe they can get an easily available and cheap, compared to 
long term yields, refinance of their short term debt which they had raised to 
finance their positions in long term illiquid assets. This refinance is expected to 
be available at or just before the maturity date of the short term debt: the 
borrowers expect to continuously roll over their debts. 
But economic units will also gradually prefer to put less emphasis on holding 
liquid cash-assets and near-cash assets (such as highly liquid short term notes 
and government bonds) and they will consequently progressively readjust their 
asset portfolios towards more illiquid assets (both financial and non-financial 
ones). This has the effects that “liquid-asset interest rates rise relative to other 
rates” (Minsky, 2008a, p. 86) or, in other words, the yield curve flattens or even 
becomes downward sloping.82 
This relative rise of short term interest rates spells trouble for those investors 
that have used short-term debt to finance the positions in long-term assets. Past 
credit contracts were made to finance positions and investments in longer-term 
assets which now pay a lower relative yield to (short term) interest rate cost 
than before. As the contractual repayment date of their debts draws nearer, 
their need, if they have not the adequate cash income from their asset holdings, 
to find refinancing possibilities increases. But even if they find refinancing it will 
be at a higher rate of interest, relative to the yield they derive from their longer-
term assets, than before because time has passed since their last liability 
contract was made and in the meanwhile the gradual decrease in general 
liquidity preference amongst economic units has had the effects that “liquid-
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 The flattening of the yield curve has been found to predate and predict economic slowdowns (Estrella 
& Mishkin, 1996; C. R. Harvey, 1988, 1989). 
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asset interest rates rise relative to other rates”. The lenders of those now-
squeezed borrowers will, due to increased risk coming from a fall in profits and 
net-income-cover of debt, either demand a) a boost in the borrower’s equity 
position or b) that the borrower pays a higher rate of interest still on their 
borrowed funds. The lenders can also demand a mix of both. Kalecki’s Principle 
of Increasing Risk83 adds further to the problems stemming from the relative 
increase in short term rates. 
The requirement of higher interest charges will put further pressure on the 
profits of those leveraged units and the borrower may even simply reject such 
stipulations and decide, or desire, rather to liquidate his positions and pay up 
his debts. The requirement of higher equity pushes the borrower to find it. One 
way of doing that is to issue new shares and some of those highly indebted 
units will seek to do so. However, another choice is the same choice as in the 
case of rejection or inability to pay higher rate of interest: decrease the balance 
sheet by liquidating the positions, i.e. to “run off” or “sell out” of the positions 
previously entered. The leveraged unit is therefore likely to sell an asset on its 
balance sheet, either simply because he rejects the new loan stipulation or 
because he is forced to do so to increase his equity position. The asset in 
question can be of a financial or a real nature. But when the unit sells the asset, 
it means that its offered supply on the market will go up and, given unchanged 
demand, we can expect that this will lead to a fall in the market price of the 
asset, especially as the seller may have to liquidate the asset within a specific 
time frame, i.e. before his debt matures. 
This price decrement will have the effect that other aggressively leveraged units 
will meet the same requirement from their lenders as the first one: as the equity 
on their balance sheet has decreased due to the fall in the nominal value of the 
asset, the lender will demand, on the principle of increasing risk and higher 
market rate of interest, a higher rate of interest on the borrowed funds than 
before and/or a boost in the equity position in the units’ portfolio holdings. This 
will cause those units to run into the same problem as the first unit had before: 
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 “[T]he amount invested... must be considered as a fully illiquid asset in the case of sudden need for 
"capital." In that situation the entrepreneur who has invested in equipment his reserves (cash, deposits, 
securities) and taken "too much credit" is obliged to borrow at a rate of interest which is higher than the 
market one. If... the entrepreneur is not cautious in his investment activity it is the creditor who imposes 
on his calculation the burden of increasing risk charging the successive portions of credits above a certain 
amount with rising rate of interest (Kalecki, 1937, p. 442, emphasis added). 
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they must issue new equity or “sell out” of their asset positions. Their activity on 
the market will have the same effects as the activity of the one who liquidated 
his position ahead of them: the price will fall further. This then hits the nearest 
leveraged investor behind them and the self-enforcing chain reaction gathers 
pace. Leveraged units that do not manage to sell out of their positions in time 
before the market price of their assets falls start going bust. 
The price decreases and the news of highly leveraged economic units going 
bust will cause other investors not only to be forced to sell their positions but 
they, and their financers, will reconsider the use of leverage, which now works 
against them: the young will learn the lessons the old had before. Liquidity and 
non-leveraged positions will be increasingly favoured again and the price of 
long-term, illiquid assets will fall as balance sheets will be readjusted back 
towards more liquidity and less leverage.  
This aggravates the price decreases of long-term assets and their price falls 
further. Investment in those asset classes will consequently decrease for two 
reasons. First, the reconsidered preference for leverage makes investors and 
their bankers wary of investing with borrowed funds while they still have to 
repay their old debts. This decreases credit and money supply in the economy, 
pushing the price of assets downwards. Second, nobody will like to create a real 
capital asset, via real capital investment, whose price is not only falling but its 
bottomed-out price is still enshrined in uncertainty. Investment in illiquid real 
capital assets will therefore contract. A fall in labour demand will shortly follow 
and unemployment goes up. By now the euphoric environment has turned into 
that of pessimism about the future. Investment behaviour based on convention 
is now based on the recent past of bankruptcies but not increasing profits as 
was the case earlier in the cycle.  
The primary consideration of economic units is now to reconstruct their balance 
sheets. This they will attempt to do by selling assets and by using wage and 
capital-asset income to pay down debts. If what Minsky called Big Government 
(fiscal expenditures) and Big Bank (Lender of Last Resort) step in and support 
this phase with cash flows activities (public investment projects, unemployment 
benefits, etc.) and price-supporting activities (e.g. Quantitative Easing) the asset 
price decreases will be slowed down and the reconstruction of balance sheets 
145 
sped up compared to if no such support had been in place. Economic activity 
will be subdued until balance sheets have been adequately reformed and 
enough profits return for investors to gain their confidence in the future again. 
That will lead us back to stage one of the story where leverage is limited and 
profits are realised due to now conservative financial structures.  
The whole process can then start anew. 
3.3.2 The nature of the cash flows within the economy 
Minsky emphasised in his Financial Instability Hypothesis, as observable from 
previous discussion, that financial crises were the result of economic units’ 
cash-flows miscalculations or misalignments from what had generally been 
expected. Observable characteristics of financial instability, such as collapsing 
property prices, rising risk-awareness, fluctuations in interest rates on interbank 
markets, uncertainty amongst investors, lack of real capital investments leading 
to slower economic growth and unemployment, and a general switch from 
euphoria amongst economic units to pessimism, were to him the by-products of 
economic agents scrambling for cash inflows via “unusual ways”. Those are not 
the initial – though they may have feedback effects – reasons for increased 
financial instability but rather the symptoms. The “crisis” hits as multiple 
economic units “need or desire”, all at the same time, to restructure their cash 
flows operations and sources; the reason for financial crises is en masse 
disappointment of cash flows to be realised according to expectations.  
Cash flows can be classified into three different groups depending on their 
nature; income, balance sheet and portfolio flows (Minsky, 2008b).84 Income 
flows are the results of production and consumption of goods and services. 
Workers’ wages and firms’ sales of goods and services are examples of positive 
income flows respectively for each group. Those same workers’ consumption is 
an example of negative income flow and salaries are similarly a negative 
income flow for corporations. Income flows are generally a function of capital 
assets in all their forms, such as education (human capital) or factories (real 
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 Minsky focused also on the different sources of the cash flows (Minsky, 2008a, p. 116): “An ultimate 
reality in a capitalist economy is the set of interrelated balance sheets among the various units. Items in 
the balance sheets set up cash flows. Cash flows are the result of (1) the income-producing system, which 
includes wages, taxes, and nonfinancial corporate gross profits after taxes, (2) the financial structure, 
which is composed of as interest, dividends, rents, and repayments on loans, and (3) the dealing or trading 
in capital assets and financial instruments. For all except dividends, the cash flows determined by the 
financial structure are contractual commitments.” 
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capital). The income flows are circular in the economy between producers of 
goods and services and their consumers. Schumpeter’s “Circular Flow” 
(Schumpeter, 1934) and its stability in the economy were income flows as 
described here. 
Balance-sheet flows are cash flows that arise from the unit’s contractual 
position in its financial assets and debts (stocks). Those flows (such as the 
repayment, partial or whole, of the principal of a loan, or the payment of an 
insurance in the case of the insured event happening or the payment of a 
dividend) are the inheritance of financial contracts and the accompanied stocks 
(in this case: loans (dated & demandable), deposits (dated & demandable), 
insurances (contingent) and equity (contingent)). 
Portfolio flows are transactions where the economic unit is changing its 
assets-debt portfolio of financial and capital assets through e.g. liquidation of 
one asset in exchange for another or borrowing in order to invest in another 
asset class or to service another old loan contract that is maturing in the present 
and thereby creating a balance-sheet flow. This act – i.e. relying on a new 
portfolio flow (loan) today in order to service a balance sheet flow that is 
maturing – is the act of refinancing an old loan. The portfolio of each unit is 
divided into two parts: (net) capital assets and (net) financial assets. The (net) 
capital-assets part of the unit’s portfolio yields the income flow as production 
and prices are realised while it is the (net) financial-assets part of the portfolio 
that has consequent balance sheet flows, all according to the relevant 
contractual agreement. Portfolio flows are changes in the mix of capital and 
financial assets such as when a demand deposit (financial asset) is used to buy 
a new factory (capital asset). Portfolio flows can also be changes within the 
same asset class, capital or financial, towards more or less liquid asset. An 
example of this is e.g. when a stock on a thinly traded market (illiquid financial 
asset) is sold and the proceedings are kept in the form of a bank deposit or 
cash (liquid financial asset). 
Note that when trade, i.e. cash flow, between two economic units takes place 
they will sort the cash flows into similar accounts – one unit’s balance sheet 
inflow is another one’s equal and opposite balance sheet outflow – with one 
exception: a purchase of an investment good is an income cash flow for the 
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producer85 of that good but a portfolio flow for the buyer; the buyer is changing 
his capital & financial asset-debt portfolio in such a way that he is expecting 
higher positive income flows in the future once the investment good has been 
transformed into capital stock, yielding production, that will be part of his assets-
debt portfolio of capital and financial assets. 
Furthermore, by accounting identity, the sum of those cash flows must add up 
to zero at all time periods for each economic unit, i.e.86  
 Income flow + Balance sheet flow = Portfolio flow (1) 
A few examples are in order to better understand the relationship between 
those different types of flows.  
• If a worker has a negative balance sheet flow (e.g. a mortgage payment), 
he must service that flow by e.g. a positive income flow (such as after-tax 
wages) or by selling his assets, such as savings (a financial asset, a 
negative portfolio flow), or his car (a non-financial asset, a negative 
portfolio flow). Similarly, he could enter into another loan contract in order 
to pay of that mortgage which would show up as a negative portfolio flow 
(loan is raised, decrement of net financial assets).  
• If a bank must pay out a deposit to its customer (negative balance sheet 
flow) it must meet that flow by e.g. an interest rate income on its 
outstanding loans (positive balance sheet flow), or by selling financial 
services (positive income flow) or by a negative portfolio flow, such as a 
REPO agreement with a bank or the receipt of a deposit from another 
customer. The bank can also sell some of its assets, such as Treasury 
bonds (a negative portfolio flow).   
• A non-financial production firm that is meeting its payment on an 
outstanding bond (negative balance sheet flow) must meet that flow by 
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 It must be the producer of the investment good that is the seller of it. If the investment good is sold 
again later by another one than the original producer it is not income flow for that seller but portfolio flow 
as he is changing his asset portfolio by selling his investment good for cash. The seller could have bought 
the investment good from the original producer to speculate with its price. He might also have bought it 
as an insurance against a possible future need of it. Once that need is thought to have passed, the 
investment good can be sold again, thereby yielding a positive portfolio flow. 
86
 This accounting identity is parallel to the current account = capital account identity, assuming that 
financial account is included in capital account on the right side of the equation; “income flow” compares 
to net balance of trade, “balance sheet flow” is analogous to net factor income and net transfers while 
“portfolio flow” is the change in net assets. 
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either having a positive income flow from productions and sales, sell its 
assets in the form of savings (negative portfolio flow), sell its capital 
assets in form of inventory (negative portfolio flow), refinance the 
maturing bond with an issuance of another (negative portfolio flow) or sell 
newly issued stock (negative portfolio flow).  
In all those cases, (1) holds.  
3.3.3 Minsky’s hedge, speculation and Ponzi units 
There were three types of economic units that Minsky distinguished between; 
hedge, speculation and Ponzi units. The nature of each of the units is quite 
different and it is the mix and the prevalence of each type compared to the other 
that decides whether the economy is stable: hedge units’ income flows can 
service both their contractual interest payments and principal repayments; 
speculation units’ income flows can only cover their contractual interest 
payments; and Ponzi units’ income flows cannot even cover their contractual 
interest costs.  
All the units have a certain individual mix of financial and capital assets, i.e. the 
units make their own personal choices how to construct their capital and 
financial assets to make up their portfolio of those asset types. Their income, 
balance sheet and portfolio flows are results of those individual choices on what 
sort of a mix of capital and financial assets and liabilities they prefer.  
Hedge units are the most secure ones of the three types. Their portfolio of 
capital and financial assets, along with the accompanying contracts, makes it 
possible for them to meet their contractual income and balance sheet flows with 
each other; the left hand side of the accounting unity (1) above sums up to zero 
or a higher positive number. 
A hedge unit is thus capable of meeting a negative balance sheet flow, due to 
e.g. negative net financial assets creating interest payments, with a positive 
income flow alone. The hedge unit can also meet a principal repayment of 
outstanding debt with his income flows, even if the repayment is demanded 
ahead of maturity date: this would be a part of the contract behind the debt. 
Therefore, in more general terms, a hedge unit can use his income flows to 
meet all and any contractual portfolio flows.  
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An example of a hedge unit would be a household that has wage income – a 
function of the households’ education level, i.e. capital asset – that suffices to 
pay its monthly mortgage payment, bills, food and other consumption. The 
household may even still have reserves left of its wage income after having 
serviced its negative balance sheet flow. Those reserves are put aside e.g. in 
the form of a savings account at the bank (a positive portfolio flow).  
A living-on-interests-only pensioner is another but opposite example; his 
positive balance sheet flow due to a positive portfolio of financial and capital 
assets is big enough to service his negative income flow in the form of 
consumption etc. If the pensioner wishes to consume (negative income flow) 
more than the sum of rents, interests and dividends (balance sheet flow) he 
receives, he must meet that increasingly negative income flow by selling his 
capital or financial assets (negative portfolio flow). He can also ask for credit at 
the bank (negative portfolio flow). 
A speculative unit is one notch below the hedge unit in terms of robustness of 
his financial structure. The speculative unit has, at least temporarily, a net 
negative balance sheet flow and the unit must meet this contractual negative 
balance sheet one way or the other. Contrary to the hedge unit, not the whole 
negative balance sheet flow can be met with a positive income flow; the interest 
costs are covered but not the whole contractual repayment of the principal of 
outstanding debt.87  
This means that the left hand side of (1) is negative for the speculative unit. The 
range of the negativity is somewhere between zero and the amount of the 
principal repayment that is due, i.e. the minimum amount that the positive 
income flow of the speculative unit can meet is the interest payment part of the 
balance sheet flow. The principal repayment part of the negative balance sheet 
flow, or at least a share of it, must be met with a negative portfolio flow. That 
negative portfolio flow can consist of selling net capital and/or financial assets. 
A refinancing of the due principal is also possible.  
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 The negative balance sheet flow can also be in the form of a non-contractual dividend payment, and its 
financing can be in the form of a negative portfolio flow, i.e. a new loan. An example is Byr savings bank 
in Iceland. In April 2008 it paid out a ISK 13.5 billion dividend that was higher than the ISK 7.9 billion 
profit of the year before. The difference was financed with borrowed funds. See e.g. Þórðarson (2009) 
and company annual reports. Arguably, Byr was a Ponzi and not a speculation unit. 
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An example of a speculative unit would be an individual that uses mortgage 
financing to acquire a buy-to-let property. Contrary to the original expectations 
when the house was bought – e.g. interest payments increased more than 
expected – the rent income (a positive balance sheet flow) cannot cover both 
the monthly interest rate expenses and the contractual principal repayments 
according to the mortgage contract; the net balance sheet flow is negative. The 
individual must meet the difference with either improved income flow (by e.g. 
working more or consuming less) or by e.g. short-term borrowing (a negative 
portfolio flow), such as in the form of an overdraft. He can also sell his car or 
stock and bonds holdings (negative portfolio flow). He can also decrease his 
balance sheet by selling the house he just bought (negative portfolio flow) and 
repay the mortgage to free him of future contractual principal and interest 
payments.88 
Another very important and a prominent example of a speculation unit is a 
commercial bank. If, contrary to expectations, the commercial bank experiences 
a large number of deposit withdrawal requests, it must meet that surprisingly 
negative balance sheet flow by selling its (financial) assets or by asking for 
emergency liquidity from the central bank (both a negative portfolio flow).89 This 
would be an example of a contractual – perhaps it was unexpected but it was 
still contractual, i.e. the deposits were available on demand – repayment of 
outstanding debt that cannot be fully met with an income flow. 
The Ponzi unit’s financial structure is, expectedly so, even less robust than that 
of the speculative unit. Again, just as the speculative unit, the Ponzi unit has, at 
least temporarily, a net negative balance sheet flow due to contractual cash 
flows. The left side of (1) is negative at its current situation. However, contrary 
to the speculation unit, not even the contractual interest rate cost of maturing 
debt repayments can be covered with its current sources of cash income: the 
left hand side of (1) is negative by more than the principal repayment part of the 
balance sheet flow that it must meet. This means that the Ponzi unit is actually 
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 The reader can see here that if many speculation units experience this position at the same time, the 
market price of properties is likely to decrease.  
89
 The point should be highlighted here that even though the speculation unit may be in a positive equity 
position – assets are higher in value than debts – it can experience a bankruptcy if negative balance sheet 
flows, such as contractual debt repayments, are not met with available income flows or refinancing 
possibilities (negative portfolio flows). 
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increasing its (net) debt: it issues more debt, or sells some of its assets, to 
cover at least part of its interest payments. 
For Minsky, the emergence of the Ponzi unit was a natural consequence of first 
of all the fact that the future, at any time, is uncertain and, second, the thought 
process of basing one’s investment decisions on convention, in which the 
recent past got more weight in the decision process than the distant past. This 
had the effect that, during the phase of the Financial Instability Hypothesis when 
leverage was being rediscovered and profits were abounding, the recent past, 
mirroring those developments, got more weight in the investment decision 
process than the distant past and the Ponzi unit optimistically believed that the 
good times would simply continue. He therefore enters a “super-leveraged” 
financial position which is profitable as long as a) he can refinance the maturing 
principal and interest payments and b) the price of the asset which he uses the 
credit to take position in goes up faster than he accumulates debt.  
This works while the good times roll and “others follow” the leaders into the 
speculation boom and the increased use of leverage. However, there comes the 
time when underlying profits of real capital assets cannot support the then 
leveraged financial structure of the economy. Refinancing dries up. 
This forces the Ponzi unit, by all likelihood, to be the first economic unit to be 
forced to “run off” and “sell out” his positions. If many enough Ponzi units find 
themselves in this position at the same time, the price of the sold assets will fall 
as they liquidate their positions. The chain reaction of liquidation and lower 
asset prices then gathers pace as more Ponzi units sell out. The decrease of 
asset prices will harm the speculation units as their lenders, due to their lower 
net worth arising from the fall in the asset price, will demand a higher rate of 
interest or more equity. The speculation unit can therefore become a Ponzi unit 
as the price of its assets falls. Hedge units can become speculation units.  
3.3.4 The effects of speculation and Ponzi units 
We can see that the emergence and the position of Ponzi units in the economy 
have a major influence on the robustness of the financial structure of units of 
the economy. As the mix of hedge, speculation and Ponzi borrowers tilts 
towards less financially robust units, not only the need for an ever-lasting debt 
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refinancing possibilities becomes increasingly important but fluctuations in asset 
prices and incomes can have more serious knock-on effects (Minsky, 2008b): 
A unit in a speculative or Ponzi financing posture obtains the cash to 
satisfy its debtors by selling some assets, rolling over the maturing 
debt, or new borrowing; such units are dependent upon financial 
markets conditions in a more serious way than units whose liability 
structures can be characterised as hedge financing. 
A characteristic of the dominance of speculation and Ponzi units is that new 
debt contracts are created increasingly due to refinancing of older and maturing 
ones but not because of external financing of entrepreneurship projects. Income 
flows from production no longer service balance sheet flows but new financial 
debt is created to service the maturing debt. Portfolio flows explode relative to 
income flows. 
Once Ponzi units have emerged they will put increasing stress on the financial 
system as the deficit of their balance sheet flows will increase each time they 
roll over their debt. The net worth of their portfolio decreases due to their act of 
financing interest rates expenses with more credit. The more prominent Ponzi 
financing is, the more fragile the financial structure of the economy is (Minsky, 
1984, p. 22):  
For any given regime of financial institutions and government 
interventions the greater the weight of hedge financing in the 
economy the greater the stability of the economy whereas an 
increasing weight of speculative and Ponzi financing indicates an 
increasing susceptibility of the economy to financial instability. 
It is the Ponzi and speculation units that can deliver the fatal blow to financial 
stability if they are forced or desire to run off their positions at a similar time, 
Ponzi units more so since their reliance on external financing is more 
prominent. As Minsky (1984, p. 67, emphasis added) himself argued:  
Ponzi financing units cannot carry on too long. Feedbacks from 
revealed financial weakness of some units affect the willingness of 
bankers and businessmen to debt finance a wide variety of 
organizations... the decline in investment that follows from a 
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reluctance to finance [maturing debt] leads to a decline in profits and 
in the ability to sustain debt. Quite suddenly a panic can develop as 
pressure to lower debt ratios increases.  
3.4 Applying Minsky’s FIH to measure financial stability 
Minsky put his FIH forward in words but it has been mathematically backed up 
by Keen (1997). Despite its theoretical and seemingly empirical and historical 
allure, Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis has, as far as the author is 
aware of, not been directly used in an attempt to measure financial instability. 
The following is an attempt at outlining how that could be done.90 
Minsky’s own views and attempts to look into the stability of the financial 
structure of the economy should of course be relied on. The methodology of 
creating an index out of selected variables can then be applied.  
3.4.1 The appropriate use of two time horizons 
Minsky effectively looked at two time horizons when he discussed the stability of 
the financial structures in the economy.  
First of all, he noted the “panic” phase when “pressure to lower debt ratios 
increases.” This is similar to the financial instability indices that focus on market 
developments and consequently spike during panic episodes. Examples are 
Hakkio and Keeton (2009) and Holló, Kremer, and Duca (2012), covered in 
more detail later in this section.  
Second, Minsky focused on the underlying financial structures of the economy. 
Included were stock-flow ratios such as households’ liabilities divided by 
disposable personal income and stock-stock ratios such as non-financials’ total 
liabilities divided by demand deposits. Flow-flow ratios, such as cash (out)flows 
from contractual liabilities compared to income from operations or assets, 
should be considered as well. Minsky (1984) believed that ratios such as those 
were informative when it came to estimating how resilient the financial structure 
of the economy really was. He furthermore wanted to take the nature of 
contractual liabilities into the picture. If, for example, liabilities were mainly 
composed of short term debts the financial structure of the economy would be 
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 Ishikawa et al. (2012) use the FIH as well. They, amongst other things, look at different time horizons. 
But they, for example, do not make an index resting on the FIH. Another potential approach would be to 
develop Vogel and Werner (2015) further but that is left to future researchers. 
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less resilient to a shock than when liabilities were mainly long term in nature. 
We can imagine that any new stipulates, such as interest-only and negative 
amortisation loans, can have effects as well: as long as the cash flows of two 
loans are different, their “nature” can be said to be different. This “nature” of 
liabilities was in fact so important, according to Minsky, that a high debt-to-
income ratio of a sector in the economy could be more stable than if the ratio 
were lower if the contracts behind the debt in the high debt-to-income ratio had 
favourable characteristics for financial stability. Examples include e.g. a long 
and even repayment schedule of outstanding debt and a lower rate of interest.91 
This Minskyian approach to estimating financial (in)stability would not be the 
same as looking at the ongoing market developments during the panic phase as 
is done in e.g. Hakkio and Keeton (2009) or ex post measures of the severity of 
instability such as in Bordo et al. (2002). Minsky’s approach and understanding 
of financial instability was more wide-ranging. Minsky wanted to look at balance 
sheets and cash-receipts of not only one specific sector in the economy but all 
of them in order to estimate the potential build-up of stress in the underlying 
financial structure of the economy. He also wanted to look at the nature of the 
financial contracts in the economy and not simply overall stocks or flows. 
Unsustainable conditions, connected to speculation and especially Ponzi 
financing, would also have to be considered. An example of Ponzi conditions 
would e.g. be a rate of interest that would be higher than the growth of income 
or return on assets that would be smaller than the interest cost of credit used to 
create the asset. An increasing share of income used to service debt 
repayments and interest costs would also signal a deteriorating strength in the 
underlying financial structure and so would overall dependence on credit 
amongst economic units. Such indicators would give an idea whether there 
might be an underlying issue of potential financial instability, waiting to develop 
into an outright panic phase. It could also give an estimate on how the 
underlying financial structure of the economy is developing, i.e. towards or away 
from more robustness. This would of course put a Minskyian financial stability 
index close to early warning indicators. But the difference would be that 
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 Consider the following as an example of this argument: “As shown in Table 1 [not shown in this text], 
the debt-income ratios for both households and corporate nonfinancial business rose during the sustained 
expansion of 1922-29 and 1948-62... Inasmuch as the nature of mortgage debt changed markedly between 
1929 and 1962, the larger household debt-income ratio in 1962 may not indicate a greater sensitivity to a 
shock” (Minsky, 1984, p. 10, emphasis added). 
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unsustainable conditions, such as comparisons in e.g. interest rates and income 
growth, economic units’ increasing dependence on credit and overall deeper 
considerations about the size of different flows (income, portfolio, balance 
sheet) would have be to be considered as well. Furthermore, early warning 
indicators do not seem to be aggregated into a composite index so often 
although they have been combined into other graphical presentations, such as 
a “spider web map” by the  International Monetary Fund (2013b). 
Constructing an index, or a composite indicator, of financial instability including 
factors such as those just mentioned would be an attempt to follow the cycle in 
Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis. This would be in addition to pure 
“panic phase” indicators such as yield spreads, discrepancy in return on stocks 
or negative correlation between the price movements in stocks and bonds like 
Hakkio and Keeton (2009) do. The nature of the financial structures should be 
taken into account as well as much as possible. External and domestic factors 
should also be considered in the same composite index to grasp the possibility 
of weaknesses developing both in the internal and the external financial 
structures of the economy.  
It can be argued that this Minskyian argument about how to monitor the state of 
financial stability in the economy has not been fully taken into account in 
existing financial instability indices (or composite indicators). Hakkio and Keeton 
(2009) focus on market developments and look past macroeconomic factors 
such as credit flows. Duca and Peltonen (2013) go down a similar road and 
construct a Financial Stress Index that includes 5 market variables that are all 
market oriented (yield spreads between 3-month government bills and interbank 
rates, equity returns, realised volatility of equity prices, realised volatility of 
nominal exchange rate, realised volatility of 3-month government bill rate). Holló 
et al. (2012, p. 2) construct CISS (Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress) the 
aim of which is to “emphasise the systemic nature of existing stresses in the 
financial system, where systemic stress is interpreted as an ex post measure of 
systemic risk, i.e. risk which has materialised already.” This is not Minskyian in 
the sense that underlying financial structures of different economy segments 
are not looked at. Their variables in the CISS are market-based (prices, spreads 
and volatilities) with the exceptions of emergency lending from central banks to 
monetary financial institutions and price-book ratios for the equity index of the 
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financial sector, which naturally utilises the value of equity, i.e. a balance sheet 
variable. Brave and Butters (2010) get close to the Minskyian measure of 
financial instability though. Their financial condition index includes 100 
variables, including numerous yield spreads, repo market volume (signalling 
emergency lending to banks), asset price volatility measures, outstanding debt 
stocks (as a share of GDP) and new debt issuances to name just a few. This 
excessive mix of current market developments and underlying financial 
structures can however be disadvantageous when considering the underlying 
development of financial structures and realised and current market 
developments. They also do not consider Ponzi-financing conditions. 
We, therefore, will make a distinction between two different measurements of 
financial stability following Minsky’s argument on how to estimate the level of 
financial instability in the economy. We will call the first one – similar, but not the 
same, to the indices developed by e.g. Hakkio and Keeton (2009) and Holló et 
al. (2012) – “short term” financial instability. Those will focus on more time-
immediate factors such as emergency or short term lending, asset price 
movements and other market developments. We will then consider “long term” 
financial instability which will focus more on balance sheets, the fragility of 
underlying financial structures and, as should be evident, a longer horizon. This 
would be an attempt to edge ourselves towards looking at the financial stability 
of the economy the Minskyian way. The advantage of splitting the 
measurements up this way is that we get one which is more focused on the 
underlying financial structures of the economy (long term view) and another 
which is more concerned about the immediate developments (short term view). 
They may not be developing the same way which is why it is important to make 
this distinction. 
3.4.2 “Short term” financial stability 
We have already established the view that financial stability is a macro 
economical phenomenon. Not only did Minsky (1984, p. 128, emphasis added) 
speak of financial instability occurring “whenever a large number of units resort 
to extraordinary sources of cash” but W. A. Allen and Wood (2006) also focus 
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on the macro-wide sources and consequences of it. We will therefore not look 
at individual units but sectors in aggregate.92 
Following Minsky’s emphasis on cash flows and the need for and possibilities 
for finding a refinancing of maturing debt, such indicators should be included in 
a “Minskyian” financial instability index. This applies both to the short term and 
the long term measurements of financial instability. Liquidity ratios such as the 
current ratio (short term assets / short term debt) and the cash ratio ([cash + 
marketable securities] / short term debt) would be informative.93 Flow-flow ratios 
and flow-stock ratios focusing on short term liabilities and cash-flows would be 
useful as well. An example is the ratio of income from operations to short term 
contractual liabilities (such as maturing rents, debt and interest costs). The 
prevalence of protected assets and near-cash assets, such as treasury bonds, 
should be compared to that of non-protected assets, given Minsky’s own words, 
previously quoted: “....and the ratio of unprotected to protected financial assets 
are determinants of the stability of the financial system.” The economy’s 
external position – such as external contractual payments, their maturity profile 
and net receipts from abroad which can be used to service external debts – 
should also be considered for an open economy since those are cash flows as 
well and domestic units can have contractual obligations with foreign parties. 
This should preferably be done for all sectors of the economy (households, 
financials, non-financial corporations, government). 
Furthermore, if possible, we should try and distinguish between income flows 
and portfolio flows when it comes to how contractual cash flows are serviced. 
The reason is that a balance sheet flow, even if it may be arising from short 
term financial contracts, that is serviced with income flows is a characteristic of 
a hedge financing: the units’ cash income from operations covers the cash 
outflow from contractual liabilities. If, however, the cash outflow is serviced with 
a portfolio flow, such as new borrowings, it is a characteristic of a speculation or 
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 Minsky did realise the importance of interrelations between economic units and the potential domino 
effects of the default of one economic unit: “How do units get into a position where their cash outflow 
due to commitments is greater than their cash inflow due to operations? One way... is by having debtors 
on owned contracts default – which in a closely articulated set of layered financial relations can have a 
domino effect” (Minsky, 2008a, p. 85). However, to simplify things, we will ignore this complication 
here. 
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 We have already noted that Minsky considered the ratio of total liabilities of nonfinancial corporations 
to their demand deposits as informative to estimate the robustness of the financial structure of the 
economy. 
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Ponzi financing. Such financing structures are less stable than that of the hedge 
unit. Therefore, if it is possible, we should try and make the distinction between 
how contractual cash flows are serviced or will need to be serviced. This could 
give us a signal of whether “imminent” financial stress is building up in the 
financial system; it could give an estimate of how significant Ponzi and 
speculation financing is in the financial system which may lead to an outright 
panic. 
A prime example of an “imminent” financial stress building up in the economy, 
while traditional panic indicators are doing well, is Iceland’s economy before the 
Crash in 2008.94 Before the Crash, dependency on available financing had been 
building up in the financial system. 1/3 of all corporate loans had become bullet 
bonds. Likewise, half of all loans to asset holding companies were bullet bonds 
(Ólafsson, 2013). From Minsky’s point of view, this would have been a clear 
sign of increased weight of speculation and Ponzi units in the economy and a 
consequential threat to financial stability: if asset holding companies would not 
have been able to refinance their market positions, the resulting liquidation of 
assets would have been catastrophic for asset prices. This turned out to be the 
case. Traditional short-term financial instability indices, which focus mainly or 
only on ongoing market developments such as bond spreads and changes in 
asset prices, would not, however, have realised those cracks in the economy’s 
financial structure until the market finally collapsed. 
Nevertheless, as is done with traditional measurements of financial instability, 
market signals and the behaviour of market participants should be considered in 
a Minskyian financial instability index, just as they are in many others. That 
would fit well with Minsky’s “panic” phase in the FIH where refinancing 
possibilities may be limited (pushing for asset sales), asset prices are 
fluctuating and the scramble for cash is prevalent. For this part of the 
measurement of short term financial instability, we can support our work with 
that of previous makers of financial instability measures, such as Hakkio and 
Keeton (2009).95 
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 “Crash” is written here with a capital C for Icelanders traditionally, by now, speak of the economic 
crisis in October 2008 as “Hrun(ið)“ which directly translates to (the) Crash. A timeline reference to the 
event is common, e.g. “Did you move to Norway before or after the Crash?” 
95
 The selection of indicators will be described in more detail in chapter 4. 
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Measuring “short term” financial instability should therefore be focusing on 
current developments in the economy that are related to the immediate stress 
put on economic units to serve their contractual debt obligations. This would be 
in accordance with Minsky’s FIH. The “short term” measurement should be 
focusing on the “panic” phase of the FIH. 
3.4.3 “Long term” financial stability 
Estimating long term financial stability would be different from the traditional 
method of measuring financial instability. This would however, as already 
argued, rhyme well with Minsky’s view of the necessity of estimating the 
resilience of the financial structure of the economy. The methodology in 
constructing the corresponding index could however be similar to that of 
constructing the short term financial stability index although the indicators would 
not be the same set. 
The long term financial stability index would look at a longer horizon than the 
short term stability index. The long term index would serve as a measurement 
of “upcoming” contractual payments that would, as time passes and their 
maturity becomes shorter, naturally transform into short term liabilities. Such 
contractual payments could, as Minsky emphasised, be hard to service when 
they finally matured, forcing or making units desire more cash “than is available 
from their usual sources and so they [will] resort to unusual ways to raise cash.” 
A financial crisis could ensue. The long term financial stability index would, 
properly designed, therefore give us an estimate of the resilience of the 
financing structure of the economy.96 
We would, following Minsky’s argument, still focus on flow-flow and flow-stock 
ratios.97 Stock-stock ratios would be informative as well, such as to estimate 
leverage levels (using e.g. assets-to-equity ratio). The weight of external 
financing in investment operations would be informative to look at the 
development of leverage at the margin (complementing e.g. assets-to-equity 
ratio).98 Indicators that would give us an idea of the development of contractual 
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 Note that although the index could convey the information that, say, resilience had decreased between 
periods, this would not say that a “crisis” would happen. It would simply just tell us that the economy’s 
financial resilience had decreased, nothing more, nothing less.  
97
 The emphasis on flow-flow and stock-flow ratios was not only emphasised by Minsky. Godley 
considered it as a valuable warning signal of unsustainable developments as well (Lavoie & Zezza, 2012). 
98
 Minsky himself considered this ratio (Minsky, 1984). 
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payments compared to the development of income streams would also be 
useful. The difference between the yield on investment and the rate of interest 
would be an example as it can significantly influence the build-up of debt and 
therefore contractual principal and interest payments compared to the incomes 
that are received from the investment (Keen, 1997). A rate of interest that is 
higher than the rate of economic growth could also be signal of upcoming 
structural weaknesses in the financial structure: the macroeconomic level of 
debt would grow exponentially. Such an environment can in fact lead to a 
cyclical development towards an overall debt-induced economic breakdown 
(Keen, 1997). 
As with short term financial stability, we should strive to make a difference 
between income flows and portfolio flows when it comes to looking at how 
contractual payments are serviced. An economy where long-term debts are 
mainly financed with new borrowings could signify a great weight of speculation 
and Ponzi units in the economy, making its overall financial structure less 
robust.99 
It is necessary to stress here that a “long term” financial instability measure, if in 
accordance with Minsky’s FIH, should be constructed so that it can follow the 
development of the fragility of the underlying financial structure of units in the 
economy: are the financing positions of units in the economy of a hedge, 
speculation or Ponzi nature? Furthermore, it is vital to realise that if such a 
measure is constructed and it shows a value that indicates that the financial 
structure of units in the economy has become more fragile than it was it does 
not mean that there will be a financial crisis or a panic in the economy. It merely 
shows that the underlying resilience of financial structures of economic units 
has become more fragile than they used to be, not that they will necessarily 
break apart. Or as Minsky himself wrote, previously quoted, see 3.3.4 The 
effects of speculation and Ponzi units: “Ponzi financing units cannot carry on too 
long... Quite suddenly a panic can develop as pressure to lower debt ratios 
increases.” 
                                            
99
 As with short term financial stability, chapter 4 will cover in better detail which indicators can be used 
to measure long term financial stability. 
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3.4.4 The clash between long term and short term financial instability 
Minsky (1984) argued that although short term financial stability could be 
supported by official intervention – Big Government and a decisive central bank 
– the consequence could be that economic units would take this into account 
when they decide how to finance their general operations. The consequence 
would be encouraged debt financing, i.e. a higher leverage. 
But higher leverage increases the fragility of the financial system, making it less 
robust against endogenous and exogenous shocks. Temporary instability, or 
even a full scale debt deflation, is a consequence of the financial structures of 
economic units not enduring setbacks in asset prices (net worth of economic 
units) and incomes when they happen (ibid). That temporary (short term) 
financial instability or even deflation calls for a respond from the policy makers: 
Big Government steps in to support profits and the central bank supports asset 
prices. But that means we are back to square one where debt financing is 
encouraged because of policy makers’ response to market turmoil.   
Therefore, a government and a central bank that wish to support profits and 
asset prices, thereby supporting short term financial stability, could, possibly, 
increase the fragility of the financial structure of the economy, i.e. long term 
financial instability. This means that the causality between short term financial 
instability and long term financial instability can be positive but, somewhat 
counter-intuitively, running from the former to the latter. At the same time, more 
variance in short term financial instability should be expected as long term 
financial instability, i.e. the fragility of underlying financial structures in the 
economy, grows. 
This also introduces the risk of long term financial stability being “sacrificed” if 
the gain is an immediate improvement in short term financial stability. The risk 
of this happening is not negligible. First of all, humans are “present-biased” 
meaning that they weigh the present and the close future a lot more into their 
decision making than can be accepted following a time-consistent discounting 
of the future. Our discount functions are dynamically inconsistent and a 
“hyperbolic discounting” is more realistic than time-consistent discount functions 
(Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002; Thaler, 1981). On top of this 
come the effects of humans’ loss averse behaviour, where the absolute impact 
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of losing wealth is perceived to be greater than the absolute impact of gaining 
the same amount (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). The effects, especially as loss 
aversion combines with hyperbolic discounting, can be that we, possibly even 
knowingly, tend to sacrifice long term stability for the gain of short term stability: 
we want our comforts and wealth sustained in the immediate future, even if we 
potentially know that we can or even will have a more serious crisis coming 
upon us later. 
Second, politicians’ behaviour has an impact as well. It is documented that 
ruling politicians can have the tendency to expand government spending, 
decrease taxation, or postpone austerity measures, just before elections, the 
purpose being to stimulate the economy and get re-elected (Persson, 2002; Shi 
& Svensson, 2006).100 Similarly, we should expect politicians to favour short 
term stability over long term stability, even if they, and possibly others as well, 
potentially know that they are threatening the resilience of the economy’s 
financial structure by doing so. Given humans’ loss averse and present-biased 
behaviour, we cannot confirmingly expect voters to make a great fuss about it. 
Conclusion to chapter 3 
We have discussed the term “financial stability” in this chapter and highlighted 
some of the contributions on how to measure the phenomenon. We have also 
introduced Minsky’s contributions in this area, in particular his Financial 
Instability Hypothesis on the natural development of financial instability in the 
economy. Its cash-flow foundations and main players have been described.  
Using Minsky’s FIH we have laid out the ground methodology of which 
indicators should be used to measure financial instability in the economy. We 
have discussed how such “Minskyian” indices would be different from the 
traditional ones. We have also described the possibility of a clash between what 
we called “short term” and “long term” financial instabilities.  
In next chapter we will put the theoretical basis of this chapter to the 
methodological test. Two “Minskyian” financial instability indices will be 
developed and their interrelations with some economic figures looked at. Their 
interrelationship will be probed into as well to see if there is any empirical 
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 This is not a generalisation and can depend on e.g. the institutional organisation, such as presidential or 
parliamentary rule (Persson, 2002) and the level of development in the economy (Shi & Svensson, 2006). 
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struggle between long term and short term financial instabilities. We will also 
see if we can make any empirical statements about the relationship between 
financial instability on one hand and FDI in general and in financial services on 
the other. 
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Chapter 4 - Methodology, Data and Results 
Measure what can be measured and make measurable what cannot 
be measured. 
Attributed to Galileo Galilei (see Strohmer (2012, p. 887)) 
In this chapter financial instability is measured, following the theoretical 
argumentation of chapter 3, with two indices, one for short term instability and 
another for long term instability. Hakkio & Keeton (2009) is used as a model of 
how to construct the indices with Principal Component Analysis.101 Those 
measurements of financial instability are then investigated in relation with 
foreign direct investment, following the discussion in chapters 1 and 2, and 
economic growth. Data was collected for two major economies: the United 
States and the United Kingdom. Data sources were Bloomberg, Datastream, 
OECD, The Federal Reserve, Bank of England and national statistics agencies.  
4.1 The construction of the indices 
4.1.1 The Hakkio & Keeton methodology and the expansions made 
When H&K (Hakkio & Keeton, 2009) measured financial instability in the United 
States, they used short term factors and proxies for investors’ sentiments and 
beliefs on the market. This is in accordance with the panic phase of Minsky’s 
FIH. The factors were uncertainty about the fundamental value of assets and 
the behaviour of other investors, the asymmetry of information, the (decreased) 
willingness to hold risky assets – termed “flight to quality” – and the (decreased) 
willingness to hold illiquid assets – termed “flight to liquidity”.  
From those key features, H&K constructed a financial instability index using 
monthly data. The index was successful in showing periods of market turmoil 
where newsworthy events in the markets took place. Examples included 
implosion of the US stock bubble in 2000, BNP Paribas’s freeze on redemptions 
from three of its asset-backed securities funds in August 2007, and Bear 
Stearns’s collapse in March 2008 to name just a few.  
In H&K, the data samples were first standard-normalised so all of them had a 
mean value of zero and a standard deviation of one. The index itself was a sum 
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 Further details and reasoning for the selection of variables can be found in Appendix 2. 
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of the individual standard-normalised data samples of variables that were meant 
to represent one or more of the key features of financial instability mentioned 
here above. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was used to decide the 
weight of each of the data samples when the index was constructed. This 
fundamental methodology is adopted in this work. 
Other possible methodologies of constructing an index, or a composite 
indicator, include e.g. common factor analysis, representative-weights and 
macroeconomic simulations, see 3.1.2 Measuring financial (in)stability. This 
research will only rely on PCA, as H&K do. PCA approach is one of the most 
common approaches in the literature (Carlson, Lewis, & Nelson, 2014) and 
other researchers have found that it is a very favourable approach compared to 
others (Thompson, van Eyden, & Gupta, 2013). 
There were, however, expansions and tweaks made. The first obvious 
expansion was to divide financial instability features into long term and short 
term. “Short term” is in this research as close as possible to being within a 
year’s time. “Long term” is anything else. This line between short term and long 
term is far from being the only “correct” one. The division between “short term” 
and “long term” is indeed very blurred as Kalecki (1971, p. 165) noted (quoted 
by Duménil and Lévy (1999)): “In fact, the long-run trend is but a slowly 
changing component of a chain of short-period situations; it has no independent 
entity...”.102 
The second expansion from the H&K methodology is to include factors in the 
short term that make an attempt to monitor debt and cash flows and not only 
investors’ sentiment as H&K did. Those include the change in the overall levels 
of debt, thereby attempting to proxy the net issuance of debt, and the change of 
change (acceleration) of debt, drawing on research on the effects of credit 
creation and credit and interests repayments on asset prices, investment, 
output and general financial stability (Keen, 2011c). The acceleration of debt 
has, as far as the author is aware of, never been included in research that 
attempts to create a composite indicator of financial stress.  
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 For the argument for the division between short term and long term financial stability, see chapter 3. 
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The third difference is that data used here is on a quarterly basis while H&K 
used monthly data. This is simply done for lack of monthly based data, such as 
in the case of national accounts which are generally in the form of quarterly 
data. In the cases where monthly data is available the average of the monthly 
values for each quarter is used as an input in the financial instability indices. 
Further aggregation is done when the indices are regressed against the data on 
foreign direct investment: the FDI data from OECD, from where they are drawn, 
are on an annual basis and so, to run regressions with annual data, the indices’ 
quarterly data points are averaged over each year and the average used to run 
regressions with the annual FDI data. The FDI data is always divided with the 
nominal GDP in the relevant year, i.e. the FDI figures are not absolute numbers 
but relative to nominal GDP. 
Fourth, the methodology on deciding which economic indicators are to be used 
to construct the indices is different. H&K decided, arbitrarily, to use 11 variables 
which they argued were useful in collecting data on how much instability is in 
the financial system. They then applied Principal Component Analysis on those 
figures.  
The methodology applied here is to construct a “base” index with 10 variables, 
i.e. economic indicators. Those 10 economic indicators are chosen from the 
pool of available indicators that, using Minsky’s FIH, are informative when trying 
to estimate the level of financial (in)stability in the financial system: see tables 
4.1 and 4.2 and 4.1.2 Some notes on the methodology. The total number of 
available indicators is not fixed, they are e.g. 22 in the case of short term 
instability for UK (see table 4.1).  
The method of choosing which 10 indicators are used in the base index is as 
follows. A cross-correlation matrix is constructed between all the available 
indicators. Those 10 indicators that are on average most correlated to other 
indicators are then used to construct the index. An exception is made if indicator 
X is highly (>0.9) correlated with indicator Y, where Y has a higher average 
correlation to the rest of the available indicators. In that case indicator X is 
skipped and does not become building material for the index. Principal 
Component Analysis is then used on the 10 indicators to decide their weights in 
the index. If an indicator’s weight is not significant from zero (with 95% 
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significance level) it is skipped and the index recalculated with the remaining 
indicators. This is repeated until all the indicators in the index have a weight that 
is not zero (with 95% significance level). The index with all non-zero-weight 
indicators is presented on a normalised form, i.e. with standard deviation of one 
and average of zero. This index is then used in regressions with FDI data. 
4.1.2 Some notes on the methodology 
There are several aspects about the methodology that need to be discussed. 
First, what is the purpose of choosing the indicators with a cross-correlation 
matrix? Furthermore, does that risk choosing spurious indicators: just because 
a particular set of indicators is closely correlated with each other does this say 
anything about causation, timing and the overall usefulness of the indicators? 
The purpose of choosing the indicators with a cross-correlation matrix is to 
choose the most informative indicators and yet have flexibility in that choice. 
Selecting a specific and non-amendable list of indicators that shall be a part of 
the financial instability index, like Hakkio and Keeton do, risks focusing on a 
limited number of indicators that may or may not be the most appropriate ones 
when it comes to quantifying financial stability in the relevant economy during 
the time period in question. There is nothing that strictly says that a list of 
certain indicators of a certain number is the only or the most appropriate list of 
creating a financial instability index at all times. One list of indicators may be the 
most appropriate one in one economy at one time period while the selection of 
indicators should be different in the next economy or next time period. The 
reason is that economies develop and change. An indicator that may be very 
informative in one time period may not be so in the next nor have the same 
informative value between economies.  
The methodology here applied is an attempt to tackle those issues. The 
methodology chooses the indicators that are most closely correlated to all the 
other indicators that, on the basis of Minsky’s FIH, provide valuable information 
about the development of financial stability in that relevant economy during that 
particular time period under investigation. It does not fix the list of indicators to a 
certain number, although it is certainly arbitrary, up to a point,103 to choose to 
begin with a “base” index of 10 indicators that may or may not be made fewer 
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 See last paragraph in this section for a reason why the number 10 is chosen. 
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as the final index is constructed. Using this methodology we are given the 
indicators that should be most relevant for that economy and that time period 
without any preconceptions about which indicators are “the best ones”.  
It should be noted that this methodology can grasp what Minsky emphasised 
when he pointed out how financial stability can develop (improve) despite one 
indicator becoming worse, and the other way around. An example is household 
debt (Minsky, 1984, p. 10, emphasis added):  
Inasmuch as the nature of mortgage debt changed markedly 
between 1929 and 1962, the larger household debt-income ratio in 
1962 may not indicate a greater sensitivity to a shock.  
An indicator that would have focused on including debt of households at all 
times, because it was considered to be one of “the best ones” based on the 
simple and obvious argument that too much debt has implications for financial 
stability, could have overestimated the true development of financial instability 
in the economy during this time period. Minsky himself noted how financial 
stability in the US economy had been “unusual” and how the economy’s 
performance had been “more than adequate” in the post-war years (Minsky, 
2008b, p. 77):  
The debate about the proper organisation of the monetary and 
financial system, which has been a continuing issue in U.S. history, 
was muted during the two decades of economic tranquillity and 
progress after World War II. The economy’s more than adequate 
performance and the unusual stability of the domestic and 
international banking and financial system were taken to mean that 
we had finally gotten things right after nearly two hundred years of 
experimentation.  
What is interesting is that at the same time household debt was increasing both 
as a share of disposable personal income and as a share of money holdings 
(which Minsky held to be “a crude measure of liquidity” (Minsky, 2008b, p. 94)). 
This was happening while the stability of the financial system had been 
“unusual” and the economy’s performance “more than adequate”.  
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The development of household debt was, in other words, an outlier to the 
general development of indicators that offer valuable information about the 
development of financial stability. Consequently, financial stability during this 
time period was, indeed, “unusually” stable even if household debt was growing. 
Therefore, using the cross-correlation methodology adopted here would have 
resulted in an index where the indicator “household debt” would have been an 
unlikely candidate as one of the building blocks, exactly because its negative 
influences on overall financial stability in the economy were overwhelmed by 
other developments, resulting in an “unusually” stable economy. The 
development of “household debt” was not a good representative of the overall 
development of financial stability in the economy – it was an outlier – and 
should, in such situations, be discarded in attempts to measure financial 
stability. In other words, the “may” in Minsky’s words was in effect. 
But just because a particular set of indicators is closely correlated with each 
other does not say anything about causation and the overall usefulness of the 
indicators. If among N indicators, n (n≤N) are misleading, but highly correlated, 
then this methodology would select them as the ones to be used.  
To answer those criticisms, please consider the following. First, we are not, in 
any way, testing for causation between the indicators. They are chosen on the 
grounds of being the best representatives of measuring the underlying financial 
stability in the economy, following Minsky’s FIH, and not the “causality” of them 
onto financial instability. This issue is therefore irrelevant.  
Second, we should expect crisis indicators to have a high correlation with each 
other. M. Goldstein, Reinhart, and Kaminsky (2000, p. 98), discussing early 
warning indicators for crises in emerging markets, note that 
[i]n most banking and currency crises, a high proportion of the 
monthly leading indicators – on the order of 50 to 75 percent – reach 
their signalling thresholds. Indeed, both in and out of sample, we 
found that fewer than one-sixth of crises occurred with only five or 
fewer of the 15 monthly leading indicators flashing. In other words, 
when an emerging economy is lurching toward a financial crisis, 
many of the wheels come of simultaneously.  
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This, then, is an obvious argument for using correlation to determine the most 
informative indicators: those indicators are the ones that are the wheels that are 
coming of simultaneously. 
Third, the issue of usefulness of the indicators rests on Minsky’s FIH. Choosing 
whether an indicator should be amongst the potential inputs in the base index 
rests on whether it should be there with Minsky’s FIH in mind! An obscure 
indicator, such as the number of cars in the economy or the tons of imported 
goods into it, may have a really good correlation with some other indicators on 
the list of potential inputs in the base index. Therefore, such an indicator would 
be chosen with this cross-correlation methodology and be a part of the 
indicators making up the index. There could be other indicators like this, such 
as six, or any other number. But having such an obscure indicator on the list of 
potential inputs would not make any sense in the first place: they are chosen on 
the basis of Minsky’s FIH and are, therefore, not misleading for the purpose of 
measuring financial stability in the economy with the FIH in mind. In fact, they 
cannot be misleading as long as Minsky’s FIH and the argument for choosing 
the indicator as a potential building block of the index on makes sense with the 
FIH in mind. Having the number of cars in the economy as a potential indicator 
would never make such sense. It would therefore never end up on the list of 
potential indicators in the first place. 
There are two ways of having an indicator in the index that is misleading and 
works against the effort of measuring financial instability in the economy. The 
first is to incorrectly argue that it should be there, i.e. it does not follow Minsky’s 
FIH well enough. The second is that Minsky’s FIH is itself misleading in 
measuring financial instability in the economy. Minsky’s FIH was discussed, and 
defended, in chapter 3. Appendix 2 provides reasoning for the selection of the 
indicators. 
The reason why an indicator X that has a high correlation (>0.9) with another 
indicator Y that has a higher average correlation with other indicators is skipped 
as an input in the index is the following. We want to create an index that gives 
us as much information about the underlying financial instability as possible. In 
the case where indicator X has a high correlation with an indicator Y that has 
already been chosen to be in the index we have a situation where most of the 
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information that X would have contributed to the index is already there due to 
indicator Y. Including X therefore adds little information and it is more valuable 
for the reach and the depth of the index to skip indicator X and include the next 
indicator on the list. This decreases the potential threat of focusing too much on 
too few indicators that bring too little depth and breadth of information to the 
index.  
Finally, a consequence of the methodology of choosing the indicators must be 
pointed out and discussed: the outputs, i.e. the values, of the index can, and 
most likely will, change as the time period over which the index is constructed is 
changed. What this means is that the output value for e.g. 1Q2000 in the 
relevant index could, and most likely would, be different if the time periods 
which the index is constructed for are different, e.g. the time periods 4Q1990 – 
4Q2005 on one hand and 4Q1990 – 4Q2009 on the other.  
This is likely to happen even though the economic indicators that are used to 
construct the index can happen to be exactly the same between the two 
different time periods. In other words, if e.g. the set S of economic indicators is 
chosen, based on the cross-correlation matrix, to be the building block in the 
relevant index both for, say, the time periods 4Q1990 – 4Q2005 and 4Q1990 – 
4Q2009 it is very likely that the 1Q2000 point, as an example, will not have the 
same quantitative value in both cases.  
The reason why this is likely to happen is twofold. First, in the case where the 
set S is indeed unchanged, we should remember that the outputs values of the 
relevant index are standard normalised to have the mean value of zero and 
standard deviation of one over the time period in chosen. It follows that because 
of the standard normalisation process it will, quite likely, change the individual 
output values if the time period is changed between constructing the index: i.e. 
the 1Q2000 value of the index, using data over the time period 4Q1990 – 
4Q2005, is unlikely to be quantitatively the same as the 1Q2000 value of the 
index using data over the time period and 4Q1990 – 4Q2009. Remember, we 
assume that the set S is the same.  
Also, the weight of the indicators in S, which we still assume to be unchanged 
between two different time periods, can change depending on the time period 
we use to construct the index. This is another reason why the output values of 
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the index may change depending on the time period we use to construct the 
index. 
But S does not need to be the same. The indicators that are chosen as building 
blocks in the financial instability indices – the set S – are based on cross-
correlation of each of them to the rest of available indicators over the time 
period which data is extracted from. 
Some may consider this variability in the index and its building blocks, 
depending on the time period chosen to construct it, a drawback since 
comparison of the historical development of financial instability, according to the 
indices, changes depending on the time period chosen.  
This criticism is acknowledged. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that this 
may be a very important characteristic and lend flexibility to the index. First, the 
idea is that relevant economic indicators are chosen on the basis of how much 
information on financial instability they reflect. That can easily depend on the 
intrinsically dynamic and ever-changing characteristics of the economy at any 
time. Therefore, fixing the choice of indicators, and even their weights, for 
financial instability, with the purpose of standardising the measurement of it, no 
matter the time period in question, can have the unintended consequences of 
not observing the impact of exogenous or endogenous development in the 
economy that can impair financial stability. Standardising which indicators 
should be monitored, and even their weight as well, can reduce the ability of the 
index to give us valuable information of the state of financial instability. This has 
already been discussed in this section. 
Furthermore, indices where the inputs, and their weights, change depending on 
the time period in question are already widely used in economics, despite their 
very much so well-known faults. The most obvious examples are price indices 
such as Consumer Price Indices (CPI) or Retail Price Indices (RPI). These 
indices are widely used, e.g. to guide monetary policy, and the weights of their 
inputs, which form the basis that the price indices are constructed on, change 
frequently. So even if the financial instability indices here developed may be, as 
price indices are, inaccurate to some extent (Joensen, 2009; Moulton, 1996; 
Wynne, 2005) and that the weight of their building blocks change, and the 
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building blocks themselves, those drawbacks certainly do not doom their use or 
the value of the information they give us.  
Finally, why is PCA not applied to all available data and only 10 indicators? 
Because including more variables would complicate the data handling without 
improving or adding much, or any, information: “[in] multivariate analysis when a 
large number of variables, say 10 or more, is available the results are often little 
changed if a subset of the variables is used” and “[i]t is certainly useful to 
reduce the number of variables, if possible, for often variables are present 
which complicate the data but do not give any extra information” (Jolliffe, 1972, 
p. 160).  
We therefore choose to select the 10 most highly correlated indicators to all the 
available indicators and then run PCA on them to create the “base” index. We 
see that reducing the number of indicators in the indices, compared to their 
relevant “base” index of 10 indicators, does not significantly change them (see 
figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.4 and 4.5). This signals that we are not losing much 
information when the indicators are discarded showing that Joliffe is exactly 
right: “the results are often little changed if a subset of the variables is used”. 
Joliffe comments that “[m]any methods are possible for deciding which variables 
to reject, but, in practice, experience and intuition often play a part in the 
selection” (ibid). The choice of method is, therefore, “in practice” at least 
partially subjective. 
4.1.3 Data availability 
Data availability and standardisation was the most severe problem this research 
had to deal with. Of the numerous indicators that were thought of as being 
valuable in measuring the state of financial stability in the economy only some 
of them were available, able to be constructed or estimated, even differing 
between economies that were under the scope. In the case of short term 
financial instability index table 4.1 shows which economic indicators were 
available and how they were constructed using available data.  
The following tables describe the availability of data and the transformations 
that were done on the available figures. The last column of tables 4.3 - 4.6 is 
the average of correlation coefficients with all the other available data in the 
table. Tables 4.1 – 4.2 show on the other hand the economic indicators that 
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were available and used for the long term instability index. Data comes from the 
OECD, the Federal Reserve, National Statistics of United Kingdom, 
Datastream, Bloomberg and Reuters Financial. 
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Table 4.1 Available data for the short term instability index 
 
 
Variable UK US
(Households’ after-tax disposable 
income - net interest expenses all debt -
households’ current liabilities) / 
households' income
(Total resources (NSSF) - mortgages 
rates*loans secured on dwellings - 
outstanding consumer credit) / total 
resources household debt burden, % of income
Credit growth Change in debt/GDP Change in debt/GDP
Credit acceleration or deceleration 
(credit impulse) (Change in change in debt/GDP)^2 (Change in change in debt/GDP)^2
(Firms’ cash flow from sales and 
operations [EBIT] - net interest 
expenses of all debt - firm’s current 
liabilities)/Firms cash flow
[Gross op. Profits (4Q m.avrg) - Bond 
yields, Datastream 
average*sum(securites other than 
shares, loans) - Money Market 
Instruments - Finance Loans]/Gross 
op.profits
(Nonfinancial inc. before tax - avr. 
AAA&BAA int.rates*nonfinancial total 
fin. liab. -short term fin. 
liabil.)/nonfinancials' inc. before tax
(Government [tax] revenues - net 
interest expenses of long term debt - 
government current liabilities) / 
Government revenues
(Total Current Receipts - avr.interests 
5,10,20yrs*securities other than 
shares - Money Market Instruments) / 
Total Current Receipts Unavailable
(Banks’ net interest income - banks’ 
current liabilities) / Net interest income
(Gross op surplus - MMIs outstanding - 
Deposits) / Gross op surplus Unavailable
([net] exports - net interest expenses of 
external debt - short term external 
debt) / exports
(net exports - avr.interests 
5,10,20yrs*net foreign financial 
assets) / net exports Unavailable
(short term debt + interest expenses - 
net income) / outstanding debt 
[households]
(Basic Mortgage Rate*loans secured 
on dwellings + unsecured loan 
int.rate*total consumer credit + total 
consumer credit -Total Resources) / 
Total Loans Unavailable
(short term debt + interest expenses - 
net income) / outstanding debt [non-
financials]
[Bond yields, Datastream 
avr*sum(securities other than shares, 
loans) + Money Market Instruments + 
Finance Loans - Gross op. Profits (4Q 
m.avr.)] / (Total Liabilities - Shares)
(Short term fin. Liabil. + avr. AAA&BAA 
rates*outstanding liabilities - inc. 
Before tax)/Short term fin. liabilities
(short term debt + interest expenses - 
net income) / outstanding debt 
[financials]
(Money Market Instruments + Deposits 
- Gross op. Surplus) / (Total Liabilites - 
Shares) Unavailable
Newly issued debt / (matured debt - 
income) [households] Unavailable Unavailable
Newly issued debt / (matured debt - 
income) Unavailable Unavailable
The amount of protected assets / debt 
of financial obligations
Securites of central gov / Financials' 
liabilities Unavailable
securities of central gov / financials' 
short term liabilities
Securities of central gov / sum(Money 
Market Instruments, Deposits)
Federal debt / commercial banks' 
liabilities
The amount of outstanding REPO 
agreements with the Central Bank Unavailable
Federal bank total REPO agreements, 
3mth average
The structure of the yield curve 20yr - 5yr zero coupon yield difference 10 year Treasury bill - 3mth T bill
The size of government expenditure (of 
GDP) Gen. Gov exp / GDP (OECD figures) Gen. Gov exp / GDP (OECD figures)
The spread between LIBOR and T-bill 
yields LIBOR, T bill yield spread (3mth) LIBOR, T bill yield spread (3 mth)
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Table 4.1 (cont.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable UK US
Interest rate swap yield spread Unavailable Unavailable
Yield spread between off-the-run and 
on-the-run treasury bonds Unavailable Unavailable
The yield spread between highly rated 
corporate bonds and treasury bonds AAA, 10 yr Treasury yield spread
AAA, average 5,10,20,30 year gov 
bonds yield spread
The yield spread between highly rated 
corporate bonds and low rated 
corporate bonds UK Corp BBB, AAA yield spread Unavailable
The yield spread between “junk bonds” 
and low rated corporate bonds Unavailable Spread between BAA and AAA yield
The yield spread between consumer 
asset backed securities (CABS) and 
treasury bonds Unavailable Unavailable
The correlation between stock returns 
and treasury bonds returns FTSE 100 and overall Treasury Index
DJ and Overall Treasuy Index 3mth 
correlation
Volatility of stock prices VIX index VIX index
Individualistic volatility of bank equity 
prices Banks in FTSE 100 Banks index Banks in Dow Jones Index
Dispersion of returns on bank stocks FTSE 100 Banks and FTSE 100 indices Variance of 3mth return, DJ Banks
(Stock) trading volume, turnover, IPOs 
and margin calls Unavailable (Quarterly change in volume/m.cap)^2
(Real) exchange rate quarterly change 
squared Bank of England figures
JP Morgan real effective exchange 
index, sq. quarterly change
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Table 4.2 Available data for the long term instability index 
 
 
 
Variable UK US
Debt / GDP
Balance Sheet of UK: Liabilities; Loans / 
GDP
sum of Federal, state, nonfinancial, 
household debt
Change in Debt/GDP Annual Change in  debt/GDP annual change in debt
(Change in change in 
debt/GDP)^2 annual change in annual change in debt)^2
annual change in annual change in 
debt)^2
Nom GDP growth - LT interest 
rates
Average 5,10,20 year UK Bond Yield - OECD 
GDP Growth Rates
GDP annual growth - OECD LT interest 
rates
Net External Debt
Balance Sheet of UK: Foreigners; Net 
Financial Wealth / GDP Unavailable
Net External Debt / Exports 
(Goods and Services)
Balance Sheet of UK: Foreigners; Net 
Financial Wealth / Net Exports, 4Q average Gross Debt / OECD GDP figures
Annual Change in Net External 
Debt Annual change in Net External Debt / GDP Unavailable
Net Exports / GDP
4Q sum net exports, goods and services / 
GDP, 4Q sum OECD Figures
Annual Change in Net Exports Annual Change in Net Exports / GDP Annual change in CA / GDP balance
(Int rates on net foreign assets 
+ net exports (annual)) / GDP
(Net External Debt * Int Rates on Treasury 
Gilts + Net Exports)/GP Unavailable
Terms of Trade OECD figures, Exports / Imports OECD figures, Exports / Imports
Real Exchange Rate Unavailable JP Morgan Real Effective Ex. Rate
Current Account Balance / GDP National Statistics Data Federal Reserve Data
International Investment 
Position / GDP BoP IIP Net / GDP Unavailable
Assets / equity of non-financial 
companies
Balance Sheet of Non-Financials: Total 
Assets / Equity
Nonfinancials' assets at market prices / 
equity
Profitability of non-financial 
corporations (g.op.s/assets) Gross op.surplus / assets Income before taxes / assets
Assets / equity of financial 
companies
Balance Sheet of Financials: Assets / 
Equity Commercial banks' assets / equity
Profitability of Financial 
Companies Gross op.surplus / assets Commercial banks' return on assets
Non-financials' and financials' 
collective leverage
Multiple of financials' and nonfinancials' 
leverage
Average of financials' and nonfinancials' 
leverage
Non-financials' net operating 
surplus / assets Unavailable Unavailable
Gross return of assets / cost of 
credit (non-fin)
Gross op.surplus / assets  - Corporate 
Interest Rates Unavailable
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Table 4.2 (cont.) 
 
As already explained the available data was used to build a cross-covariance 
matrix. That matrix was then used to find which economic indicators should be 
the concrete-and-brick in the relevant financial stability index based on which 10 
indicators had the highest average correlation with all the available indicators. 
Variables with # are used to construct the relevant base-index. To save space, 
the full name of the variables has been shortened down.  
 
  
Variable UK US
Gross return of assets / cost of 
credit (fin) Gross op.surplus/assets - LIBOR Rates Unavailable
Gross return of assets / cost of 
credit (gov.) Unavailable Unavailable
Productivity gains Annual change in output per worker Annual change in output per employee
GDP / AD GDP / GDP + qu.change in outstanding debt
GDP / GDP + qu. change in outstanding 
debt
Cash flow governmental safety 
net size (Gov exp - Invest) / GDP (Gov exp - Investm)/GDP
Gov Expenditure 
Responsiveness
(Gov exp - Invest) / GDP annual change, 
squared Unavailable
non-financials' usage of 
external funds in investment Unavailable
Nonfinancials' gross 
investment/nonfinancial net borrowing
Structure of the yield curve Unavailable
10 Yr Treasury Bond Yield - 3mth 
Treasury Bill Yield
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Table 4.3 The correlation matrix from available data (UK, Long Term Instability Index) 
 
 
 
Those marked with # are chosen 
for the base index
Avr. 
Correl
Rank Debt / GDP
Change in 
Debt/GDP
(Change in 
change in 
debt/GDP)^2
LT int rates - 
Nom GDP gr
Net Ext Debt 
/ GDP
Net Ext Debt 
/ Exp
Ann. Ch. 
Net Ext 
Debt
NX / GDP
Ann. 
Change NX 
/ GDP
(Int. Rat. N. 
For. A. + NX) 
/ GDP
ToT CA / GDP
Debt / GDP # 0.36 2 1.00 0.29 0.40 -0.14 0.77 0.76 -0.15 0.60 0.03 0.05 0.53 0.06
Change in Debt/GDP # 0.18 13 0.29 1.00 -0.26 -0.54 0.31 0.31 -0.07 0.49 0.35 0.32 0.43 0.32
(Change in change in debt/GDP)^2 0.16 17 0.40 -0.26 1.00 0.23 0.23 0.22 -0.04 0.16 -0.10 -0.02 0.12 -0.09
LT int rates - Nom GDP gr -0.05 22 -0.14 -0.54 0.23 1.00 -0.37 -0.38 -0.17 -0.27 -0.51 -0.06 -0.31 -0.12
Net Ext Debt / GDP # 0.27 6 0.77 0.31 0.23 -0.37 1.00 1.00 0.21 0.36 0.17 -0.16 0.36 -0.06
Net Ext Debt / Exp * 0.27 8 0.76 0.31 0.22 -0.38 1.00 1.00 0.22 0.35 0.16 -0.17 0.36 -0.07
Ann. Ch. Net Ext Debt -0.03 21 -0.15 -0.07 -0.04 -0.17 0.21 0.22 1.00 -0.04 0.07 0.06 -0.02 0.00
NX / GDP # 0.36 3 0.60 0.49 0.16 -0.27 0.36 0.35 -0.04 1.00 0.31 0.77 0.93 0.62
A. Change NX / GDP 0.08 20 0.03 0.35 -0.10 -0.51 0.17 0.16 0.07 0.31 1.00 0.07 0.43 0.25
Int. Rat. N. For. A. + NX / GDP # 0.18 12 0.05 0.32 -0.02 -0.06 -0.16 -0.17 0.06 0.77 0.07 1.00 0.68 0.71
ToT ** 0.33 5 0.53 0.43 0.12 -0.31 0.36 0.36 -0.02 0.93 0.43 0.68 1.00 0.65
CA / GDP 0.18 14 0.06 0.32 -0.09 -0.12 -0.06 -0.07 0.00 0.62 0.25 0.71 0.65 1.00
IIP / GDP *** 0.27 7 0.77 0.32 0.23 -0.38 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.36 0.17 -0.16 0.36 -0.06
Nonfin. Leverage # 0.34 4 0.88 0.15 0.38 -0.01 0.49 0.48 -0.30 0.64 -0.01 0.20 0.57 0.09
Nonfin. Profitability # 0.37 1 0.88 0.31 0.28 -0.16 0.68 0.67 -0.22 0.71 0.16 0.21 0.68 0.23
Fin. Leverage 0.08 19 0.17 -0.34 0.35 0.62 -0.28 -0.30 -0.34 0.07 -0.32 0.09 0.00 0.08
Fin. Profitability # 0.22 11 0.54 0.26 0.15 -0.28 0.66 0.65 -0.12 0.25 0.27 -0.17 0.34 0.03
Nonfin. & Fin Leverage 0.16 18 0.41 -0.15 0.48 0.19 0.17 0.15 -0.31 0.07 -0.05 -0.08 0.02 -0.11
Nonfin ROA - Int.cost # 0.23 9 0.40 -0.02 0.26 0.47 -0.10 -0.12 -0.34 0.56 -0.30 0.56 0.44 0.39
Fin ROA - Int. Cost -0.12 23 -0.45 0.40 -0.37 -0.42 -0.18 -0.17 -0.03 -0.09 0.14 0.10 -0.07 0.16
Pr. Gains # 0.22 10 0.42 -0.03 0.34 0.32 0.09 0.07 -0.11 0.43 -0.08 0.40 0.34 0.17
GDP / AD 0.17 15 0.28 0.92 -0.30 -0.68 0.36 0.36 0.02 0.51 0.27 0.37 0.45 0.36
Gov. Safety Net 0.17 16 0.60 -0.24 0.37 0.47 0.28 0.28 -0.19 0.09 -0.35 -0.25 0.02 -0.23
Gov. Exp. Responsiv. -0.15 24 -0.37 -0.15 -0.21 0.22 -0.45 -0.44 -0.12 -0.32 -0.26 -0.10 -0.31 -0.10
180 
Table 4.3 (cont.) 
 
 
IIP / GDP
Nonfin. 
Leverage
Nonfin. 
Profitability
Fin. 
Leverage
Fin. 
Profitability
Nonfin. & 
Fin 
Leverage
Nonfin ROA - 
Int.cost
Fin ROA - 
Int. Cost
Pr. Gains GDP / AD
Gov. Safety 
Net
Gov. Exp. 
Responsiv.
Avr. 
Correl
Rank
Economic 
indicator
0.77 0.88 0.88 0.17 0.54 0.41 0.40 -0.45 0.42 0.28 0.60 -0.37 0.36 2 Debt / GDP #
0.32 0.15 0.31 -0.34 0.26 -0.15 -0.02 0.40 -0.03 0.92 -0.24 -0.15 0.18 13 Change in Debt/GDP #
0.23 0.38 0.28 0.35 0.15 0.48 0.26 -0.37 0.34 -0.30 0.37 -0.21 0.16 17 (Change in change in debt/GDP)^2
-0.38 -0.01 -0.16 0.62 -0.28 0.19 0.47 -0.42 0.32 -0.68 0.47 0.22 -0.05 22 LT int rates - Nom GDP gr
1.00 0.49 0.68 -0.28 0.66 0.17 -0.10 -0.18 0.09 0.36 0.28 -0.45 0.27 6 Net Ext Debt / GDP #
1.00 0.48 0.67 -0.30 0.65 0.15 -0.12 -0.17 0.07 0.36 0.28 -0.44 0.27 8 Net Ext Debt / Exp *
0.20 -0.30 -0.22 -0.34 -0.12 -0.31 -0.34 -0.03 -0.11 0.02 -0.19 -0.12 -0.03 21 Ann. Ch. Net Ext Debt
0.36 0.64 0.71 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.56 -0.09 0.43 0.51 0.09 -0.32 0.36 3 NX / GDP #
0.17 -0.01 0.16 -0.32 0.27 -0.05 -0.30 0.14 -0.08 0.27 -0.35 -0.26 0.08 20 A. Change NX / GDP
-0.16 0.20 0.21 0.09 -0.17 -0.08 0.56 0.10 0.40 0.37 -0.25 -0.10 0.18 12 Int. Rat. N. For. A. + NX / GDP #
0.36 0.57 0.68 0.00 0.34 0.02 0.44 -0.07 0.34 0.45 0.02 -0.31 0.33 5 ToT **
-0.06 0.09 0.23 0.08 0.03 -0.11 0.39 0.16 0.17 0.36 -0.23 -0.10 0.18 14 CA / GDP
1.00 0.49 0.68 -0.29 0.66 0.16 -0.11 -0.17 0.09 0.36 0.27 -0.45 0.27 7 IIP / GDP ***
0.49 1.00 0.86 0.31 0.39 0.53 0.59 -0.52 0.62 0.14 0.63 -0.35 0.34 4 Nonfin. Leverage #
0.68 0.86 1.00 0.08 0.57 0.29 0.49 -0.41 0.38 0.29 0.52 -0.39 0.37 1 Nonfin. Profitability #
-0.29 0.31 0.08 1.00 -0.28 0.29 0.61 -0.37 0.24 -0.42 0.58 0.34 0.08 19 Fin. Leverage
0.66 0.39 0.57 -0.28 1.00 0.30 -0.04 -0.04 0.11 0.24 0.14 -0.41 0.22 11 Fin. Profitability #
0.16 0.53 0.29 0.29 0.30 1.00 0.25 -0.35 0.62 -0.16 0.31 -0.29 0.16 18 Nonfin. & Fin Leverage
-0.11 0.59 0.49 0.61 -0.04 0.25 1.00 -0.38 0.55 -0.07 0.46 -0.10 0.23 9 Nonfin ROA - Int.cost #
-0.17 -0.52 -0.41 -0.37 -0.04 -0.35 -0.38 1.00 -0.49 0.49 -0.72 0.10 -0.12 23 Fin ROA - Int. Cost
0.09 0.62 0.38 0.24 0.11 0.62 0.55 -0.49 1.00 -0.07 0.25 -0.35 0.22 10 Pr. Gains #
0.36 0.14 0.29 -0.42 0.24 -0.16 -0.07 0.49 -0.07 1.00 -0.34 -0.21 0.17 15 GDP / AD
0.27 0.63 0.52 0.58 0.14 0.31 0.46 -0.72 0.25 -0.34 1.00 0.09 0.17 16 Gov. Safety Net
-0.45 -0.35 -0.39 0.34 -0.41 -0.29 -0.10 0.10 -0.35 -0.21 0.09 1.00 -0.15 24 Gov. Exp. Responsiv.
* high correlation with Net External Debt / GDP so it' skipped
** high correlation with Net Exports / GDP so it' skipped
*** high correlation with Net External Debt / GDP so it' skipped
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Table 4.4 The correlation matrix from available data (UK, Short Term Instability Index) 
 
Those marked with # are chosen for 
the base Index
Avr. 
Corr.
Rank
(Hhld disp. 
Inc - int. 
Exp. - curr. 
Liabil) / 
hhld. Inc.
Ch. 
Debt/GDP
(Ch. in ch. in 
debt/GDP)^2
(Firm's EBIT - int. Exp - 
curr. Liab. / Firms' 
EBIT
(Gov. Tax Rev. - int. 
Exp. - curr. Liab.) / 
Gov. Tax Rev.
(NX - int. Exp - 
ST debt) / NX
ST debt + int. 
Exp. - inc. / 
Outst. Debt 
[househ.]
ST debt + int. 
Exp. - inc. / 
Outst. Debt 
[non-fin.]
ST debt + int. 
Exp. - inc. / 
Outst. Debt 
[financ.]
Prot. 
Assets / 
Debt of 
Financ.
Gov. Secur. 
/ Financ. ST 
Liabil.
(Hhld disp. Inc - int. Exp. - curr. Liabil) / 
hhld. Inc. * 0.19 8 1.00 0.38 0.28 0.44 -0.22 0.62 0.98 -0.12 -0.41 0.94 0.90
Ch. Debt/GDP 0.02 17 0.38 1.00 -0.29 -0.28 -0.48 0.38 0.38 -0.42 0.20 0.34 0.49
(Ch. in ch. in debt/GDP)^2 # 0.14 14 0.28 -0.29 1.00 0.43 0.25 0.10 0.21 0.25 -0.48 0.29 0.15
(Firm's EBIT - int. Exp - curr. Liab. / 
Firms' EBIT # 0.26 1 0.44 -0.28 0.43 1.00 0.43 -0.13 0.40 0.78 -0.76 0.56 0.33
(Gov. Tax Rev. - int. Exp. - curr. Liab.) / 
Gov. Tax Rev. -0.03 18 -0.22 -0.48 0.25 0.43 1.00 -0.35 -0.30 0.44 -0.37 -0.18 -0.34
(NX - int. Exp - ST debt) / NX 0.03 16 0.62 0.38 0.10 -0.13 -0.35 1.00 0.61 -0.57 -0.21 0.55 0.51
ST debt + int. Exp. - inc. / Outst. Debt 
[househ.] 0.17 12 0.98 0.38 0.21 0.40 -0.30 0.61 1.00 -0.15 -0.34 0.93 0.91
ST debt + int. Exp. - inc. / Outst. Debt 
[non-fin.] # 0.19 7 -0.12 -0.42 0.25 0.78 0.44 -0.57 -0.15 1.00 -0.45 0.04 -0.11
ST debt + int. Exp. - inc. / Outst. Debt 
[financ.] -0.22 21 -0.41 0.20 -0.48 -0.76 -0.37 -0.21 -0.34 -0.45 1.00 -0.53 -0.17
Prot. Assets / Debt of Financ. # 0.25 3 0.94 0.34 0.29 0.56 -0.18 0.55 0.93 0.04 -0.53 1.00 0.92
Gov. Secur. / Financ. ST Liabil. ** 0.18 10 0.90 0.49 0.15 0.33 -0.34 0.51 0.91 -0.11 -0.17 0.92 1.00
Strct. Of Yield Crv. -0.07 19 0.00 0.32 -0.32 -0.62 -0.75 0.43 0.07 -0.56 0.42 -0.03 0.11
Gov Exp / GDP -0.16 20 -0.67 0.01 -0.43 -0.74 -0.51 -0.21 -0.61 -0.26 0.63 -0.70 -0.55
LIBOR, T Bills spr. # 0.26 2 0.18 -0.06 0.13 0.49 0.03 -0.17 0.12 0.54 -0.56 0.26 0.10
High Rat. Corp. Bonds & Tr. Bonds 
Yield Spr. ** 0.18 11 -0.20 -0.61 0.34 0.93 0.53 -0.53 -0.34 0.95 -0.72 0.25 -0.43
High Rat. & Low. Rat. Corp. Bonds 
Yield Spr. # 0.16 13 -0.15 0.20 -0.17 -0.05 -0.48 -0.28 -0.08 0.21 0.22 0.15 0.39
Stock & Tr. Bonds Return Correl. 0.12 15 0.02 0.01 0.20 0.04 -0.13 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 -0.08 -0.04 -0.08
VIX # 0.19 9 -0.21 -0.40 0.14 0.64 0.15 -0.58 -0.27 0.78 -0.41 0.07 -0.24
Ind. Volatil of Bank Stocks # 0.20 6 -0.01 -0.49 0.35 0.59 0.26 -0.23 -0.02 0.60 -0.52 0.07 -0.14
Disp. Of Bank Stock Return # 0.24 4 0.12 -0.22 0.14 0.61 0.24 -0.11 0.09 0.60 -0.60 0.25 0.04
Real Exch. Rate Ch. (Sqrd) # 0.24 5 0.09 -0.11 0.26 0.46 0.12 -0.23 0.03 0.49 -0.48 0.18 0.03
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Table 4.4 (cont.) 
 
Strct. Of 
Yield Crv.
Gov Exp / 
GDP
LIBOR, T 
Bills spr.
High Rat. 
Corp. Bonds 
& Tr. Bonds 
Yield Spr.
High Rat. & Low. 
Rat. Corp. Bonds 
Yield Spr.
Stock & Tr. 
Bonds 
Return 
Correl. VIX
Ind. Volatil of 
Bank Stocks
Disp. Of 
Bank Stock 
Return
Real 
Exch. 
Rate Ch. 
(Sqrd) Avr. Cor. Rank
0.00 -0.67 0.18 -0.20 -0.15 0.02 -0.21 -0.01 0.12 0.09 0.19 8
(Hhld disp. Inc - int. Exp. - curr. Liabil) 
/ hhld. Inc. *
0.32 0.01 -0.06 -0.61 0.20 0.01 -0.40 -0.49 -0.22 -0.11 0.02 17 Ch. Debt/GDP
-0.32 -0.43 0.13 0.34 -0.17 0.20 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.26 0.14 14 (Ch. in ch. in debt/GDP)^2 #
-0.62 -0.74 0.49 0.93 -0.05 0.04 0.64 0.59 0.61 0.46 0.26 1
(Firm's EBIT - int. Exp - curr. Liab. / 
Firms' EBIT #
-0.75 -0.51 0.03 0.53 -0.48 -0.13 0.15 0.26 0.24 0.12 -0.03 18
(Gov. Tax Rev. - int. Exp. - curr. Liab.) / 
Gov. Tax Rev.
0.43 -0.21 -0.17 -0.53 -0.28 -0.03 -0.58 -0.23 -0.11 -0.23 0.03 16 (NX - int. Exp - ST debt) / NX
0.07 -0.61 0.12 -0.34 -0.08 -0.01 -0.27 -0.02 0.09 0.03 0.17 12
ST debt + int. Exp. - inc. / Outst. Debt 
[househ.]
-0.56 -0.26 0.54 0.95 0.21 0.07 0.78 0.60 0.60 0.49 0.19 7
ST debt + int. Exp. - inc. / Outst. Debt 
[non-fin.] #
0.42 0.63 -0.56 -0.72 0.22 -0.08 -0.41 -0.52 -0.60 -0.48 -0.22 21
ST debt + int. Exp. - inc. / Outst. Debt 
[financ.]
-0.03 -0.70 0.26 0.25 0.15 -0.04 0.07 0.07 0.25 0.18 0.25 3 Prot. Assets / Debt of Financ. #
0.11 -0.55 0.10 -0.43 0.39 -0.08 -0.24 -0.14 0.04 0.03 0.18 10 Gov. Secur. / Financ. ST Liabil. **
1.00 0.58 -0.21 -0.70 0.30 0.01 -0.42 -0.41 -0.34 -0.38 -0.07 19 Strct. Of Yield Crv.
0.58 1.00 -0.20 -0.48 0.54 0.06 -0.04 -0.23 -0.34 -0.25 -0.16 20 Gov Exp / GDP
-0.21 -0.20 1.00 0.62 0.35 0.28 0.64 0.48 0.72 0.72 0.26 2 LIBOR, T Bills spr. #
-0.70 -0.48 0.62 1.00 0.08 0.14 0.78 0.85 0.72 0.61 0.18 11
High Rat. Corp. Bonds & Tr. Bonds 
Yield Spr. **
0.30 0.54 0.35 0.08 1.00 0.13 0.31 0.09 0.23 0.42 0.16 13
High Rat. & Low. Rat. Corp. Bonds 
Yield Spr. #
0.01 0.06 0.28 0.14 0.13 1.00 0.25 0.11 0.10 0.38 0.12 15 Stock & Tr. Bonds Return Correl.
-0.42 -0.04 0.64 0.78 0.31 0.25 1.00 0.58 0.53 0.61 0.19 9 VIX #
-0.41 -0.23 0.48 0.85 0.09 0.11 0.58 1.00 0.70 0.53 0.20 6 Ind. Volatil of Bank Stocks #
-0.34 -0.34 0.72 0.72 0.23 0.10 0.53 0.70 1.00 0.65 0.24 4 Disp. Of Bank Stock Return #
-0.38 -0.25 0.72 0.61 0.42 0.38 0.61 0.53 0.65 1.00 0.24 5 Real Exch. Rate Ch. (Sqrd) #
* high correlation (>0.9) to "amount of protected assets / financial obligations" so it's skipped
** high correlation to "The amount of protected assets / debt of financial obligations"
 *** high correlation to "(Firms’ cash flow from sales and operations [EBIT] - net interest expenses of all debt - firm’s current liabilities)/Firms cash flow" so skipped
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Table 4.5 The correlation matrix from available data (US, Long Term Instability Index) 
 
Those marked with # are 
ussed for the base index
Average 
correl
Rank Debt / GDP
Ch. in 
Debt/GDP
(Ch. in ch. in 
debt/GDP)^2
Nom GDP 
gr. - LT int. 
Rates
Net Ext 
Debt / 
Exports
NX / GDP
Ann. Ch in 
NX
ToT
Real Exch. 
Rate
CA / GDP
Leverage 
[non-fin.]
Debt / GDP # 0.17 9 1.00 0.37 0.47 -0.04 0.76 0.54 -0.41 0.27 0.54 0.48 -0.32
Ch. in Debt/GDP # 0.26 1 0.37 1.00 0.13 0.29 0.56 0.55 -0.26 0.54 -0.17 0.52 0.32
(Ch. in ch. in debt/GDP)^2 # 0.11 11 0.47 0.13 1.00 0.14 0.24 0.08 -0.11 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.03
Nom GDP gr. - LT int. Rates 0.04 17 -0.04 0.29 0.14 1.00 -0.38 -0.48 -0.61 -0.50 0.03 -0.53 0.46
Net Ext Debt / Exports # 0.18 7 0.76 0.56 0.24 -0.38 1.00 0.85 -0.03 0.74 0.13 0.83 -0.35
NX / GDP # 0.22 2 0.54 0.55 0.08 -0.48 0.85 1.00 0.11 0.92 -0.03 0.99 -0.17
Ann. Ch in NX -0.09 21 -0.41 -0.26 -0.11 -0.61 -0.03 0.11 1.00 0.32 -0.49 0.18 -0.17
ToT 0.19 5 0.27 0.54 0.03 -0.50 0.74 0.92 0.32 1.00 -0.29 0.93 -0.09
Real Exch. Rate 0.03 18 0.54 -0.17 0.07 0.03 0.13 -0.03 -0.49 -0.29 1.00 -0.07 -0.16
CA / GDP ** 0.20 3 0.48 0.52 0.03 -0.53 0.83 0.99 0.18 0.93 -0.07 1.00 -0.23
Leverage [non-fin.] # 0.15 10 -0.32 0.32 0.03 0.46 -0.35 -0.17 -0.17 -0.09 -0.16 -0.23 1.00
Prof.bility [non-fin.] # 0.17 8 -0.16 0.43 0.06 0.41 -0.17 0.07 -0.20 0.13 -0.38 0.02 0.63
Leverage [fin. Comp.] -0.05 20 -0.44 -0.17 -0.06 0.67 -0.69 -0.68 -0.31 -0.62 0.00 -0.71 0.52
Prof.bility [fin.comp.] # 0.19 4 0.24 0.42 0.29 0.68 -0.11 -0.11 -0.52 -0.19 0.24 -0.18 0.57
Collctv lvrg 0.09 13 -0.41 0.18 0.00 0.60 -0.53 -0.39 -0.24 -0.30 -0.12 -0.45 0.94
Productv. Gains 0.08 16 -0.05 -0.10 -0.08 -0.09 -0.21 -0.04 -0.11 -0.15 0.21 -0.05 0.25
GDP / AD # 0.18 6 -0.12 0.51 -0.12 -0.32 0.32 0.53 0.27 0.65 -0.31 0.53 0.38
TBTF Banks 0.09 14 0.76 0.29 0.28 -0.41 0.86 0.73 0.00 0.58 0.06 0.72 -0.63
CF Gov. Saf. Net # 0.11 12 0.54 0.27 0.44 0.62 0.05 -0.17 -0.60 -0.37 0.46 -0.27 0.28
Ext. Funds [non-fin.] 0.08 15 -0.27 0.04 -0.18 -0.31 -0.03 0.18 0.17 0.29 -0.11 0.23 0.13
Yield Crv -0.03 19 -0.24 -0.23 -0.32 -0.45 -0.07 0.11 0.19 0.11 -0.07 0.17 -0.19
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Table 4.5 (cont.) 
 
Prof.bility 
[non-fin.]
Leverage 
[fin. 
Comp.]
Prof.bility 
[fin.comp.]
Collctv lvrg
Productv. 
Gains
GDP / AD TBTF Banks
CF Gov. 
Saf. Net
Ext. Funds 
[non-fin.]
Yield Crv
Average 
correl
Rank
-0.16 -0.44 0.24 -0.41 -0.05 -0.12 0.76 0.54 -0.27 -0.24 0.17 9 Debt / GDP #
0.43 -0.17 0.42 0.18 -0.10 0.51 0.29 0.27 0.04 -0.23 0.26 1 Ch. in Debt/GDP #
0.06 -0.06 0.29 0.00 -0.08 -0.12 0.28 0.44 -0.18 -0.32 0.11 11 (Ch. in ch. in debt/GDP)^2 #
0.41 0.67 0.68 0.60 -0.09 -0.32 -0.41 0.62 -0.31 -0.45 0.04 17 Nom GDP gr. - LT int. Rates
-0.17 -0.69 -0.11 -0.53 -0.21 0.32 0.86 0.05 -0.03 -0.07 0.18 7 Net Ext Debt / Exports #
0.07 -0.68 -0.11 -0.39 -0.04 0.53 0.73 -0.17 0.18 0.11 0.22 2 NX / GDP #
-0.20 -0.31 -0.52 -0.24 -0.11 0.27 0.00 -0.60 0.17 0.19 -0.09 21 Ann. Ch in NX
0.13 -0.62 -0.19 -0.30 -0.15 0.65 0.58 -0.37 0.29 0.11 0.19 5 ToT
-0.38 0.00 0.24 -0.12 0.21 -0.31 0.06 0.46 -0.11 -0.07 0.03 18 Real Exch. Rate
0.02 -0.71 -0.18 -0.45 -0.05 0.53 0.72 -0.27 0.23 0.17 0.20 3 CA / GDP **
0.63 0.52 0.57 0.94 0.25 0.38 -0.63 0.28 0.13 -0.19 0.15 10 Leverage [non-fin.] #
1.00 0.40 0.52 0.62 0.19 0.24 -0.25 0.24 0.06 -0.17 0.17 8 Prof.bility [non-fin.] #
0.40 1.00 0.41 0.77 0.07 -0.28 -0.75 0.34 -0.22 -0.28 -0.05 20 Leverage [fin. Comp.]
0.52 0.41 1.00 0.58 0.18 -0.06 -0.24 0.63 0.01 -0.31 0.19 4 Prof.bility [fin.comp.] #
0.62 0.77 0.58 1.00 0.21 0.18 -0.76 0.34 0.02 -0.25 0.09 13 Collctv lvrg
0.19 0.07 0.18 0.21 1.00 0.06 -0.25 0.09 0.24 0.23 0.08 16 Productv. Gains
0.24 -0.28 -0.06 0.18 0.06 1.00 0.02 -0.35 0.43 0.21 0.18 6 GDP / AD #
-0.25 -0.75 -0.24 -0.76 -0.25 0.02 1.00 -0.01 -0.11 0.00 0.09 14 TBTF Banks
0.24 0.34 0.63 0.34 0.09 -0.35 -0.01 1.00 -0.59 -0.64 0.11 12 CF Gov. Saf. Net #
0.06 -0.22 0.01 0.02 0.24 0.43 -0.11 -0.59 1.00 0.68 0.08 15 Ext. Funds [non-fin.]
-0.17 -0.28 -0.31 -0.25 0.23 0.21 0.00 -0.64 0.68 1.00 -0.03 19 Yield Crv
* high correl to net exports / GDP so skipped
** high correl to net exports / GDP so skipped
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Table 4.6 The correlation matrix from available data (US, Short Term Instability Index) 
 
Those marked with # are used in the base 
Index
average 
correl
rank
(Hhld inc. - 
int. Exp - 
hhld curr. 
Liabil.) / 
hhld inc.
Change in 
Debt/GDP
(Change in 
change in 
debt/GDP)^2
(Fims' EBIT - 
int. Exp - 
curr. Liab.) / 
Firms' EBIT
ST debt + int. 
Exp - Inc. / 
Outs. Debt 
[non-financ.]
Gov. 
Securites / 
Financials' 
ST liabil.
Outst. REPO
Str. Of Yield 
Curve
LIBOR vs. T-
bill Spread
(Hhld inc. - int. Exp - hhld curr. Liabil.) / hhld 
inc. * 0.23 6 1.00 0.55 -0.08 0.54 -0.50 0.90 0.63 0.22 0.09
Change in Debt/GDP # 0.23 7 0.55 1.00 0.13 0.30 -0.13 0.58 0.34 -0.23 0.15
(Change in change in debt/GDP)^2 0.05 14 -0.08 0.13 1.00 0.13 -0.25 -0.09 -0.14 -0.32 -0.14
(Fims' EBIT - int. Exp - curr. Liab.) / Firms' EBIT 
# 0.26 2 0.54 0.30 0.13 1.00 -0.13 0.66 -0.36 -0.04 0.12
ST debt + int. Exp - Inc. / Outs. Debt [non-
financ.] -0.03 16 -0.50 -0.13 -0.25 -0.13 1.00 -0.21 -0.65 0.15 0.32
Gov. Securites / Financials' ST liabil. # 0.26 3 0.90 0.58 -0.09 0.66 -0.21 1.00 0.28 0.17 0.16
Outst. REPO 0.08 13 0.63 0.34 -0.14 -0.36 -0.65 0.28 1.00 0.17 0.46
Str. Of Yield Curve 0.05 15 0.22 -0.23 -0.32 -0.04 0.15 0.17 0.17 1.00 0.14
LIBOR vs. T-bill Spread # 0.23 5 0.09 0.15 -0.14 0.12 0.32 0.16 0.46 0.14 1.00
High vs. Low Rated Corp Bond Yield Spread #
0.18 9 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.74 -0.22 0.37 -0.49 -0.43 -0.02
Junk Bonds vs. Low Rated Corp Yield Spread
-0.27 17 -0.28 -0.67 -0.25 -0.48 -0.08 -0.39 -0.09 0.30 -0.40
Correl of Stock & Treasury Bond Return # 0.12 11 0.30 0.23 0.19 0.16 -0.23 0.31 0.30 0.11 -0.04
VIX # 0.27 1 0.18 0.34 0.20 0.67 0.16 0.32 -0.28 -0.06 0.47
Ind. Volatil of Bank Stock Prices # 0.26 4 0.13 0.29 0.06 0.48 0.11 0.22 0.07 -0.06 0.60
Dispersion of Return on Bank Stocks
0.10 12 -0.11 0.18 0.15 0.08 0.10 -0.06 -0.03 -0.28 0.20
Trading Volume # 0.21 8 -0.01 0.32 0.02 0.33 0.07 0.07 0.18 0.05 0.41
Real Exch Rate Change, Squared # 0.15 10 0.09 0.20 0.00 0.26 0.02 0.11 0.06 -0.12 0.43
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Table 4.6 (cont.) 
 
High vs. Low 
Rated Corp 
Bond Yield 
Spread
Junk Bonds 
vs. Low 
Rated Corp 
Yield Spread
Correl of 
Stock & 
Treasury 
Bond Return
VIX
Ind. Volatil 
of Bank 
Stock Prices
Dispersion 
of Return on 
Bank Stocks
Trading 
Volume
Real Exch 
Rate 
Change, 
Squared
average 
correl
rank
0.28 -0.28 0.30 0.18 0.13 -0.11 -0.01 0.09 0.23 6
(Hhld inc. - int. Exp - hhld curr. Liabil.) / hhld 
inc. *
0.29 -0.67 0.23 0.34 0.29 0.18 0.32 0.20 0.23 7 Change in Debt/GDP #
0.29 -0.25 0.19 0.20 0.06 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.05 14 (Change in change in debt/GDP)^2
0.74 -0.48 0.16 0.67 0.48 0.08 0.33 0.26 0.26 2
(Fims' EBIT - int. Exp - curr. Liab.) / Firms' EBIT #
-0.22 -0.08 -0.23 0.16 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.02 -0.03 16
ST debt + int. Exp - Inc. / Outs. Debt [non-
financ.]
0.37 -0.39 0.31 0.32 0.22 -0.06 0.07 0.11 0.26 3 Gov. Securites / Financials' ST liabil. #
-0.49 -0.09 0.30 -0.28 0.07 -0.03 0.18 0.06 0.08 13 Outst. REPO
-0.43 0.30 0.11 -0.06 -0.06 -0.28 0.05 -0.12 0.05 15 Str. Of Yield Curve
-0.02 -0.40 -0.04 0.47 0.60 0.20 0.41 0.43 0.23 5 LIBOR vs. T-bill Spread #
1.00 -0.51 0.05 0.66 0.41 0.17 0.22 0.32 0.18 9
High vs. Low Rated Corp Bond Yield Spread #
-0.51 1.00 0.00 -0.68 -0.68 -0.31 -0.51 -0.57 -0.27 17
Junk Bonds vs. Low Rated Corp Yield Spread
0.05 0.00 1.00 -0.02 -0.07 -0.01 -0.11 -0.18 0.12 11 Correl of Stock & Treasury Bond Return #
0.66 -0.68 -0.02 1.00 0.56 0.13 0.48 0.50 0.27 1 VIX #
0.41 -0.68 -0.07 0.56 1.00 0.27 0.71 0.26 0.26 4 Ind. Volatil of Bank Stock Prices #
0.17 -0.31 -0.01 0.13 0.27 1.00 0.23 0.07 0.10 12
Dispersion of Return on Bank Stocks
0.22 -0.51 -0.11 0.48 0.71 0.23 1.00 0.09 0.21 8 Trading Volume #
0.32 -0.57 -0.18 0.50 0.26 0.07 0.09 1.00 0.15 10 Real Exch Rate Change, Squared #
* high correlation with securities of central gov / financial short term liabilities so it is skipped
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4.1.4 The indices 
Tables 4.7 – 4.8 show the weight of the indicators in the relevant indices. 
Table 4.7 The weights of inputs in the relevant indices, United Kingdom 
 
Table 4.8 The weights of inputs in the relevant indices, United States 
 
Notice that the inputs are both symptoms of financial instability (such as the 
spread between LIBOR and T-bills) and causation of financial instability (such 
as debt/GDP). This follows Minsky’s FIH: he emphasised that high credit to 
income ratio would be the initiator of financial instability and he pointed out that 
interest rate increases would be the symptom of the problem getting very 
serious. The LIBOR/T-bill spread is but one measurement of this seriousness 
brewing. A high VIX value is another: it signals a sell-off on equity markets, i.e. 
that the speculative and the Ponzi borrowers are liquidating their positions.104 
                                            
104
 This compares to other potential measures to follow financial instability, such as Werner’s (2005) 
Quantity Theory of Credit which focuses only on credit and its allocation. Using the QTC rather than the 
FIH to construct the financial instability indices will not be done here. Following lex parsimonie 
Werner’s Quantity Theory of Credit may be simpler than Minsky’s FIH and therefore to be favoured. But 
to follow lex persimonie, we would have to create “a competition” between the FIH and the QTC to see 
which one of them is “better” or if they are equally as good when measuring short term and long term 
financial instability. That has never been done and is considered outside the scope of this text. 
Furthermore, the QTC has not been shown to meet the criticism of Blatt (1983) regarding being an 
economic model that is “essentially dynamic”. The FIH, however, has been shown to meet that criticism, 
see Box 2. Therefore, it is deemed valid to focus on creating the indices using the FIH rather than the 
QTC. 
ST 10 ST 8 LT 10 LT 9
(Ch. in ch. in debt/GDP)^2 0.055 Debt / GDP 0.124 0.134
(Firm's EBIT - int. Exp - curr. Liab. / Firms' EBIT 0.117 0.136 Change in Debt/GDP 0.054
ST debt + int. Exp. - inc. / Outst. Debt [non-fin.] 0.113 0.134 Net Ext Debt / GDP 0.088 0.093
Prot. Assets / Debt of Financ. 0.050 0.056 NX / GDP 0.114 0.120
LIBOR, T Bills spr. 0.111 0.133 Int. Rat. on Net For Assts + NX / GDP 0.055 0.057
High Rat. & Low. Rat. Corp. Bonds Yield Spr. 0.025 Nonfin. Leverage 0.124 0.136
VIX 0.088 0.105 Nonfin. Profitability 0.128 0.138
Ind. Volatility of Bank Stocks 0.108 0.126 Fin. Profitability 0.073 0.078
Disp. Of Bank Stock Return 0.118 0.141 Nonfin ROA - Int.cost 0.080 0.090
Real Exch. Rate Ch. (Sqrd) 0.108 0.127 Pr. Gains 0.079 0.089
ST 10 ST 7 LT 10 LT 8
Change in Debt/GDP 0.089 0.120 Debt / GDP 0.122 0.161
(Fims' EBIT - int. Exp - curr. Liab.) / Firms' EBIT 0.126 0.178 Ch. in Debt/GDP 0.134 0.142
Gov. Securites / Financials' ST liabil. 0.101 0.145 (Ch. in ch. in debt/GDP)^2 0.073 0.097
LIBOR vs. T-bill Spread 0.067 0.072 Net Ext Debt / Exports 0.126 0.149
High vs. Low Rated Corp Bond Yield Spread 0.113 0.158 NX / GDP 0.118 0.128
Correl of Stock & Treasury Bond Return 0.016 Leverage [non-fin.] 0.027
VIX 0.113 0.146 Prof.bility [non-fin.] 0.052 0.043
Ind. Volatil of Bank Stock Prices 0.095 0.121 Prof.bility [fin.comp.] 0.073 0.084
Trading Volume 0.059 GDP / AD 0.063
Real Exch Rate Change, Squared 0.079 CF Gov. Saf. Net 0.074 0.101
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The indices can be graphed using the available data, see the following figures. 
“ST 7” stands for 7 inputs in that index – see sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 for further 
discussion on the methodology of choosing the inputs in the indices. This is the 
reformed index as are ST 8, LT 9 and LT 8. The weights of all the inputs in 
those indices are significant at the 95% level (i.e. we can reject, with 95% 
certainty, the null hypothesis that the weights are, individually, equal to zero) 
and those are the indices that are used here to represent the financial stability 
measure in the regressions; ST 10 or LT 10 are never used in the regression 
analysis with FDI data.  
However, despite omitting up to three inputs, we can see that it does not make 
much difference on the value of the index, implying that we do not lose much 
information even if we cut down the number of indicators. This signals that not 
many indicators are necessary to give us much information about the status of 
financial stability in the economy.  Figures 4.1 – 4.8 compare the indices.  
Figure 4.1 The Short Term Financial Instability indices for United Kingdom 
  
Data: 1Q 1995 – 2Q 2010 
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Figure 4.2 The Long Term Financial Instability indices for United Kingdom  
 
 Data: 1Q 1989 – 2Q 2010 
Figure 4.3 Short Term and Long Term Financial Instability indices UK 
 
Data: 1Q 1989 – 2Q 2010105 
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 A comment is in order on the big difference between LT and ST in figure 4.3 (the kernel of this 
comment also applies to figure 4.6). We can see that there is a big difference in the value of the two 
indices. We should however be careful in drawing interpretations from this difference. The biggest 
difference is in 4Q 2008, which is of course the height of the crisis period (since October 2008 is in 4Q 
2008). The drop in ST in 1Q and 2Q 2009 shows how markets stabilized gradually as the crisis receded. 
The huge drop in 3Q2009 represents how markets had improved by then, showed e.g. by smaller spreads 
in credit markets and a rebound on the equity market. At the same time, only a small improvement was 
made on the long-term scale, such as in non-financials’ leverage. Interpreting the difference between LT 
and ST is therefore not a straightforward matter. After all, LT and ST are not focusing on the same things 
anyway. 
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Figure 4.4 Short Term Financial Instability indices for the United States.  
  
Data: 4Q 1984 – 1Q 2011 
Figure 4.5 Long Term Financial Instability indices for the United States.  
  
Data: 4Q 1984 – 1Q 2011 
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Figure 4.6 Short Term and Long Term Financial Instability indices for US 
 
Data: 4Q 1984 – 1Q 2011 
4.1.5 Do the indices tell us anything useful? 
Now that we have seen the indices it is worth pondering their usefulness. First, 
let’s see how major events register on the indices (figures 4.7 and 4.8). 
Figure 4.7 Short Term Financial Instability in UK and US and notable news 
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Figure 4.8 Long Term Financial Instability in the UK and US and notable news 
 
We can see that most notable events in the financial press for the last 20 years 
or so register on the indices, in particular the short term indices. The reason 
why the long term index is not fluctuating as much during those events is that it, 
more than the short term index, focuses on the fundamental financial structure 
of the economy. The short term index includes “panic” factors that grasp the 
phases of sell-off and the scramble for emergency cash during episodes of 
extreme financial stress. The long term index does not. Therefore, we should 
expect the short term index to fluctuate more than the long term index, as it 
does. 
A note is worth highlighting here. As we can see, the extreme values of the 
indices is in 4Q 2008. This might seem strange as the Trouble Asset Relief 
Program, TARP, was passed in early October 2008. The TARP calmed markets 
down after the collapse of Lehman Brothers the month before. Therefore, it may 
seem strange that the indices top in 4Q 2008 when it seems like the height of 
the instability was in September 2008. 
The explanation for this is simple. The reason why the indices top in 4Q 2008 is 
that, although markets calmed down after TARP was passed in October 2008, 
the extreme instability before that heaves the whole quarter’s value up, creating 
the spike in the index despite the (relative) calmness of the second part of it. 
Also, the instability was far from over although the TARP had been passed.  
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Another way of presenting the data is on a quarterly differential basis. Figures 
4.9 and 4.10 show the quarter-over-quarter change in the value of the short 
term indices for the UK and the US respectively. 
Figure 4.9 QoQ change in Short Term Financial Instability, UK 
 
Figure 4.10 QoQ change in Short Term Financial Instability, US 
 
Now, numerous issues should be highlighted as we look at figures 4.7-4.10. 
First, notice that the strain of notable events does not seem to be identical in the 
US and the UK. As an example, the Russian default and the LTCM crisis in 
1998 is much more stressful in the US than it is in the UK. This is expected: 
LTCM was an American firm. Another example of similar non-identical strains 
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from events is the burst of tech stocks in 2000 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
With this in mind it is interesting to look at the development of the indices in late 
summer of 2007. In the US, BNP Paribas froze its securities accounts in August 
2007. Around the same time, Bear Stearns was running into liquidity problems 
(Donnelley, 2008). In the UK, Northern Rock sought assistance from the Bank 
of England in September 2007 (which puts it in the same quarter as the BNP 
freeze), only a few days after Barclays asked for similar assistance from the 
Bank. Those events register as a notable increase in the short term financial 
instability index. Another similar parallel chain of events can be found in the first 
quarter of 2008 when Northern Rock was finally nationalised (February) and 
when Bear Stearns went bankrupt (March). Bear Stearns had offices in London. 
So events of what could be called episodes of “notable” financial instability 
register on the short term index. The same cannot be said about the long term 
index. This is to be expected as explained above: the long term index is not 
designed in any way to grasp the panic phase of financial instability but rather to 
focus, as much as possible, on the underlying fundamentals of financial 
structures. The construction of those financial structures can, possibly, lead to 
cash flow problems and panic phases which are more focused on by the short 
term index. The lack of fluctuations in the long term index is therefore not 
surprising.  
This implies that there should be some positive correlation between a high 
value of the long term index and bursts in the short term index.106 The reason is 
clear: a high value of the long term index signals fundamental financial 
structures that are more fragile and more susceptible for “It” – i.e. a crisis 
episode – to take place. Or to use Fazzari’s (2014) parable: a high value of the 
long term index means that “a lot of weight has been put on each side of the 
bar”, i.e. financial structures – the bar – have been stretched and put to the test. 
Due to this the fragility of the bar, i.e. its vulnerability, has increased. The risk of 
the bar actually breaking – i.e. of “It” happening” as Minsky referred to a crisis 
event – is therefore higher. For that reason, seeing a correlation between “the 
increased weight on the bar” (a high value on the long term index) and the 
                                            
106
 The mean of the short term index is still unchanged since the index has, by design, a mean of zero over 
the whole time period that is used to construct the index. 
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actual occurrence of the bar breaking (a burst in the short term index) is exactly 
what should be expected following Minsky’s FIH.107  
This is indeed so. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show that a positive and complicated 
non-linear relationship is in place between the level of long term financial 
instability and the variation of short term financial instability. The relationship is 
best (highest R2) described with a quadratic polynomial, included on figures 
4.11 and 4.12. This relationship is not investigated further here but merely 
pointed out to strengthen the claim that the indices are properly designed and 
according to Minsky’s FIH. 
Figure 4.11 Long Term Financial Instability and four-quarter variance in Short 
Term Financial Instability (US) 
 
                                            
107
 A parallel can be drawn here with geology. Seismic risk analysis (a pioneering paper on the topic is 
Cornell (1968)) attempts to measure the amount of stress, i.e. fragility, in the earth’s crust to give an early 
warning of an earthquake taking place, its size, depth, velocity and even, to some extent, time. As 
expected, the higher the stress in the earth’s crust, the higher the likelihood of a (severe) earthquake to 
take place. The Long Term Financial Instability index is them measuring the “tension” in the “crust” (the 
economy) compared to how it has been historically. It does not give us an exact estimate on when a crisis 
may take place, only, if its value goes up, that the risk of a crisis happening is higher than it was before. 
The Short Term Financial Instability index is, in the meanwhile, the severity of the “earthquake” itself. 
And, naturally, more “tension” (higher long term instability) means more severe and/or more frequent 
“earthquakes”. 
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Figure 4.12 Long Term Financial Instability and four-quarter variance in Short 
Term Financial Instability (UK) 
 
We have, however, still not argued for the usefulness of the indices. Can they 
e.g. tell us that things are unstable before major financial institutions go 
bankrupt?  
From a strictly quantitative point of view: no, they cannot! And for good reasons. 
First of all, the indices do not act as a strict Early Warning Indicator as that is 
not their purpose. This should be clear for the short term index, which mainly 
tracks recent developments, but it also applies to the long term index. In order 
for the indices to be considered EWIs, which, given a certain threshold, provide 
the researcher with a “yes” or “no” answer when asked “is a crisis coming?”, it 
must give a quantitative answer to that question, even if it is only “1” or “0” as in 
the case of some EWIs (some EWIs give a probability estimate, rather than a 
“yes” or “no” answer (M. Goldstein et al., 2000)).  
Neither of the indices does this. The short term index focuses on immediate 
developments in comparison to how they looked like in the past. The long term 
index is similar; it compares the current underlying financial structures to those 
of the past, given the indicators that are used to construct it. This is not to be 
interpreted as a “yes” or “no” signal about an upcoming crisis, but merely as a 
signal of the financial structure of the economy being different than it was in the 
past.  
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As an example, a high value of the long term index does not tell us that a crisis 
is coming, with so and so much probability or confidence behind such a 
forecast, but merely tells us that the financial structure of the economy has 
become more fragile than it was in the past. Yes, we can, intuitively, expect that 
a high value of the long term index would coincide with more fluctuations in the 
markets, hence the correlation of a high value of the long term index and the 
variations in the short term index (see figures 4.11 and 4.12). But the value of 
the long term index is not to be interpreted as a quantitative probability value of 
an oncoming crisis nor is it a warning of a crisis coming within a specific time 
period as EWIs signal. The indices are a comparison between the current and 
past states of financial stability.  
Second, the indices can tell us different information from EWIs, exactly because 
they are a continuous measure of the developments of the economy. As an 
example, a system of EWIs can signal “a red light” or a certain (high) probability 
of a crisis on, say, 5 out of 25 crisis indicators at time t=0 and 4 out of 25 
indicators at t=1. This could give the impression that the level of financial 
stability in the economy has improved. However, if we would construct an index 
out of those indicators and graph the development between periods, we could, 
possibly, see that in t=1 the financial stability had worsened compared to t=0. 
How could this be? The reason is simple. EWIs will signal, rightfully or 
wrongfully so (they are subject to Type 1 and Type 2 errors), a certain 
probability of a crisis happening within a certain time period. EWIs, based on a 
“colour system” instead of a “probability system”, can signal a “red light” if the 
relevant indicator just crosses the predetermined threshold that draws the line 
between “red” and “green” lights (or “yellow”, or however many thresholds or 
“danger levels” are defined).  
Now, assume that between t=0 and t=1, one of the indicators crosses back into 
“green” status, or it can signal a lower probability of a crisis happening in a 
probability system. Meanwhile, the rest of the indicators can worsen. If we are 
dealing with a colour system, they can stay within the same colour band even if 
they signal a different and a higher probability of a crisis taking place. In that 
case we have a situation where one of the indicators “turned green” while the 
198 
others stayed the same colour, despite a higher probability estimate. This 
signals an improvement, exactly the opposite of what could be the truth.  
If we have a probability system, we have the problem that even if one of the 
indicators improves and some others deteriorate, we still do not know how 
much the situation has actually changed in comparison to other periods. The 
reason for this is that some indicators are more important than others for the 
economy. So what are the cumulative effects of the changes in the indicators? 
How much has the situation actually changed, compared to the past? 
An index answers those questions. An index that is constructed out of the 
indicators in question could catch the development and could, contrary to a 
“colour system” EWIs, signal that financial stability had actually deteriorated 
between t=0 and t=1.108 It could also, contrary to the “probability system” EWIs 
give us information on how much the situation has changed, overall (and not 
just focusing on some indicators, possibly not so important) compared to the 
past. An index can give us a system-wide ranking order of periods based on the 
probabilities of a crisis happening: a high value of an index would tell us that, 
relative to other periods with lower values of the index, there is a higher 
probability of a crisis taking place in that high-value time period compared to 
other low-value periods. Note that we do not know the probability of a crisis 
coming nor are we even trying to estimate it with the index. We only know that it 
would be higher than it was in the past: the indices are not designed to give us 
a formal quantitative probability value or a time window of when a crisis 
could/would hit, but merely a relative financial-stability comparison to other past 
periods, as has already been stressed. 
Finally, regarding the usefulness of the indices, we should remember that the 
failure of a single, or multiple, financial institutions, major or not, is not, strictly, 
the same as a financial crisis. A bank, or any financial institution, can go 
bankrupt without any significant changes or disruptions in the markets. 
Likewise, we can have instability in the market without any financial institutions 
going bankrupt. Therefore, a high value in a financial instability index does not 
necessarily mean that there are many bankruptcies at the same time. In other 
                                            
108
 This example is inspired by M. Goldstein et al. (2000), especially page 16. 
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words, there does not need to be any close correlation at all between the two 
variables.  
To underline this point we should first of all remember the words of Issing 
(2003, italics added), discussed in 3.1.1. Defining financial stability: 
[F]inancial stability [is] the prevalence of a financial system, which is 
able to ensure in a lasting way, and without major disruptions, an 
efficient allocation of savings to investment opportunities... Due to the 
focus on the resilience of the financial system [the definition] would 
not classify each individual bank failure or each large swing in an 
asset price as proof of financial instability. 
Figure 4.13 shows clearly how we can have a high value of financial instability, 
according to the indices, while bank failures are not of the same pedigree. 
Likewise, relative financial stability can be in place although bank failures are 
many, underlining Issing’s words in italics. In other words, bank failures, 
handled in an organised way, need not be a financial crisis, nor do bank failures 
need to be many during what could be called a financial crisis.109  
Figure 4.13 US bank failures and the financial instability indices 
 
                                            
109
 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the US has the role of stepping in when 
commercial banks fail. The FDIC describes its purpose as following (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 2014): “The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is an independent agency 
created by the Congress to maintain stability and public confidence in the nation's financial system by... 
managing receiverships.” That is to say, the FDIC’s purpose is to make sure that banks are liquidated in 
an orderly manner, and thereby “maintain stability and public confidence” in the financial system. 
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The indices give us an insight into the state of financial stability in comparison to 
the past, resting on Minsky’s FIH. The short term index in particular gives us 
valuable information about the seriousness of recent (how recent rests mainly 
on the delay of necessary data) bursts and changes in financial instability that 
can, possibly, aid policy makers in reacting before the problem gets even 
worse. The comparison to the past is valuable in this perspective for policy 
makers can then better estimate how serious reaction is needed, and compare 
them to interventions in the past during then-current instability episodes. This 
can also help market participants in understanding the state of financial stability 
in the economy and compare it to past episodes. The long term index provides 
us with information that we can use to understand the sturdiness of financial 
structures in the economy, compared to how they have been in the past. By 
providing us with this information it, intuitively, gives us an informal guidance on 
how vary we should be when we evaluate the state of financial stability for the 
short term, hence the relationship between the level of long term financial 
instability and variations in the short term financial instability. This can 
complement formal EWIs if they are put to use in the first place, especially as 
they may grasp developments that EWIs do not – see previous discussion.  
Furthermore, the indices help us to evaluate the gradations in financial 
instability, as Chant (2003) described one of its characteristics, and can either 
complement or substitute EWIs on this front since, as previously discussed in 
this section, “either/or” EWIs do not grasp gradual changes in financial stability 
in the same way as the indices here developed. 
4.1.6 The FDI data and the necessary changes to the indices 
The data on Foreign Direct Investment comes from the Organisation of 
Economic Co-Development, OECD. The data is always represented as a share 
of Gross Domestic Product, never as an absolute amount. The FDI data (total 
FDI and financial FDI, stocks, flows, inward and outward) are on an annual 
basis and cover the time period 1987 – 2008 in the case of United Kingdom but 
1985 – 2009 for the United States. 110 
                                            
110
 Note for figures 4.14-4.17. Abbreviations are as follows: OFF: Outward Financial Flow, IFF: Inward 
Financial Flow, OF: Total Outward Flow, IF: Total Inward Flow, OFS: Outward Financial stock, IFS: 
Inward Financial Stock, OF: Total Outward Stock, IF: Total Inward Stock. 
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Figure 4.14 UK Inward FDI Data (% of GDP) 
 
Figure 4.15 UK Outward FDI Data (% of GDP) 
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Figure 4.16 US Inward FDI Data (% of GDP) 
 
Figure 4.17 US Outward FDI Data (% of GDP) 
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transformation was simple: the annual data was compiled by averaging, over 
each year, the quarterly data for financial instability. This is similar to what 
Cardarelli, Elekdag, and Lall (2011) did, except they had monthly index-outputs 
which they averaged over quarters to facilitate comparisons with quarterly 
macro figures. In our case, we have quarterly-outputs which we average over 
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instability, United Kingdom) and 1985 – 2010 (long term and short term 
instability, United States), were regressed against the annual data of FDI. 
The regressions and the causation effects were estimated with Granger-
causality, i.e. with Vector Autoregression, VAR, models of either one or two 
lags. The VAR model is a common-practice model to estimate causality, at least 
of statistical rather than purely actual nature, between economic factors. The 
usual warnings of “causality” in the Granger model should be remembered: 
although the word “causality” is used the Granger-causality test is more about 
forecasting variable Y with variable X. The direction of the ‘causation’ is also 
probed into in the model, i.e. do past values of X forecast current values of Y, 
the other way around, or even both (a feedback). 
A general representation of a VAR(p) model is: 
% = &'%' + &(%( +⋯+ &*%* + +, + - 
where all “y” are a k x 1 vectors, all “A” and “B” are k x k vectors, “x” is a k x 1 
vector of external variables – including the possibility of a time trend – and -a k 
x 1 vector of white noise. 
 In order to get strong Granger-causality estimations, the VAR regressions must 
preferably be done on stationary samples, i.e. I(0) samples. The samples can 
also be I(1), i.e. non-stationary, and cointegrated . Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show P-
values of Augmented Dickey Fuller tests, looking for stationarity in the variables. 
The null hypothesis is that the variable is non-stationary. So if the p-value is 
lower than 0.05 we can reject the null-hypothesis and conclude that the variable 
is stationary, i.e. an I(0) process.  
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Table 4.9 ADF tests for non-stationarity on the quarterly data 
 
P-Values from Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests, quarterly data (1 lag)
Each ADF test is done with a constant. The lower p-value is with trend as well.
United Kingdom United States
Short term instability 0.113 0.172
0.214 0.286
Long term instability 0.961 0.860
0.228 0.790
1st diff. ST instability 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000
1st diff. LT instability 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000
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Table 4.10 ADF tests on annual data (one lag)  
  
p-value in second line of each variable is ADF test with trend. 
United Kingdom United States
Short term instability 0.116 0.003
0.607 0.004
Long term instabil ity 0.873 0.945
0.094 0.909
1st diff. ST instability 0.796 0.000
0.948 0.010
1st diff. LT instability 0.100 0.041
0.271 0.000
2nd diff. ST instabil ity 0.252
0.350
2nd diff. LT instabil ity 0.002
0.008
Outward Flow of Financial FDI 0.290 0.008
0.000 0.051
Outward Flow of FDI 0.101 0.253
0.241 0.002
Inward Flow of Financial  FDI 0.063 0.032
0.030 0.072
Inward Flow of FDI 0.059 0.031
0.064 0.118
Outward Stock of Financial FDI 0.978 0.888
0.158 0.708
Outward Stock of FDI 0.923 1.000
0.176 1.000
Inward Stock of Financial FDI 0.995 0.640
0.719 0.019
Inward Stock of FDI 0.959 0.978
0.583 0.425
Outward Flow of Financial FDI, 1st diff 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000
Outward Flow of FDI, 1st diff 0.007 0.000
0.047 0.000
Inward Flow of Financial  FDI, 1 st diff 0.000 0.001
0.000 0.007
Inward Flow of FDI, 1st diff 0.066 0.037
0.267 0.167
Outward Stock of Financial FDI, 1st diff 0.031 0.009
0.066 0.047
Outward Stock of FDI, 1st diff 0.101 0.219
0.295 0.000
Inward Stock of Financial FDI, 1st diff 0.004 0.000
0.000 0.001
Inward Stock of FDI, 1st diff 0.044 0.044
0.050 0.121
Nominal GDP Growth 0.064 0.039
0.036 0.011
Real GDP Growth 0.034 0.064
0.153 0.123
Real GDP Growth, 1st diff. 0.000 0.001
0.000 0.010
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Tables 4.11 – 4.13 aggregate Engle-Granger tests on cointegration. The null 
hypothesis is that there is no cointegration. The p-values show there is no 
cointegration relationship in the quarterly data. Test was done with one lag. 
Only those variables that fail the ADF test are included as they are of course the 
only ones we can consider being I(1) variables. Very limited cointegration 
relationship is present in the data according to the Engle-Granger test. 
Table 4.11 p-values from Engle-Granger tests on cointegration, quarterly data.  
 
 
 
UK, quarterly data ST instability LT instability
ST instability - 0.8843
LT instability -
US, quarterly data ST instability LT instability
ST instability - 0.7518
LT instability -
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Table 4.12 p-values from Engle-Granger tests on cointegration, annual data, UK.  
 
Table 4.13 p-values from Engle-Granger tests on cointegration using annual data on US.  
 
The null hypothesis in no cointegration. Test was done with one lag.  
UK, cointegration test. Annual 
data
ST 
instability
LT 
instability
1st diff. ST 
instability
1st diff. LT 
instability
Outward 
Flow of 
Financial 
FDI
Outward 
Flow of 
FDI
Inward 
Flow of 
Financial 
FDI
Inward 
Flow of 
FDI
Outward 
Stock of 
Financial 
FDI
Outward 
Stock of 
FDI
Inward 
Stock of 
Financial 
FDI
Inward 
Stock of 
FDI
Inward 
Flow of 
FDI, 1st 
diff.
Outward 
Stock of 
FDI, 1st 
diff.
ST instability - 0.4209 0.3882 0.2530 0.6609 0.4485 0.3464 0.8457 0.2522 0.4870 0.2888 0.1876 0.2019 0.4101
LT instability - 0.8419 0.9664 0.9645 0.9823 0.9534 0.9556 0.4320 0.5458 0.1902 0.1206 0.9260 0.9775
1st diff. ST instability - 0.5082 0.9859 0.9795 0.9073 0.9740 0.7424 0.9357 0.8535 0.8374 0.9538 0.9620
1st diff. LT instability - 0.2582 0.2408 0.2051 0.2365 0.0250 0.1088 0.0281 0.0916 0.5067 0.4508
Outward Flow of Financial FDI - 0.2404 0.2564 0.0351 0.0007 0.0135 0.0114 0.0285 0.3360 0.3830
Outward Flow of FDI - 0.0895 0.0560 0.1519 0.1903 0.1666 0.2127 0.1432 0.5966
Inward Flow of Financial FDI - 0.0000 0.0088 0.0087 0.0157 0.0066 0.2907 0.0221
Inward Flow of FDI - 0.0093 0.0134 0.0243 0.0893 0.0045 0.0194
Outward Stock of Financial FDI - 0.1068 0.2998 0.2964 0.9906 0.9678
Outward Stock of FDI - 0.1379 0.3833 0.9696 0.9601
Inward Stock of Financial FDI - 0.0089 0.9955 0.9880
Inward Stock of FDI - 0.9790 0.9825
Inward Flow of FDI, 1st diff. - 0.2098
Outward Stock of FDI, 1st diff. -
US, cointegration test. Annual 
data.
LT 
instability
Outward 
Stock of 
Financial 
FDI
Outward 
Stock of 
FDI
Inward 
Stock of 
Financial 
FDI
Inward 
Stock of 
FDI
Real GDP 
Growth
LT instability - 0.8685 0.6575 0.9094 0.7865 0.9542
Outward Stock of Financial FDI - 0.3736 0.2942 0.3592 0.4950
Outward Stock of FDI - 0.4035 0.4151 0.7916
Inward Stock of Financial FDI - 0.0459 0.5664
Inward Stock of FDI - 0.7542
Real GDP Growth -
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As the ADF tests show, there seems to be a structural deficiency in the UK 
short term data in the sense that the first difference of the series for short term 
instability in the UK seems not only to be non-stationary but even more strongly 
so than the original series themselves. This implies an I(2) structure, or above. 
In the meanwhile, both the original short term data and the first difference of the 
short term series in the case of US seem to be stationary. 
This is at least partially dealt with by checking for autocorrelation (Ljung-Box 
autocorrelation test) and cointegration. The first difference of long term 
instability in the UK, which failed the ADF test (it is an I(1) process), does have 
a cointegration relationship with Outward Stock of Financial FDI and Inward 
Stock of Financial FDI, which are also unit-root I(1) processes. Regressions 
with those variables are therefore included and there is indeed positive and 
statistically significant Granger-causality from Outward Stock of Financial FDI 
on the first difference of long term financial instability, see table 4.14 below. 
However, other cointegration tests which include either long term or short term 
financial instability in the UK do not reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration. They are therefore not included.  
In general, the data for US seem to be better constructed (e.g. fewer unit roots 
in the series). The reason is perhaps partly the fact that the annual series for 
UK ST stability only stretch over 15 years (1995 – 2009) while the availability is 
26 years (1985 – 2010) in the case of US. In the case of FDI data, the data 
availability stretches from 1987 to 2008 in the case of UK but 1985 to 2010 for 
US.  
The lack of data can therefore play an important part in making the UK figures 
not as trustworthy as the ones for the US. The results of regressions using the 
UK figures are nonetheless shown with the warning that their quality is limited. 
So if the results using the UK figures are different from those arising from the 
US data, the latter is judged to be more trustworthy.  
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Annual data 
Tables 4.14 and 4.15 show VAR regressions with F-test for Granger-causality 
where the p-value of at least one of the VAR(n) regressions is 10% or lower 
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(null hypothesis: no Granger-causality, β=0 => reject H0: β=0 at 90% confidence 
level). Remember that the financial instability indices measure increased 
instability if the value of the indices goes up between time periods. 
Only the most notable Granger-causalities, based on p-values, will be 
presented in the following tables to save space. For more details on 
regressions, see Appendix 3 where numerous tables and results can be found. 
The form of the data representation in tables 4.14 and 4.15 is from Xiaming Liu 
et al. (2001).111 Their method of not giving the numerical value of the 
coefficients, or the sums, in the Granger-causality regressions, but merely the 
sign of the coefficient, or their sums, is adopted here. The significance level 
(90%, 95% or 99%) is given as well. Please see Appendix 3 for numerical 
values and other comment on the results. 
                                            
111
 Only I(0)-I(0) and cointgrated relationships are shown in tables 4.14 and 4.15. This automatically 
excludes all instances with UK short term financial instability since the series fails the stationarity test. 
The stars (*, **, ***) signal significance levels: 90%, 95%, 99% levels respectively. How to read the 
tables: the x variable in each line Granger-causes the y variable in the same line. If there is no y variable 
in that line it is the same as is in the line above, e.g. Nom. GDP Growth (table 4.14, line 6) Granger-
causes ∆2LT in the UK, see table 4.14. In that particular case, the causality effects are positive (+, the 
coefficient, or their sum, is positive) and significant at 95% (**) when estimated with both VAR(1) and 
VAR(2) models.  
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Table 4.14 Overview of the results, UK 
 
If we focus first on the UK data (table 4.14) we can highlight the following.  
First, various FDI activities do not seem to have positive effects on long term 
financial stability in the UK (table 4.14, lines 1-5). In fact, none of them has 
positive effects on long term financial stability according to those results – 
remember that an increased value of the index signals deterioration in the level 
of financial stability. Remember, however, that we are using the second 
difference of long term financial stability in those regressions to avoid problems 
due to non-stationarity. Also, those results do not include time trend. If time 
trend was included, the relationship between those variables disappeared (not 
reported in table 4.14). This signals that there might be an exogenous factor, 
not included in the dataset, which influences the development of financial 
stability and FDI. Furthermore, interpreting the relationship between the second 
difference (the acceleration) of long term financial stability and other variables is 
a slippery slope. Generally, therefore, especially due to the general lesser 
Line y x 1 2 Notes
1 ΔLT Outward Stock of Fin. FDI  +**  +*** Cointr.
2 Δ²LT ΔOutward Fin. Flow  +  +***
3 ΔOutward Flow  +***  +***
4 ΔInward Fin. Flow +  +*
5 ΔOutward Fin. Stock +  +**
6 Nom. GDP Growth  +**  +**
7 Real GDP Growth +  +***
8 Inward Fin. Stock ΔLT  +***  +** Cointr.
9
10 Other notable relationships:
11 Inward Fin. Flow Real GDP Growth  +**  +** Line 22
12 Real GDP Growth - w.trend  +*  + Line 23
13 ΔOutward Fin. Flow Nom GDP Growth -  -**
14 Real GDP Growth -  -***
15 Outward Fin Flow Nom. GDP Growth  -**  -* Line 19
16 ΔOutward Fin. Stock Nom. GDP Growth  -  -*
17 ΔInward Stock Real GDP Growth  +***  +**
18 Real GDP Growth - w.trend  +**  +
19 Nom GDP Growth Outward Fin. Flow  -  -** Line 15
20 Inward Fin. Flow  -***  -***
21 ΔInward Fin. Flow  -  -**
22 Real GDP Growth Inward Fin. Flow  -***  -** Line 11
23 Inward Fin. Flow - w.trend  -***  -** Line 12
LagsVariables
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quality of data in the case of UK, compared to the US, we should be careful not 
to draw too strong conclusions from the results in lines 1-8, table 4.14. 
The data in the lower half of table 4.14 (lines 11-20) do not suffer from any 
serious data problems however. We can more aggressively draw conclusions 
from them. The most stand-out result is, first of all, the relationship between the 
change in inward stock of FDI into the UK and real GDP growth (lines 17-18). 
The positive effects of GDP growth on inward stock of FDI holds whether a 
trend is included or not. The relationship can be explained simply by arguing 
that foreign firms are willing to strengthen their position in the UK in the wake of 
strong economic growth. This can be done either by reinvesting their earnings 
in the economy or adding to the investment from the home country, i.e. a flow. 
Both of which would increase the stock of inward FDI in the UK. However, the 
flow explanation may be less powerful since there seems to be no Granger- 
causality between GDP growth and inward FDI flow into the UK. Revaluations 
of existing assets in the wake of strong GDP growth can also be an explanation 
for the apparent relationship. Notice that inward FDI – stock or flow – does not 
affect GDP growth: the causal relationship seems to be one-way only. 
Another relationship worth highlighting is the one between inward financial-FDI 
flow and real GDP growth (lines 11-12, 22-23). We can see that increased 
economic growth draws in financial-FDI into the UK. However, that financial-FDI 
inflow has negative effects on real economic growth. The relationship is in place 
whether we include a trend or not, signalling that no serious exogenous factors 
have a role in the relationship. This is contrary to the expectations that more 
FDI increases growth (see chapter 1 for discussion on the matter).  
Another notable result is that increased growth has adverse effects on outward 
flow and stock of financial-FDI (lines 13-16). This supports the view that 
financial institutions in the UK are home-biased: if economic growth is good at 
home and plenty of business opportunities in place, why risk expanding outside 
the home market, which is better known than many other markets that the 
financial institutions may operate in? See Chapter 2, especially section 2.3.4 
Contagion risks from financial-FDI and the references therein, for further 
discussion on the home-bias of financial institutions. 
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Table 4.15 Overview of the results, US 
 
Line y x 1 2
1 ΔLT Inward Fin Flow  +**  +*** No trend
2 Inward Flow  +**  +*** No trend
3 ΔInward Stock  +**  +** No trend
4 ST  +  +*** No trend
5 ΔST  +***  +*** No trend Line 12
6 ΔLT ST  +  +*** With trend
7 ΔST  +***  +*** With trend Line 17
8 Nom GDP Growth  +  +** With trend
9 ΔST Inward Flow  +**  +** No trend
10 ΔInward Flow  +**  +** No trend
11 ΔInward Stock  +**  + No trend
12 ΔLT  -**  - No trend Line 5
13 Nom GDP growth  +***  +** No trend Line 50
14 Δreal GDP growth  +*  + No trend Line 62
15 ΔST Nom. GDP Growth  +***  +** With trend Line 52
16 Δreal GDP Growth  +*  + With trend Line 70
17 ΔLT  -***  - With trend Line 7
18 ST Inward Fin Flow  -  +** No trend
19 Inward Flow  +***  +*** No trend Line 30, 33 (~)
20 Δinward Flow  +*  +* No trend Line 39 (~)
21 Δinward Stock  +***  +* No trend
22 Nom GDP Growth  +***  +*** No trend Line 49
23 ST Nom GDP Growth  +***  +*** With trend Line 51
24
25 Other notable relationships
26 Outward Fin Flow ST  -***  -*** No trend
27 Outward Fin Flow ST  -**  -** With trend
28 Inward Fin Flow ΔST  +*  + No trend
29 ΔReal GDP Growth  +*  + No trend
30 Inward Flow ST  -**  - No trend Line 19
31 Nom GDP Growth  +**  + No
32 Δreal GDP Growth  +**  + No trend
33 Inward Flow ST  -**  - With trend Line 19 (~)
34 Nom GDD Growth  +**  + With trend
35 Δreal GDP Growth  +**  + With trend
36 ΔInward Fin Flow Nom GDP Growth  -  -* No trend
37 Δreal GDP growth  +**  +* No trend
38 Δinward Fin Flow Δreal GDP growth  +*  +* With trend
39 Δinward Flow ST  -**  -** With trend Line 20 (~)
40 Real GDP Growth  +  +** With trend
41 Δreal GDP Growth  +**  +** With trend
Variables Lags
Notes
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Table 4.15 (cont.) 
 
~ signals a feedback effect, however where one of the regression is made with a trend but not the other.  
The data and the results from the US are much more robust than in the case of 
the UK. In the case of US, structural problems, such as non-stationarity, were 
not as serious. There are numerous points to be highlighted when it comes to 
those results. 
If we focus explicitly on the causes of and the repercussions of financial stability 
in the US we can point out the following: 
- Inward financial-FDI flows (line 1) and inward FDI flows (line 2) in general 
have a negative effect on long term financial stability. Notice, that if we 
include a (time) trend in the regression, the effects disappear. This can 
be interpreted as exogenous effects: there might be something else than 
Line y x 1 2
42 Δoutward Fin Flow ΔST  -*  - No trend
43 Real GDP growth  -  -** No trend
44 Δoutward Flow ST  -*  - No trend
45 ST  -*  - With trend
46 Δinward Stock ΔST  +**  +*** No trend
47 Δoutward Stock ST  +  +** With trend
48 ΔST  +*  +* With trend
49 Nom GDP Growth ST  -*  -*** No trend Line 22
50 ΔST  -***  -*** No trend Line 13
51 ST  -  -** With trend Line 23
52 ΔST  -***  -*** With trend Line 15
53 Real GDP Growth ST  -*  -** No trend
54 ΔST  -***  -*** No trend
55 Inward Fin Flow  -  -* No trend
56 Inward Flow  -**  -** No trend
57 Δinward Fin Flow  -  -** No trend
58 Δinward Flow  -  -** No trend
59 Δinward Fin Stock  +**  +** No trend
60 Δinward Stock  -**  -* No trend
61 Δreal GDP Growth ST  -  -*** No trend
62 ΔST  -***  -*** No trend Line 14
63 Inward Flow  -**  -* No trend
64 ΔOutward Flow  +  -* No trend
65 Δinward Fin Flow  -  -*** No trend
66 Δinward Flow  -  -** No trend
67 Δinward Fin Stock  +**  +* No trend
68 Δinward Stock  -**  -** No trend
69 Δreal GDP Growth ST  -  -*** With trend
70 ΔST  -***  -*** With trend Line 16
Variables Lags
Notes
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a possible causal relationship between FDI flows and financial stability 
that is driving the apparent statistical causal relationship between the 
variables. This might e.g. be increased financialisation, which has 
increased for the last decades and can have a negative impact on the 
real economy and financial stability (Hein & Truger, 2012; Orhangazi, 
2008). Our dataset limits us from testing this hypothesis more formally. 
- Short term financial instability Granger-causes long term instability to 
increase, both without (lines 4, 5) and with a trend (lines 6, 7). The 
feedback is negative: increased long term financial instability calms short 
term financial instability down (lines 12 (no time trend), 17 (with time 
trend)). This relationship reverberates the discussion in 3.4.4 The clash 
between long term and short term financial instability. Drawing from that 
discussion, this relationship is easily explained. Markets are ruled by 
short-termism, i.e. markets think first and foremost about calmness in the 
short term. If e.g. a bailout or a quick-fix change in the financial system, 
which does nothing to improve the fragility of the underlying financial 
structures of the economy, i.e. increases the level of long term instability, 
is used to calm markets down from an episode of serious financial stress, 
the net effects will be calmness, even if underlying financial structures 
can be weaker than before. This reverberates Minsky’s words as he 
explained the problems in the US financial system in 1966 (Minsky, 
2008b, p. 101, emphasis added): “Because the difficulties were papered 
over with the cosmetic changes that allowed interest rate ceilings to vary 
with the size of the deposit, the crunch was not interpreted as a signal 
that there were serious weaknesses in the financial structures.” Four 
years later, a liquidity squeeze took place: the “serious weaknesses in 
the financial structures” had not been fixed. The relationship between the 
long-term and short-term financial instability is also to be expected from 
the point of view of myopic loss aversion: humans have it ingrained in 
them to prefer a quick-fix to their problems even if it leaves them with 
another to solve later (see e.g. Thaler (1981), Tversky and Kahneman 
(1991), Frederick et al. (2002)). Professional traders in financial markets 
have even been shown to be more myopic loss averse than everyday 
students (Haigh & List, 2005). This relationship between long term and 
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short term financial instability is therefore not surprising, drawing from 
Minsky’s work and the work of behaviourists. 
- Economic growth seems to encourage economic units to build up 
leverage and generally accept more fragile financial structures than if 
growth was low: long term financial instability increases in the wake of 
strong growth (line 8). The effects are similar on short term financial 
instability (lines 15, 16, 23). This, again, follows from Minsky’s FIH. 
Drawing from this we can state the following. Inward FDI flows and stocks do 
not seem to have caused improvements in financial stability in the US. In fact 
inward financial-FDI flows, inward flow of FDI in general and inward stock of FDI 
in general seem to have had negative effects on the level of financial stability in 
the US. This depends, however, on whether we include a trend in our 
regressions or not which signals that there is possibly something else that is 
driving the statistical relationship between the variables. In any case, FDI 
certainly does not improve financial stability although its negative effects might 
be limited. These empirical conclusions are in accordance with the theoretical 
ones developed in chapters 1 and 2: the net effects of financial and non-
financial FDI on financial stability are inconclusive and can land on either side of 
the “red line” so to speak. High economic growth is, however, a breeding 
ground for financial instability. Again, this is in full accordance with Minsky’s 
FIH: high growth comes with greater optimism about the future which leads to 
over-leverage and increased financial fragility and instability. 
Looking at other regressions (table 4.15, lines 26-70) we can highlight the 
following: 
- Short term financial instability has negative effects on all sorts of FDI 
activities (note especially lines 27, 33, 39, 45 and 47-48).  
- In case of outward financial-FDI flow (lines 26, 27) the impact is negative. 
This result is not obvious. On one hand, we could expect short term 
financial instability to push banks out of the economy, incentivise them to 
find more fertile markets abroad. On the other, short term financial 
instability at home can force managers to focus on the home market, 
which we can expect to be the best known market, and improve the 
company at home before expanding abroad. Unstable markets at home 
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can also put pressures on the parent to retreat in other markets (De 
Haas & Van Lelyveld, 2014). The result here is more according to that 
story and reconfirms the one where financial institutions focus on the 
home market and withdraw, at least partially, from abroad if faced with 
troubles, or a crisis, at home (Hryckiewicz & Kowalewski, 2011; Peek & 
Rosengren, 2000a). In other words, US financial institutions are home-
biased. 
- Financial instability also scares FDI away from the economy, i.e. 
increased short term financial instability has negative impact on inward 
flow of FDI in general (lines 33, 39). This is the opposite of the “fire sale 
FDI” argument (which was applied to emerging economies anyway and 
not the US): financial instability does not draw FDI in but scares it away.  
- Short term financial instability has also negative impact on the activities 
of US companies abroad: outward flow and stock are negatively affected 
by short term financial instability (lines 45, 47-48). This is a sign that not 
only are US multinational financial companies home-biased (lines 26, 27) 
as already mentioned but so are US multinational companies in general. 
- The effects of economic growth on FDI activities seem to be that 
economic growth draws FDI into the US (lines 34, 35, 38, 40, 41). Those 
results are similar to that of the UK (see table 4.14) where economic 
growth was drawing FDI into the economy. When it comes to the 
feedback – does inward FDI activities into the US cause economic 
growth? – the effects are much weaker, albeit generally negative (except 
the impact of the change in inward financial-FDI stock, line 59), and do 
not tolerate the addition of regressing with a time trend (lines 55-60, 63, 
65-68). Therefore, we cannot say for sure that FDI into the US economy 
has any noticeable effects on economic growth but if the effects are 
there, they are generally negative. This is a slightly better result than in 
the UK case where inward financial-FDI flow had negative effects on real 
GDP growth, including when time trend was taken into the account (table 
4.14, line 23). This result is in accordance with the pessimistic view of the 
effects of FDI on economic growth (see section 1.1 FDI and economic 
growth). What is interesting is that in this case we are not talking about 
poor countries but rich ones. The impact of FDI is more likely to be 
negative the poorer the country is (Gallagher & Zarsky, 2006). Yet, here 
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we have two of the richest economies in the world and the impact is 
negative. The reason may be found in the fact that more FDI is not 
always better: after a certain threshold, the negative effects of FDI can 
begin to dominate the positive ones (Eller et al., 2006) in a quadratic-
relationship fashion. 
- As expected, short term financial instability has negative effects on GDP 
growth (lines 51, 52, 69, 70). Notice the previously discussed impact of 
GDP growth on financial instability: the effects are positive. Again, this is 
in full accordance with Minsky’s FIH. 
4.2.2 Quarterly data 
We can investigate further the relationship between long term and short term 
financial instability using quarterly data. The first difference of the quarterly time 
series is stationary (see table 4.9) in both cases. We can use a VAR(n) lag 
selection test to determine the most appropriate model when it comes to lag 
selection. Tables 4.16 and 4.17 summarise AIC, BIC and HQC results that 
show us that a VAR(1) is the most appropriate model in the case of UK data 
while a VAR(2) or, possibly, a VAR(4) is best in the case of US. 
Table 4.16 VAR(n) lag selection test, UK quarterly data  
 
lags loglik p(LR) AIC BIC HQC
1 -17.49716 0.886685* 1.109737* 0.972460*
2 -16.78117 0.83862 1.01061 1.382363 1.153568
3 -15.08879 0.49562 1.09769 1.618145 1.297832
4 -10.44477 0.05429 1.073387 1.742543 1.330712
5 -5.2464 0.03425 1.028166 1.846023 1.342675
6 -3.46052 0.46705 1.111718 2.078276 1.483409
7 -2.68973 0.81925 1.233575 2.348834 1.66245
8 3.79047 0.01147 1.139982 2.403943 1.626041
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Table 4.17 VAR(n) lag selection test, US quarterly data 
 
Note: The lag test is between Long Term Financial Instability and Short Term Financial Instability using 
quarterly data.  
There is no need to summarise the results for the regressions here in the same 
way as in the case of annual results, for the vast output is not in place, but 
merely four tables similar in construction to those found in Appendix 3, detailing 
the annual data.  
Tables 4.18-4.19 show us the results for UK quarterly data. Table 4.18 shows 
us that no Granger-causality is found from long term financial instability onto 
short term financial instability. This is the same result as in the case of annual 
data. However, short term financial instability Granger-causes long term 
financial instability to increase, relying on the VAR(1) model which is the most 
appropriate one (see table 4.19). In the case of the annual data, the data was 
non-stationary with no co-integration relationship in place. This regression was 
therefore not done. Notice that those results – UK short term financial instability 
Granger-causes UK long term financial instability to increase – is the same as in 
the case of US annual data, see table 4.15. Furthermore, US quarterly data 
show that short term financial instability Granger-causes long term financial 
instability to increase (table 4.21). All these results (UK quarterly, US quarterly 
& US annual) therefore depict that market participants are affected by short-
termism (see discussion after table 4.15 and 3.4.4 The clash between long term 
and short term financial instability). 
Thinking about the effects of long term financial instability on short term 
financial instability we can see that tables 4.18 and 4.20 do not add much meat 
on the bones: long term financial instability does not Granger-cause short term 
The asterisks below indicate the best (that is, minimized) values of the respective information criteria,
AIC = Akaike criterion, BIC = Schwarz Bayesian criterion and HQC = Hannan-Quinn criterion.
lags loglik p(LR) AIC BIC HQC
1 2.46581 0.073629 0.233901 0.138413
2 11.7489 0.00096 -0.036435 0.230684* 0.071539*
3 13.05447 0.62485 0.019699 0.393666 0.170862
4 20.31496 0.00581 -0.048228* 0.432587 0.146125
5 20.90403 0.88168 0.022833 0.610496 0.260376
6 23.50008 0.26815 0.052082 0.746593 0.332814
7 25.91365 0.3055 0.085132 0.886491 0.409055
8 27.2866 0.60121 0.139863 1.048069 0.506975
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financial instability (p-values are statistically insignificant). Comparing this to the 
annual data makes us notice that the Granger-causality from long term financial 
instability onto short term financial instability seems to weaken: the effects are 
still the same but statistically insignificant. This signals that the relationship 
between these factors needs a longer time period than only one quarter to be 
realised. 
Table 4.18 Does Long Term Instability Granger-cause Short Term Instability? UK 
 
Table 4.19 Does Short Term Instability Granger-cause Long Term Instability? UK 
  
Table 4.20 Does Long Term Instability Granger-cause Short Term Instability? US 
 
ST 8, 1st diff P-value, coeff. P-value, F-test
Ljung-Box P 
value (4 lags)
LT 9 1st diff. 0.672 0.371 0.371 0.943
LT 9 1st diff. (2 lags) 0.597 0.384 0.675 0.981
-0.265 0.594
LT 9 1st diff. (4 lags) 0.618 0.263 0.763 0.999
0.083 0.838
0.767 0.449
0.119 0.715
Sum of coefficients (4 lags) 1.587
LT 9, 1st diff. P-value, coeff. P-value, F-test
Ljung-Box P 
value (4 lags)
ST 8 1st diff 0.058 0.083 0.083 0.939
ST 8 1st diff 0.056 0.101 0.250 0.996
0.010 0.846
ST 8 1st diff 0.038 0.269 0.030 0.963
0.013 0.825
-0.033 0.122
-0.067 0.062
Sum of coefficients (4 lags) -0.049
ST 8, 1st diff
P-value, 
coeff.
P-value, F-
test
Ljung-Box P 
value (4 lags)
LT 9 1st diff. -0.268 0.349 0.349 0.708
LT 9 1st diff. (2 lags) -0.215 0.430 0.356 0.545
-0.175 0.322
LT 9 1st diff. (4 lags) -0.341 0.233 0.301 0.997
-0.447 0.101
-0.170 0.563
0.079 0.646
Sum of coefficients (4 lags) -0.879
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Table 4.21 Does Short Term Instability Granger-cause Long Term Instability? US 
 
A final comment is in order. Following post-Keynesian methodology, we should 
be careful in interpreting these econometric conclusions as non-changeable and 
applicable to all economies at all times. A very important note should be made, 
especially, on the fact that the focus is here on two economies that are both 
institutionally developed and modern. This institutional support facilitates and 
improves the effects of FDI onto the economy in question, as it does with 
general economic activities. Therefore, even if e.g. FDI activities are concluded 
here to have at best no effects on financial stability and at worst negative effects 
the result may not be as favourable in economies where the institutional 
framework is not as developed. Furthermore, it should be stressed here that the 
focus is first and foremost on FDI flows and stocks and not on other less sticky 
capital flows or capital flow “bonanzas” which are often disruptive (C. M. 
Reinhart & Reinhart, 2008). 
4.3 Conclusion: where from here? 
From the abovementioned regressions and tables, one can draw numerous 
conclusions. Bear in mind that the quality of data is better in the US case and so 
should the information be which we can yield of that dataset. 
First, flows and stocks of FDI can and do have negative impact on financial 
stability, both for the short and the long term (remember that we are here talking 
explicitly about the US and UK economies). The effects are however weak, 
judging on the grounds of more sound US data. In any case, we cannot say that 
FDI activities strengthen financial stability. They do not even seem to strengthen 
economic growth, at least in the US. In short, the positive effects of FDI 
LT 9, 1st diff.
P-value, 
coeff.
P-value, F-
test
Ljung-Box P 
value (4 lags)
ST 8 1st diff (1 lag) 0.148 0.002 0.002 0.242
ST 8 1st diff (2 lags) 0.109 0.005 0.000 0.787
0.173 0.007
ST 8 1st diff (4 lags) 0.108 0.003 0.000 0.987
0.172 0.004
0.080 0.110
-0.053 0.365
Sum of coefficients (4 lags) 0.308
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activities do not seem to be strong enough to completely outweigh the negative 
effects (see chapters 1 and 2 for discussion on what those effects are). 
A second clear result is that short term financial instability causes economic 
growth to decrease. This is entirely in accordance with Minsky’s Financial 
Instability Hypothesis.112 This strengthens the case for financial stability to be an 
unmistakable part of monetary and other policy objects, as Borio and Lowe 
(2002), Adrian and Shin (2008) and Eichengreen, Rajan & Prasad (2011) have 
spoken for. Indeed, Goodhart (1988) points out that financial stability was the 
original purpose of central banks. This original purpose should be remembered. 
Furthermore, short-termism seems to be a problem: long term financial stability 
is sacrificed for improvements in short term financial stability. 
It should be noted that, following the VAR model here applied, long term 
financial instability does not seem to cause short term financial instability to take 
place, as could have been expected from the discussion in chapter 3. In other 
words, the statistical method here applied only manages to catch the short-run 
dynamics between short-term financial instability and long-term financial 
instability. Nevertheless, Figures 4.11 and 4.12 indicate that there is a complex 
non-linear relationship between the terms, supporting Minsky’s description of 
the complex dynamics of the development of financial instability and how 
underlying financial structures (long term financial instability) will affect the 
immediate development (short term financial instability) of stability in the 
system. Therefore, although the VAR model does not catch those complex 
dynamics running from long term financial instability onto short term financial 
instability, Figures 4.11 and 4.12 hint that the relationship between them is as 
Minsky expected it to be. 
Finally, we have, generally, not confirmed the view that FDI activities have a 
positive effect on GDP growth. In fact, we have shown that the Granger-
causality from FDI on GDP growth is negative or neutral at best. This confirms 
the validity of prior studies, such as Mencinger (2003) – see also 1.1 FDI and 
economic growth. In short, FDI should, with the story here told, not be relied on 
to boost economic growth – at least not in the current institutional framework. 
                                            
112
 This is also in accordance with Werner’s (2005) Quantity Theory of Credit. There, a crisis causes all 
credit creation to shrink – since banks flee to cover and decrease the supply of credit in general – and 
when that happens, economic growth contracts. 
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All in all, foreign direct investment does not seem to have positive effects on the 
economy according to this study. But some of the positive effects of foreign 
direct investments have certainly not been disproved. The point about foreign 
banks introducing better risk and operations management into the financial 
system is still very valid and should not be taken lightly. Nor should technical 
progresses and other positive spillover effects be forgotten. The positive effects 
of financial-FDI should, in short, not be altogether waved off in light of these 
results. 
The challenge that now arises is to strengthen the potential benefits of FDI, both 
financial-FDI and FDI in general, while the possible drawbacks, such as 
excessive credit booms and establishments of economic links which financial 
instability can travel by, are mitigated or extinguished. In next chapter we bring 
forward the outlines of the fundamentals that we should look at when attempting 
to strengthen the positive sides of FDI while downplaying the drawbacks. Some 
improvements to a developed financial system are proposed with this purpose 
in mind. 
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Chapter 5 – A Suggestion, Part I: On Credit 
Now there is no part of our economic system which works so badly 
as our monetary and credit arrangements; none where the results of 
bad working are so disastrous socially; and none where it is easier to 
propose a scientific solution. 
John Maynard Keynes (1973b) 
The cause of the economic cycle is a rate of interest that is too high 
for a level of investment consistent with full employment, 
compounded by a monetary system that finances excessive 
investment for a prolonged period. Older terminology might be 
usefully resurrected: the economic cycle is caused by money which 
is easy – that is, readily available – but dear. 
Geoff Tily, (2010, p. 244)  
We have seen from the previous chapters that FDI activities can be a double 
edged sword.  
In chapter 1 we noted that FDI “should increase economic growth in the host 
economy... and even be more effective in boosting economic growth than 
domestic investment.” But we also mentioned that “FDI does not always 
increase economic growth” and that absorptive capabilities should be in place in 
the host economy for positive spillovers of FDI to be realised. In chapter 2, we 
highlighted that “[t]he entry of a foreign bank into an economy can enhance the 
efficiency of the domestic financial sector.” However, we also quoted Reinhardt 
and Dell'Erba (2013, p. ii): “...while FDI surges occur across all sectors, only 
surges in FDI in the financial sector are accompanied by a boom-bust cycle in 
GDP growth.” Sure enough, in the case of our datasets, inward (financial) FDI 
flow had a negative Granger-causality on real GDP growth in the UK (table 
4.14, line 23). General FDI inflows did not have any Granger-causality effects 
on GDP growth in the UK. In the case of the US, the results were more on the 
positive side albeit clearly not altogether supportive of neither non-financial or 
financial-FDI. In fact, if there were any effects at all, they were on the negative 
and not the positive side. 
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When we look at the link between financial stability and financial-FDI activities 
we saw in chapter 2 that foreign banks have, empirically, had unclear effects on 
credit availability and credit stability, making their impact on financial stability 
due to their effects on those factors rather hard to nail down. Furthermore, 
contagion risks between economies are introduced when the financial-FDI link 
is established. The Icelandic banks pre-2008 are an example of outward 
financial-FDI leading to contagion risks for the home economy. But, likewise, a 
well diversified international bank, with secure assets in many economies, can 
act as a buffer to local shocks instead of transferring them between countries. 
Banks’ country- and industry-diversification is a double edged sword. Therefore, 
we cannot securely say whether the net effects of financial FDI on financial 
stability will be positive or negative. 
Looking at FDI in general, the net effects of it onto financial stability are just as 
unclear. In chapter 1 we wrote that “the conventional view is that if a country 
wants to reduce the financial instability arising from capital flows reversals, FDI 
should be increased as a share of total capital inflows.” But this does not seem 
to work all the time, especially since capital can flow into an economy under the 
disguise of FDI but out of it as a portfolio flow. Furthermore, as we wrote in 
chapter 1, “FDI can have a boosting impact on the rate of growth of credit in the 
economy.” That can have serious implications for financial stability in the 
economy, following Minsky’s FIH.  
Empirically, we found in the case of the US that although the negative Granger-
causality effects of FDI, both general FDI and financial-FDI, seemed to lessen 
significantly if we added a trend in our model, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that FDI had a negative impact on financial stability. The data certainly does not 
suggest that FDI activities have had a predominantly positive impact on 
financial stability in the US. The same applies for the UK, albeit the data is 
much more difficult to deal with in that case. 
The empirical investigation introduces a certain dilemma. Arguments abound 
that FDI can have positive effects on economic growth, economic development 
and financial stability – see chapters 1 and 2. However, empirically, the track 
record of the impact of FDI seems to be a less glamorous image than the 
positive arguments paint. We saw that FDI, in particular inflows of it, can harm 
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financial stability and economic growth (see chapter 4). In short, the negative 
effects of FDI inflows onto the economy can overpower the positive ones. 
Therefore, we must ask us: can we dampen the negative economic effects of 
FDI activities while maintaining or even strengthening the positive ones? 
This chapter is an attempt to answer this question. The chapter offers an insight 
into how the monetary system itself can be amended to moderate the adverse 
effects of FDI while, at least, maintaining its positives. 
The chapter is constructed as follows. First, we will argue that the kernel of the 
negative effects of FDI activities is the risk of excessive credit expansion that 
can accompany and is encouraged by FDI inflow. This leads to financial 
instability, in accordance with Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis. We will 
then discuss two ways of controlling credit expansion. The Optimum Exchange 
Rate System, OERS, is introduced in the wake of that discussion. It is argued 
that the OERS can help maintaining financial stability while FDI activities are 
freely allowed to be carried out. Croatia is used as an empirical case of where 
the OERS would have been beneficial. We therefore conclude that adopting the 
OERS can support financial stability – dampening the negative economic 
effects of FDI – while allowing FDI activities to have an overall favourable 
impact on the economy. 
5.1 FDI, credit expansion and financial stability 
5.1.1 FDI and credit expansions 
In chapter 1, we touched shortly on the relationship between FDI and credit 
expansion in the host economy. Specifically, we noted, quoting Bird and Rajan 
(2002, p. 200) that it is a “fact that FDI tends to be accompanied by an increase 
in bank loans.” Before the late 1990s crisis in Malaysia, FDI inflows, albeit not 
as volatile as other capital flows, had been “procyclical in nature, amplifying 
business cycles” (Doraisami, 2007). And business cycles are driven by credit 
cycles, according to Minsky, signalling an amplification effect between FDI and 
credit in Malaysia. FDI, and other capital inflows, fed credit growth in Bulgaria 
between 1997 and 2008 (Hegerty, 2009). And in Iceland, especially during the 
early 2000s, there was a strong correlation between changes in the stock of 
inward FDI and credit expansion (see figure 5.1 and tables 5.1-5.2).  
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Figure 5.1 Year-over-Year growth of inward FDI stock and credit, Iceland, 1990-
2011 
 
Table 5.1 OLS regression, Year-over-Year growth of inward FDI stock and credit, 
1990-2011 
Model 1: OLS, using observations 1990-2011 (T = 22) 
Dependent variable: Total_cr_gr_GDP 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 0.0231271 0.0156582 1.4770 0.15525  
FDIst_gr_GDP 0.103097 0.0400784 2.5724 0.01818 ** 
 
Mean dependent var  0.046482  S.D. dependent var  0.067367 
Sum squared resid  0.071611  S.E. of regression  0.059838 
R-squared  0.248604  Adjusted R-squared  0.211034 
F(1, 20)  6.617129  P-value(F)  0.018180 
Log-likelihood  31.78641  Akaike criterion -59.57282 
Schwarz criterion -57.39073  Hannan-Quinn -59.05878 
rho  0.495168  Durbin-Watson  0.953472 
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Table 5.2 Similar regression analysis as table 5.1, except over 2000-2011 
Model 2: OLS, using observations 2000-2011 (T = 12) 
Dependent variable: Total_cr_gr_GDP 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -0.00261598 0.0220227 -0.1188 0.90780  
FDIst_gr_GDP 0.171716 0.0473588 3.6259 0.00464 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  0.050778  S.D. dependent var  0.082286 
Sum squared resid  0.032178  S.E. of regression  0.056726 
R-squared  0.567976  Adjusted R-squared  0.524773 
F(1, 10)  13.14686  P-value(F)  0.004644 
Log-likelihood  18.50104  Akaike criterion -33.00207 
Schwarz criterion -32.03226  Hannan-Quinn -33.36113 
rho  0.274468  Durbin-Watson  1.231716 
 
OLS regressions show how statistically robust the correlation has been since 
1990 (see table 5.1) and even stronger since 2000 (see table 5.2): notice how 
the coefficient off the growth of FDI stock becomes not only higher (0.17 in table 
5.2 compared to 0.10 in table 5.1) but statistically more significant as well (p-
value 0.004 from 2000-2011 sample compared to 0.018 from 1990-2011 
sample).113 
Correlation does not necessarily mean causation. Arguably, the causation, if 
any direct one is in place, could go both ways. First, incoming FDI could have 
credit expansionary effects: investments increase, wages and income in the 
wake of that and credit, both for further gross capital investment and general 
consumption credit as well (higher income of workers would make them more 
secure borrowers, easing their credit constraints and expand the supply of 
available credit from banks). Second, the effects may go the other way around: 
a domestic credit expansion could expand the economy, increase the 
population’s income and make general investments profitable – including 
foreign direct investments. Then, a feedback cycle may well be in place, making 
the causation two-ways. Also, there may be no causation at all and any 
measured correlation spurious, or it may be time- and/or country-specific.  
The issue of the “hen and the egg” is therefore not a clear cut. Data analysis on 
the Icelandic case (see figure 5.1) reveals no Granger-causalities between 
                                            
113
 Both inward stock of FDI and credit are divided by GDP at each year. 
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inward stock of FDI and domestic credit expansion, only that the correlation has 
been very strong between those factors. We should nevertheless note, as we 
did in chapter 1 (see 1.4 FDI and financial stability), that FDI inflows have had a 
role in encouraging credit growth directly (Hegerty, 2009) and indirectly via e.g. 
investors’ sentiment, which can spur credit growth and stock-market booms and 
busts. And “typically... the domestic investment undertaken by FDI 
establishments is heavily leveraged through the domestic credit market” (Razin, 
Sadka, & Yuen, 1999, p. 2) so credit expansion directly or indirectly due to 
inward FDI activity should be expected. Furthermore, as we noted in chapter 2, 
in the wake of inward financial-FDI, it is entirely to be expected that banks, 
foreign and domestic, will expand credit in the niche market as they fight for 
market share. This was, in fact, the case in some Eastern European countries 
between 2003 and 2007 where FDI in the non-tradable sector, of which 
financial-FDI was a large share, “fueled credit booms” (Kinoshita, 2011).  
It may nevertheless not be certain that FDI will, definitely, cause or be positively 
correlated with credit expansion: it can depend on the phase of the business 
cycle. Following the phase of Minsky’s FIH where the economy has recovered 
from past instability episode and investors have regained their confidence, 
investments, no matter whether they are domestic or foreign, and credit 
expansion have a positive feedback effects on each other. If the economy is in 
this up-beat stage we should expect there to be a positive correlation, and even 
a two-way causation, between FDI and credit expansion. However, during the 
downturn-phase of the FIH, we might get an inflow of “fire sale” FDI, as 
discussed in chapter 1. In this case the correlation between inflow of FDI and 
credit expansion should not be expected to be strong, and even negative, as 
domestic units are, during the downturn, reconstructing their balance sheets 
and deleveraging. 
5.2 Credit expansion and some of its effects 
If FDI inflows of any kind do lead to or encourage credit expansion in the host 
economy the repercussions for financial stability could be sizeable. Excessive 
credit expansion is, according to Minsky’s FIH, the fuel of the incubation of 
unstable financial structures in the economy. And indeed, credit expansion has 
predated numerous episodes of financial instability. Werner (2005) blames the 
Japanese financial crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s on credit expansion 
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the years before. Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2011, p. 340), looking at the 
experiences of 14 developed countries since 1870 until 2008, argue that 
(domestic) credit expansion is “the single best predictor of financial instability” 
over the period. They note that external imbalances, (they use current account 
deficits to measure external imbalances), have “an additional role” in crisis 
formation, especially in the post-World War II world. The main cause of financial 
instability is, ultimately, excessive domestic loan growth. Borio and Lowe (2002, 
p. 11) reach a similar conclusion: “One of the relatively few robust findings to 
emerge from the literature on leading indicators of banking crisis is that rapid 
domestic credit growth increases the likelihood of a problem.” 
This should not surprise anyone who believes that Minsky was right when he 
developed his Financial Instability Hypothesis. Indeed, credit, its development 
and derived cash flows due to repayments of outstanding debts, such as 
interest costs, are important variables in our indices of financial instability, see 
chapter 4. And it should be added here that although external imbalances have 
had an “additional role” in the development of crises, it is in fact domestic credit 
creation that drives those imbalances as well. This includes current account 
deficits but also the depletion of foreign reserves and devaluations of the 
currency. The depletion of foreign reserves has been recorded to take place 
before a balance of payments crisis (Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999) and the 
excessive depreciation of a currency introduces all sorts of problems to the local 
economy, including higher import prices and, consequently, inflation. Currency 
depreciation can in fact be so severe that it is a crisis – a currency crisis – on its 
own, and the extreme depreciation can aggravate any problems that are in 
place in the banking sector, especially if it owes foreign-currency-denominated 
debt (ibid).  
5.2.1 Domestic credit expansion and current account deficits 
We have previously established that money creation is endogenous to the 
creation of credit in the banking sector (chapter 2). This money creation is the 
creation of purchasing power. This purchasing power is spent on goods and 
services in the economy, including imported goods. Therefore, the creation of 
credit finances imports as the new purchasing power is spent: the creation of 
credit leads to worsening of the current account. 
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We can use simple accounting identities to explain this more rigorously. The 
following rests on IMF’s balance of payments manual (International Monetary 
Fund, 2011) and Wray (2012). From the IMF we learn, through accounting 
identities and traditional meaning of symbols, that: 
 S – I = CAB  (1) 
 CAB = (Sp – Ip) + (Sg – Ig) (2) 
The IMF (2011, p. 224) points out that: 
[I]f government sector dissaving is not offset by net saving on the part 
of the private sector, the current account will be in deficit. More 
specifically, the identity shows that the budgetary balance of the 
government (Sg – Ig) may be an important factor influencing the 
current account balance. 
Equally, the current account will be in deficit if private sector dissaving is not 
offset by net saving by the government sector. 
“Dissaving” is the opposite of saving, i.e. when expenditures are higher than 
income. Dissaving can take place when existing stock of gross savings is 
liquidated, partly or wholly, and used to finance expenditures larger than 
income. Credit can also be created and the resulting purchasing power so 
created used to finance expenditures larger than income. Further, capital from 
abroad can be used to finance expenditures that are higher than income. This 
dissaving can be performed by either the domestic private sector or domestic 
government sector and this national (total) dissaving will constitute a saving for 
the foreign sector (Wray, 2012). Therefore, national dissaving and foreign 
saving adds up to zero according to accounting identities because domestic 
expenditures in excess of domestic incomes – financed with net creation of 
debt, capital inflows and/or net liquidation of savings – will constitute as savings 
for the foreign sector (ibid). We can therefore write: 
 CAB + B + L + K = 0 (3) 
Here, B is (net) credit creation by domestic parties (which, as we saw in chapter 
2, are mainly banks), L is (net) liquidation of existing savings and K is (net) 
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capital flows from abroad. The sum of those three variables is equal to the 
national (dis)saving while the current account balance is the foreign balance.114 
So national expenditures in excess of national income, i.e. a current account 
deficit, can be financed via those three channels: net credit creation (B), net 
liquidation of savings (L) and net capital flows (K) from abroad. IMF comments 
that causation should not be inferred from accounting identities, such as this 
one, and that (International Monetary Fund, 2011, p. 227) “[w]hether there is 
spontaneous financing of the current account deficit – that is, whether the gap 
between saving and investment is met from autonomous flows – depends on 
number of considerations.” The institution, as an example, mentions a current 
account deficit that is financed with temporary liquidation of foreign reserves to 
smooth national dissavings due to a crop failure, which would be a shortfall of 
national income. 
We are interested, specifically, in whether there actually is causation in place, 
running from credit expansion onto the current account. Ignoring L and K for a 
moment we can see that a domestic credit expansion, B, could cause the 
foreign balance to improve, i.e. the current account, CAB, to worsen. We saw in 
chapter 2 that banks are the main creators of credit in the domestic economy 
via their decisions to supply credit to borrowers. The hypothesis that we need to 
empirically test is then the following: expansion of domestic bank credit causes 
the current account balance to worsen.115 The causality should not run the other 
way, i.e. worsening of the current account should not cause bank credit to 
expand.  
Working from Keynes’s realisation that investment can be financed with 
domestic credit expansion, without savings taking place before the investment 
to finance it (Tily, 2010), it is easy to see how the result of a domestic credit 
expansion can be a deficit on the current account, since CAB = S – I. If I 
increases, financed with a domestic credit expansion, then CAB worsens. 
Likewise, increased consumption, financed with new credit, would decrease 
savings, S, and worsen the current account balance. Empirically, evidences 
have been found for the validity of the hypothesis. Rapid loan growth 
                                            
114
 This accounting identity can also be derived in a more rigorous way than here using purchasing 
powers, see Appendix 4. 
115
 See Werner (2005) for similar tests on Japan. 
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“stimulated” current account problems in Croatia, according to data from 1995-
2003 (Kraft & Jankov, 2005) and in Mexico, before 1994, the current account 
deficit was “to a large extent” the offspring of “a huge credit expansion” 
according to Gil-Diaz (1998). 
This must be looked at in connection with the capital account. If a domestic 
credit creation takes place and the purchasing power so created is used to buy 
a foreign good, it will constitute a capital flow into the economy, because foreign 
ownership of domestic assets is increasing. At the same time, the current 
account will worsen. The relationship, or rather the timing, of capital account 
and current account book entries also depends on the international acceptability 
of the domestic currency. 
Let’s look an example to explain this, following Wray (2012) and relying on 
figure 2.2.116 A bank in the US creates a loan and a deposit for a US borrower. 
The borrower uses the deposit to buy a good from China. The commercial bank 
of the buyer asks the US Fed to transfer reserves from its account at the Fed to 
the account of the Chinese central bank at the Fed. The Chinese central bank 
then credits the account of the seller’s commercial bank and that bank credits 
the seller’s account in China. At the same time, the US bank debits the buyer’s 
account in the US. In this case, the credit expansion led to an income for the 
foreigner and the Chinese central bank now holds a financial liability of the Fed, 
i.e. the reserves – which it can use to buy US treasuries. Therefore, the capital 
accounts of the two economies must be amended as this constitutes a capital 
inflow into the US and a capital outflow from China: the net change in financial 
liabilities for the US is negative while it is positive for China. However, there was 
no actual “flow” of capital from China to the US: the creation of the credit took 
place in the US and a financial liability was, in the wake of that, simply 
transferred, within the US (between two accounts at the Fed), from an American 
owner to a Chinese one in exchange for an imported good. Therefore, the 
domestic credit expansion caused book entries on the capital account and the 
current account of the US (and China) at the same time. The reason why this is 
possible is that the foreigner, the Chinese central bank, is willing to hold a 
financial liability, Fed reserves, denominated in the domestic currency, US 
dollars in this case (Wray, 2012).  
                                            
116
 See chapter 2, section 2.1.1 Banks and the payment system. 
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But what happens if foreigners are not willing to hold financial liabilities 
denominated in the domestic currency, which is common in the case of 
developing nations (the so-called “Original Sin” (Eichengreen & Hausmann, 
1999))? Wray (2012, loc. 2623) explains: 
If there is no foreign demand for IOUs (government currency or 
bonds, as well as private financial assets) issued in the currency of a 
developing nation, then its foreign trade becomes something close to 
barter: it can obtain foreign produce only to the extent that it can sell 
something abroad. This could include domestic real assets (real 
capital or real estate) or, more likely, produced goods and services 
(perhaps commodities, for example). It could either run a balanced 
current account (in which case revenues from its exports are 
available to finance its imports) or its current account deficit could be 
matched by foreign direct investment. 
Alternatively, it can issue foreign currency-denominated debt to 
finance a current account deficit. 
Here, the acquisition of foreign funds, either via exports or capital flows in the 
form of FDI or the issuance of a foreign currency-denominated debt, will happen 
before the current account is affected: because the domestic currency unit is 
not accepted as a payment for the import, the developing nation must acquire 
foreign currency, accepted as a payment, before it can buy anything abroad, 
instead of issuing a domestic-currency denominated credit at the same time as 
the import of a foreign goods takes place. Notice that Wray specifically 
mentions “a developing nation.” This seems indeed to be the case: capital 
inflows Granger-cause current account deficits, especially in emerging markets 
but much less so in developed economies (Ho-don & Yang, 2008). 
Mastroyiannis (2012), looking at Portugal between 1980 and 2009, held that the 
long-run causal relationship between the capital account and the current 
account was unidirectional from the former to the latter.117  
                                            
117
 Is Portugal a developing nation? In this respect, yes: it does not issue a sovereign currency that is in 
demand by foreigners. The same applies to Iceland, which is considered a developed economy: although 
it is an issuer of a sovereign currency it is not sought out by foreigners (no nation has Icelandic krona in 
its foreign reserves, as an example). 
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Note that domestic credit creation can still cause current account deficits in the 
case of developing countries, even if the credit is in the form of the domestic 
currency, which we will assume is under the spell of “The Original Sin”, i.e. not 
in demand amongst foreigners. In that case, domestic credit expansion would 
produce purchasing power that is spent on both domestic and foreign goods, 
i.e. imports. But rather than transferring a domestic financial liability (central 
bank reserves) to a foreigner, as in the previous case of the US dollar, the gross 
holdings of a nation of a foreign currency, such as central bank’s foreign 
reserves or banks’ holdings of foreign currency-denominated funds in 
corresponding banks, would be depleted instead (see figures 2.2 and 2.3 for 
details). We will investigate this in more depth later in this section (see 5.2.2 
Domestic credit expansion and the depletion of foreign reserves).118 For now we 
will focus on the hypothesis that credit expansion at home will cause the current 
account to worsen. 
It is time to empirically test this hypothesis. We have already mentioned some 
research on this topic where it was found that domestic credit expansion did 
lead to worsening of the current account (Gil-Diaz, 1998; Kraft & Jankov, 2005; 
Werner, 2005). We will expand this literature by using data from Iceland.119 We 
will also look into whether the capital account Granger-causes the current 
account in Iceland, as Wray (2012) expects is the case of “developing nations” 
and other researchers (Ho-don & Yang, 2008; Mastroyiannis, 2012) have found 
to be the case. 
Table 5.3 describes the results from Granger-causality test on the relationship 
between domestic credit expansion in Iceland (change in outstanding stock of 
credit) and changes in the current account (annual figures).120 
                                            
118
 See also Kouri and Porter (1974) and Werner (2005) in regards to the relation between credit 
expansion and the balance of payments. 
119
 Data from Central Bank of Iceland, Statistics Iceland and author’s calculations. Aggregate data is only 
available. It is therefore impossible to look at only GDP-related credit and/or non-GDP-related credit. 
120
 Data was constructed from two different data sources, i.e. from Statistics Iceland’s “Hagskinna” and 
the Central Bank of Iceland. The Hagskinna has data covering the current and capital accounts back to 
1946 but meaningful data for outstanding credit only stretches back to 1971, coming from the Central 
Bank of Iceland (combining them with Hagskinna’s data creates an illogical gap in the amount of 
outstanding credit and it is therefore not done). The reason why the sample is cut short in 2007 is that in 
2008 the commercial banks were reconstructed with, practically, an unknown book-value discount 
compared to the face value of outstanding credit. The capital and current accounts are also under the 
influence of liquidation of the bankrupt estates of the old banks. Therefore, data from and including 2008 
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Table 5.3 Credit expansion and Current Account Balance, Iceland  
VAR system, lag order 1 
OLS estimates, observations 1972-2007 (T = 36) 
Log-likelihood = -829.20959 
Determinant of covariance matrix = 3.4816229e+017 
AIC = 46.4005 
BIC = 46.6645 
HQC = 46.4926 
Portmanteau test: LB(9) = 32.8238, df = 32 [0.4265] 
 
Equation 1: CAB_90kr 
 
  
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -2914.07 3472.26 -0.8392 0.40737  
CAB_90kr_1 0.0150094 0.285747 0.0525 0.95843  
d_Credit_90kr_1 -0.275041 0.0826502 -3.3278 0.00216 *** 
 
Mean dependent var -21588.07  S.D. dependent var  34428.40 
Sum squared resid  1.02e+10  S.E. of regression  17577.39 
R-squared  0.754235  Adjusted R-squared  0.739340 
F(2, 33)  50.63719  P-value(F)  8.78e-11 
Rho  0.071486  Durbin-Watson  1.803902 
 
Tests for normality of residuals, autocorrelation and ARCH effects all come out 
favourably (at the 95% significance level). AIC, BIC and HQC all agree that 
VAR(1) is the most appropriate model. 
What those results are telling us is that credit expansion does indeed Granger-
cause the current account to worsen in Iceland. The causation does not run the 
other way, i.e. it is unidirectional from credit expansion onto the current account. 
And including the capital account in the regression does not change the result. 
In fact, as table 5.4 shows, in the case of Iceland a credit expansion drives both 
the current account and the capital account (broadly defined, i.e. including 
reserve transactions, KABRT). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
is simply not of the same pedigree as pre-2008 data. The data is reflated with the CPI (source: Statistics 
Iceland), i.e. it is on fixed-price basis (base year 1990, the year data from Hagskinna stretches to). 
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Table 5.4 Credit expansion, capital account (KABRT) and current account (CAB)  
VAR system, lag order 1 
OLS estimates, observations 1972-2007 (T = 36) 
Log-likelihood = -1220.502 
Determinant of covariance matrix = 5.6260581e+025 
AIC = 68.4723 
BIC = 69.0002 
HQC = 68.6566 
Portmanteau test: LB(9) = 50.0231, df = 72 [0.9774] 
 
Equation 1: CAB_90kr 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -1241.91 4312.75 -0.2880 0.77523  
CAB_90kr_1 0.10849 0.320715 0.3383 0.73736  
KABRT_90kr_1 0.106944 0.160981 0.6643 0.51124  
d_Credit_90kr_1 -0.289363 0.0861015 -3.3607 0.00202 *** 
 
Mean dependent var -21588.07  S.D. dependent var  34428.40 
Sum squared resid  1.01e+10  S.E. of regression  17728.09 
R-squared  0.757578  Adjusted R-squared  0.734851 
F(3, 32)  33.33374  P-value(F)  5.77e-10 
rho  0.016143  Durbin-Watson  1.925426 
 
Equation 2: KABRT_90kr 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -14718 5322.27 -2.7654 0.00936 *** 
CAB_90kr_1 0.568096 0.395788 1.4354 0.16089  
KABRT_90kr_1 -0.094715 0.198663 -0.4768 0.63677  
d_Credit_90kr_1 0.601026 0.106256 5.6564 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  13821.86  S.D. dependent var  49241.10 
Sum squared resid  1.53e+10  S.E. of regression  21877.85 
R-squared  0.819517  Adjusted R-squared  0.802597 
F(3, 32)  48.43407  P-value(F)  5.33e-12 
rho -0.064273  Durbin-Watson  2.084192 
 
All tests for normality come out normal. No autocorrelation problem is detected. 
What we can see here is a reconfirmation of the results from table 5.3: it is 
credit expansion that Granger-causes the current account to worsen, even if we 
take the capital account into the regression as well.121 Therefore we conclude 
that our hypothesis is correct: domestic credit expansion Granger-causes the 
                                            
121
 This result is concurrent with the general-to-specific methodology (J. Campos, Ericsson, & Hendry, 
2005): dropping the capital account (K) empirically simplifies the theoretical model in (3). Therefore, we 
conclude that the main driver of the current account in Iceland is not capital flows but the creation of 
credit by the banking system. It should be noted that data for net liquidation of existing savings (L) were 
not available. 
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current account to worsen – even if we look at the capital account at the same 
time as well. 
5.2.2 Domestic credit expansion and the depletion of foreign reserves 
In the wake of this finding it would be interesting to investigate whether the 
domestic credit creation causes foreign reserves to be depleted. Indeed, both 
empirical and theoretical approaches have highlighted this issue  (Cottani, 
Cavallo, & Khan, 1990; Gil-Diaz, 1998; Johnson, 1972; Mwega & Ngola, 1988). 
The IMF, in the 6th edition of its Balance of Payments Manual, (International 
Monetary Fund, 2011) notes that, according to an accounting identity, the 
following applies: 
S – I = CAB = NKF + RT 
Here, NKF is the (net) capital account transactions excluding reserves, while RT 
is “reserve transactions”, i.e. change in the (net) holdings of foreign reserves. 
Thus a current account deficit caused by credit expansion at home, whether the 
channel be reduced savings (higher consumption) or increased investment, 
must result in either a capital inflow – when the home currency is accepted by 
foreigners –  or a fall in reserves – such as when the home currency is not 
accepted by foreigners.122 
The International Monetary Fund (2011, p. 229) notes the following regarding 
the impact of what exchange rate policy is in place: 
The previously described framework for analysis of the balance of 
payments is applicable, irrespective of the exchange rate regime 
adopted by an economy. For example, if the exchange rate is 
pegged, then transactions in reserve assets will be determined by the 
net demand or supply of foreign exchange at that exchange rate (i.e., 
RT = CAB–NKF). At the other extreme, if the exchange rate 
arrangement involves a pure float so that no exchange market 
intervention takes place, then CAB = NKF. In the intermediate case of 
a managed float, purchases and sales of reserve assets are typically 
                                            
122
 See the US & China scenario, and immediate discussion after that, in 5.2.1 Domestic credit expansion 
and current account deficits for examples. 
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undertaken to achieve a desired exchange rate path for the domestic 
currency in terms of one or more foreign currencies. 
In the case of Iceland, the Icelandic krona was floated in (March) 2001. Running 
regressions regarding the impact of credit expansion on the level of foreign 
reserves would, following the remarks of IMF, not make sense over the whole 
period 1971-2007 for we should expect a break in the relationship in 2001 when 
the Icelandic krona is floated. Indeed, investigating the Granger-causality 
between credit expansion and FX changes in Iceland until and including 2007 
yields no sensible relationship at all: FX reserves go up as credit at home 
expands (table 5.5). 
Table 5.5 Credit expansion and FX changes, until 2007 
VAR system, lag order 1 
OLS estimates, observations 1972-2007 (T = 36) 
Log-likelihood = -819.77513 
Determinant of covariance matrix = 2.0613525e+017 
AIC = 45.8764 
BIC = 46.1403 
HQC = 45.9685 
Portmanteau test: LB(9) = 28.6736, df = 32 [0.6357] 
 
Equation 1: FX_90kr 
 
  
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 218.218 1637.5 0.1333 0.89479  
FX_90kr_1 -0.235481 0.1775 -1.3267 0.19373  
d_Credit_90kr_1 0.0533012 0.0156105 3.4144 0.00171 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  3056.729  S.D. dependent var  9418.100 
Sum squared resid  2.27e+09  S.E. of regression  8300.569 
R-squared  0.267622  Adjusted R-squared  0.223236 
F(2, 33)  6.029363  P-value(F)  0.005863 
rho  0.014297  Durbin-Watson  1.923911 
 
However, regressing on a sample until and including 2000 yields a relationship 
between domestic credit expansion and FX reserves that makes theoretical 
sense: FX reserves are depleted in the wake of domestic credit expansion 
(table 5.6). AIC/BIC/HQC tests point to a VAR(2) model as being the most 
appropriate one. Notice that according to the p-value of F-tests of zero 
restrictions, the d_Credit_90kr variable, i.e. credit expansion, is only significant 
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at the 90% significance level (p-value 0.0670). Residuals are normally 
distributed and no problems of autocorrelation are detected. 
 
 
 
Table 5.6 Credit expansion and FX changes, 1973-2000 
VAR system, lag order 2 
OLS estimates, observations 1973-2000 (T = 28) 
Log-likelihood = -600.61053 
Determinant of covariance matrix = 1.4676114e+016 
AIC = 43.6150 
BIC = 44.0908 
HQC = 43.7605 
Portmanteau test: LB(7) = 25.3293, df = 20 [0.1891] 
 
Equation 1: FX_90kr 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 2984.57 1570.63 1.9002 0.07001 * 
FX_90kr_1 0.216018 0.193634 1.1156 0.27612  
FX_90kr_2 -0.422322 0.203927 -2.0709 0.04977 ** 
d_Credit_90kr_1 0.037787 0.0335293 1.1270 0.27137  
d_Credit_90kr_2 -0.10021 0.0405983 -2.4683 0.02144 ** 
 
Mean dependent var  1070.285  S.D. dependent var  5384.052 
Sum squared resid  5.85e+08  S.E. of regression  5045.101 
R-squared  0.252028  Adjusted R-squared  0.121946 
F(4, 23)  1.937457  P-value(F)  0.138216 
rho  0.074812  Durbin-Watson  1.840904 
F-tests of zero restrictions: 
All lags of FX_90kr      F(2, 23) =   2.3859 [0.1144] 
All lags of d_Credit_90krF(2, 23) =   3.0465 [0.0670] 
All vars, lag 2          F(2, 23) =   3.7391 [0.0393] 
 
For the system as a whole 
Null hypothesis: the longest lag is 1 
Alternative hypothesis: the longest lag is 2 
Likelihood ratio test: Chi-square(4) = 11.8976 [0.0181] 
We therefore conclude that we have empirical signs in the case of Iceland, 
albeit perhaps weak (just below the 95% significance level), that credit 
expansion leads to depletion of foreign reserves. 
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It should be noted here that closely connected to this result is the result that 
credit expansion Granger-causes the capital account to move, see equation 2, 
table 5.4. In that regression we are using a broad definition of the capital 
account, i.e. we are including reserves (KABRT). In tables 5.5 and 5.6 we are 
specifically looking at the reserve account part of the overall capital account. 
And notice that in table 5.4 we are using the whole sample, i.e. up until and 
including the year 2007.  
This is important as it demonstrates that although credit expansion caused the 
depletion of reserves up until and including 2000, when Iceland had still not fully 
floated the Icelandic krona (as expected by the IMF), the effects of the credit 
expansion can be seen on the overall capital account over the whole time 
period, i.e. domestic credit expansion Granger-causes the net foreign liabilities 
of Iceland to increase, no matter the exchange rate policy (float or pegged). 
This, of course, is expected following Wray (2012): the domestic balance 
(income minus expenditures) is negative due to the domestic credit expansion 
and through accounting identities the foreign balance must be positive by the 
same amount. 
Net increment of foreign liabilities is, at least in the beginning, likely to be in the 
form of depletion of banks’ liquid foreign assets, since, as depicted on figure 
2.3, the payer’s bank will lose part of its (foreign currency) deposit at its 
correspondent bank when the domestic bank deposit is used to pay for imports. 
Of course, the payer’s bank might, in the wake of that, go searching for ways to 
replenish its stock of foreign-currency deposits in its correspondence bank, 
which could lead to changes in its portfolio of liquid and illiquid foreign assets 
and liabilities back to what they were before the import took place. The 
domestic bank might e.g. buy foreign currency for the domestic currency 
(reserves) or raise foreign currency through a (short term or long term) bank 
loan or other capital inflow. 
We should expect this depletion of banks’ foreign currency deposits, in the 
wake of expansion of domestic credit, to be more common in economies which 
are under the spell of The Original Sin as domestic-currency denominated 
financial liabilities are not (eagerly) sought out by foreigners. If, however, they 
241 
are, the payee’s bank (the foreign bank) would be happy to receive reserves in 
the domestic central bank instead, following the argument of Wray (2012).  
5.2.3 Domestic credit expansion and inflation 
Since credit creation is the creation of money (see chapter 2) we should not be 
surprised if credit creation predates an increase in the general price level. The 
creation of money, in one form or another, has historically been closely 
correlated with a rise in the price level, going many centuries back in time 
(Martin, 2013). One of the fundamental theories in economics, the Quantity 
Theory of Money, makes a connection between the supply of money and the 
price level, taking the volume of transactions and the velocity of money into 
account at the same time: MV=PT.123 And Friedman (1970, p. 11) famously 
concluded that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon in 
the sense that it is and can be produced only by a more rapid increase in the 
quantity of money than in output.” 
Regarding the causality between money and prices there are theoretical 
arguments for both ways. Monetarists argue that the causality runs from 
increased money supply to the price level: more money chasing the same 
amount of goods, leading to inflation. Structuralists argue that relative prices of 
goods change when the economy changes. However, some prices are 
downward inflexible. Therefore, due to this inflexibility of some prices, it is the 
flexible prices that change, driving changes in the price level which lead to 
passive responses in the money supply (Canavese, 1982). Post-Keynesians 
find the explanation for inflation in firms pricing their output according to cost 
pressures and mark-up on top of costs (Lee, 2004; Perry & Cline, 2013). If, e.g., 
the price of inputs increases firms will borrow from banks, thereby expanding 
the money supply, to finance the increased nominal cost of production (wages, 
commodity prices, cost of imported inputs, etc.) following Italian circuit theory 
(Realfonzo, 2006). Firms then pass the increased costs into the general price 
level, generally measured by the CPI. 
Monetarists’ explanations for inflation have been found to have explanation 
power in some studies (Masih & Masih, 1998; Tegene, 1989) but less so in 
                                            
123
 Werner (2005) showed that it is appropriate to break the model down to GDP-related transactions and 
non-GDP-related transactions. 
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others (Saini, 1982). The empirical record of the Post-Keynesian theory of 
mark-up pricing is strong as well (Lee, 2004). 
Again, we will rely on data from Iceland. Table 5.7 below shows the Granger-
causality regression of log-difference of expansion of domestic credit in Iceland 
and the log-difference of the Consumer Price Index. The result is that Granger-
causality runs only one way over the time period 1972-2007, i.e. from credit 
expansion onto inflation.124 No autocorrelation is in place but, mainly due to the 
extreme inflation episodes in the 1970s and 1980s, normality tests for residuals 
fails.  
Table 5.7 Credit expansion and the level of inflation 
VAR system, lag order 1 
OLS estimates, observations 1972-2007 (T = 36) 
Log-likelihood = 90.406796 
Determinant of covariance matrix = 2.258208e-005 
AIC = -4.6893 
BIC = -4.4253 
HQC = -4.5972 
Portmanteau test: LB(9) = 33.7641, df = 32 [0.3822] 
 
Equation 1: ld_CPI 
 
  
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -0.0342783 0.0260996 -1.3134 0.19812  
ld_CPI_1 0.307946 0.187377 1.6435 0.10979  
ld_Credit_kr_1 0.602173 0.186377 3.2309 0.00279 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  0.175718  S.D. dependent var  0.162059 
Sum squared resid  0.186292  S.E. of regression  0.075135 
R-squared  0.797335  Adjusted R-squared  0.785052 
F(2, 33)  64.91500  P-value(F)  3.65e-12 
rho -0.023518  Durbin-Watson  1.990867 
     
5.2.4 Domestic credit expansion and devaluation of the currency 
Finally, we will investigate whether the domestic credit expansion will lead to 
devaluations of the domestic currency. There are, again, previous arguments 
that this should be the case. Obstfeld (1982, p. 2) comments that “[d]omestic 
credit expansion... causes an incipient weakening of the exchange rate. Frankel 
                                            
124
 Note that this result supports both the monetarist and the post Keynesian view: in both cases, the 
expansion of the money supply takes place before the increase in the general price level. The results do 
not ask how that happens so they do not answer which theory (monetarists/post Keynesian) is correct. For 
yet another approach, see Werner’s (2005) Quantity Theory of Credit.  
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and Rose (1996) point out that currency crashes in emerging markets tend to 
occur when the growth of domestic credit has been high. And Cottani et al. 
(1990) show how credit expansion correlates inversely with the (real) exchange 
rate in less developed countries (LDCs), i.e. credit expansion leads to (real) 
exchange rate devaluations.  
We will, again, use Icelandic data to add to this literature. Table 5.8 shows the 
results of the Granger-causality test between the log-difference expansion of 
domestic credit and the log-difference of the (nominal) exchange rate of the 
Icelandic krona versus the US dollar over the time period 1972-2007. The 
residuals are normally distributed. No problems of autocorrelation are detected. 
Table 5.8 Credit expansion and the exchange rate 
VAR system, lag order 1 
OLS estimates, observations 1972-2007 (T = 36) 
Log-likelihood = 65.269187 
Determinant of covariance matrix = 9.1257983e-005 
AIC = -3.2927 
BIC = -3.0288 
HQC = -3.2006 
Portmanteau test: LB(9) = 30.871, df = 32 [0.5236] 
 
Equation 1: ld_USD 
 
  
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -0.134164 0.0426507 -3.1456 0.00350 *** 
ld_USD_1 -0.0369181 0.169322 -0.2180 0.82874  
ld_Credit_kr_1 0.996275 0.200196 4.9765 0.00002 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  0.119082  S.D. dependent var  0.194406 
Sum squared resid  0.465235  S.E. of regression  0.118735 
R-squared  0.648291  Adjusted R-squared  0.626975 
F(2, 33)  30.41380  P-value(F)  3.25e-08 
rho  0.044205  Durbin-Watson  1.803818 
 
We can see here that the reaction of the exchange rate of the Icelandic krona 
versus the US dollar is very closely correlated to the domestic credit expansion 
the year before. We therefore conclude that our hypothesis is correct: domestic 
credit expansion does lead to devaluations of the currency. 
We have therefore established that not only is credit expansion closely 
correlated to foreign direct investment flows, although causality there between 
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may not be always so clear, and, as Jordà et al. (2011) put it, “the single best 
predictor of financial instability” but credit expansion also Granger-causes: 
a) the current account deficit to worsen, increasing the net foreign 
liabilities of the economy, 
b) the depletion of foreign reserves, 
c) inflation to increase, and  
d) the devaluation of the domestic currency.  
It is therefore worth asking how credit expansion could be controlled in order to 
prevent these consequences, following Jorda et al and Minsky’s FIH. 
5.3 Controlling credit 
We learned in chapter 2 that banks are the main creators of credit in the 
economy. There are numerous ways to influence credit creation. Indeed, 
general bank regulation is one form of it. Via regulation governments restrict 
banks’ ability to extend credit to certain borrowers, such as those that cannot 
offer proper collateral (“Loan-to-Value” requirements) or those that otherwise 
would be “too big” borrowers for the bank (limits on single-borrower exposure). 
There are other requirements such as minimum capital requirements and 
liquidity requirements.  
Those regulation requirements, and many more, restrict banks’ ability to create 
credit, at least to some extent. We will focus on two rather specific ways to 
control credit creation, which, of course, can be looked upon as two sub-groups 
of banking regulation but would perhaps be better thought of as parts of the 
underlying institutional structure of the monetary system itself.125 Those are 
“credit controls” on one hand and a complete central bank take-over of the 
credit creation process. 
                                            
125
 Two definitions of the word ‘regulation’ (The Free Dictionary, 2014d): 1) “A principle, rule, or law 
designed to control or govern conduct.” 2) “A governmental order having the force of law. Also 
called executive order.” 
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5.3.1 Central bank credit controls 
Credit controls have many names. They have been called lending ceilings, a 
corset, credit quotas, credit framing (f. “encadrement”), credit caps (g. “Kredit-
Plafondierung”), credit planning schemes, window guidance (j. “madoguchi 
shidoo”)  and credit plans (Cull & Xu, 2003; Werner, 2002). We will mostly stick 
to “credit controls” here and onwards.  
Credit controls can be either selective or general. The former type affects the 
price, and/or quantity, of specific types of credit (e.g. trade, real-estate, exports, 
imports, consumption, etc.) while the latter are designed to influence the total 
amount of credit (Schreft, 1990). Werner (2005, p. 215) makes a similar 
compartmentalisation of credit controls into “quantitative” (“whereby the central 
bank calculates by how much total credit creation should increase in the 
economy...”) and “qualitative” (ibid):  
[W]hereby it [the central bank] decides how the increase (or 
decrease) in credit creation will be allocated across different 
industries and sectors of the economy..., while purely unproductive 
credit (for consumptive or speculative purposes) is suppressed. 
Export industries were e.g. favoured over consumption and services industries 
in Japan (Werner, 2002, 2005). The Reserve Bank of India prefers credit 
creation to the export industry rather than many other sectors (Reserve Bank of 
India, 2014).  
The central bank can also, like it did in Japan, allocate how much credit each 
bank gets to create (Werner, 2002, 2005). The severity of the execution can be 
different as well, i.e. the central bank can directly require the banks to follow the 
executive order that the credit control is or the limits can be interpreted as 
guidance only – with or without any direct implications. Indeed, “window 
guidance” (the term used for credit controls in Japan and Korea (Werner, 2002)) 
is another term for “moral suasion” which is (Investopedia, 2014):  
A persuasion tactic used by an authority (i.e. Federal Reserve Board) 
to influence and pressure, but not force, banks into adhering to policy. 
Tactics used are closed-door meetings with bank directors, increased 
severity of inspections, appeals to community spirit, or vague threats.   
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It should be noted that banks that did not follow the “window guidance” in 
Japan, i.e. over- or undershot the amount of credit to be created within a time 
period, were “punished” such as, in the case of overshooting, with a lower credit 
quota in the next period (Werner, 2002, 2005).   
Credit controls, in one form or another, have been used in many countries at 
some point in time: Japan, China, France, the UK, the US, Korea, Thailand, 
Germany, Austria, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan to name a handful 
(Werner, 2005). Many central banks abandoned, at least officially, credit 
controls after the 1970s but at least some of them were nevertheless still 
applying the instrument, largely in secrecy, although it had been officially 
abandoned (Werner, 2002, 2005). 
5.3.2 Credit controls’ pros and cons: selected issues 
First of all, credit controls allow for a control of the money supply, because 
money is credit. Credit controls can thus be used to fight inflation, perhaps 
especially when the rate of interest is low which stimulates investment and 
aggregate demand. The adoption of credit controls in America in August 1941 
was looked upon as a way of controlling inflation while the Federal Reserve was 
committed to keeping interest rates low (Schreft, 1990). Keynes had by that 
time showed how continuous and high level of employment could, and should, 
be reached through investment projects, public and private, the sustainability 
and stability of which depended on the level of long-term rate of interest: if long 
term interest rates were too high, real capital investment projects, which 
demanded labour, were unprofitable and investment depended too much on the 
volatile “animal spirits” of businessmen and their financiers (Tily, 2010). Keynes, 
in fact, considered it necessary to have and maintain a low enough rate of long-
term interest to keep employment in place, via real capital investment, and 
stave off recessions: he blamed a high rate of interest for being the principal 
cause of economic downturns (ibid). 
Credit controls are a way of keeping credit creation in the economy in check 
despite a low rate of interest and, consequently, a high demand from 
businesses for credit to finance profitable investment projects – profitable 
because interest rates are low. Through credit controls economic activity can be 
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kept at a level that is neither too high, leading to inflation and/or a credit boom, 
nor too low, leading to lack of real capital investment and unemployment. 
Via credit controls, the allocation of credit can also be affected. This would be a 
“selective” or “qualitative” version of credit controls. Credit for speculative 
purposes (purchases and sales of existing assets, such as housing) can be 
limited while credit for real economic activity (such as investment projects) can 
be favoured. The argument for this preference of credit to real economic activity 
is based on the fact that increased speculative credit can push up asset prices 
while real economic output can stay the same (Werner, 2005). Credit that is 
allocated to real economic activity, however, induces economic development via 
investment and expansion of production capabilities. Research and 
development – and the general process of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 
1934) – also needs credit. Therefore, from a social welfare point of view, credit 
to the real sector of the economy should be favoured over credit used for 
speculation purposes (Werner, 2005). Credit controls can assist in this 
allocation process.  
On the topic of credit allocation for “real economic activity” rather than 
speculation purposes with existing assets, it must be noted, however, that credit 
allocated for consumption purposes, which certainly are “real economic activity”, 
can be inflationary (Werner, 2005). Indeed, credit controls in the US after the 
Second World War, which were especially aimed at controlling consumption 
credit (Schreft, 1990), seem to have been quite effective in controlling inflation 
(see figure 5.2 and table 5.9). The only instance when inflation did not move 
favourably with the instatement of consumer credit controls was in September 
1948 when the economy was, arguably, still in post-war adjustment. 
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Figure 5.2 Inflation YoY and credit controls in the US 
 
Source: Fred Economic Data and Schreft (1990). Dashed line: consumer credit controls off; whole line: 
consumer credit controls on. See also table 5.9. 
Table 5.9 Consumer credit controls and changes in the rate of inflation 
 
The case that credit controls can control inflation is therefore appealing, 
theoretically and empirically. The use of changing the rate of interest in fighting 
inflation and speculation should also be expected to be a slow and economically 
painful process, as Keynes pointed out (Tily, 2010): employment would be 
sacrificed as real capital investments, during a time of high interest rates, were 
considered unprofitable. Indeed, as the Fed turned to the interest rate weapon 
against inflation in the early 1980s, and long term rate interest rates (adjusted 
for inflation) on US corporate debt climbed to levels not seen in half a century 
(Tily, 2010), employment fell in tandem with inflation. The Joint Economic 
Committee had the following to say regarding the use of credit controls instead 
of interest rates, as quoted by Schreft (1990, p. 27).  
The use of general interest rate increases to fight inflation is not 
neutral in its effects on the economy. It tends to fall most heavily on 
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small businessmen and on construction and other long-term 
investment and is not particularly effective in curbing speculative 
excesses. 
When businessmen begin to accumulate excess inventory because 
of anticipated price rises, or to overinvest in plant and equipment, 
their profit expectations are so high that only very large interest rate 
increases will deter them. In these sectors of the economy, interest 
rate increases may have an inflationary rather than a deflationary 
effect. On the other hand, residential construction, which we do not 
want to discourage, is hit much harder by higher rates. 
This committee believes that it would be preferable to concentrate on 
a prudent and limited restriction of consumer credit as an alternative 
to general credit restraint [i.e. higher interest rates]. Consumer credit, 
we know; is not dependent on interest costs because consumers 
think primarily in terms of the periodic payment they are required to 
make and, within broad limits, are not deterred or encouraged by 
interest rate changes. 
Credit controls, can also be used to reach special goals for the government. 
The US used them during the Second World War to support the war effort 
(Schreft, 1990). The UK did the same (Tily, 2010). The government of China 
uses, via “credit plans”, the financial system to support the state sector (Brandt 
& Zhu, 2001) and the Reserve Bank of India uses credit controls to get banks, 
foreign banks included, to direct credit to sectors that are earmarked as “Priority 
Sectors” (including, as of 1 February, 2014: agriculture, micro and small 
enterprises, education, housing, and exports (Reserve Bank of India, 2014)). 
However, despite the appealing case that credit controls are a prime way of 
managing the economy, they are not flawless.  
First, most obvious and most important, is that the central bank, or whatever 
public body it is that decides their amount and/or allocation, can, bluntly put, 
mess them up. In Japan, where credit controls were used to reach “suitable” 
nominal economic growth targets (Werner, 2002, 2005), the central bank 
practically forced the banks to pump out the credit that created the bubble that 
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collapsed in the early 1990s. Werner (2002, p. 127), interviewing a bank officer 
of a commercial bank in Japan, writes (italic text in brackets added):  
In the bubble period, we wanted a certain amount [of loan increases], 
but the Bank of Japan wanted us to use more than that. After 1985, 
the Bank of Japan said, ‘use more!’. Normally, we would not get as 
much as we want to use... Especially in 1986 and 1987, for about one 
year, the Bank of Japan said, ‘please use more, because we have a 
recession’ [compared, presumably, to the “suitable” nominal growth 
rate that the BOJ wanted to reach: real economic growth in Japan 
was 6.3%; 2,8%; 4.1%; 7.1% in 1985-1988, according to OECD 
figures]... Window guidance can be used not just to make borrowing 
smaller, but also to make it bigger. We [at the bank] actually thought, 
this is a little bit much. 
And the results (Werner, 2002, pp. 143-144, italics added): 
Many commentators have blamed banks and their leading executives 
for the creation of the bubble of the 1980s (and thus also for Japan’s 
deep recession of the 1990s). However, in this paper it has been 
established that the true culprit were the extra-legal credit controls 
(whose existence the Bank of Japan denies). The problem was not 
that bank lending was out of control. To the contrary, it was controlled 
almost perfectly by the Bank of Japan’s window guidance. Instead, 
the problem was the policy taken by the Bank of Japan in setting 
those loan-growth quotas. Because the Bank of Japan chose far 
larger quotas than banks thought necessary, compliance with window 
guidance meant that banks were forced to peddle their loans to real 
estate speculators. The Bank of Japan was aware that its credit 
controls were sharply raising the allocation of new money to the real 
estate sector, thus pushing up real estate prices.  
Clearly, the window guidance loan quotas set by the Bank of Japan 
were inappropriate, if the policy was to avoid a major banking and 
economic crisis.  
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There are administrative costs of implementing credit controls as well. Werner 
describes, in the case of Japan (see Werner (2002, p. 114) and also Werner 
(2005, p. 269)): “Once the banks had submitted detailed lending plans, the 
Bank of Japan would analyse them according to the use of the loans, such as 
by sector of the economy or by size of company.” Surely, this process is not 
free-of-charge when it comes to manpower. This manpower could find more 
productive ways for its labour and is also likely to be excellently paid, since such 
lending-plans screening positions would not be for an uneducated individual. It 
is therefore not unreasonable to think that the overhead and administrative 
costs for the public body to maintain and execute so detailed credit controls can 
be noticeable. 
Then there is the threat of too much connection between politicians and 
businessmen, something that was identified as one of the reasons for the 
financial crisis in Iceland in 2008 (Special Investigation Committee, 2010b). The 
threat is obvious: a politician or a bureaucrat that is connected to the decision 
about how much credit should be created and allocated is in a prime position to 
funnel it to his companions or related parties in the business world, giving them 
an unfair access to credit and thereby a favourable position to profit. The case 
of Iceland shows that this is not restricted to an institutional organisation where 
banks get orders from a public body about how much and where to they should 
allocate credit: banks in Iceland did not get any direct orders from a public body 
about the amount or the allocation of credit and yet the close connection 
between politicians and businessmen proved to be a problem. But introducing a 
direct chain of command – from a public body straight to the banks – where 
decisions regarding the amounts and the allocations of credit are conveyed 
from bureaucrats to bank officers certainly does not make things any better than 
they were, and perhaps still are, in Iceland. In this respect, it should be noted 
that one of the arguments against credit controls in the US in 1969 was that the 
legislation behind them “granted the President and the Board [of the Federal 
Reserve] almost dictatorial power over credit use” and that the outcome of the 
bill would be “a complete credit police state” (Schreft, 1990, pp. 27, 28). 
5.3.3 Official take-over of credit creation (“debt-free money”) 
The idea with debt free money is the following: “money does not need to be 
loaned into circulation, but can equally be spent into circulation free of interest 
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and redemption, i.e. debt free” (Huber, 2014, p. 41, emphasis added). 126, 127 
Today, the creation of money is, mostly, via the creation of credit by banks (see 
chapter 2). Monetary reform initiatives, such as Positive Money in the UK, the 
American Monetary Institute, Monetary Modernisation in Switzerland and the 
Better Monetary System (i. Betra Peningakerfi) in Iceland would however like to 
separate the creation of money and credit creation in the economy (ibid):  
Banks should be free enterprises, but must not have the privilege to 
create themselves the money on which they operate. Control of the 
quantity of money is the responsibility of a state authority (e.g. central 
bank, treasury, currency commission). 
The crux of idea is that the “central bank, treasury [or a] currency commission”, 
following Huber, should be the only identity that creates credit, applicable as 
money, in the economy (and remember from chapter 2 that the state decides 
what money is by deciding what it accepts as a payment for taxes). This created 
credit is then made available to the state which then spends it, rather than 
lending it (like banks do today), into circulation via government expenditures of 
all sorts: wages, investment, consumption, defence, etc. However, contrary to 
the case when money is lent into circulation, there is no obligation for the state 
to repay this money to the central bank, or the institution that creates this credit. 
Therefore, the creation of new money, and the resulting state-expenditure of 
that money, is “debt-free” for the state, hence Huber’s words: “money...free of 
interest and redemption, i.e. debt free”. 
How this would show up on the state’s and the central bank’s books can either 
be in the form of equity or as a perpetual loan, bearing no interest and no 
repayment obligation (see Jackson and Dyson (2012) and Jackson (2013)). 
                                            
126
 The work and the proposals of Positive Money will be extensively used and relied upon here as a 
representative of the debt-free money proposals. It is not the plan here to make an extensive literature 
review of every debt-free money proposal that has been put forward. It should be noted here, in the spirit 
of academic transparency, that the current author has, informally and without recompense, assisted and 
been in touch with Betra Peningakerfi in Iceland. 
127
 “Credit” and “debt” are not the same. “Credit” is related to trust, a “reputation for solvency and 
integrity entitling a person to be trusted in buying or borrowing” (The Free Dictionary, 2014a). Credit is 
“a sum of money or equivalent purchasing power, as at a shop, available for a person's use” (ibid) and it is 
“the sum of money that a bank makes available to a client in excess of any deposit” (ibid). “Debt”, 
however, is “something that is owed” (The Free Dictionary, 2014b), it is “an obligation or liability to pay 
or render something to someone else” (ibid). 
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Banks would, as Huber points out, still be around as “free enterprises”. They 
would have two main purposes.  
The first one is that they would collect savings from the public and lend them 
back into circulation, mostly according to their own opinion regarding the 
creditworthiness of the prospective borrowers: the public body does not, in the 
spirit of banks being “free enterprises”, interfere with how banks allocate loans, 
financed with ex-ante savings only, to their borrowers.128 Banks would cease 
being creators of credit – only the public body (the central bank) would have 
that role – and “they will have to find the money they need to make loans before 
they make them. Banks will thus become true intermediaries, merely 
transferring pre-existing purchasing power from savers to borrowers” (Jackson 
& Dyson, 2012, p. 265). Banks, operating in a competitive market, would use 
interest rates, and promises of lending the funds to certain sectors that 
individual savers might prefer over others, to attract savers in order to have 
funds to lend out to prospective borrowers: “[t]he price of money – the interest 
rate – will be set by the market” (ibid, p. 266). The central bank would stop 
using interest rates to influence the economy but instead make decisions on 
how much (debt-free) money should be created, giving the government the 
power to spend that money into circulation (Jackson & Dyson, 2012). The 
decisions regarding how much money should be created and how it should be 
allocated (spent) into circulation would be independent of each other: an 
independent monetary committee (the Money Creation Committee, MCC) would 
decide how much money should be created and simply allow the government, 
democratically elected or not, to spend that amount into the economy however it 
wanted to (ibid).  
The second main purpose of banks in the reformed system would be to fulfil 
their current role as intermediaries in the payment system. In a reformed 
system, where banks do not create any credit at all, the public would make a 
choice between how much money it would have in accounts accessible at all 
times (called “Transaction Accounts” (Jackson & Dyson, 2012) or “sight deposit” 
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 However, the public, assumingly so, could (Jackson & Dyson, 2012, p. 262): “Individuals and 
organisations would have a choice over how the money that they save is to be used. For example, each 
bank would provide a range of Investment Accounts [from where funds for lending came from] with 
different interest rates and risks attached to them... As a result, the investment decisions of banks would 
start to reflect the investment priorities of society.” 
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accounts (Huber & Robertson, 2000)) and in another type of accounts meant for 
long-term saving (“Investment Accounts” (Jackson & Dyson, 2012)  or “savings” 
accounts (Huber & Robertson, 2000)) where the money would only be 
accessible after an agreed-upon delay of the initial deposit, i.e. it would be 
illiquid. When making a payment, a transfer would be made from the payer’s 
Transaction/sight deposit account to the payee’s similar account. Banks would 
still be intermediaries of these payments. Importantly, banks would not be able 
to use funds in Transaction/sight deposit accounts for lending but only the 
money that had been deposited in Investment/savings accounts. Or as Huber 
and Robertson (2000, p. 38) explain (emphasis added):  
...[debt-free money] reform will mean that money held by bank customers 
in their sight deposit accounts (i.e. as part of the pool of plain money 
consisting of sight deposits and cash) will clearly remain their money and 
not the banks’. The banks will hold it for them as their agents, for 
safekeeping and as a basis for providing them with cash and payment 
services. But the banks will not be able to use it for their own business 
purposes, e.g. in order to lend it to someone else, unless they have 
explicitly borrowed it from their customers. Borrowing it from their 
customers will involve transferring the plain money from customers’ 
current accounts to the bank itself, in exchange for equivalent deposits in 
savings accounts or other similar accounts. Those deposits in savings 
accounts will not be money itself; they will represent claims on the part of 
customers to be repaid the money that the bank has borrowed from them. 
Debt-free money issuance – in the sense that the state is not obliged to repay 
anything at all – has historical examples. Werner (2005, p. 166) quotes Marco 
Polo as he describes how Kublai Khan created his own debt-free money and 
spent it into circulation: “With this currency he [the Khan] orders all payments to 
be made throughout every province and kingdom and region of his empire... 
And all the Khan’s armies are paid with this sort of money.” The Treasury of the 
US issued its own US dollar notes under executive order No. 11,110, signed by 
Kennedy (Werner, 2005).  The Chinese, long before Kublai Khan (b. 1215, d. 
1294), and Kennedy, had applied the creation and the expenditure of money in 
a similar way. They researched monetary theory, in the fourth century BC, and 
reached the conclusion that money was a “tool” of the sovereign and that the 
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sovereign body should retain absolute and exclusive control over that tool 
(Martin, 2013) Their conclusion was (Martin, 2013, loc. 1243):  
If anyone else in the kingdom [than the sovereign] was able to issue 
money then they would arrogate to themselves control over the value 
of the [money] standard, and usurp part of the sovereign’s power.  
Of course, this is very similar to what Huber writes, previously quoted: “[The] 
[c]ontrol of the quantity of money is the responsibility of a state authority.” 
5.3.4 Debt-free money’s pros and cons: selected issues 
The most obvious positive of a debt-free money system is increased 
seigniorage. In fact, all new money created and spent into circulation would be 
seigniorage. This could greatly increase this source of income for the 
government and could lead to lower taxes and/or increased government 
expenditures in e.g. public investment projects, social security projects or 
whatever the government wanted to spend it on (Jackson & Dyson, 2012). 
Seigniorage would again become an important source of revenue for the 
government, similar to how seigniorage was an important source of revenue for 
sovereigns in the past (see Martin (2013) on that topic). 
A second pro of debt-free money, according to its supporters, is lower debt-
burden for the government, if the government chooses to use the newly created 
money to pay down the national debt (Jackson, 2013; Jackson & Dyson, 2012), 
and lower need for government borrowing (Jackson & Dyson, 2012; Huber & 
Robertson, 2000), which could even lead to no government debt at all (Huber & 
Robertson, 2000). If national debt is lower taxes can be lower. Net after-tax 
incomes for households and businesses will consequently improve. It should be 
noted, however, that in an economy that has its own sovereign currency as a 
legal tender, the government cannot default on nominal payments except by 
choice (Wray, 2012)129 The sovereign power in such an economy can always 
“afford” to spend whatever amount of money it wishes to, although it is not 
necessarily economically wise to do so: inflation might go up, foreign reserves 
may be depleted and the exchange rate might fall or even crash (Wray, 2012). 
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 Jackson and Dyson (2012) recognise this, see Appendix II in their work. 
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Improved control over the total money supply in the economy is another feasible 
facet of debt-free money (Jackson & Dyson, 2012). If the central bank is the 
only body in the economy that decides how much money should be created the 
control of the money supply, which, today, consists mostly of credit created by 
banks, is greatly improved. This should assist the public body to better influence 
inflation and stave off credit-fuelled asset booms. This positive feature is shared 
with that of credit controls. 
A problem of debt-free money, however, is the threat of lack of savings to be 
lent by banks into the economy. If savers do not want to put money into 
investment accounts at banks, for one reason or another (they do not trust 
them, the rate of interest is not high enough, etc.) there can be a lack of savings 
in the economy to finance planned investment projects. The accounting identity 
S=I will still be in effect but rather than investment leading and causing savings, 
like Keynes pointed out was the actual case in an economy where banks create 
credit applicable as money (Tily, 2010), it will be savings that lead investments: 
the prerequisite of banks being able to lend is that they manage to collect 
savings into their Investment accounts. If those (particular type of) savings are 
in short supply, “loanable funds” for investment will be low as well, leading to 
low investment in the economy and consequently lack of labour demand from 
real capital investors. Today, banks create the credit, and money, needed for 
the investor, without any ex ante savings (ibid, see also chapter 2). 
This is a criticism that has been responded to by supporters of adopting debt-
free money (see e.g. Jackson and Dyson (2012)). However, the solution to the 
problem that is proposed by supporters of debt-free money has nothing to with 
debt-free money, spent into circulation, but with credit controls, quantitative, 
qualitative, decided and forced by the MCC, where the money is lent into 
circulation (Jackson & Dyson, 2012, p. 214, emphasis added): 
After the reform the Money Creation Committee will also be tasked 
with ensuring that businesses in the real (non-financial) economy 
have an adequate access to credit...  For example, the MCC may 
decide... to lend some newly created money to banks, with the 
restriction that the banks can only lend this money to businesses that 
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contribute to GDP (i.e. it cannot be lent for financial speculation, 
consumer finance or mortgages)...  
Another problem with debt-free money is that it does not ensure that money is 
primarily allocated to real economic activity, even with credit controls similar to 
those proposed by Jackson and Dyson (2012). The reason is simple: credit 
controls are only to be imposed on funds that are lent to the commercial banks 
from the central bank, not on funds that banks manage to gather from savers in 
the economy.  
It is easy to reason why banks would choose to finance loans meant for 
“financial speculation, consumer finance or mortgages” rather than real 
economic activity.  
The first reason is that loans to finance “financial speculation, consumer finance 
or mortgages” could be less risky and/or more profitable than loans to the real 
economy. Mortgages have a high-grade collateral while a loan meant to finance 
entrepreneurial activity might not, which is exactly one of the reasons why it is 
hard for entrepreneurs with an idea but no or limited collateral to get credit to 
finance their idea in the first place: they are screened away from the pool of 
potential borrowers. Getting collateral is a part of banks’ screening process of 
potential borrowers as it reduces the adverse selection problem faced by the 
banks (a borrower that provides high-grade collateral is less likely to run away 
from repayments than somebody that provides no collateral and only an idea). 
Short term lending to finance consumer expenditure can also be a very lucrative 
business, as profits from such loans can be high due to “stratospheric” interest 
rates: Wonga is a case in point (Barrow, 2013). 
A second reason is that commercial banks would expect the central bank to 
step in and provide them with credit meant for real economic activity even if 
they were not lending to such activities from their own funds, borrowed via 
Investment accounts. Why would the central bank step in? Because there would 
be enormous political, statutory and professional pressure on the MCC 
members to create and supply the banks with credit meant for real economic 
activity (other than consumer finance, which, as we have already established, 
can be inflationary). Politicians in power would be looking at the real economy 
slowing down in front of their noses, and apply pressures on the MCC to do 
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something, i.e. lend the banks some credit so they can lend it out into the 
economy – or give politicians the money to spend it into the economy. From the 
professional and statutory points of view, who would like to be a member of an 
MCC that was responsible for a lack of credit in the economy when that same 
MCC, according to statute, “will also be tasked with ensuring that businesses in 
the real (non-financial) economy have an adequate access to credit” (Jackson & 
Dyson, p. 214)? That same person would not only be remembered as a 
professional failure, hence the professional pressure,130 but from a statutory 
point of view this is comparable with the thought that a central bank, in today’s 
monetary system, can decide to not supply a banking system in need of 
reserves with reserves. No central bank would ever do that for it is central 
banks’ statutory obligation to maintain liquidity in the financial system, see 2.1.2 
On money, credit and banks. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that an MCC, 
“tasked with ensuring that businesses in the real... economy have an adequate 
access to credit” would not be under serious pressure to increase credit in the 
economy by creating and supplying it to the banks. 
Certainly, the MCC members could point out that the banks were not lending to 
real economic activity from their own Investment-account borrowed funds in 
order to cast the spotlight on the banks rather than themselves or the 
government in power. But there is no definite certainty that this would discipline 
the banks to lend to real economic activities if other types of lending is less risky 
and/or more profitable and they know that if they hold out the MCC will cave in 
and lend them the credit: a ‘game of chicken’ could develop where the MCC 
could easily lose to the banks due to the pressures aforementioned.  
Of course, banks would be more likely to lend to real economic activity if they 
were given an executive order by the MCC to do so. Threats and other “window 
guidance” (i.e. “moral suasion”) could also be applied by the MCC. But that 
would be credit controls, qualitative or quantitative, imposed on top of a debt-
free money system where money was spent and not lent into the economy. And 
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 Davíð Oddsson, the now-former governor of the Central Bank of Iceland during the financial crisis in 
2008, who also served as the longest-serving prime minister of Iceland (from 1991 to 2004) and the 
foreign minister (from 2004 to 2005) before becoming the governor of the Central Bank, is still today, in 
2014, remember as the man who stood watch when the crisis set in and, at least by some, blamed for it. 
One of the targets of the Central Bank of Iceland is to maintain financial stability. 
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according to the proposals, banks are meant to be “free enterprises” in the 
reformed system so this is not suggested in the first place. 
There is, therefore, no guarantee, whatsoever, that banks, in a “laissez-faire” 
debt-free money system, would prefer to lend money gathered via their 
Investment accounts to real economic activities rather than “financial 
speculation, consumer finance or mortgages”. And even with credit controls 
imposed as Jackson and Dyson (2012) propose, this still might not be the case. 
Closely connected to this issue is the potential problem regarding the rate of 
interest in a debt-free money system. The rate of interest in the economy is set 
by the public’s liquidity preference (Keynes, 1936). According to the theory, the 
rate of interest is determined by the demand and supply of money as a store of 
value. The liquidity preference depends to a large extent on the optimism of 
savers regarding the uncertain future that they face. If a saver is optimistic 
about the uncertain future he feels secure enough to demand a low amount of 
money, the liquid asset, as a store of value and he will instead invest his 
savings in an illiquid form: his liquidity preference is low. In a debt-free money 
system, this would mean, given a high-enough interest rate to compensate for 
departing with liquidity, that he would deposit a proportion of his savings in an 
illiquid Investment account of his choosing. This would mean savings available 
for lending. If, however, the saver is pessimistic or insecure about his future he 
will have the tendency to choose money, a highly liquid asset, as a store of 
value, and not an illiquid Investment account, in order to be able to meet 
unforeseen expenditures in the future. This translates into a high liquidity 
preference and, in a debt-free money system, a lower supply of available funds 
at the given interest rate than if the liquidity preference of the saver were low. 
In order to attract funds the banks may offer a higher rate of interest since, as 
Keynes (1936) pointed out, the rate of interest is the price to depart with 
liquidity, which is “the instant command over sums of money” (Skidelsky, 2010, 
p. 92). And in the debt-free money system “[t]he price of money – the interest 
rate – will be set by the market” (Jackson & Dyson, 2012, p. 266, emphasis 
added). But a higher rate of interest will impair the level of investment and with it 
the level of employment. A lower level of employment will increase the 
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insecurity of workers which increases their liquidity preference making the 
problem worse still: a vicious cycle sets in.  
In other words, the rate of interest and the level of investment may not be “self-
adjusting” towards the “optimum” level as Keynes pointed out:131 a sub-optimal 
equilibrium in the economy, where interest rates, due to a high liquidity 
preference of savers, are too high to maintain a stable and a high level of 
employment, can develop and permanently set in. Or in Tily’s (2010, p. 147, 
underlining added) words:  
...Keynes saw a free-market economy as a multiple-equilibrium 
system... [T]his meant that not only the short-run equilibrium but also 
the long-run equilibrium of an economy could be at any level of 
employment. 
And (Tily, 2010, p. 149, underlining added): 
In logical terms, the saving–investment identity dismisses the 
classical theory of interest and, as Keynes put it in 1937, leaves the 
rate of interest ‘in the air’ (CW XIV, p. 212). An alternative theory of 
interest is, therefore, required. His [liquidity preference] theory put 
credit to one side and gave centre stage to phenomena arising from 
the use of money as a store of value. Analysis of these phenomena 
led Keynes to his conclusion that there was no reason that the rate of 
interest prevailing in a free-market economy should be the rate 
appropriate for full employment. 
The logical conclusion of the General Theory was that the central bank should 
take control of the rate of interest, both the long-term and the short-term rate of 
interest (Tily, 2010). This is in stark contrast with the image that debt-free 
money supporters draw. Jackson and Dyson (2012, p. 251, italics added) write: 
In the reformed system the interest rate will be determined by the 
market rather than being manipulated by the central bank in an 
attempt to control the lending decisions by banks and therefore the 
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 Keynes, as quoted by Tily (2010, p. 136-137), wrote: “[T]he weight of my criticism is directed against 
the inadequacy of the theoretical foundations of the laissez-faire doctrine upon which I was brought up 
and which for many years I taught; – against the notion that the rate of interest and the volume of 
investment are self-adjusting at the optimum level...”. 
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business cycle. As a result the interest charged on loans will reflect 
the real time preferences of society as a whole: if society wishes on 
aggregate to defer consumption to a future period (i.e. save), the rate 
of interest will be low as individuals will place more of their money 
into Investment Accounts. Likewise, production should increase as 
more business investment takes place, ensuring that the economy as 
a whole can satisfy the demand for increased future consumption. 
Conversely, if individuals prefer to consume now, the rate of interest 
will be high, and consequently less investment will be undertaken. In 
such a system the rate of interest and the quantity of funds in 
Investment Accounts, which is determined by individuals’ preferences 
for present or future consumption (spending vs. saving), determines 
the amount of investment, so matching future demand for goods to 
future levels of production.  
This passage deserves some vitally important comments. We will highlight two. 
First, Jackson and Dyson assume that deferred consumption, i.e. savings, will 
predominately or entirely end up in Investment accounts: “...the quantity of 
funds in Investment Accounts, which is determined by individuals’ preferences 
for present or future consumption (spending vs. saving)...” Yet, as Keynes 
pointed out (Tily, 2010), the act of saving is a two-decision process: first, one 
decides how much one saves (or, equivalently, spends), i.e. how much of one’s 
income one does not use for spending. Second, that deferred spending, i.e. 
savings, can either be saved in a liquid form or an illiquid form. Keynes’s own 
words were without a doubt (Keynes, 1936, p. 108, italics added): 
It should be obvious that the rate of interest cannot be a return to 
saving or waiting as such. For if a man hoards his savings in cash, he 
earns no interest though he saves just as much as before. On the 
contrary, the mere definition of the rate of interest tells us in so many 
words that the rate of interest is the reward for parting with liquidity for 
a specified period...  
Thus the rate of interest at any time, being the reward for parting with 
liquidity, is a measure of the unwillingness of those who possess 
money to part with their liquid control over it. The rate of interest is 
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not the 'price' which brings into equilibrium the demand for resources 
to invest with the readiness to abstain from present consumption. It is 
the 'price' which equilibrates the desire to hold wealth in the form of 
cash with the available quantity of cash... 
This is why the demand and the supply of money, as a liquid store of value, are 
important according to the liquidity theory of interest. There is nothing that says 
that I, as a saver, will choose to store all my savings in an illiquid Investment 
Account as Jackson and Dyson seem to be assuming in the quoted passage. It 
would, in fact, be highly unlikely that I would choose to do so as I would demand 
liquidity (money) for four motives: transaction, precautionary, speculative 
(Keynes, 1936) and finance motives (see Wray (1992), also 2.1.2 On money, 
credit and banks). If my liquidity preference is high I will demand a high rate of 
interest, according to Keynes’s liquidity preference theory, to part with my ability 
to spend my savings whenever I want or may need to. Parting with this ability to 
spend my savings is exactly what I would do when I deposited my savings in an 
Investment account compared to depositing them in a Transaction account. 
Therefore, savings will also be deposited in Transaction accounts, depending 
on how liquid savers will want to be. But savings in Transaction accounts will 
not be available for lending according to the Positive Money proposal. It is 
therefore the liquidity preference of savers and not their “real time preference” 
that determines the supply of “loanable funds” in Investment accounts. 
Second, according to Keynes, the level of investment was not just determined 
by the rate of interest, and available funding, but by the Marginal Efficiency of 
Capital (MEC), which “reflects businesses’ expectations of the yield on 
investment in an uncertain future” (Tily, 2010, p. 150) as well. Simply put: if the 
MEC is considered, subject to e.g. businesses’ “animal spirits”, to be higher 
than the rate of interest, businesses would like to invest in real capital. But the 
MEC is greatly influenced by aggregate demand for it influences how 
businesses make cash-flow expectations about the uncertain future and 
therefore the yield of investment.  
So when Jackson and Dyson write that (italics added) “if society wishes on 
aggregate to defer consumption to a future period (i.e. save), the rate of interest 
will be low... [l]ikewise, production should increase as more business 
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investment takes place” they are applying a ceteris paribus assumption by 
looking past the effects of deferred consumption – less cash-flows – on the 
MEC and consequently investment: deferred consumption constitutes lower 
cash flows for businesses which decreases the MEC which lowers the 
investment demand which lowers the demand for labour which decreases 
workers’ wage incomes. 
One solution proposed by debt-free money supporters to this potential vicious 
cycle of lack of loanable funds, low investment, low employment, high liquidity 
preference and a high rate of interest, has already been introduced: credit 
controls (Jackson & Dyson, 2012, p. 268, emphasis added): 
If there were a shortage of funds across the entire banking system, 
particularly for lending to businesses that contribute to GDP, the Bank 
of England would possibly opt to auction newly created money to the 
banks, on the provision that they are on lent into the real economy 
(i.e. to non-financial businesses...) 
We have already discussed how banks would be able to effectively force the 
central bank to provide them with credit that is meant to be lent into the real 
economy by simply lending their own Investment-account borrowed funds to 
other activities and wait for the Bank to step in and provide credit. Again, there 
is no certainty that banks will prefer this type of lending to other types of lending 
that does not directly end in the real economy, i.e. “financial speculation, 
consumer finance or mortgages” (ibid, p. 214). 
Another proposal, and following “Keynesian” arguments about the maintenance 
of aggregate demand in the economy, would be public deficit-spending. This 
would, in all likelihood, decrease the rate of interest somewhat since;  
a) demand for money as a store of value would decrease due to a higher 
employment level in the wake of debt-free deficit spending, decreasing 
uncertainties about a potential job loss in the future and thereby providing 
workers with more secure employment and income levels, lowering their 
liquidity preference; and  
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b) the supply of money – a liquid store of value – would increase as more 
money would be spent into the economy by the government.  
Both a) and b) would, according to the liquidity preference theory of rate of 
interest, push the rate of interest downwards.  
But debt-free public deficit spending is a prime chance for bankers and 
politicians to make a deal about how to share the rents of debt-free deficit 
spending: bankers could agree to channel credit to particular politically 
preferable borrowers or constituencies and the politicians would make sure that 
deficit expenditures, financed with debt-free money, would secure cash flows 
needed to pay for the credit, plus interests, from the banks. This deal-making 
between politicians and bankers has happened before and can happen under 
any political regime at all, democracy or autocracy, and have all sorts of 
questionable effects: it can constrain competition, lead to taxpayer-financed 
subsidies, higher leverage of banks, less access to credit – unless you know the 
right people – and higher interest rates on loans (Calomiris & Haber, 2014). If 
this is realised, the possible effects of a) and b) here above are counteracted. 
Finally, it is possible that under a debt-free money system the rate of interest 
could fluctuate, even violently. Fluctuations in the interest rate make planning, 
including investment planning, about the uncertain future difficult as cash flows 
due to credit and interest rate costs become hard to estimate. 
Why would the rate of interest fluctuate? Because it is “set by the market”. 
Keynes pointed out that the rate of interest under a free market was bound to 
fluctuate, depending on the liquidity preference of the public and the supply of 
money as a store of value at each point in time (Tily, 2010). No system 
mechanism to meet any fluctuations in the liquidity preference of the public, 
such as Keynes’s debt management program in the 1930s, is provided.132 In 
fact, the supply of new liquidity (money) into the monetary system is, under the 
proposal of Positive Money, dependent on the current rate of inflation, and not 
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 For more on Keynes’s debt management policy, see the work of Tily (2006). 
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unemployment or the liquidity preference of the public (Jackson & Dyson, 
2012). 133  
We therefore conclude that debt-free money has some serious flaws, most 
notably the risk of high and fluctuating rate of interest, possible lack of private 
investment and high and/or fluctuating level of employment.  
A Suggestion, Part II: The OERS monetary system 
5.4 Introduction 
So far, some of the issues we have inspected and/or established throughout 
this whole work are the following: 
- FDI flows and stocks have grown significantly in the last decades. The 
effects of this development on the economy are disputed (Chapter 1). 
Nevertheless, FDI can potentially have – with some notable limitations – 
generally a positive impact on GDP growth (Chapter 1). 
- FDI flows are preferable – albeit not perfect – over “hot money flows” to 
finance current account deficits. FDI can complement or substitute those 
flows (Chapter 1).  
- Banking and financial services are the centre of the credit-driven 
economy as they act as intermediaries and creators of purchasing 
power. FDI in financial services can have several causes and effects, 
some welcome – such as distribution of risk, development of financial 
infrastructure and financial services and increased availability of credit – 
and some not – such as the risk of credit booms and the establishment of 
a link that financial instability can travel by internationally (Chapter 2). 
- FDI can have implications for the level of financial stability in the 
economy (Chapters 1 and 2). 
- Financial instability can be quantified using Minsky’s Financial Instability 
Hypothesis. Maintaining financial stability is important to support the 
long-term growth prospects of the economy (Chapter 3).   
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 Inflation may not be the ultimate target (Jackson & Dyson, p. 204): “...in line with democratic 
principles, if Parliament deems targets other than price stability to be more desirable, it will have the 
ability to change the MCC’s mandate.” Of course, this opens the MCC up for many possible political 
pressures which will not be discussed further here. 
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- Some of the deciding factors about the level of financial stability in the 
economy are the level and expansion of debt, the rate of interest, the 
supply of liquidity in the economy, the external balance of the economy, 
the real exchange rate, profitability of companies, cash-flow coverage of 
debt burden and response of the government’s expenditures to slack in 
the economy to sustain cash flows (Chapters 3 and 4). 
- The empirical record shows that inward FDI flows can have a negative 
effect on financial stability (Chapter 4). Financial instability can also 
cause economic growth to suffer (Chapter 4).  
- Credit expansion is not only, according to Minsky, a theoretical cause of 
but has also been, empirically, “the single best predictor of financial 
instability” (Jordà, Schularick, & Taylor, 2011, p. 340).134 We have also 
seen that credit expansion can be highly correlated with, and even 
caused and/or supported by, FDI inflows (Chapter 5). 
In the wake of this we discussed two ways of controlling credit expansion: credit 
controls and debt-free (sovereign) money. We, however, saw that those two 
ways of containing the credit expansion are somewhat lacking, at least certainly 
not flawless.  
In the light of the previous work the current author would like to make the 
following suggestion regarding possible changes to the monetary system with 
the aim of maintaining financial stability while still allowing or even encouraging 
FDI and other long-term international capital flows. The kernel of the suggestion 
is to follow the empirically observed effects of credit expansion and design the 
system in such a way that an internal operatus will automatically respond to 
those observed effects of credit expansion. As such, it is a suggestion in the 
spirit of post-Keynesian economic theory: relevant and representing reality as 
observed (see Arestis (1996)). 
Banks are still allowed to create credit. Debt-financed investment can therefore 
take place without ex-ante savings. However, certain credit controls, which are 
both quantitative and qualitative in nature, are applied and enforced to give the 
banks profit incentives to create and allocate credit to entrepreneurial and other 
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 To mention a specific case, Werner (2005, p. 232) finds the cause of the Japanese asset bubble in the 
1990s being excessive credit creation within the banking system for non-GDP-related transactions 
(speculation), 
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real-economy purposes such that economic goals, decided by the government, 
are reached. The suggestion here assumes that the economic goals are a 
stable, yet flexible, nominal exchange rate and a low level of the “misery 
index”,135 i.e. simultaneously low inflation and unemployment.  
As an additional incentive for the banks to efficiently create and allocate credit 
the government is encouraged, within limits, to deficit-spend money into 
circulation: if banks fail to reach the economic goals via their foreign exchange 
market and credit-creation activities the government, given a green light from an 
independent Monetary Creation Committee (a term coming from Jackson and 
Dyson (2012)), should be encouraged to create the credit needed itself and 
spend it into circulation with the aim of reaching the economic goals. The 
government, as the issuer of the legal tender and the political authority which 
decides the taxes that drive the currency’s worth (see chapter 2), can pay 
whatever rate of interest it chooses for this type of credit creation – including 
0%, which, after all, is the “natural” base rate of interest (Forstater & Mosler, 
2005). 
We will see later how exactly it will be a profit incentive for the banks to make 
sure this deficit-spending of the government does not happen but the crux of the 
reason is the following: deficit-spending by the government causes depletion of 
foreign reserves which is exactly the liquid asset that the banks’ credit-creation 
capabilities hinge on. 
Via the economic goals the banks will also have a profit incentive to adjust the 
exchange rate towards its “optimal level” so that the economy is close to being 
in balance on the current account while maintaining a low misery index at home. 
Foreign capital will be free to flow in and out of the economy but domestic 
banks, being important intermediaries between foreign and domestic parties 
(see Chapter 2), will have an incentive to primarily induce long-term foreign 
capital flows rather than short-term capital flows. In other words, long-term flows 
such as FDI and long-term portfolio flows will be preferred, due to banks’ profit 
incentives, to short-term and more unstable foreign capital flows. 
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 Also known as the Economic Discomfort Index, coined by Arthur Okun (Welsch, 2007). 
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It is the hope of the author that the system in question can join the pros of credit 
controls with the pros of “debt-free” money while still accommodating for the 
positive potentials that capital flows, in particular long-term ones, can offer. The 
outcome, it is hoped, is a monetary system:  
- where neither too much nor too little credit is created 
- where created credit is allocated towards real economic 
development rather than speculation and/or Ponzi finances 
- where the domestic economy is in or close to a balance with other 
foreign economies and where the nominal exchange is stable yet 
flexible 
- where capital flows are possible but preferences are given to more 
stable and economically favourable long-term flows. 
As such, the proposed system is a natural outcome from the research in 
the previous chapters: if focuses on maintaining financial stability while 
allowing for capital flows which can bring on added economic benefits for 
the world but can also exacerbate the boom-bust cycle in economic 
growth. This includes FDI in the financial sector. The approach here is 
post-Keynesian in nature: “the starting point of theory [is] the nature of the 
real world” (Dow, 2001, p. 12) since we begin by observing empirical facts 
regarding FDI, credit expansion and the construction of the banking system 
– see previous chapters – and set up our model with that in mind. 
5.5 The basic functionality of the system: the OERS 
OERS stands for Optimum Exchange Rate System. It is the brainchild of Leigh 
Harkness.136 The fundamental functionality of the OERS is credit controls where 
banks’ credit creation (lending) is bounded by a certain changeable multiple, the 
value of which depends on how far the economy is from reaching the economic 
goals set by the policy maker. This changeable multiple – here christened the 
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 Harkness came up with the OERS system in the wake of his work as an economist for the treasury of 
Tonga, a small (100,000 habitants) sovereign state in the Pacific Ocean. This monetary system, first 
developed in the 1990s, has not been published in any peer-reviewed academic journal, as far as I know, 
and should consequently be considered with warnings thereof. Harkness’s work can be accessed on his 
website: www.buoyanteconomies.com. What follows is predominantly an original contribution of mine, 
drawing on insights made from earlier in this thesis, but the idea of the OERS is certainly in its entirety 
Harkness’s. All faults and mistakes are mine. 
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“regulatory DFX ratio” – can be influenced by the banks as their credit creation 
and credit allocation processes influence the economy to or from the economic 
goals.  
Box 2 – What is the DFX ratio? 
The abbreviation “DFX” comes from the variables that are included in it: 
Domestic loans divided by FX reserves. Each banking institution has a 
balance sheet and this balance sheet has multiple assets, which can be 
divided into “domestic” and “foreign” assets. Each asset class 
(domestic/foreign) includes different assets, such as cash and cash-like 
assets (that includes reserves at central banks), bonds and equities, and 
loans. 
The OERS proposal is, essentially, a balance-sheet constraint for banks. 
Balance-sheet constraints for banks are nothing new: the classical 
Reserve Requirement Ratio is one of them. However, the OERS focuses 
on the asset side of the banking system and not the liability side. As such, 
it is a variant of an asset-based reserve requirement for banking 
institutions and as such it follows the proposal of Palley (2004). 
How to calculate the DFX ratio for a specific bank is very simple. It is 
simply the ratio of the (nominal) value of loans that the bank has granted 
to domestic borrowers compared to the bank’s assets in foreign reserves. 
Foreign reserves are defined as highly liquid net short term foreign-
currency assets. At each time t, the value of the DFX ratio for bank A 
would then be DFXAt. This value is then compared to the concurrent 
regulatory DFX value which the Central Bank decides but, as is clear from 
the discussion to follow, can be influenced by the banks’ credit creation 
and allocation. 
Each bank will have a certain value for its DFX ratio which is derived directly 
from its balance sheet at any time. Each bank’s DFX ratio is compared to and 
bounded by the regulatory DFX value, i.e. a bank’s DFX ratio ≤ regulatory DFX 
value. The regulatory DFX value is decided and enforced by the central bank. 
We stress that its value depends on how far the economy is from the economic 
goals: the closer the economy is to the predetermined national economic goals, 
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the higher the regulatory DFX value is. As such, the regulatory DFX value is a 
function of the status of the economy at each time (see also 5.5.4 A graphical 
representation of the regulatory DFX surface). 
If banks break the regulatory DFX value (i.e. a bank’s DFX ratio ≥ regulatory 
DFX value) the central bank will have the power to respond. The central bank 
could e.g. issue an executive order, forcing the bank to decrease its lending 
until its DFX ratio has gone below the regulatory DFX value again. The central 
bank could also give the bank a “window guidance”, as was the case in Japan 
(Werner, 2002, 2005), on what it should do. 
The regulatory DFX value and the central bank’s enforcement of it constitute 
quantitative credit controls where the central bank calculates the upper limit of 
the amount of credit created in the economy. The regulatory DFX value also 
limits the amount of credit each individual bank can create, as was the case in 
Japan (ibid). However, and contrary to the case of Japan, the individual bank 
can influence greatly the amount of credit it is allowed to create by influencing 
the economy towards a favoured state and by acquiring foreign reserves. 
5.5.1 The banks’ profit maximisation problem in the OERS 
The regulatory DFX value, which all banks must obey, is a function of three 
variables, i.e. regulatory DFXt value = At = f(µt, πt, ∆Et) where the following 
applies: 
1) "
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where π0 is an inflation target set by the policy maker; µ: unemployment; E: 
nominal exchange rate (price of domestic currency in foreign currency) and ∆: 
percentage change in the nominal exchange rate. See also 5.5.4 A graphical 
representation of the regulatory DFX surface. 
Under the system, all banks will face the following profit (φ) function (ignoring 
management costs): 
: = ;<= + ;>? − ;AB 
with the following balance sheet constraints (ignoring equity): 
2) = + ? = B 
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3) = = &? 
with L: loans; D: deposits; F: foreign reserves. Expressing F in domestic 
currency becomes: 
4) ? = 

 
where m: units of foreign currency in reserves. The static profit function then 
becomes (at the constraints): 
: = ;<&? + ;>? − ;AC&? + ?D 
= ?[&C;< − ;AD + ;> − ;A] 
5) = ["C.,7,∆DCGHDIJH]

 
Looking at 5) and 1) we see that each bank, no matter its size, has the profit 
incentive to: 
a) have a level of inflation close to the inflation target. 
b) have a low level of unemployment. 
c) a weak exchange rate. 
a) – c) deserve a further comment. We will begin with c). 
5.5.2 Banks and the exchange rate in the OERS 
Looking at the static profit function of banks (5)), we see that they will have the 
incentive to have a weak currency, E, as it boosts their profits. They will also 
want to increase their holdings of foreign reserves, m. This implies, in the static 
version, that banks will continuously devalue the domestic currency to boost 
their profits.  
This will not happen in dynamic reality. First, the direct influences of devaluing 
the exchange rate are dealt with with the regulatory DFX value itself since: 
K1
K∆L
≥
1
1 − ∆L
 
Remember that ∆E stands for the percentage change in the nominal exchange 
rate. Why is this derivative as such? Because the DFX ratio is calculated as the 
ratio between domestic loans and foreign reserves and if E is devalued by ∆E 
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the bank’s DFX ratio falls by 1/(1-∆E).137 This, therefore, takes away the ability 
of banks to boost their credit creation capabilities by devaluing the exchange 
rate alone (and if the “>” sign applies, this actually decreases their credit 
creation capabilities as the exchange rate depreciates). 
We have then to deal with the indirect influences. For that, we must look at the 
economy as a whole and then identify the banks’ role in it. 
First, following textbook macroeconomics (Blanchard, Amighini, & Giavazzi, 
2010), we express net exports NX as: 
NX = X(Y*,e) – IM(Y,e)/e 
Where X: exports; Y*: foreign income; Y: domestic income; IM: imports; e: real 
exchange rate (the price of domestic goods in terms of foreign goods). The 
following applies: 
KM
KN∗
> 0	,
KM
KP
< 0,
KQR
KN
> 0,
KQR
KP
> 0 
We now express Ya as actual output and Yp as potential output. We adopt 
Werner’s (2005, p. 208) definition of potential output as “a function of the 
quantity of factor inputs (QFI) [such as labour and machinery] and the quality of 
their use (total factor productivity, TFP).” Yp “can also be considered akin to the 
aggregate supply of the economy” (ibid). Indeed, Dutt (2010, p. 222, original 
emphasis) adopts a similar definition of aggregate supply: “...the maximum real 
output that can be produced by the economy given determinants of factor 
supplies... technological parameters... and a vector of all other possible 
determinants of [aggregate supply]...”. So, by definition, Ya ≤ Yp (for how can 
something be larger than its potential, i.e. maximum). We have: 
Ya = GDP = C + I + G + X(Y*,e) – IM(Y,e)/e 
An exchange rate devaluation boosts foreign demand for domestic goods, 
leading to increased domestic production and employment of resources, 
                                            
137
 A simple example for explanation purposes only: Regulatory DFX ratio = bank’s DFX ratio = 50 = 
domestic loans/foreign reserves = 100 billion / 2 billion at exchange rate E. 10% currency devaluation 
takes place. Then, bank’s DFX ratio is 100 / 2.2 = 45.45 = 50/1.1. Therefore, the regulatory DFX ratio 
should be lowered by a factor of at least 1.1 (1/(1-(-10%)) to stop the bank from being able to create more 
credit due to exchange rate devaluation alone. 
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including labour. It also decreases the domestic demand for imports. This 
moves the economy towards the economic goal of low unemployment as 
demand shifts towards domestic goods. The regulatory DFX value goes up 
accordingly. The banks can create more credit given the same amount of 
foreign reserves. The increase in net exports also improves the economy’s 
source of foreign reserves. 
But Ya cannot be higher than Yp – by definition – so a devaluation only gets the 
economy so far. And if Ya is pushed towards Yp, inflation pressures build up.138 
This will apply unless Ya and Yp are expanded at the same time, such as via 
real capital investment in production facilities (increased/improved machinery), 
education (improved efficiency of labour) or entrepreneurial activity that 
“reconfigures” the available inputs into a more valuable output, given costs, than 
before: Schumpeter’s creative destruction. Furthermore, banks’ credit 
expansion in the wake of increased exports and lower unemployment leads to 
current account deficits (see 5.2.1 Domestic credit expansion and current 
account deficits) as domestic purchasing power is used to buy goods, including 
imported goods. The banks’ foreign reserves are depleted in the wake of the 
credit expansion (see 5.2.2 Domestic credit expansion and the depletion of 
foreign reserves). Also, devaluation in the exchange rate can lead to inflation 
via higher import-prices (exchange-rate pass-through effects). This is 
complemented by the inflationary effects of the credit expansion itself (see 5.2.3 
Domestic credit expansion and inflation). Higher inflation decreases the 
regulatory DFX value. 
Employment is decided by the intersection of aggregate supply and aggregate 
demand, i.e. by effective demand (Setterfield, 2012; Stockhammer, 2012). If 
employment is low, banks will want to boost effective demand, thereby 
increasing employment and increase the regulatory DFX value, allowing them to 
create more credit. Here, banks can boost effective demand in three ways.  
First, they can buy foreign currencies for domestic, and create a devaluation in 
the exchange rate. This boosts effective demand. Employment is created and 
                                            
138
 This is, of course, closely related to the idea of a non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment 
(NAIRU). From the post-Keynesian view, the NAIRU is unstable and will move as a consequence of 
changes in effective demand. This is different from the Neoclassical version of NAIRU for in that case, 
NAIRU is exogenously determined by supply-side factors arising from the labour market institutional 
framework (Stockhammer, 2012). 
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deflationary pressures disappear as actual output (Ya) approaches potential 
output (Yp).  
Second, banks can also create credit to boost effective demand. This pushes Ya 
up towards Yp. The creation of credit depletes banks’ foreign reserves (or slows 
down their accumulation) and so raises their DFX ratios via changes in both the 
nominator (domestic loans) and the denominator (FX reserves). Banks can 
respond by buying foreign currencies. However, if the banks had already 
pushed Ya up to Yp with credit creation, the consequential devaluation of the 
exchange rate causes further inflationary pressures: the regulatory DFX value 
goes down as inflation goes up. In other words, the inflation-governor in the 
regulatory DFX value now stops banks from being able to expand their loan 
portfolios, removing the inflationary pressures again. 
Finally, banks can reallocate credit without expanding its total supply. In this 
case, banks can channel credit away from non-productive speculative means 
with existing assets and inflationary consumer finance towards projects such as 
capital investment projects. Capital investment projects demand labour and so 
the employment level rises. Capital investment also expands potential output, 
Yp, and, accordingly, decreases or keeps inflation pressures at bay. Note that if 
the investment project is in exports, this reallocation of credit in the economy 
can actually increase the net receipts of foreign currency despite possible 
increases in imports in the wake of a higher employment levels and growth of 
wage income. And, just as in the case of a credit expansion, what banks do on 
the foreign exchange market (buy or sell the domestic currency) must take the 
allocation, and quantity, of credit into the account. Too weak exchange rate will 
create inflationary pressures, which will feed through the inflation governor, and 
too strong exchange rate will lead to current account deficits and the depletion 
of foreign exchange (unless met with capital inflows). Allocating credit towards 
non-productive means, such as speculation, should also have more impact on 
banks’ foreign reserves since no additional production capabilities are created. 
Banks have therefore the incentive to favour borrowers that plan to invest in real 
capital rather than speculate with existing assets. 
The argument is therefore simple. In the OERS, banks will have the profit 
incentive to have the exchange rate neither too strong nor too weak. If the 
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exchange rate is too strong, they will bleed foreign reserves through imports 
and their profit capabilities are cut. If the exchange rate is too weak, inflationary 
pressures are formed and the regulatory DFX value is consequently lowered by 
the inflation-governor and their profit capabilities are cut again. At the same 
time, credit quantity and allocation must be taken into the account. 
5.5.3 Banks, the inflation and the unemployment 
Now, if we accept that increased aggregated credit in the economy can be 
inflationary, then we have no problem accepting that if inflation goes up the 
regulatory DFX value will be lowered. This forces banks to slow down their 
credit creation and/or allocating it to projects that expand the production 
capabilities of the economy, both of which counter the inflation pressure. 
Inflation will subsequently fall. Banks can also strengthen the domestic currency 
to respond to inflation but then they risk not only unemployment (because of a 
fall in effective demand) but also depleting their own stock of foreign reserves 
as imports pick up. At the same time, they will not favour too weak exchange 
rate since the inflation governor will be activated in the wake of imports-inflation. 
This applies to all banks: the inflation governor in the regulatory DFX surface is 
effective, no matter the banks’ size. 
The reader may, however, consider it a potential problem that the individual 
bank may not have the adequate incentive to allocate credit towards labour 
intensive projects if the bank thinks that due to its (small) size, the impact of 
such allocation (on the rate of unemployment and therefore the regulatory DFX 
surface) will be remote and not worth the effort. Therefore, full employment may 
not be reached because banks, individually, do not think they can affect the rate 
of unemployment enough with their lending decisions.  
This is unlikely to be a problem for four reasons. First, banks may, formally or 
informally, decide to act as a collective entity when it comes to their lending 
decisions. A formal collective action by banks with the purpose of lowering 
unemployment would be a cartel-like entity. And cartels can be positive for 
economic growth (Werner, 2005) so this form of collective action by the banks 
should not be discouraged by the government. An informal collective action by 
banks would be voting-like behaviour. And although in some cases the chance 
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of casting the decisive vote is one-in-millions,139 people still vote – The Paradox 
of Voting (Downs (1957) is perhaps the most widely-read text on the subject). 
So banks, even without any formal cartel-like agreement, can act in an informal 
voter-like way and still decide to allocate credit such that they increase 
employment. 
Second, the fact is that most economies are not characterised by thousands of 
small banks that have, individually, slim to no effects on the economy when they 
allocate credit. In a study covering 95 countries Nicoló, Bartholomew, Zaman, 
and Zephirin (2004) found that in the year 2000 the average ratio of total 
banking assets in the ownership of the five largest banks in each country was 
60% - and the trend was upwards. Surely then, most economies are 
characterised by banks that are big enough to care about their credit allocation 
under a well designed regulatory DFX surface. 
Third, even if banks are small and they do not act in neither formal nor informal 
collective action, the central bank can use “sticks and carrots” to get the 
preferred results. As a carrot, it can increase the unemployment incentive in the 
regulatory DFX surface. As a stick, it can apply “window guidance” on the banks 
– and if that information is made public the banks’ managers may be swayed, in 
a “responsible voter” fashion, to amend their ways later.  
Fourth, and finally, let’s assume that none of the previous points applies, i.e. the 
economy is characterised with several, small banks that individually have no 
effect on the employment situation in the economy with their lending decisions, 
the banks do not act in a formal or an informal collective way as an entity and 
the central bank does not use sticks and carrots to drive the credit allocation of 
the numerous small banks in the economy.  
Then, banks still have an incentive to lower unemployment. But rather than 
allocating credit to reach that goal – we are now assuming that they cannot – 
they can buy foreign currencies for the local one. All banks, no matter their size, 
will always need net foreign reserves in order to back up their loan portfolios, 
following the regulatory DFX value. If unemployment is high banks can buy 
foreign currencies. This lowers their own DFX ratio and, as the local currency 
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 In the American 2008 presidential elections, the average voter had a 1/60,000,000 chance of casting 
the decisive vote (Gelman, Silver, & Edlin, 2012). 
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falls in value, increases effective demand which creates employment. At the 
same time, the inflation governor in the regulatory DFX surface stops banks 
from devaluing the exchange rate too much. This becomes especially relevant 
when employment is already high (see also 5.10.1 Simultaneously low 
unemployment and low inflation). 
Therefore, banks can lower unemployment with their foreign exchange 
decisions even if they are so small that they consider it not worthwhile aiming 
for that target with their lending decisions: the unemployment governor in the 
regulatory DFX surface is effective, no matter the banks’ size.  
Therefore, even if the economy is characterised by small banks (which is, 
empirically, usually not the case anyway so from a post-Keynesian perspective 
the potential small-banks problem should not worry us much),140 we rule that 
the regulatory DFX surface can be used to effectively incentivise the banks to 
reach the economic goals of low inflation and low unemployment. 
5.5.4 A graphical representation of the regulatory DFX surface 
The regulatory DFX ratio is a function of three economic goals: low 
unemployment, low inflation target and a stable nominal exchange rate which, 
as we have just seen, the banks have a profit incentive to steer towards the 
“optimum” level, taking credit creation into the account, such that Ya = Yp.  
As such, the regulatory DFX ratio is a three-dimensional surface in a four-
dimensional space. Such surfaces are not easily drawn on a two-dimensional 
paper. Therefore, we must settle for figure 5.3 for graphical explanation of how 
the regulatory DFX ratio works. On figure 5.3 the regulatory DFX surface is 
maximised at 0% unemployment and 0% inflation but the values and the shape 
of the regulatory DFX surface should be understood as for presentation 
purposes only. It is, again, the policy maker who defines the DFX surface. 
Recapitulating what has been said before and expanding the discussion even 
slightly before we present figure 5.3 is in order. The regulatory DFX value is the 
maximum value that the ratio between banks’ domestic loans and their foreign 
reserves can be. Foreign reserves are very liquid and as such they are a 
financial asset that yields a low rate of interest. Holding foreign reserves is 
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 See Arestis (1996).  
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therefore not very profitable. Domestic loans are, however, very profitable since 
they are more illiquid than the deposits they create. This creates a profit 
incentive for banks via the net interest differential between domestic loans and 
domestic deposits. Banks would, from a profit incentive point of view, like to 
maximise their loans. For that, however, in the OERS they need foreign 
reserves and/or an economy with a low unemployment and a low inflation. 
Banks influence the economy with their credit creation and allocation decisions. 
Operating under the regulatory DFX surface creates, depending on its shape, a 
profit incentive for the banks to allocate their credit creation in such a way that 
the economy reaches the economic goals. The closer the economy is to the 
economic goals, the higher the regulatory DFX value is. Banks can then 
increase their domestic loans given foreign reserves. Therefore, banks have a 
profit incentive, due to the credit controls incorporated in the regulatory DFX 
value, to allocate their credit creation towards economic activity that a) 
demands labour and b) keeps inflation down. Examples would be real capital 
investment and entrepreneurial activities. Credit creation meant for financial 
speculation, mortgages or consumer finances would not be incentivised by the 
regulatory DFX surface since those can be inflationary and do not demand 
particular labour activity. This constitutes qualitative credit controls where the 
allocation of credit is influenced by the central bank.  
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Figure 5.3 A possible regulatory DFX surface, two social welfare goals.  
 
Formula of the DFX surface shown: max(1, – π^2 – 1.5*µ + 20). The surface is for presentation purposes 
only to explain the functionality of the OERS. 
5.6 Why those foundations? 
The OERS is a monetary system where banks’ lending is tied to banks’ foreign 
reserves. This needs further explanations. Furthermore, the social welfare goals 
of the system are low unemployment, low inflation and a stable nominal 
exchange rate.141 The reasoning for those economic goals needs to be made 
clear as well. 
5.6.1 The foreign reserves base 
We saw in 5.2 Credit expansion and some of its effects that credit expansion in 
the domestic economy precedes four developments: the current account to 
worsen, the depletion of foreign reserves, higher inflation and the devaluation of 
the domestic currency against foreign currencies.  
Connecting the credit creation of banks to the foreign reserves has the purpose 
of making an explicit link there between. If the banking system increases credit 
in circulation it should expect the overall DFX ratio (sum of all banks’ 
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 Harkness’s original idea was to rely on only two economic goals: low unemployment and low 
inflation. He proposed using certain accounting rules to stop banks from devaluing the domestic currency. 
Here, the nominal exchange rate is incorporated directly into the regulatory DFX surface. 
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outstanding loans / sum of all banks’ foreign reserves) to increase due to two 
reasons. First of all, the nominator in the DFX ratio (domestic loans/FX 
reserves) increases. Second, as the credit expansion leads to an incipient 
depletion of foreign reserves the denominator goes down as well, increasing the 
DFX ratio even further. This is therefore a governor142 that regulates the supply 
of new credit being created (see also 5.8 On the governors of the system). 
5.6.2 Inflation, employment and the exchange rate 
The purpose of using inflation as a governor is similar to that of using foreign 
reserves. As credit creation speeds up, inflation can be caused, leading to the 
regulatory DFX value to fall in value, forcing the banks to slow down their credit 
creation and/or improve its allocation towards expanding Yp. Again, this is a 
governor that reacts automatically to the development of the economy which is 
under the influence of banks’ credit creation and allocation. 
Focusing on inflation, employment and the exchange rate has the purpose of 
incentivising banks to allocate credit to productive purposes, rather than 
speculation with existing assets or consumer finance. This allocation incentive 
can not only allow banks to create credit without creating inflation but it can 
create economic growth as a consequence as well. The banks have also an 
incentive to balance the economy, taking credit creation and allocation into the 
account, via the exchange rate, which also acts as a governor. Following in the 
footsteps of Werner (2005) we can make the following arguments (we will 
continue calling actual output Ya while potential output is Yp).  
1) First, if Ya < Yp then, for a given productivity level, credit creation may not 
raise prices. If the credit creation leads to improvement in the utilisation of 
resources, such as labour (lower unemployment), then production will increase 
at constant prices. Consumptive lending may in this case improve the utilisation 
of resources as workers are needed to produce the consumption goods. An 
exchange rate devaluation, such as when banks buy foreign currencies for the 
domestic, can cause the same effects: Ya goes up towards Yp. However, if the 
credit creation or the exchange rate devaluation does not manage to improve 
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 Governor in the following meaning (The Free Dictionary, 2014c): “A feedback device on a machine or 
engine that is used to provide automatic control, as of speed, pressure, or temperature.” The opening of 
Maxwell’s famous “On Governors” paper is worth quoting as well (Maxwell, 1867, p. 1): “A governor is 
a part of a machine by means of which the velocity of the machine is kept nearly uniform, 
notwithstanding variations in the driving-power or the resistance.” 
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the utilisation of resources, e.g. if no new workers are employed because of it 
(no, or very few, new workers would be employed because of a credit-fuelled 
speculation on the housing market), then we will have more money chasing the 
same amount of goods and the risk of inflation increases. Excessive nominal 
exchange rate devaluation would have similar effects, especially as it would 
also affect the cost of imported inputs of production, putting supply-shock 
pressures on prices. Banks keenness to primarily finance asset purchases is 
held back by a low regulatory DFX value due to unemployment. Banks can and 
have a profit incentive to finance economic processes (investment, 
consumption) that create employment. 
2) Second, let us assume here that credit creation, credit allocation and the 
exchange rate level have been perfected to such a utopian level that Ya = Yp. 
Here, factor inputs (labour and real capital) are fully utilised at their maximum 
efficiency. Then, for a given productivity, credit creation for consumption and/or 
an exchange rate devaluation are going to raise prices for this is where “more 
money is chasing the same amount of goods” and the economy simply cannot 
supply more of them as it already is at its maximum potential output level. Ergo, 
we are likely to have inflation. 
3) Third, we will keep the assumption that Ya = Yp. Here, if banks allocate credit 
to investment projects (entrepreneurial activity, real capital investments, 
education projects, etc.) that expand Yp, rather than to finance consumption, 
then we will go back to the first case where Ya < Yp because the production 
capabilities of the economy are expanded.143 This will, as was seen in that 
case, allow banks to create more credit, expanding their stock of domestic 
loans.  
Increasing Yp, so that Ya < Yp, can be in the form of increased ability to export 
(e.g. better machinery or improved quality (education) of labour in an export 
industry). If demand for exports is in place, exports will increase as the 
capability to supply them increases. Increased exports show up as a positive 
entry on the current account, meeting the negative impact credit expansion can 
                                            
143
 This might happen with a delay, as Schumpeter (1934) argued and Werner (2005) points out: banks’ 
initial credit creation for entrepreneurial activity happens at full capacity utilisation, creating inflation. 
However, as entrepreneurs create high-value goods, the full value of goods in the economy goes up and 
the inflation pressure is reversed, partially, entirely or even more. 
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have on it (see5.2 Credit expansion and some of its effects) and improving the 
development of net foreign assets of the economy. Increased exports are also a 
source of foreign reserves for the banks, slowing down the incipient depletion of 
foreign reserves in the wake of credit expansion. Banks have therefore a double 
profit incentive to lend to investment activities that expand the potential export 
output of the economy. It expands their domestic loans and provides them with 
foreign reserves. 
Finally, banks’ credit creation does not only lead to the incipient depletion of 
foreign reserves (increasing their DFX ratio) and inflation (decreasing the 
regulatory DFX ratio) and little effects on employment if allocation is not for 
productive purposes, but devaluation of the currency as well (decreasing the 
regulatory DFX ratio). Currency devaluation can also lead to import-price 
inflation via the exchange-rate pass-through. But nominal exchange rate 
changes are incorporated in the regulatory DFX value to stop banks from 
having a profit incentive in continuously devaluing the exchange rate. And if 
banks were to try to allow the exchange rate to strengthen, thereby increasing 
the regulatory DFX ratio, imported goods would become cheaper in comparison 
to domestic goods, leading to current account deficits and depletion of foreign 
reserves, which increases their DFX ratio. They therefore gain nothing from 
either too weak or too strong exchange rate. 
The system as a whole therefore works as a collection of governors on banks, 
automatically directing them to create and allocate credit and buy and sell the 
domestic currency such that the social welfare goals are all reached 
simultaneously. 
5.7 Fiscal activity 
We have so far focused on the banking system in the OERS. It is now time to 
focus on the public finances in the system. 
5.7.1 Deficit-spending by the government: how it incentivises the 
banks 
In the OERS it is the banks, via their credit creation and credit allocation, which 
are made, effectively, responsible for reaching the economic goals – given a 
well-designed regulatory DFX surface. However, if the banks do not reach the 
economic goals via their credit creation and allocation the central bank, and the 
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government, can create the credit themselves and deficit-spend it into the 
economy with the purpose of reaching those goals. After all, the government, as 
the issuer of a national currency, creates credit, i.e. money, every day as it pays 
for goods and services (Forstater & Mosler, 2005, see also next section) and 
this can be used to reach a lower unemployment level in case the banks do not 
do it themselves. One possibility would be an Employer of Last Resort (ELR) 
program (see Tcherneva (2012) for a concise intro to the subject).144 
This would have important consequences. First of all, the government’s 
expenditures would become “a failsafe” in case the governors in the OERS 
would not work as expected or if a dominant part of the banks would, e.g. due to 
external and random shocks, or temporary incompetence, end up with DFX 
ratios above the regulatory DFX value, hindering their ability to create and lend 
credit into the economy. This could also be an available option if banks were 
saddled with bad debts, hindering them from supplying credit into the economy 
– similar to what Werner (2005) suggested for Japan.145 While banks were 
working on reorganising their loan books, so that they would again comply with 
the regulatory DFX value, the government could sustain employment and cash 
flows in the economy by spending money into the economy and thereby 
maintaining aggregate demand. In case of bad debts in the banking system, the 
government could use bank-credit to do this, i.e. borrow from the banks, to 
improve their balance sheets as there is no safer borrower than the state 
(Werner, 2005). This would improve the ratio of good debts vs. bad debts on 
their balance sheets.146 
Second, government deficit-spending becomes an incentive for the banks to 
fulfil the economic goals at all times because the money created by 
government’s deficit-spending can be used, just as other bank-credit created 
money, as a means of payment in the economy. As such it can be spent on 
whatever goods and services there are in the economy. Part of this purchasing 
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 If an ELR program would be introduced the regulatory DFX surface could use the ratio of the 
workforce employed via such program as the relevant unemployment statistics. 
145
 Werner (2005, p. 262): “With the ability of banks to create credit severely impaired by bad debts, an 
economic recovery could be created by a policy of aggressive expansion of both central bank and bank 
credit.”  
146
 In serious cases, the establishment of a publicly funded “Bad Bank” could be juxtaposed with other 
interventions. The Bad Bank would then take over the bad debts of the banking system, effectively 
bailing out the banks. The Bad Bank can be financed with credit creation from the treasury, similar to 
when the treasury creates credit every day when it pays for goods and services. 
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power will lead to imports, leading to incipient depletion of banks’ foreign 
reserves. The government deficit-spending, used to e.g. finance an ELR, 
therefore decreases the banks’ ability to create credit. 
Consequently, banks are likely to vehemently oppose such government 
expenditures. But exactly because the government now directly influences the 
banks’ ability to create credit via its own credit creation via deficit-spending, it 
can demand of banks that they reach and sustain the economic goals. If they do 
not, the government will, indirectly, decrease their profit capabilities by creating 
and allocating the credit that the economy needs itself to reach a level of low 
unemployment. 
Explicitly incorporating the possibility of government expenditures to reach the 
economic goals in case the banks do not do it therefore creates not only a 
failsafe in case of a genuine external shock that the banks can do nothing 
about. It also acts as an incentive for the banks to actually reach the goals. 
Government expenditures, e.g. in the form of an ELR program, therefore act as 
a stick and a failsafe at the same time. Whether the government can or will 
misuse this stick is discussed in 5.11 Responsibly sharing the power to create 
money. 
5.7.2 Public debt, its management and the rate of interest 
When the government spends it credits the reserve accounts of banks at the 
central bank. When the government taxes, it debits the reserve accounts of 
banks at the central bank. Net deficit spending by the government therefore 
leads to a net increase in the reserves of banks at the central bank (Forstater & 
Mosler, 2005). The government can choose to pay whatever rate of interest it 
wants on those reserves, including 0% (ibid). A negative rate of interest on 
reserves is also possible, as current, at the time of this writing, deposit rates for 
bank reserves at the ECB show us and at Danmarks Nationalbank before that 
(see e.g. Bomsdorf (2014)). 
The purpose, then, of issuing government bonds is not to “borrow” funds for the 
government which it can then spend – for the government, being the issuer of 
the currency, credits bank accounts when it spends and therefore does not 
need to borrow anything in order to be able to spend (Forstater & Mosler, 2005) 
– but “to manage aggregate bank reserves and control short-term interest rates 
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(overnight interbank lending rate)” (ibid, p. 538). This can also be looked at as 
the act of soaking up past monetary expansions due to net-deficit spending by 
the government. 
Another purpose of issuing government bonds is to make sure that (domestic) 
financial assets are available for savings purposes in case the private sector 
decides to rein in spending such that the private sector balance (S-I) is positive. 
In that case, the only way the domestic private sector can find domestic 
financial assets to use as saving instruments is in the form of government 
liabilities, following the accounting identity S – I = (G – T) + (X – M): private 
sector domestic savings are only possible if the government runs a deficit at the 
same time (Wray, 2012). Therefore, the government must issue bonds in order 
to allow the private sector to save domestically. 
Similar to the interest rate on reserves, authorities can pay “whatever they like” 
(Tily (2010) quoting Keynes (CW Vol. XXVII, p. 391-3)) on government bonds of 
whatever maturity. Those rates, being considered the risk-free rate of interest, 
would then become the base of all other rates in the economy. The only 
prerequisite for this to be valid is that the government must “allow[...] the public 
to be as liquid as they want” (ibid), i.e. the government must be indifferent about 
the amount of outstanding government bonds of all maturities. Since the 
government is the issuer of the currency and as such cannot default on 
domestic-currency bonds, except by choice, (Forstater & Mosler, 2005; Wray, 
2012), the government should be indifferent about the maturity profile of its 
domestic-currency debt.  
The management of public debt should be carried out with this in mind. Its aim 
should be to influence the rate of interest, i.e. the whole yield curve, towards 
what Keynes described as the “optimum” rate, where full employment would be 
reached, and is, according to him, different amongst societies (Keynes, 
1936).147 
It is proposed here that the debt management of public debt would follow that 
applied in the UK during the 1930s and early 1940s. The theoretical foundations 
were Keynes’s liquidity theory of the rate of interest (Tily, 2006, 2010, 2012). 
                                            
147
 For a comment on whether it is possible to lower the domestic rate of interest below the world rate of 
interest without the use of capital controls, see 5.10.3 Will banks stop lending at home? 
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While the debt management was following Keynes’s advice (1931-1946) both 
real and nominal long-term interest rates in the UK fell and the economy greatly 
improved (Tily, 2010). 
5.8 On the governors of the system 
The OERS is a self-controlled system and fits well within control theory. Its 
fundamental assumption is that banks want to maximise their profits.148 It is a 
dynamic system where oscillations are dealt with automatically within the 
system itself, resulting in a (financial) system that constantly strays to keep the 
economy near the nation’s economic goals. It should be noted that the system 
does not need to have any stable “equilibrium”. As such, the OERS falls well 
within the boundaries of post-Keynesian economics, which are “Economics 
without Equilibrium” (Arestis (1996), referencing Kaldor (1985)). 
The problem in control theory is to affect a process that is at time t0 in initial 
state x0 towards the desired state x1. This process is dynamic and can be 
expressed with an ordinary differential equation (Aström & Murray, 2008; 
Benner, 2007): 
ST CUD = VWU, SCUD, XCUDY, SCU4D = S4 
To reach the desired state x1, we apply a control function u(t) which is an input. 
The aim is that by applying u(t) we will reach x1 at t1≥t0.  
In the case of the OERS, the desired state x1 is the economic goals. The 
economy begins at stage x0. To reach the desired state x1 we apply the control 
function “regulatory DFX surface”. This underlines the importance of the shape 
of the regulatory DFX surface. The output is the banks’ credit creation and 
allocation and activity on the FX market which will affect the state of the 
economy towards the economic goals x1. 
If we use xt to signify the state of the economy at time t, ut to signify the 
regulatory DFX value at time t and yt to signify the banks’ credit-creation 
activities, including allocation, and foreign exchange activities the chain of 
events can be described as follows: 
                                            
148
 Banks may have a social goal, like the local employment of their region (this was commonly the 
original purpose of savings banks in Iceland). If they do, they nevertheless would fit within the system 
here proposed.  
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...xt -> ut -> yt -> xt+1 -> ut+1 -> yt+1 -> ... -> x1 
The governors of the system therefore guide the economy constantly towards 
the economic goals. A failsafe is incorporated into the system with the possible 
deficit-spending of the government in case the economic goals are not reached 
via the control function alone: the banks may not have been following it 
properly, they may have experienced an external shock which they could do 
nothing about or the DFX surface was badly designed. 
5.9 A note on capital flows in the proposed system 
We now turn our attention towards international capital flows in the proposed 
system. We saw in chapter 2 that banks are intermediaries between the 
domestic and the foreign economies. They act as such via their role in the 
payment system where an international payment to/from the domestic economy 
goes either directly through the nation’s central bank or via commercial banks’ 
correspondent banks (see 2.1.1 Banks and the payment system). Banks also 
act as intermediaries of foreign funds between domestic borrowers and foreign 
lenders. 
5.9.1 Capital flows and banks’ profit incentive 
The standard view of short term capital flows is that they respond to arbitrage 
opportunities (Montiel & Reinhart, 1999). Those arbitrage opportunities can e.g. 
be high interest rates in the capital-importing economy (ibid) or exchange rate 
opportunities such as triangular arbitrage. Carry-trade with currencies is one 
form of this arbitrage opportunity: borrow in a low-interest rate currency and 
invest the funds in a high-interest rate currency. Liquidity transformation is 
another way of profiting: borrow short term abroad at a low rate of interest and 
lend it long term at a higher rate of interest, continuously rolling over the debts 
as they mature.  
A sizeable portion of international wholesale funding, a large part of it short 
term, goes through the banking system (Brunnermeier et al., 2012). Domestic 
banks, especially too-big-to-fail banks and under the spell of moral hazard, can 
profit from liquidity transforming foreign funds. In fact, too-big-to-fail banks 
always have an incentive to borrow abroad and relend the money to domestic 
parties, especially under de facto or de jure fixed exchange rates (Eichengreen, 
2004; Kraft & Jankov, 2005). This can have serious consequences for the 
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financial stability of the economy as short-term foreign debt, public or private, 
can force balance of payments problems onto the economy when capital flows 
are subject to sudden stops and reversals (Rodrik & Velasco, 1999).  
The same authors also note that the ratio between foreign reserves and short-
term foreign debt is an indicator of a looming crisis. Indeed, the Guidotti-
Greenspan rule is that (emerging) economies should keep foreign reserves 
such that “usable foreign exchange reserves should exceed scheduled 
amortizations of foreign currency debts (assuming no rollovers) during the 
following year” (Greenspan, 1999). Calafell and Del Bosque (2003) showed that 
the ratio is a useful indicator of an oncoming currency crisis. In the case of 
Iceland, the ratio was only 8% (instead of the Guidotti-Greenspan 
recommended 100%) around the time of the collapse in 2008 (Benediktsdottir, 
Danielsson, & Zoega, 2011). 
Parallels can be drawn between the Guidotti-Greenspan rule and the system 
here proposed. The system is built on foreign reserves, this time of banks 
instead of the central bank, defined as net short term foreign-currency assets. 
Banks therefore cannot boost their foreign reserves, and thereby their credit 
creation capabilities, with short-term foreign borrowing since short-term foreign 
borrowing does nothing in boosting their net foreign reserves. Banks, if they 
wish to have an outstanding domestic loan portfiolio, will always have positive 
net short term foreign assets on their books and since a large part of the 
international short-term wholesale funding goes through the banking system, as 
Brunnermeier et al. told us, this will likely have the effect that the economy is 
very close to fulfilling the Guidotti-Greenspan rule at all times.  
Other capital flows, such as into domestic equity and bond markets, are also 
possible in the OERS. Domestic banks are likely to act as intermediaries in 
such flows via their brokerage services and participation in the international 
payment system (see 2.1 What do banks do?). This includes but is not limited to 
FDI flows. Such flows are still open for possible sudden-stops and reversals and 
banks will not, under the OERS, build up any particular system-imposed buffers 
against possible reversals of these flows. The banks may want to do so 
nevertheless as a part of their risk management operations or because they 
would like to prevent the currency from deviating too much from a value that 
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they expect would balance Ya and Yp, given credit creation and credit allocation. 
The central bank could also choose, independently, to amass foreign reserves 
in the case of such inflows of short-term capital. 
However, the risk to financial stability due to those flows is lower than that due 
to (short-term) bank flows. Brunnermeier et al. (2012, p. 8) explain: 
In principle, equity-type [rather than debt-type] liabilities should be 
helpful in a crisis, since foreign investors take an automatic hit if the 
market value of liabilities declines. The typical equity investor 
(corporation, pension fund or mutual fund) is not leveraged, so 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio equity flows are less 
likely to reverse abruptly. Even when they do, the impact may be less 
damaging than a “sudden stop” associated with bank flows. In the 
case of portfolio equity flows, for example, foreign sellers of stocks in 
a crisis face the double penalty of lower local currency prices when 
they sell, as well as a sharply depreciated exchange rate when they 
exit... 
However, debt-type inflows intermediated by banks can generate 
adverse dynamics, especially in an environment in which GDP is 
shrinking, price deflation is occurring, and default risk is rising. 
Although bank-related flows are just one component of overall capital 
flows, they are an especially procyclical and volatile one that is 
important for transmitting financial conditions. 
To summarise: banks will not be able to expand their domestic credit creation 
by borrowing foreign currencies for the short-term. They can, of course, still 
borrow foreign currencies for the short term, it just does not expand their credit 
creation capabilities. This creates a particularly strong defence against credit 
expansion during the euphoric phase of Minsky’s FIH when concerns about 
liquidity are suppressed by false overconfidence, because the foreign short-
term borrowing by banks, which is procyclical and volatile, is made unprofitable. 
Instead, banks can borrow foreign currency long-term in order to expand their 
domestic loan portfolio: that way, the foreign-currency liability is long-term but 
the asset (raised funds) is short term, thereby boosting their short term foreign 
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reserves and lowering their DFX ratio at that time (they will then have to deal 
with it when the long-term liability turns short term, with the passing of time, and 
their DFX ratio will consequently increase). But such foreign borrowing is much 
safer than liquidity transforming foreign funds, where the foreign-currency 
liability is short term. Banks can also make increased use of equity and FDI 
flows into the economy to boost their foreign reserves and therefore credit-
creation capacity at a given state of the economic goals. But those are more 
stable flows than short-term bank-debt flows and do not pose the same risk to 
financial stability to the local community as Brunnermeier et al (2012) point out. 
5.9.2 The behaviour of capital flows in the system as proposed 
So capital flows due to banks’ hunt for profits via liquidity transformation of 
foreign funds – borrow abroad short term and lend long term – are discouraged 
in the system and long-term bank flows are instead encouraged. But other 
capital flows, which are short term in nature and can be destabilising, are 
discouraged as well. We can identify two reasons why. 
First, banks, being both managers of money and creators of it (see chapter 2), 
have less profit incentive than before to speculate with the exchange rate. For 
even if the money-manager part of the bank wishes to speculate with the 
exchange rate and asset prices in the hunt for short-term profits made from 
capital gains on its asset portfolio, creating capital flow as a consequence of 
that hunt, the money-creating part of the bank does not profit from such activity 
if it displaces the economy from a path which leads it to reaching the economic 
goals of the nation where the regulatory DFX value, and the bank’s credit 
creation capabilities, are maximised.  
The second reason is that the credit creation of banks is not controlled with a 
price instrument (policy rate changes by the central bank) but a quantity 
instrument, i.e. the regulatory DFX value. Short term interest rates, i.e. policy 
rates, will not change frequently, if ever, in the OERS. Money market interest 
rates will therefore be very stable. Public debt management is also carried out 
with the aim and purpose of reaching and sustaining a low rate of interest on 
government bonds over the whole yield curve. And similar to the management 
of banks’ credit creation, the management of public debt is performed using 
quantities (outstanding amount of government bonds) and not prices (interest 
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rates): the price of government bonds is fixed, but the quantity is not while the 
traditional way is to fix the quantity and let the price fluctuate.  
This way of carrying out the management of public debt, along with very 
infrequent, if any, changes on policy rates, takes away the profit incentive that is 
created by price speculation: capital gains, or losses, on government bonds due 
to changes in prices (interest rates) of those bonds become much less frequent. 
Money managers, including banks, insurance companies, hedge, pension and 
mutual funds, are, to a significant extent, driven by those gains rather than the 
income flow (such as interests and dividends) of their asset portfolio (Wray, 
2009). Money managers, as they move wealth between economies, creating 
capital flows as a consequence, therefore lose the main incentive behind their 
portfolio choices: price speculation.149  
Capital flows that arise from money managers’ hunt for short term capital gains 
are therefore of a lesser degree than if the price of government bonds would be 
allowed to fluctuate. Also, due to those mitigating effects of fixed price of 
government bonds on capital flows, the chances to speculate with the exchange 
rate will also be of a lesser degree than before. Money managers therefore lose 
a large part of both the capital-gains incentives that arise from changes in the 
price of the asset (government bonds) and the currency. The time horizon of 
international capital flows is consequently likely to become longer compared to 
what it is today since the prospects of immediate capital gains and losses – i.e. 
asset price and exchange rate movements – are diminished. 
In short, the system, as proposed, discourages capital flows driven by “money 
manager capitalism”, a term coming from Minsky to describe capitalism of the 
sort where managers of money are the “leading players in financial markets and 
in determining the course of economies” (Minsky, 1988, p. 4). As such, the 
system works against the intensifying effects that money manager capitalism 
has on financial instability, described by Nersisyan (2012). We should 
remember that money manager capitalism has had the effects of shortening the 
holding period of financial instruments considerably, making them being traded 
                                            
149
 At least on government bonds and, to a large extent, on money-market securities since policy rates will 
be stable. Private bonds and equities will still fluctuate in price and be open to speculation. But the 
vexation arising from capital flows of this type, especially of the equity type, should not be severe, see 
previous section.  
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mainly due to the prospects of capital gains (price movements) rather than 
income flows (dividends).150 
How, then, would capital flows in the OERS behave if money-manager driven 
capital flows are discouraged? It is well possible that they will behave more in 
the Kouri and Porter (1974, p. 447) fashion where “changes in real variables 
and changes in the domestic component of the monetary base cause portfolio 
substitutions which lead... to capital flows”. 
There are, however, a number of points to be made about that possibility. First, 
the exchange rate is floating in the OERS and not fixed, as in the K&P model. 
Expectations will still play a part in the formation of the exchange rate, even if 
the expectations of some short-term capital gain will not be as influential as 
before. This makes the K&P model inappropriate for the OERS framework for 
the model neglects the effects of expectations of the exchange rate changes on 
capital flows. K&P themselves recognise this problem (p. 452). 
Second, in the K&P model (ibid, p. 447) “monetary factors are assumed not to 
influence real variables in the current period.” This assumption is rejected. 
Monetary factors do influence real variables in the real world, and the OERS, 
and that is the post-Keynesian way of looking at money: it is not neutral, the 
reason being that the future is uncertain (Arestis, 1996). 
Third, the K&P model endogenises the domestic rate of interest. But the (risk-
free) interest rate is exogenous in the proposed system: the domestic 
authorities can have the domestic risk-free rate of interest “whatever they like” 
and fix it there as long as they are willing to buy and sell bonds at the 
predetermined price (see 5.7.2 Public debt, its management and the rate of 
interest). 
Fourth, the empirical explanation power of the model can be questioned (see 
Werner (1994, 2005)). 
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 According to Farrow (2012) the average holding period of a stock in the US is only 22 seconds. The 
problem is similar when it comes to government bonds: back in 1988, it was already only 20 days on US 
treasuries with maturities longer than 10 years (Klarman, 1991). And the reason: “Professional traders 
and so-called investors prize thirty-year Treasury bonds for their liquidity and use them to speculate on 
short-term interest rate movements, while never contemplating the prospect of actually holding them to 
maturity” (ibid, p. 7, emphasis added). 
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Rather, it would be more realistic to model capital flows in the system a la 
Werner (2005). There, total financial wealth (W) of the domestic economy is in 
foreign (F) and domestic (D) assets such that W = F + D. The causes of capital 
flows are stock adjustments (where W is unchanged but the ratio between F 
and D changes) and flow adjustments (where W changes but the ratio between 
F and D is unchanged). Capital flows therefore take place because existing 
stock of financial wealth is rebalanced one way or the other and because new 
financial wealth (credit) is created and added onto the existing wealth. 
It is easy to argue that the stock adjustment effects are not going to be 
prominent in the proposed system. The reason is simple: money manager 
capitalism is attenuated, as already discussed, and therefore the management 
of existing stock of financial wealth is not going to be prominent. The main 
influencer of capital flows is therefore likely to be the flow adjustment. Werner 
(2005) finds that the flow adjustment alone has considerable explanation power 
in the case of Japan. It is reasonable, because money manager capitalism is 
attenuated, to believe that the flow adjustment would even have more 
explanation power in the proposed system than it had in the case of Japan (of 
course, this cannot be empirically tested until the system has been adopted). 
But that means that “net capital outflows are directly proportional to excess 
credit creation entering the financial circulation [since e]xcess credit creation in 
the financial circulation expands the total national financial portfolio” (Werner, 
2005, p. 241).151 
Now we must be careful and distinguish between two cases: when the domestic 
sovereign currency is accepted as a means of payment abroad and when it is 
not. If it is accepted abroad, the local financial system can create credit 
(purchasing power) that can be used to “go shopping”, as Werner (2005, p. 243) 
colloquially puts it in the case of Japan, abroad. Capital outflows can then be 
financed with domestic credit creation that enters the financial circulation 
without the exchange rate to be affected – at least at that moment – because 
the foreigner accepts that domestic-currency denominated payment at par 
value, just like any other domestic party does.  
                                            
151
 Werner (2005) distinguishes between credit used for GDP-based transactions, which he calls CR, and 
credit used in financial circulation, which he calls CF. The latter is closely connected to speculative 
purposes. 
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But if the domestic currency is not accepted abroad, this is impossible. Then, 
credit that enters the financial circulation, which leads to capital outflows via the 
flow adjustment, will necessarily be exchanged into another currency that is 
accepted as a means of payment abroad. But, contrary to the case where the 
domestic currency is accepted abroad, that will lead to exchange rate 
depreciation and/or depletion of foreign reserves. In the system proposed, that 
will lead to a decrease of the regulatory DFX value, and even imports-inflation, 
and/or an increase in banks’ DFX ratios, consequently stopping the continuation 
of the credit creation. Capital flows due to the creation of credit entering 
financial circulation will slow down. 
This shows how reactive the system is to credit creation and how flexible it is in 
keeping credit creation not only at the appropriate level but also in the real 
economy rather than for financial activity and speculative purposes. This applies 
especially for an economy without an internationally accepted sovereign 
currency. No matter whether the newly created credit is going to enter the 
financial circulation or the real-economy circulation of the economy, the external 
balance of the economy is at the forefront, since otherwise banks’ foreign 
reserves will either build up or be depleted. And even if the share of domestic 
financial assets increases in the total domestic financial wealth a reflex in the 
regulatory DFX value stops the credit creation from continuing.152 Credit-driven 
booms are therefore unlikely to go out of hand. Furthermore, because the banks 
have the unemployment incentive incorporated in the regulatory DFX value, it 
gives them the incentive to direct credit to real economic activity, which creates 
employment, rather than financial and speculative activity, especially since 
money manager capitalism is attenuated. 
5.10 Selected issues and problems 
5.10.1 Simultaneously low unemployment and low inflation 
Judging from the discussion so far, the reader may get the impression that zero 
unemployment and zero rate of inflation are the explicit targets of monetary 
policy. The reader can then doubt the empirical possibility of the system, given 
                                            
152
 In that case, i.e. when there is a stock adjustment towards more domestic financial assets, the 
nominator in the DFX ratio of banks goes up and sooner or later it will hit the regulatory DFX value. If 
the credit creation leads to capital outflow (i.e. when the share of domestic assets does not increase, i.e. no 
stock adjustment) the denominator goes down as well, speeding up the increment in the banks’ DFX ratio 
towards the regulatory DFX value at that time. 
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that low unemployment and low rate of inflation may be hard to achieve and 
maintain. 
The OERS is constructed on the post-Keynesian approach to monetary policy, 
i.e. that monetary policy affects both output and prices – and not only prices as 
neoclassical theory maintains (Howells, 2012). The system adopts at least three 
of the four characteristics of post-Keynesian monetary policy (as listed by 
Howells (2012)): aggregate demand determines the level of economic activity; 
full employment is not necessarily reached through free-market forces; and the 
money supply is endogenous.153  
In the system an incentive is given to banks to construct their credit creation, 
credit allocation and activities on the foreign exchange market such that 
unemployment and inflation will be kept permanently low. Theoretically, the 
optimal scenario is no inflation environment with full employment of all inputs, 
real capital and labour, such that actual output is equal to potential output, i.e. 
Ya = Yp and inflation and unemployment will both be equal to zero, 
simultaneously. Whether this utopian optimality will actually be attained and 
maintained is a different matter. In fact this would be a very unlikely situation. 
But even if those utopian targets are not reached, at any particular time, “lower” 
unemployment and inflation towards the inflation target π0 in the regulatory DFX 
surface are still the incentives constantly given to the banking system.  
A note on unemployment and inflation and their relationship is in order here. 
Low unemployment, or “full employment”, has no universally agreed-upon 
definition in economics. To Keynes, full employment was when involuntary 
unemployment was nonexistent at the market-determined money-wage 
(Mitchell & Watts, 2012). Later, after the Phillips curve was born (A. W. Phillips, 
1958), full employment became a political concept: the rate of unemployment 
that was acceptable given the rate of inflation (Mitchell & Watts, 2012). The next 
step in the evolutionary process was the NAIRU: “full employment” was 
redefined into being equal to the “Non-Accelerating-Inflation-Rate of 
Unemployment” (ibid). But that said nothing about whether there existed 
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 The fourth characteristic (a preference for more equal distribution of income and wealth) is not directly 
addressed. Yet, via full employment, this may well be realised if the system works as planned. 
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involuntary unemployed or under-employed persons or not. Keynes’s definition 
had been abandoned. 
The NAIRU is rejected in the post-Keynesian approach to economics. The 
NAIRU is considered unstable and not unique but will change between time 
periods as a consequence of changes in the effective demand (Stockhammer, 
2012) and the hysteresis effects (Mitchell & Watts, 2012).154 It is effective 
demand, and not supply-side or microeconomic problems related to the labour 
market, that determines whether an economy will be able to attain full 
employment or not. Structural changes, such as technological progresses, 
depletion of natural resources and changes in consumers’ tastes, can then 
recreate unemployment, i.e. maintaining full employment levels can be 
challenging due to endogenous or exogenous developments (Forstater, 2012). 
Inflation, on the other hand, is “a complex social process” (Smithin, 2012, p. 
292), caused by a plethora of effects (cost-push, demand-pull, workers-vs.-
capitalists bargaining power, tax changes, etc.). Building a universal model of 
inflation, that fits all times and places, may well be impossible (ibid), although 
some brush strokes can be made, such as in this work when it comes to the 
relationship between credit and inflation. The post-Keynesian approach of 
observing empirical facts should be followed, not forgetting that characteristics 
and institutional factors of economies can change and invalidate or at least 
affect the processes that drove the original inflation dynamics.  
The relationship between unemployment and inflation – the Phillips curve – is, 
following post-Keynesian thinking, not to be expected to be stable, just like the 
NAIRU. Keynes himself did not put forward some sort of a “Phillips curve 
argument” when it came to the empirical relationship between inflation and 
unemployment and he would not have argued that there ever was or would be a 
stable such relationship (Lodewijks, 2012). Keynes argued that the economy 
was a system that could settle in at multiple equilibria and not a single one. 
Unemployment could be at any level, both in the short and the long run, and no 
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 Hysteresis has been investigated in many economies. Bolat, Tiwari, and Erdayi (2014) found the 
effects in Netherlands, Slovakia, Italy, Portugal and Cyprus but not in other Eurozone economies. 
Australian unemployment exhibits hysteresis (Tiwari, 2014) and the effect has been argued to exist in the 
US economy as well (Plotnikov, 2014). The fact that hysteresis is not always confirmed to exist signals 
the importance of the post-Keynesian institutional approach: different economies can have different 
institutional frameworks that will affect economic outcomes – such as the level of hysteresis. 
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market-based process would guarantee full employment at all times (Tily, 
2010). Inflation could at the same time be at whatever level. Chick discusses 
price changes without even mentioning the Phillips curve. The reason: 
“Fundamentally I do not think it was designed for the job [to explain price 
changes]” (Chick, 1983, p. 282). 
The orthodox long run Phillips curve is vertical. Boosting aggregate demand 
does nothing in the long run but to create inflation in this framework and 
employment will always settle in at its NAIRU level, which, according to this 
theory, can only be lowered with microeconomic reforms, such as deregulation, 
privatisation and the minimal size of the welfare state (Mitchell & Watts, 2012). 
But post-Keynesians reject the vertical long run Phillips curve (Kriesler & 
Lavoie, 2004). The rejection is based on the fact that the future is fundamentally 
uncertain so an expectations-augmented vertical long-run Phillips curve would 
simply be coincidental (so its slope can be of whatever degree and sign, 
positive or negative).155 Instead, as already mentioned, unemployment is 
caused by lack of effective demand and can exhibit hysteresis effects. 
Furthermore, inflation is “a complex social process” and its effects are far from 
being demand-related alone. 
The post-Keynesian view is, therefore, that there is no steady relationship 
between unemployment and inflation, neither in the short nor the long run. If 
there is a Phillips curve in place it can be of any shape and shift without much 
warning. Also, as Chick (1983) points out, the traditional Phillips curve, as 
simple and attractive as it is, is victim to exactly its own simplicity. The process 
of price changes is more complex than including only money-wages. Therefore, 
the Phillips curve, describing price changes only in relation to the labour market 
development, is simply inadequate as an explanation for inflation.156 
The OERS, which adopts post-Keynesian monetary theory characteristics, 
should be looked at within this post-Keynesian framework of the relationship 
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 As an example, Kriesler and Lavoie (2004) present a Phillips curve that is horizontal over a large 
range of capacity utilisation in the economy. 
156
 That does not mean that some sort of a Phillips-curve relationship cannot be shown to exist between 
unemployment and inflation in the post-Keynesian framework. An increase in effective demand that 
increases employment and output can lead to demand-pull inflation (Smithin, 2012), more notably so if 
capacity utilisation is high (Kriesler & Lavoie, 2004). This would show up as a downward sloping short 
term Phillips curve. But, as has been emphasised, post-Keynesians are careful not to consider this 
apparent relationship between unemployment and inflation as lasting or the only important one. 
298 
between inflation and unemployment. In the OERS, monetary policy is used to 
motivate banks to simultaneously reach full employment and low inflation via 
maintaining adequate demand and prefer lending to real economic activity 
rather than asset price speculation or inflationary consumer finance. A similarity 
can be drawn between the new-Keynesian approach and the OERS approach. 
In the new-Keynesian approach, the central bank faces a loss function (e.g. 
based on a Phillips curve) in reaching a higher level of employment. The losses 
are in the form of higher inflation. In the OERS, the “loss function” for the banks, 
as the conductors of monetary policy (creators and allocators of credit), is the 
(potential) trade-off between the effects of a change in the level of employment, 
inflation and the exchange rate on the regulatory DFX value as credit creation 
and credit allocation take place. We can express this with the following 
(simplified) relationship in mind:157 
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This means that the effects on the regulatory DFX value due to credit creation 
are going to be through the effects that said credit creation has on 
unemployment, inflation and the nominal exchange rate. Those factors will then 
affect the regulatory DFX value.  
Remember that it is the central bank that decides the shape of the regulatory 
DFX surface and as such the central bank defines, directly, the “loss function” 
for the banks. But the trade-off between employment, inflation and nominal 
exchange rate changes due to credit creation is affected by the allocation of 
credit:158 the effects of creating credit for consumer finance on the regulatory 
DFX value is not going to be the same as creating credit for expanding 
production capabilities in an export industry. The loss function which is derived 
from the regulatory DFX surface is therefore only a potential-loss function where 
the loss can be minimised by proper credit allocation. The potential-loss 
function, so defined by the regulatory DFX surface, also influences the rate at 
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 This follows the expressions on p. 254, i.e. regulatory DFX
 
value = f(µ, π, ∆E). This simplification 
excludes time and also the endogenous effects of changes in between the variables themselves e.g. the 
effects of a change in the nominal exchange rate on the level of unemployment (which will affect the 
regulatory DFX value). 
158
 Credit allocation is something new-Keynesian models do not commonly address but is an 
unquestionable part of the incentives in the OERS. 
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which banks would be willing to allow the currency to fall in value in an attempt 
to reach a higher level of employment as such currency devaluation can lead to 
temporary import-price inflation. 
The structure of the OERS moves in the direction of letting the private sector, 
with incentives from the policy maker, solve the problem of attaining full 
employment: the effective demand problem (see Forstater (2012)) is, at least 
partially, solved by the private sector itself due to the unemployment-incentive 
given by the regulatory DFX surface to banks. The regulatory DFX surface also 
incentivises the banks to maintain full employment, thereby providing a private-
sector solution, at least partially, to the structural change problem (ibid) of 
employment.159 At the same time, low inflation will be strived for by the banking 
system, no matter the level of employment, via the regulatory DFX surface. On 
top of this comes the ELR program which provides a public solution to both the 
effective demand and the structural change problems (Forstater, 2012) and 
helps stabilising wages and prices (Tcherneva, 2012). 
It should be noted that although employment is kept up by aggregate demand it 
does not mean that more aggregate demand is always better. The reason is 
simply that although growth theory models have traditionally looked at 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply independently of each other when 
postulating about the reasons for economic growth (and employment) in the 
short and the long run (Dutt, 2010) that approach is likely to be inappropriate 
(ibid). As an example, theoretically, economic growth could be demand-led in 
the short run but supply-led in the long run (Lavoie, 2010). If so, more demand 
does nothing for growth in the long run and its main long-run effects are a 
higher price level. But other theoretical growth models have adopted the view 
that both aggregate demand and aggregate supply are influential in the long run 
(Dutt, 2010). Yet, still, more demand will still lead to inflation if the expansion of 
aggregate supply does not keep up with the expansion of aggregate demand. 
There is therefore a limit to what aggregate demand can yield in the long run in 
the forms of economic growth and employment considering the cost paid in the 
                                            
159
 The effective demand problem is self-explanatory. The structural change problem is when changes in 
the economy itself cause unemployment, e.g. depletion of natural resources or the invention of a new 
technology that decreases the demand for labour. Banks will have the incentive, via the regulatory DFX 
value, to fight against this type of unemployment by allocating credit to new or other industries so that 
they will have the credit to develop and expand further, reemploying the unemployed as that development 
and expansion take place. 
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form of inflation: more aggregate demand is not always better for aggregate 
supply must follow suit. If it does not, we may have full employment but we are 
also likely to have high inflation (given a fixed liquidity preference).160  
5.10.2 Can banks spend other banks’ foreign reserves? 
When a bank extends credit to a borrower within the OERS it will lead to 
increased imports as the increased credit in the economy is purchasing power 
which in the end is spent on all sorts of goods, including imports. But if Bank A 
extends credit to a borrower, and imports pick up, there is nothing that says that 
Bank A will see its foreign reserves being depleted. It may just as well be the 
foreign reserves of Bank B that are used to finance the imports. This seems 
then to be a problem: banks can extend credit knowing that they may not be the 
(only) ones which will lose foreign reserves in the wake of it.  
Harkness suggests improving the interbank market such that when banks 
extend liquidity (central bank reserves) to each other they can demand being 
paid back in a foreign currency. If e.g. Bank A extends credit into the economy it 
will need to find liquidity (i.e. reserves) in the domestic currency to facilitate that 
credit extension for “[i]n the real world, banks extend credit, creating deposits in 
the process, and look for the reserves [in the domestic currency] later” (Holmes, 
1969, p. 73). Ways of finding those reserves include (in increasing-cost order) 
cash from depositors, the interbank market and the central bank (Wray, 2012).  
Harkness’s suggestion, in short, is that a bank which lends liquidity, in the 
domestic currency, to another bank on the interbank market may demand to be 
repaid in the foreign currency (at an agreed exchange rate) if it so chooses: all 
interbank lending will basically be accompanied with a currency option contract, 
executable at the will of the interbank-market lender. The same functionality can 
be in contracts between the central bank and the commercial banks.  
                                            
160
 Introducing new money into the economy in an attempt to boost aggregate demand, effective demand, 
output and employment is not a straightforward matter (Keynes, 1936, p. 187-188, emphasis added) “[f]or 
the schedule of liquidity-preference itself depends on how much of the new money is absorbed into the 
income and industrial circulations, which depends in turn on how much effective demand increases and 
how much the increase is divided between the rise in prices, the rise in wages, and the volume of output 
and employment.” The OERS assists, via the regulatory DFX surface, in diverting the increase in money 
supply such that the volume of output and the level of employment grow rather than causing a rise in 
consumption and asset prices or idle money balances (due to a high liquidity preference of the owner). 
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This means that when Bank A extends credit and later looks for liquidity in the 
interbank market, it will lose foreign reserves as it repays that interbank loan, if 
the lender so chooses. No individual bank would be able to extend credit and sit 
on their foreign reserves like Fáfnir sat on his gold.161 A positive development of 
this procedure is that a forward and/or options market would necessarily 
develop in the domestic currency, a feature that is missing or scarcely 
developed for many small currencies.162 
5.10.3 Will banks stop lending at home? 
Keynes wrote (quoted by Tily (2010, pp. 78-79), shortened and underlining 
added): 
Freedom of capital movements is an essential part of the old laissez-
faire system and assumes that it is right and desirable to have an 
equalisation of interest rates in all parts of the world... In my view the 
whole management of the domestic economy depends upon being 
free to have the appropriate rate of interest without reference to the 
rates prevailing elsewhere in the world. Capital control is a corollary 
to this. 
This seems to be a potential problem within the OERS. Harkness (1995) notes 
that domestic rates are likely to be insignificantly different from the world 
interest rates. But we have already seen how, potentially, a public debt 
management can be used to influence the domestic rate of interest downwards, 
see 5.7.2 Public debt, its management and the rate of interest. This would be 
done to gain a full employment level via investment activity.  
If it so happens that the domestic rate of interest to reach a full level of 
employment is lower than the world rate of interest, will the domestic public 
choose to invest all their savings abroad, due to the higher rate of interest? And 
would banks choose to invest their foreign reserves abroad instead of basing 
their credit creation at home on it? Will the end result then be a lack of credit 
due to a too-low rate of interest at home compared to the world rate of interest? 
                                            
161
 In Nordic mythology, Fáfnir was a dragon who had in his nest a vast amount of gold. He was greedy 
and poisoned the land around his nest so that nobody could ever approach it and the gold. 
162
 For a quick look at the FX forward market and how thinly, or not at all, traded it is with some 
currencies compared to others, see e.g. CME Group (2014). See also Bank of International Settlements 
(2013), especially table 5. 
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This is an unlikely situation to materialise. But before we continue explaining 
why, it should be noted that interest rate differentials between economies have, 
empirically, been in place even if the flow of capital is free. Amongst the OECD 
countries the difference between (nominal) long-term interest rates has ranged 
between 7 and 21 per cent since 2000.163 Of course, some of this difference is 
due to “different estimations of risk”, including inflation risk. But even the real 
interest rate parity hypothesis has, empirically, shown itself to be difficult to 
prove (J.-L. Wu & Chen, 1998). Furthermore, even if real interest rate parity 
would hold the balancing item may not be the rate of nominal interest or inflation 
but the exchange rate: low domestic real interest rates, pushed down by the 
management of public debt, compared to the “world” real interest rate could be 
corrected for by a (long term) strengthening of the nominal exchange rate 
instead of changes in the inflation or the interest rate: the chain of events in the 
interest rate parity hypothesis is unclear. As an example, real interest rates (CPI 
debased nominal rates, ex post) have been, on average, lower in Japan than in 
the US since 1989: the difference has been -0.34 per cent (green line, figure 
5.6). At the same time, the Japanese yen has strengthened versus the US 
dollar (figure 5.6, quarterly data from the OECD). 
Figure 5.6 Long term real rates differential and the USDJPY exchange rate 
 
Now, let us discuss the problem at hand. First, regarding the banks, it is unlikely 
that they, operating under a well-designed regulatory DFX surface, will 
                                            
163
 Data from the OECD. 
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predominantly choose to invest their foreign liquid assets abroad instead of 
using them to base their domestic credit creation on.  
The reason is the following. Imagine that the rate rh = rd + δd is the home rate of 
interest for private borrowers from banks. rd is the “risk free” rate at home; the 
rate on fully liquid government bonds, externally decided by the central bank 
and maintained via the management of public debt, see 5.7.2 Public debt, its 
management and the rate of interest. δd is the risk premium private borrowers 
pay on top of the risk free rate. At the same time, the “world rate of interest” is rw 
= rf + δf where rf is the risk free rate abroad and δf the risk premium foreign firms 
pay on top of that. The problem is that if rh < rw is needed to sustain full 
employment, will banks invest their foreign reserves abroad instead of creating 
credit at home? 
Let us look at the choice of the individual bank. Let us imagine that the 
individual bank within the OERS has acquired NX new foreign reserves. Since 
there are no capital controls in the OERS, the bank can freely choose to invest 
the NX either abroad or at home. What will the bank do? 
The bank may choose to use the NX foreign reserves to create and extend 
credit in the home economy even if the rate of interest is lower than abroad. If 
the bank is going to create credit at home then the interest income of the 
domestic loan would be (in the domestic currency):  
DFX * NX * (rd + δd) 
At the same time, the interest income of the foreign loan is (in the foreign 
currency):  
NX * (rw + δf) 
Assuming no changes in the exchange rate, the profit incentive for the bank to 
lend at home rather than abroad is the following: 
B?M ∙ ^M ∙ C; + _D > ^M ∙ W;" + _"Y 
B?M >
;" + _"
; + _
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So as long as the regulative DFX value is high enough, the bank will have the 
profit incentive to use its foreign reserves to create credit for domestic 
borrowers rather than investing abroad. Notice also that if banks borrow long 
term overseas at rf + δf the individual bank can still have the profit incentive to 
borrow abroad and use the foreign currency it gets to expand its creation of 
credit at home. That would in fact draw foreign funds into the economy despite 
rh < rw.  
But what about everybody else? Even if banks will be willing to use their foreign 
reserves to base their domestic credit on rather than using them to buy foreign 
assets, will the general public not still want to buy foreign high-interest rate 
financial assets, keeping its savings abroad rather than at home at a lower rate 
of interest? 
First, in regards to this question, remember that we have already argued that 
stock adjustments of financial wealth between foreign (F) and domestic (D) 
assets are not going to be prominent in the proposed system. Rather, capital 
flows are mainly going to be driven by flow adjustments and those adjustments 
will be driven by credit creation which will again be kept in check via the 
regulatory DFX surface.  
The case of “everybody else” preferring to keep their savings in a foreign form 
would be a stock adjustment towards foreign financial assets, the extreme of 
which would be domestic wealth stored in its entirety in foreign assets. From a 
portfolio theory point of view, that would be equivalent to placing all the eggs in 
the same basket. The holders of financial wealth in the economy are unlikely to 
make that choice. Furthermore, domestic parties ultimately need purchasing 
power in the domestic currency and not a foreign one. This creates a demand 
for financial wealth (store of value) in the domestic currency. So “everybody 
else” is not going to move all their wealth into foreign assets, creating acute and 
everlasting shortage of foreign reserves. Yes, financial wealth may be shifted 
between domestic and foreign financial wealth in the beginning, after the 
adoption of the system. But that stock adjustment would be temporary and so 
would its effects on capital flows be.  
Second, and generally about the possibility overall of having a rate of interest 
that is lower than the world rate of interest, this is basically an argument stating 
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that countries (central banks) are not tied to a global interest rate because they 
can exploit the uncovered interest parity condition, UIP, as long as they manage 
to create expectations about a stronger exchange rate in the future.164 
Lavoie (2000) discusses exactly this. He points out that one interpretation of the 
UIP is that it means that domestic interest rates cannot be lower than world 
rates – unless exchange rate expectations are manufactured by the policy 
maker. The real interest rate parity (RIP) is practically the same, taking inflation 
into the account. But Lavoie also points out that empirical studies have failed to 
prove that the UIP applies, just as is the case when it comes to the RIP. He also 
points out (relying on Coulbois and Prissert (1974) and Prissert (1972)) that the 
forward exchange rate is set administratively by foreign exchange dealers by 
reversing the covered interest rate parity, CIP. 165 In other words, the forward 
exchange rate is not a market-driven approximation of E(St+1) but simply 
calculated, by foreign exchange dealers, using the other known variables in the 
equation, i.e. Ft = St * (1+if) / (1+id). Therefore, the domestic monetary power 
can do whatever it likes to domestic interest rates – they are exogenously 
determined by it as long as it is willing to supply liquidity as the market wants 
(see 5.7.2 Public debt, its management and the rate of interest) 166 – and the 
forward exchange rate will simply follow: lower the domestic rate of interest and 
the forward exchange rate will appreciate.  
That, however, is not enough since the forward exchange rate is a bad predictor 
of the future spot exchange rate (Lavoie, 2000). As Lavoie points out, J. T. 
Harvey (1993, p. 517) is of the opinion that “...actual changes in the exchange 
rate are a function of how dealers expect the rate to change over the short and 
medium term.” Those expectations are subject to uncertainty, herd-behaviour 
and other traits focused on by the post-Keynesian literature. “News” is one 
variable that Harvey finds influential in moving the exchange rate and breaks it 
down to news of a) monetary policy moves, especially regarding actual or 
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 For ease of reference, the UIP is: 'I`
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= CbcdeD
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. 
165
 Again, for ease of reference, the CIP is: 'I`
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= >c
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 where Ft is the forward exchange rate at time t. 
166
 Footnote 9 in Lavoie (2000) is also interesting in this perspective where he refers the work of Dow 
(1999) who is of the opinion, according to Lavoie, that, fundamentally, it is the offered liquidity in the 
currency that affects the rate of interest of assets denominated in that currency. This only strengthens this 
author’s opinion that Keynes’s public-debt management would be effective in influencing the rate of 
interest to whatever level the monetary power would see fit to reach full employment in the economy, see 
section 5.7.2 Public debt, its management and the rate of interest and the references therein. 
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hinted interest rate movements, b) balance on the current account, c) economic 
indicators (excluding the current account), d) central bank intervention in the 
foreign exchange market and e) other news. Harvey finds that a), b), c) and e) 
are the most influential news that drives the exchange rate. 
Now think about a), b) and c) in the OERS as proposed.167 Factor a) is pretty 
much non-existent since the monetary policy is not driven by interest rate 
changes anymore but rests on quantitative and qualitative credit controls. 
Factor b) is still in effect but its prominence is likely to be limited since banks will 
not be able to create credit, which drives the current account down, to a larger 
extent than the DFX surface allows them. They are also unlikely to allow the 
current account to be in a large surplus as it would constitute a build-up of 
foreign reserves in the economy, which can be used to create more credit. 
Factor c) will be just as important as before and since the economic indicators 
in the OERS are, if the system works, generally positive, since the system 
drives the banks to reach the economic goals, c) is likely to have, generally, 
strengthening effects on the exchange rate in the long run. Lavoie points exactly 
this out when he highlights that a low rate of interest can actually draw in foreign 
capital, especially of the long term type, since the low interest rates spur 
economic growth. And, as we saw in chapter 4, economic growth actually drags 
FDI into the economy. 
To summarise the argument: domestic interest rates that are lower than the 
world interest rate are possible in the OERS because the forward exchange rate 
market follows the interest rate changes of the domestic monetary power (CIP 
holds by definition) and positive economic development in the wake of a low 
domestic rate of interest will spur speculators and investors to strengthen the 
exchange rate over the long term. In short, as Lavoie (2000, p. 176) notes: 
The empirical failure of uncovered interest parity, combined with the 
cambist causal explanation of the covered interest parity relation and 
the Post Keynesian view of the foreign exchange market, sustains 
the notion that central banks are able to set real rates of interest that 
                                            
167
 “Other news” (factor e)) were news that were impossible to rank with a)-d). Harvey mentions a 
military confrontation (US vs. Libya in early January 1989, supposedly the Gulf of Sidra incident) and 
these news must be evaluated one by one. Other “other news” could then be e.g. politics or the weather. 
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are lower (or higher) than those ruling on average in the rest of the 
world.  
5.11 Responsibly sharing the power to create money 
John Locke (1821, p. 116) wrote: 
The great question which in all ages has disturbed mankind, and 
brought on them the greatest part of those mischiefs which have 
ruined cities, depopulated countries, and disordered the peace of the 
world, has been, not whether there be power in the world, nor 
whence it came, but who should have it. 
Martin (2013) describes how the power of creating money has been 
“perennially” fought over by the sovereign and private parties. Today, the 
situation is that most money is created by the banking system (see e.g. figure 
2.6). However, that has not always been the case as Martin (2013) points out. 
The power of money creation was considered the right of the sovereign by the 
Chinese. Creating money – the seigniorage – was in some cases the main 
source of income for the government (ibid). Supporters of taking the money-
creation capabilities away from banks want, basically, to move the money-
creation power back in its entirety to the state, showing, indeed, how perennial 
this battle is.  
But the sovereign power has repeatedly misused this power (ibid). Exactly 
because seigniorage can be such an important source of revenue it is easy for 
the government to be tempted to issue “just a bit more”. This causes inflation 
and devalues the purchasing power of existing stock of money, changing the 
monetary standard in comparison to the amount of goods it can buy. This 
inflationary episode can, in some cases, be democratically favoured as it 
recalibrates the monetary standard, when it becomes “unfair”, towards 
increased fairness (ibid). An example could be when financial assets are mainly 
distributed towards a plutocratic elite and the plebs want economic justice and 
equity, and demand them via their political right to cast a ballot – and if they do 
not have that right the plutocratic elite risks a plebeian revolution (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2013).  
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But history shows that the sovereign cannot be entirely trusted to handle the 
power to create money in an economically responsible way – and democracy is 
open to the flaws of populism: will the common populace most definitely reach 
the economically soundest conclusion via the ballot? Every so often, the 
sovereign misuses the power of creating money at the cost of the private sector 
(Martin, 2013), whether populism is a problem or not. 
Minsky famously pointed out that “everyone can create money; the problem is 
to get it accepted” (Minsky, 2008, p. 255). The private sector does this everyday 
as private parties enter into promises to pay, i.e. create an IOU, and most of 
today’s money creation takes place in banks (see Chapter 2). But contrary to 
the sovereign no private party has political authority. And as Martin (2013) 
points out, private money only works in good times when it is trusted. When 
confidence vaporises it is the sovereign that must step in and provide liquidity, 
even equity, to the banking system. And sovereign money (today, central bank 
reserves) is at the top of the liability pyramid: it is the ultimate payment of taxes 
and private liabilities make use of the currency, the money, that the government 
issues and demands payments of taxes in (Wray, 2012). For a long time, the 
sovereign has been recognised as having the responsibility – and the capability 
– of stopping a liquidity crisis in the banking system (Martin, 2013) exactly 
because the sovereign controls the only institution that has the capability of 
creating vast amount of liquidity of sovereign money almost instantaneously: the 
central bank. The problem is however still in place but turned on its head: the 
cost of the private sector’s misuse of the power to create money is now borne 
by the sovereign. The money that is created by the central bank to finance a 
bailout for the private banking system could be used for something else, such 
as providing a free-for-all road or free-for-all education. 
The problem is therefore essentially the same if the power to create money, de 
jure or de facto, is mainly in the hands of either the private sector or the public 
sector: those who benefit from creating the money do not bear the full cost of 
their actions in case they create too much or too little of it. When the sovereign 
creates all the money, and creates an economic mess (such as inflation), it is 
the private sector that foots the bill. When the private sectors creates the 
money, and creates an economic mess (such as debt-induced crises), it is the 
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public power that foots the bill. Money creators, in brush strokes, do not equally 
face both the potential upsides and downsides of their money-creation actions. 
The system here proposed solves this accountability problem. The solution is in 
the form of deficit-spending by the government that is aimed at reaching the 
economic goals of the nation in case the banks do not reach them. As 
previously explained, deficit-spending by the government leads to depletion of 
banks’ net foreign reserves. They will therefore vehemently oppose such 
spending. But if the government is going to hold back on its deficit spending, it 
will demand that of banks that they reach and sustain the economic goals: quid 
pro quo.  
Friedman (1978) believed “that the problem in this world is to avoid the 
concentration of power.”168 On a similar note, Acemoglu and Robinson (2013, p. 
364) note that “[r]ich nations are rich largely because they managed to develop 
inclusive institutions at some point during the past three hundred years” and 
that (ibid): 
Under inclusive economic institutions, wealth is not concentrated in 
the hands of a small group that could then use its economic might to 
increase its political power disproportionally. Furthermore, under 
inclusive economic institutions there are limited gains from holding 
political power, thus weaker incentives for every group and every 
ambitious, upstart individual to try to take control of the state. 
Werner (2005, p. 214-215, emphasis added) also writes: 
Since the credit market is supply-determined and the decision about 
whether and how much to lend and who to lend to is entirely made by 
the banks, a crucial public goods function that affects the entire 
economy is performed by them... [But t]here is no guarantee [in a 
laissez-faire system] that the choice made by individual banks is 
consistent with the [credit] allocation that would maximize social 
welfare. Given the pervasiveness of imperfect information, it would be 
a mere coincidence if the banks’ decisions were welfare optimal. 
                                            
168
 Relying on small and decentralised banking systems to counter the concentration of power within the 
financial system has been proposed (Werner, 2013). 
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Indeed, the incentive structure of loan officers may produce 
behaviour that is oriented towards other goals than what would be in 
the interest of the overall population (for instance, they may favour 
large-scale firms in established industries, as this may minimize risk 
to their own job security, or real estate speculators, expecting high 
profits). 
Thus there is a case for government intervention at various levels: 
firstly, the government can intervene to implement an institutional 
design for the banking system, which will give loan officers incentives 
that will align their individual behaviour more with the social welfare 
goal. Secondly, the government or other delegated authority (such as 
the central bank) may enhance welfare by intervening in the decision-
making process concerning the decision of how much to lend in 
aggregate (that is, how much total credit should be created) and who 
to lend to (which industrial sector, and so on). 
In the system here proposed, and contrary to the ideas of “debt-free” money 
supporters, banks will still, as they do today, take the first step in the money 
creation process. They will still be able to allocate and create – and not merely, 
as in the “debt-free” money proposals, allocate – credit and money, i.e. the 
medium of exchange. After all “that is what they are for” and “[t]hat is the 
banking business, just in the same way a steel plant makes steel” according to 
a former governor of Bank of Canada (Towers, 1945). But banks’ economic 
power, their “economic might”, will be limited compared to what it is today, the 
reason being that not only are their credit (money) creation capabilities 
quantitatively limited by the central bank’s regulatory DFX value but they have a 
strong incentive to adhere to the wishes of society of economic welfare. If the 
banks, via their credit creation and allocation, fail to reach the economic goals 
and their private-money creation leads to divergence from these goals, the 
government will step in and create the money itself. The government will get its 
seigniorage, as is one of the goals of debt-free money supporters, but only if 
banks have failed to reach the economic goals. This is a clear institutional 
incentive structure for banks, which, albeit not being directed directly to loan 
officers, is along the lines of Werner’s recommendations. His recommendations 
of some sort of quantitative and qualitative credit controls are also heeded. 
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But a vital question still stands unanswered: will the government, like the 
sovereigns of old, not misuse its power to deficit spend? 
5.11.1 Will the government misuse its power to deficit-spend? 
This is an institutional question. As such, we seek insights from Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2013). The question is then: how do we set up an institutional design 
such that the government will not, or, preferably, cannot, misuse its power to 
deficit-spend? 
Wray (2012) notes that there are no operational constraints on the ability of the 
government to spend money. The constraints are self-imposed and political in 
the form of inflationary and exchange rate pressures. In the framework set up 
here, another political pressure will be coming from the banks since government 
spending will lead to depletion of banks’ foreign reserves. That, on top of 
political pressures on the government in the form of democratic voting, should 
tip the scale such that there are “limited gains from holding political power” 
when it comes to the government’s power to create money by spending. This 
institutional design is that of inclusive economic and political institutions. 
If this is not a strong enough institutional design around the system, it can be 
strengthened further to limit the government from spending “just a bit more” and 
misuse its power to deficit-spend money into existence. One way of doing that 
would be to set up a “Money Creation Committee”, MCC, a term coming from 
“debt-free” money supporters. The MCC would have the (constitutional) 
mandate to stop the government from expanding the money supply via deficit-
spending if inflation goes above a pre-determined value, which could even be 
decided by the MCC itself. The MCC would therefore act as the “traffic-light” of 
government deficit-spending, stopping the government from misusing its power 
to create money if inflation is too high. 
At the same time, the MCC can also be the institutional venue for different 
opinions of interested parties to be publicly and democratically discussed. It will 
not be discussed in detail here how this institutional venue could be organised 
but following Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) work on inclusive institutions and 
their favourable economic consequences, some simple principles should be 
kept in mind.  
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First, political and economic accountability should be in place. Political and 
economic powers should be limited, such as with a cap on how long and how 
often an individual can sit on the MCC. Second, all interested parties should be 
represented and their voices equally heard: pluralism should be favoured.169 
Third, an institutional design that caters for quick execution of decisions is 
favourable as, in times of crisis, time can be severely limited and actions must 
take place swiftly. The possibility of temporarily ignoring the MCC’s 
constitutional mandate for low inflation should e.g. be considered in case of war 
or other crisis. For excellent examples of crises where time was short, see 
Bruner and Carr (2007) and Sorkin (2010). 
5.11.2 The deal 
The system here proposed is a deal between the banks and the sovereign 
power: the government allows the banks to create and allocate credit, 
functioning as money, into the economy. Instead, it demands a well-functioning 
economy at all times: quid pro quo.  Deals between those parties are common 
and, indeed, those two parties need each other: banks need e.g. clear property 
rights and a well-functioning legal system, which the government provides, to be 
able to operate safely, while the government needs a well-functioning payment 
system and an economy-wide supply of credit, which the banking system 
provides, to have a flourishing economy (Calomiris & Haber, 2014).  
In the end, it is beneficial for both the banks and the government that everybody 
plays by the rules and that the economic goals of low unemployment, low 
inflation and a stable exchange rate are reached. And it is in nobody’s interest 
to cheat: if banks do, the government will stop them, via the regulatory DFX 
surface, and even outright take over the money creation process. If the 
government cheats, and inflation goes out of bounds, the MCC can stop it in its 
tracks. It will also face political pressures, especially from banks. Quid pro quo 
goes both ways. 
                                            
169
 An example of a five-member MCC could be the following: a central bank representative, a bank 
representative, a government representative, a labour union representative, and an independent academic 
(with a background in monetary economics). The meetings of the MCC should be open to the public 
and/or the media for transparency reasons. Records of MCC meetings should be public. 
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5.12 An empirical case: Croatia  
Croatia170 is a small European economy with its own currency, the kuna (HRK). 
The currency regime is classified by the IMF as a “crawl-like arrangement” 
versus the euro (International Monetary Fund, 2013a), but Croatia, which joined 
the EU in 2013, expects to, eventually, join the euro zone (Thomson, 2013). 
Geršl and Jašová (2014, p. 13) describe the arrangement as follows:  
The National Bank of Croatia de jure employs an exchange rate 
regime of managed floating... [But] de facto operates under a quasi-
currency board that allows for exchange rate volatility to discourage 
one-way gambles and speculation and encourage FX hedging.   
We can use statistics from the Croatian National Bank (CNB), the World Bank 
and the Croatian Bureau of Statistics to discuss what the implications for the 
Croatian economy would be if the OERS system had been adopted. 
A credit expansion took place in the Croatian economy, both immediately after 
the war of independence (which ended in 1995) until 1998 and again after 2000 
until 2008 (Geršl & Jašová, 2014; Kraft & Jankov, 2005). This credit expansion, 
also visible on figure 5.7 (data from CNB Bulletin, Table D1), had the effects of 
stimulating current account and foreign debt problems along with generally 
increasing the threat of a banking crisis (Kraft & Jankov, 2005). To hold back 
the credit expansion, regulations regarding banks’ reserve requirements were 
applied (2004-2006), capital buffers changed and credit ceilings adopted (from 
January 2003 to December 2003 and November 2007 until 2009: the limit was 
16% annual growth of banks’ outstanding credit but circumvented via banks’ 
foreign offices, see Dell’Ariccia, Igan, Laeven, and Tong (2013)) amongst other 
measures (Geršl & Jašová, 2014).171 Some of those measures worked, to some 
limited extent (ibid), but the overall stock of outstanding credit expanded 
nevertheless noticeably as figure 5.6 shows (data from CNB).172 
                                            
170
 Special thanks to Ines Merkl at the Publishing Department of the Croatian National Bank for 
assistance in finding data for this section. All faults are mine. 
171
 As expected, according to endogenous money creation theory (see chapter 2 for an introduction), the 
changes in the reserve requirements were ineffective in holding back the expansion of credit: “...the boom 
did not stop in 2006, rendering the overall effectiveness of such measures questionable” (Geršl & Jašová, 
2014, p. 17) 
172
 “Credit institutions” includes banks and non-bank financial institutions. The power to create credit 
(money) does not reside with the non-bank private sector but only banks (Werner, 2005). It is hoped that 
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Figure 5.6 Croatia: Credit institutions’ claims (all currencies) on domestic sectors 
 
This credit expansion was accompanied with a fall in the unemployment rate 
and strong economic growth, especially immediately after the end of the war of 
independence. However, when the credit expansion slowed down, 
unemployment rose and GDP growth fell. Inflation, after an initial short term 
burst, fell as well and is now, in May 2014, below 0%, i.e. deflation (figures 5.7-
5.9). 
Figure 5.7 Croatia: Unemployment and growth of total claims of credit institutions 
 
                                                                                                                                
the assumption that “credit institutions” mainly includes banks, in the case of Croatia, is not a heroic one 
and does therefore not excessively eschew the following discussion. 
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Figure 5.8 Croatia: GDP growth and growth of total claims of credit institutions 
 
Figure 5.9 Croatia: Inflation and growth of total claims of credit institutions 
 
We can see what happened to the DFX value of the banking system (aggregate 
figures). Figures 5.10 and 5.11 below show how the ratio grew steadfastly along 
with the expansion of credit and began to fall again as the credit expansion 
slowed down. Notice that most of the credit expansion was to the domestic 
sector (also pointed out by Kraft and Jankov (2005) who disaggregate the 
figures more than is done here).  
A note on the calculation of the DFX ratio is in order: “foreign reserves” of banks 
are calculated as “Foreign currencies” (CNB Bulletin data, Table D2: Foreign 
assets) + “Demand deposits” (ibid, Table D2: Foreign assets) – “Demand 
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liabilities” (ibid, Table D10: Foreign liabilities). This is an estimate of “foreign 
reserves”, as previously defined, of banks operating in Croatia as the CNB does 
not disaggregate “Loans and advances” (ibid, Table D10: Foreign liabilities) or 
any other line in its data tables into “short term” and “long term” sections. 
Figure 5.10 Croatia: DFX ratio of credit institutions 
 
Figure 5.11 Croatia: DFX ratio and growth of total claims of credit institutions 
 
Croatian policy makers began applying reserve requirements in 2003 in an 
attempt to hold the credit expansion back. This did not work and credit 
continued to expand. Had they, however, limited the DFX value of banks to, 
say, 60 they would have stopped the banks’ ability to expand credit as quickly 
as they did post-2002, when that value would have become restrictive (see red 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Ju
l-
9
9
A
p
r-
0
0
Ja
n
-0
1
O
ct
-0
1
Ju
l-
0
2
A
p
r-
0
3
Ja
n
-0
4
O
ct
-0
4
Ju
l-
0
5
A
p
r-
0
6
Ja
n
-0
7
O
ct
-0
7
Ju
l-
0
8
A
p
r-
0
9
Ja
n
-1
0
O
ct
-1
0
Ju
l-
1
1
A
p
r-
1
2
Ja
n
-1
3
O
ct
-1
3
DFX ratio Central Government
Other Domestic Sectors DFX ratio: 60
12 per. Mov. Avg. (DFX ratio)
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Ju
l-
9
9
A
p
r-
0
0
Ja
n
-0
1
O
ct
-0
1
Ju
l-
0
2
A
p
r-
0
3
Ja
n
-0
4
O
ct
-0
4
Ju
l-
0
5
A
p
r-
0
6
Ja
n
-0
7
O
ct
-0
7
Ju
l-
0
8
A
p
r-
0
9
Ja
n
-1
0
O
ct
-1
0
Ju
l-
1
1
A
p
r-
1
2
Ja
n
-1
3
O
ct
-1
3
DFX ratio
Claims growth, YoY
317 
dashed line, figure 5.10). This would have decreased the current account 
problem, which was the main reason for the central bank’s credit interventions 
(Kraft & Jankov, 2005), by decreasing the growth of imports, which is linked to 
the growth of credit (see 5.2.1 Domestic credit expansion and current account 
deficits, also Kraft and Jankov (2005)). Limiting the credit expansion also would 
have limited the downgrade in lending standards that took place (ibid) and 
limited the pressure on the exchange rate, which, had it set off, would have 
caused realisation of credit risk in the banking system (many domestic loans are 
linked to the exchange rate or in foreign currencies while borrowers’ income is 
in the domestic currency) and stirred memories of previous uncontrolled 
inflation and exchange rate depreciations (ibid). Instead, the policies applied 
were at best only partially successful in holding back the credit expansion (ibid). 
The economy would not have suffered due to the credit limitation imposed by a 
regulatory DFX value of 60. First, banks would have responded by raising long-
term foreign funding, via their foreign parent companies or not, thereby boosting 
their foreign reserves and credit-creation capabilities. This also would have 
diminished the international-crisis-induced problem of capital flows reversal, as 
banks’ funding would have been for the long term.  
Second, banks would have had the explicit institutional incentive to lend to real 
economic activity, especially export industries. This would have improved the 
current account and improved employment and kept inflation low as production 
would have expanded parallel to increased credit in the economy. This incentive 
would also be particularly strong today in the current state of very low inflation 
(deflation) and high unemployment. 
Third, the level of private credit in the economy would have been more 
manageable, which, according to Minsky’s FIH, would have strengthened the 
financial stability of the economy. Credit, due to the incentives in the institutional 
design of the system, would have come from banks first and foremost to finance 
investment and real economic activities, which generate cash flows from 
production instead of speculation with existing assets. Such cash flows serve 
contractual debt obligations as they mature. Consequently, aggregate private 
debt-to-income levels would have been contained and banks’ non-performing 
loans ratio been lower than it is today. Instead, domestic credit to the private 
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sector, provided by banks, grew from 36% of GDP in 2001, which is the last 
year that a regulatory DFX value of 60 would have been non-restrictive (see 
figure 5.10), before topping in 71% of GDP in 2011 (World Bank data) and 
banks’ non-performing loans are currently 15.4% of their total gross loans (year 
end 2013 figures), up from 4.8% in 2007 (ibid). 
Finally, had banks not adequately performed their task of creating and 
allocating credit efficiently, the Croatian government would have stepped in and 
done it itself. Public investment in export industries, education, health and 
infrastructure would have been welcome, especially in a country that had rather 
recently been torn by war and its destruction. This would have expanded the 
production capabilities of the Croatian economy while providing employment 
and sustaining cash flows to firms and workers. Such government spending 
would, today, still have positive effects as it would improve banks’ balance 
sheets by lowering their non-performing loans ratio. Unemployment levels 
would drop. The Croatian state could even, as an additional measure, borrow 
from the banks to improve their balance sheets, as suggested by Werner (2005) 
in the case of Japan: a safer borrower than the state hardly exists in any 
economy. This government spending, via the banking system or not, could 
come instead of the measures now adopted by the CNB to stimulate credit 
growth in an attempt to revive the economy (see e.g. Vidakovic and Zbašnik 
(2014) for discussion on the measures adopted: they include the lowering of the 
reserve requirement).  
We therefore conclude that had Croatia adopted the OERS the credit expansion 
of post-2000 had been largely contained. The allocation of credit created would 
have improved as well. Today’s possibilities of maintaining employment and low 
inflation at the same time would have been expanded compared to what they 
actually are. 
Conclusion to chapter 5 
In the beginning of this chapter, we stated that this “chapter offers an insight 
into how the monetary system itself can be amended to moderate the adverse 
effects of FDI while, at least, maintaining the positives.”  
Hopefully, the chapter has done so. The OERS encourages banks to look for 
long term financing at all times, including when FDI inflows into the economy 
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take place and, as we saw in chapter 1 and earlier in this chapter with the case 
of Iceland, credit expansion can, consequently and parallel to the FDI activity, 
take place. This way, the positive spillovers that, potentially, can take place with 
the FDI activity will have their chance of affecting the host economy while credit 
expansion is kept in check and, following the empirical record and Minsky’s FIH, 
financial stability is maintained.  
In the OERS the economy is never in a slump for the state can intervene with 
government spending even if the banks fail to maintain employment and low 
inflation. Depending on how well the system works an economy with a record of 
high level of financial stability may even attract further FDI, boosting yet further 
the potential positive spillovers of such international economic activity. Credit, 
i.e. money, is cheap in the OERS but not readily available for any financing at 
all. The economic cycle is thus discouraged to take place and the economy will 
be more stable in the state of a “quasi-boom.” The OERS follows, in other 
words, what Keynes had envisaged in order to get rid of the economic cycle 
(Keynes, as quoted by Tily (2010, p. 244)): 
[T]he remedy for the boom is not a higher rate of interest but a lower 
rate of interest! For that may enable the so-called boom to last. The 
right remedy for the trade cycle is not to be found in abolishing booms 
and thus keeping us permanently in a semi-slump; but in abolishing 
slumps and thus keeping us permanently in a quasi-boom. 
The OERS recognises the need to keep the credit expansion in check. FDI 
inflows will have mainly isolated effects on the industry in question instead of 
leading to excessive credit booms over the economy as a whole. FDI outflows 
are neither encouraged nor discouraged and such projects will, as today, be 
judged on their expected profitability. Other destabilising capital flows, such as 
short-term bank financing, are discouraged as banks cannot expand their credit 
creation capabilities by raising such finance. 
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Conclusion 
Theories should be relevant in that they should represent reality as 
accurately as possible and should strive to explain the real world as 
observed empirically. 
Philip Arestis (1996, p. 261) 
We have travelled afar from the introduction to this work. We set out on this 
journey by quoting Arestis (1996, p. 112): “The main aim of post-Keynesian 
economics is to provide a clear understanding of how the economy works, by 
relating economic analysis to real economic problems.” We adopted the post-
Keynesian approach to economics “which begins with observation and 
proceeds to build upon ‘realistic abstractions’ rather than ‘imaginary models’.”  
Since then, we have provided a brush-stroke image of some of the literature 
behind foreign direct investments, both in general and in the financial sector. 
We have described Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis, FIH, and argued 
how it can be used to develop measures of financial instability. Using those 
measures, we investigated the connections between financial instability, foreign 
direct investment, and economic growth (see section 4.2 Results for details). 
Then, using observation and realistic abstractions, we developed a monetary 
system – the OERS, supported by public debt management a la Keynes – 
which we argued would solve the “policy problem” as Minsky (2008, p. 328) 
described it: “...to devise institutional structures and measures that attenuate 
the thrust to inflation, unemployment, and slower improvements in the standard 
of living without increasing the likelihood of a deep depression.” 
The conclusion, in as concise form as possible, is that foreign direct investment 
is a double-edged sword. Although theoretical arguments can be made for its 
case the empirical record as observed here points in the direction of financial 
stability being impaired, rather than not, parallel to FDI activities. In short, the 
pessimistic view of FDI and its effects on the economy seem to be empirically 
more accurate than the optimistic view when it comes to financial stability. 
However, whether that is unavoidably the case is not certain and should be 
judged on a case-by-case basis. Adopting the OERS, along with public debt 
management a la Keynes, would certainly improve the ability of FDI to have 
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positive effects on the economy, rather than negative, especially as financial 
stability would be supported by a strong policy framework. Those are the core 
empirical and theoretical contributions of this work. 
6.1 Policy implications of this work 
On 24th of November, 2005, Halldór Ásgrímsson, then the prime minister of 
Iceland, established a committee. The committee had the purpose of discussing 
the possibilities of building Iceland up as an international financial centre. The 
committee was headed by Sigurdur Einarsson, then the chairman of the board 
of directors of Kaupthing Bank, Iceland’s largest bank, but later found guilty of 
market manipulation, receiving a prison sentence of five years (Ríkisútvarpið, 
2013). The committee’s report was published in October 2006 
(Forsætisráðuneyti, 2006). It recommended some reforms that were to move 
Iceland closer to becoming an international financial centre. 
Two years later, the economy crashed and the financial system was wiped out. 
It was rebuilt only on the grounds of an exigency legislation (laws no. 125/2008, 
normally referenced to as “The Emergency Act”) that allowed, amongst other 
things, the Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority to force banks into 
liquidation and the government to establish new banks on the ashes of the old, 
bankrupt ones. The Central Bank raised capital controls and took over the 
intermediation of international payments to and from Iceland.  
Less than six years after the collapse of the Icelandic banking system, in June 
2014, Aldo Musacchio, Associate Professor of Business Administration at 
Harvard Business School, argued that Iceland (Jónsson, 2014) 
...should try to follow into the footsteps of states such as Hong Kong 
and Singapore. It would be a good idea to make use of the 
experience and the knowledge which [Icelanders] have gained in the 
field of finance after the collapse of the banks in the fall of 2008 to 
open up the economy for foreign investors and turn it into an 
international financial centre. 
One of the centrepieces of Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis is that 
market participants, people, forget. Or as he put it: “...over time the memory of 
the past disaster is eroded” (see 3.3.1 Minsky’s Financial Instability 
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Hypothesis). It is tempting to argue that in the case of any ideas regarding 
turning Iceland into an international financial centre, memories of the past 
disaster have eroded particularly fast. 
As noted in the introduction to this work, Iceland has been an inspiration to me. 
One reason might be that Icelanders were, before 2008, stricken exceptionally 
blind by euphoria that nothing could cast a shadow on. Words of warnings were 
ridiculed. Infamous are the examples of Þorgerður Katrín Gunnarsdóttir and 
Árni Mathiesen before the crash in 2008. In 2006, when the Icelandic banks 
faced criticism regarding their business model from international finance 
professionals, including Richard Thomas of Merrill Lynch, Gunnarsdóttir asked, 
as the minister of education and a member of the Icelandic parliament, if 
Thomas “did not need a refresher course [in economics]” (Vísir, 2008c). 
Mathiesen, as the minister of finance and a member of parliament, asked, in 
March 2007, the opposition, who tried to echo the words of warning from 
abroad: “Boys, can’t you see the party?” (Alþingi, 2007). A year and a half later, 
the party was over. 
Steingrímur Hermannsson, then the minister of foreign affairs and a member of 
the Icelandic parliament, commented back in 1987 that “in this small economic 
society of ours [Iceland], which is far from being in equilibrium, those holy laws 
of economics do not apply” (KB, 1987). Those words have been repeatedly 
ridiculed since then. They have been interpreted such that Iceland is conceived 
as being “special” and so unique that the “holy laws of economics do not apply.” 
But of course the laws of economics must apply in Iceland, like any other 
economy. Otherwise, they are not laws in the first place. And Iceland is just an 
economy, like any other. Hermannsson’s words are an oxymoron at best and 
nationalistic at worst. 
But Hermannsson must be given credit. He was referring to the laws of laissez-
faire economics: “[m]onetary policy based on laissez-faire economics will take 
everything here to Hell if it is not stopped” (ibid). Twenty-one year later, the 
economy, under the helmsmanship of liberal economic theories, arrived to Hell. 
To Minsky, like post-Keynesians, the laws of laissez-faire economics were not 
laws in the first place. The economy was not destined to tend to a stable 
equilibrium but to unstable disequilibria. With the passing of time, a “stable” 
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economy would endogenously develop trends towards ever increasingly fragile 
financial structures. The time would come that the system would, endogenously, 
break under the build-up of leverage and debt and a financial panic would be 
the result. Contrary to laissez-faire economics, “stability is destabilising” and the 
government had a role: to stabilise markets and solve “the policy problem”. 
Minsky built his theory of endogenous financial instability on a diverse set of 
economists that preceded him. Schumpeter was his doctoral supervisor and he 
understood, like post-Keynesians, how money is endogenously created by the 
banking system and how endogenous money finances economic activity without 
any ex-ante savings. Fisher’s debt deflation theory explained how too much 
debt can force a deflation in prices to take place, which will have a feedback 
back onto the overburden of debt so that a vicious cycle sets in. Kalecki’s 
principle of increasing risk helped understanding how an interest rate increase 
can develop, endogenously, in the financial system as the leverage builds up. 
The increase in interest rates can then act as the snowball that turns into the 
avalanche of debt deflation. 
But it was Keynes who provided the shoulders of a giant that the FIH stands on. 
It was Keynes’s approach to economics, relying on uncertainty, money, and 
human behaviour, that provided the most influential theories behind Minsky’s 
formulation of the FIH. Keynes was so influential to Minsky that he saw it 
worthwhile to write a book, named after Keynes himself, about his theories and 
how they had been misunderstood by the mainstream. 
Admittedly, because Minsky’s theories are constructed on Keynes’s, it can be 
hard to see where the line between them is to be drawn. This work, which to a 
large extent rests on Minsky’s theories, can consequently be interpreted as 
being an offspring of Keynes’s theories rather than his intellectual son. As an 
example, the last chapter of this work builds a monetary system which, it is 
argued, helps solving the “policy problem”, as Minsky described it. But it can 
just as well be interpreted as a continuation of Keynes’s ideas for Keynes 
“regard[ed] monetary policy as an important policy to prevent recession and 
public works as most relevant to the cure of recession” (Chick & Tily, 2014, p. 
2). That is exactly what the OERS, along with Keynes’s public debt 
management, does. It uses monetary policy (quantitative and qualitative credit 
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controls) to prevent recessions and keep the economy permanently in a “quasi-
boom”. Public works, such as an Employer of Last Resort program, act as a 
failsafe – the cure to recessions – in case the monetary policy fails, for one 
reason or the other, to prevent them. 
Reorganising the way monetary policy is done may seem radical to some. But 
the dominant monetary-policy regime of the day, i.e. inflation targeting, has 
been tested. And it failed the test.  
Today, it is generally accepted that keeping inflation down is not enough to 
secure financial stability (Bank of International Settlements, 2014). Central 
banks have therefore had to improvise and the idea of “Inflation Targeting Plus” 
has, essentially, resurfaced.173 According to these ideas, inflation targeting must 
be accompanied with something else, such as direct interventions on the 
exchange rate market or more proactive government finances. Changing 
interest rates to suffocate inflation and let the market do the rest is not enough. 
But the problem goes deeper than that. Monetary policy based on an inflation 
target and conducted by changing interest rates seemed to have defeated high 
inflation when it was gradually adopted in the late 1980s and 1990s. But that 
success can be ascribed to nothing else than luck: it was the lack of economic 
shocks that created the Great Moderation and not inflation targeting 
(Beckworth, 2014; Cecchetti & Ehrmann, 1999). And one cannot ignore the fact 
that the Great Moderation preceded the Great Recession without monetary 
policy based on inflation targeting having much to say about it: monetary policy 
based on inflation targeting did not prevent the Great Recession, thereby failing 
to fulfil the purpose of monetary policy as Keynes saw it.  
                                            
173
 The term has also been called “Augmented Inflation Targeting” and “Inflation Targeting 2.0” 
(Baldwin & Gros, 2013). No exact definition of the term seems to exist but Baldwin and Gros highlight 
that it “involves financial stability considerations – even when that means coordinating with other 
domestic institutions, regulators, and so on”. This, of course, breaks the “linchpin” of the trust that the 
inflation target itself rests on: central-bank independence. There is therefore a certain internal conflict in 
“Inflation Targeting Plus”. A mention of the exact term, considerably before the Great Recession, is in 
Holub (2004). But the idea is older. As an example, Bofinger and Wollmershäuser (2003) discuss the 
role, or the lack thereof, of exchange rate interventions in a macro model where the monetary policy is 
based on inflation targeting. They then introduce exchange rate interventions as complementary to 
inflation targeting via policy rate changes and note that despite central banks declaring their target being 
inflation and their policy tool being interest rate changes, they frequently intervene in the exchange rate 
market. Goldstein (2002, p. 1) discusses “”managed floating plus,” where the “plus” is shorthand for a 
framework that includes inflation targeting and aggressive measures to reduce currency mismatching.” 
But the policy tool is still interest rate changes. 
325 
So just as interest rate changes superseded the idea of conducting monetary 
policy on the basis of growth of the money supply, the “experiment” that inflation 
targeting is may have reached its end (Beckworth, 2014). Something else must 
come instead. “Inflation Targeting Plus” is one suggestion. Another suggestion 
is the OERS, supported by the tested, and successful, method of managing the 
public debt a la Keynes. 
The switchover from the Great Moderation to the Great Recession would have 
been impossible within the OERS. First, credit controls would have stopped the 
debt build-up. Credit fuelled asset bubbles would have been few and small. 
Second, interest rates would have been more stable, supporting the financial 
structure of the economy instead of being the source of instability via changes 
in the interest burden. Third, money manager capitalism would have been 
attenuated and its destabilising effects, at least the part arising from 
international capital flows, euthanised within the OERS. Fourth, deficit 
spending, in case of monetary policy being incapable of preventing the 
recession from beginning, would have been targeted directly towards public 
works and full-employment schemes. Consequently, unemployment would have 
been kept at bay. So even if the recession would have taken place it would 
have been immediately stopped in its tracks: if the prevention would have failed, 
the cure would have followed. 
The policy implications of this work are not to shut down or fight international 
economic activity, even if foreign direct investment, like other international 
capital flows, can have a negative impact on financial stability. Far from it! The 
policy implications are that the institutional structure of the monetary system 
should be restructured, yet without shutting down globalisation. International 
economic activities such as foreign direct investment programs can yield 
positive results. Nevertheless, they should not be carried out in the blind faith of 
free markets and wishful thinking regarding ergodic trends in the economy 
towards stable equilibrium. Rather, the economy should be recognised for what 
it is: a chaotic non-equilibrium system with endogenous processes that tend to 
unstable equilibria, as Minsky and post-Keynesians have argued. As such, the 
policy implications of this work are to reorganise the institutional framework of 
the monetary system such that the possible positive effects of international 
economic activities, such as foreign direct investment, can be enjoyed to the 
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fullest without putting financial stability at risk. The OERS is a theoretical 
contribution in that direction, based on observations of how the world works. 
6.2 Where from here: the next steps in research 
There are still aspects of financial instability to be understood. The approach 
here has been from the macroeconomic side. But the organisational setup of 
the financial system matters as well. For banks have two roles in the economy. 
The first is the lending function: to screen potential borrowers and create credit. 
The second is the payment function: to intermediate payments and thereby 
grease the process of commerce. But the first function – the lending function – 
can make banks fail while the second function – the payment function – relies 
on them not failing. Therefore, banks’ roles in the economy are inherently 
misaligned (R. J. Phillips, 2014). 
Studying financial stability and its maintenance must also be done from the 
organisational point of view of the payment system. This is not done in this work 
and could be a welcomed expansion of it. Again, Iceland’s experience in 2008 is 
inspirational. Iceland’s payment system was and is channelled through the 
central bank which operates as the system’s settlement institution. This is the 
reason why Icelandic debit and credit cards continued to function normally 
despite the banks going bankrupt in 2008: the payments are settled in central 
bank money. In contrast, payments with debit and credit cards are settled with 
commercial bank money in the United Kingdom (Dent & Dison, 2012). That 
organisation would have been catastrophic had it been the implemented one in 
Iceland in 2008: commercial bank money became worthless and illegible as a 
means of payment as the banks went bankrupt. The problem of banking 
institutions being too-big-to-fail is closely connected to this organisational 
structure of the payment system. To end too-big-to-fail, banks cannot be 
allowed to be an indispensible part of the ultimate settlement process of the 
payment system. 
Setting the OERS up in a stock-flow consistent framework and rigorously testing 
it to various types of endogenous and external shocks (a build-up in leverage, a 
credit-supply shock, a fall in productivity, changes in consumer preferences, 
changes in foreign interest rates, etc., etc.) would be very informative and 
speed the development of the system. 
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Finally, the OERS is likely to receive criticism. That natural criticism must, of 
course, pass the tests of being relevant and “strive to explain the real world as 
observed empirically”. It should not be built on “imaginary models” and be 
irrelevant to real-world economic analysis. Judging on the severity of that 
criticism the system may have to be amended and developed further. That 
work, as this has hopefully been, must always be carried out with the aim of 
post-Keynesian economics in mind: 
...to provide a clear understanding of how the economy works, by 
relating economic analysis to real economic problems. 
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Appendix 1 
During the Icelandic “Golden Age”, domestic firms expanded rapidly abroad. 
Examples include the banks, Actavis, Bakkavor and other Icelandic 
manufacturers. Somehow, all this FDI activity had to be financed. But contrary 
to Japan during the 1980s, Iceland was, as Mexico before the Tequila crisis, 
running a large current account deficit. Therefore, not only did the Icelandic 
nation have to finance a current account deficit that peaked at more than 24% 
of GDP but it had to finance a net FDI flow abroad that amounted to similar 
figures. On top of that came a net accumulation of Other Investment, i.e. other 
than portfolio investments.174 
The most spectacular period and the one we will focus on is 2004 – 2006. 
During that time, Iceland ran an accumulated current account deficit of ISK 
1,800 billion; the accumulated net FDI abroad was ISK 1,650 billion; and the 
accumulated net other investments were ISK 2,700 billion. Altogether, this 
amounted to nearly 200% of GDP over the same time period. 
The way all this foreign-asset accumulation and spending on imports was 
financed was, largely, via portfolio investments.175 Figure A1.1 shows how the 
flows developed during 2003 – 2006.  
                                            
174
 The Central Bank of Iceland (Central Bank of Iceland, 2013), where the accompanying data comes 
from, has this to say on Other Investment: “Other investments than [direct investment, portfolio 
investment and financial derivatives] or reserve assets consist of trade credits and loans classified into 
short-term (with an original maturity of one year or less) or long-term. Currency and deposits are included 
in this category, along with other movements in assets and liabilities such as financial leases.”  Interest-
rate and currency swaps linked to foreign borrowing by residents is also included in Other Investment. 
175
 Central Bank of Iceland’s definition of Portfolio Investments in its International Investment Position 
data (Central Bank of Iceland, 2013): “Portfolio investment shows residents’ holdings of foreign 
securities (assets) and non-residents’ holdings of Icelandic securities (liabilities). Definition of foreign 
and Icelandic securities is based on the residence of the issuer of the security. Portfolio investment covers 
equities, shareholdings of less than 10% in companies and units in mutual funds, and debt instruments, 
bonds and notes (original maturity over one year) and money-market instruments (such as commercial 
paper). Securities need not be listed on a stock exchange but are classified according to their format.” 
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Figure A1.1 – International capital flows in Iceland, 1Q2003 – 4Q2006 
 
The stacked shadowed areas show “expenditures” of foreign currencies while the line is “collected” 
foreign currencies. The gap in the figures during 2006 comprises of mainly the balancing item, which’s 
importance grows considerably after 2005. The data is graphed on four quarter moving average for 
smoothing purposes. 
When it comes to the current account deficit in particular, figure A1.2 shows the 
balance on trade with goods and services.  
Figure A1.2 – Balance on trade with goods and services (4Q mov.avr) 
 
Breaking down the data on imports can give us an idea what sort of goods were 
being imported. We will, as a proxy for “luxury goods”, look in particular at cars 
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(data from Statistics Iceland).176 We see from figures A1.2 and A1.3 that not 
only did the trade deficit build up to unprecedented heights before the Crash in 
2008 but it seems that the growth in luxury imports was noteworthy as well. This 
chimes with the development of Mexico before the Tequila crash. 
Figure A1.3 – Annual importation of cars into Iceland 
 
Now, it is impossible to make a distinction between banks and non-banks in the 
public CBI’s data on portfolio investments: who were the institutions raising the 
funds for all this foreign-asset accumulation and current account deficit? 
However, after the Crash in 2008, the CBI started explicitly reporting the share 
of now-bankrupt banks in the IIP of Iceland. Relying on that data, we can see 
that the bankrupt estates of the banks are the main issuers of outstanding 
external debt instruments issued by Icelandic parties. Arguably then, it is not 
heroic to assume that it was mainly the banks that raised the foreign funds and 
channelled them to into the Icelandic economy. 
                                            
176
 Infamous is the story that during the height of the Icelandic bubble there were more Range Rovers 
imported into Iceland than in Sweden and Denmark combined, (population ratio ca. 1/50) (Valdimarsson, 
2013). In Iceland, after 2008, the luxury car goes by the name “Game Over”. 
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Figure A1.4 – Outstanding IIP, portfolio debt instruments 
 
Now, an interesting issue must be highlighted here. In the case of Japan, 
Werner (2005) explains how Japanese banks’ (speculative) credit creation 
Granger-caused capital outflows from Japan to the rest of the world. “Japan in 
effect created much money that was not backed by real economic activity and 
used it to ‘go shopping’ in the world” (Werner, 2005, p. 243). The exchange 
market did not price this credit creation properly, i.e. the yen was overpriced. 
Despite all the yen-credit creation, foreigners bought into it: “[i]t seems that 
nobody called Japan’s bluff during the 1980s” (ibid, p. 245). Werner notes that, 
seemingly so, the world suffered from a “yen illusion”.  
Following his model, we could discuss whether Icelandic banks’ speculative 
credit creation was, at least partially, responsible for the capital outflows from 
Iceland to the rest of the world. Indeed, foreign financial firms began, in August 
2005, to issue “Glacier bonds” which were bonds denominated in Icelandic 
krona. Issuers included KFW, Rabobank, Rentenbank and Deutsche Bank. 
Those bonds were sold to foreigners seeking a higher yield than they could 
normally get in other currencies (ask yields for AAA-rated bonds were, by 
February 2007, generally between 8-14% depending on maturity, see 
Ásbjörnsson (2007)) but they would have to accept a currency risk instead: if 
the Icelandic krona would fall in value, the worth of the principal of the bond, in 
other currencies, would fall. The Icelandic banks were involved in those deals 
not only to supply the kronas to the buyer of the Glacier bond – the foreign 
financial institution issuing the bonds gets paid for it in ISK, which the buyer of 
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the bond finds in the foreign exchange market, where the the Icelandic banks 
operate – but also to meet demand for exchange-rate hedges from the issuers, 
which were provided in the form of currency swaps (for a more in-depth 
discussion about how the issuance of Glacier bonds and the exchange-rate 
hedges worked, see Ólafsson (2005)).  
This way, the Icelandic banks expanded their balance sheets with domestic 
credit to foreign parties, seemingly similar to what the Japanese banks did in 
the 1980s. And the amounts were considerable. In August 2007, outstanding 
Glacier bonds topped, amounting to ISK 450 billion (Datamarket, 2014), or 
roughly a third of GDP. In 2011, there were still ISK 200 billion of those foreign-
owned funds on the balance sheets of the Icelandic banks (Viðskiptablaðið, 
2011). And as in the case of Japan in 1980s, foreigners bought into this credit 
creation, at least for a while: the exchange rate of the Icelandic krona did not 
begin to drop until late 2007 and then sank by 50% in 2008. Until then, we may 
perhaps say that the world was suffering from a “krona illusion”. 
But the Icelandic banks, especially the “Big Three” (Kaupthing, Glitnir, 
Landsbanki) also raised funds via foreign bond markets, especially in Europe 
(EMTN: Euro Medium Term Note) and, later, in the US (USMTN: US Medium 
Term Note), see figure A1.5. Those funds were then re-lent to domestic parties, 
having the effect that outstanding foreign-currency loans to Icelandic 
corporations, and households, increased (see figure A1.6). The Icelandic banks 
were, as Mexican banks before the Tequila crisis, intermediating funds from 
abroad as well. 
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Figure A1.5 Bonds issuances by the “Big-Three” Icelandic banks, billion EUR 
 
Source: The Special Investigation Commission (Special Investigation Committee, 2010b) 
Figure A1.6 Outstanding foreign-currency loans in Iceland, EUR billion177 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland, author’s calculations 
We conclude that Icelandic banks raised funds abroad and used those funds to 
finance their own FDI and other Icelandic firms’ FDI abroad during the Icelandic 
“Golden Age”. The Icelandic banks also raised funds to finance the spectacular 
                                            
177
 Footnote no. 33 is reproduced here, see 2.1.2 Banks as intermediaries: “A considerable portion of 
“foreign currency” loans in Iceland were in fact not in foreign currency but loans in Icelandic krona but 
linked to the exchange rate. The Central Bank of Iceland nevertheless counted them as “foreign currency 
loans”, making it impossible for us to know exactly how much of the total credit to corporations, and 
households (“foreign-currency” mortgages and car loans became increasingly popular after 2006), was in 
fact in foreign currencies. The “foreign currency loans”, i.e. ISK credit with the principal linked to the 
exchange rate, were, generally, deemed illegal with a series of court rulings starting from 2009, resting on 
laws from 2001 (no. 38/2001) amongst others. Complications apply that will not be discussed here.” 
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current account deficit and imports of luxury goods, just as the Mexican banks 
had done in the early 1990s. They also, as the Japanese banks in the 1980s, 
issued domestic credit that was used to “go shopping” in the rest of the world, 
assisted by the world’s “krona illusion”. This is similar to what the Japanese 
banks did according to Werner (2005). The Icelandic banks were therefore 
“Japanese” in this sense, and “Mexican” also as they acted as intermediaries as 
well. The Icelandic nation then used the money raised and created by the 
Icelandic banks to go on a consumption binge (negative current account), buy 
and build foreign production facilities abroad (FDI) and buy other assets as well. 
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Appendix 2 – Reasoning for the selection of indicators 
This appendix explains the reasons for selecting the indicators that are used to 
construct the financial instability indices, see tables 4.1 and 4.2. We will begin 
with the short term index and move to the long term index later. Do note that the 
indicators may not be exactly the same as were in fact used, the most common 
reason being lack of data. Furthermore, the indicators highlighted here are in 
some cases only some of the many similar indicators that can be used to 
estimate the same effects.  
A2.1 Indicators in the short term index 
The indicators that would be valuable to include in the short term index, 
following Minsky’s FIH, can be categorised into two categories. The 
categorisation depends on whether they are connected to income flows or 
portfolio flows covering balance sheet flows (see chapter 3, equation 1).  
A2.1.1 Income-flow covered balance sheet flow 
Economic units’ cash flows profile should be as close to that of a Minsky hedge 
unit as possible for them to be secure. Net income flows should cover, as much 
as possible, net negative balance sheet flows due to financial positions, creating 
no or limited need for net negative portfolio flows such as additional borrowing 
or emergency sales of capital and financial assets. Income-flow-covered 
balance sheet flow is the characteristic of hedge financing. 
Economic units which do not have adequate income flows to cover balance 
sheet flows are taking speculation or even Ponzi positions, trusting that they 
can find refinancing whenever there is shortage of operational income to cover 
balance sheet flows. Their net income flows do not cover their net negative 
balance sheet flows, creating need for net negative portfolio flows such as 
increased borrowing or sales of any financial or capital assets they may have 
positions in. Such borrowing needs and sales of assets can bring price 
instability to asset markets, even leading to fire-sales spiralling out of control. 
An important input in estimating whether the economy is financially robust or not 
is therefore the ratio of net income flows to balance sheet flows. Sectoral look is 
appropriate, as Minsky did (Minsky, 2008b). Those ratios can include but are 
not limited to: 
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(Households’ income - net interest expenses of long term debt - 
households’ current liabilities ) / households’ income 
(Firms’ cash flow from sales and operations [EBIT] - net interest expenses 
of long term debt - firm’s current liabilities) / Firms’ cash flows from sales 
(Government primary balance - net interest expenses of long term debt - 
government current liabilities) / government primary balance  
(Banks’ net interest income - banks’ current liabilities) / banks’ net interest 
income 
([net] exports - [net] interest expenses of external debt - short term 
external debt) / [net] exports 
Minsky emphasised that financial crises are due to optimistic expectations of 
cash flows failing to come true, leading to selloff pressures on external funded 
assets, which in the end leads to a drop in asset prices, lack of investment and 
general instability until expectations of cash flows are revised downwards and 
actually realised. With this in mind, the following indicator, or something similar, 
could be valuable: 
The size of government expenditure (of GDP) 
In an economy with Big Government (public expenditures are high compared to 
GDP), the state makes sure that fluctuations of cash flows are not as excessive 
as they would otherwise be in an economy with Small Government (Minsky, 
2008b). The size of the government expenditure is therefore assumed to be a 
proxy of how easily the state can sustain cash flows within the economy and 
how easily automatic stabilisers, such as unemployment benefits and social 
security payments, kick in once the private cash flows within the economy fail to 
realise investors’ expectations and the economy slows down.  
This cash-flow-supporting mechanism therefore supports the financial system, 
at least for the short term although the long term effects may be negative: too 
much “guarantee” of cash flows can increase moral hazard and leverage 
amongst private economic units as they trust that the government will step in in 
case of lack of cash flows.  
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A2.1.2 Portfolio-flow covered balance sheet flow 
Portfolio flow can supply economic units with cash in two different ways: 
refinancing of the maturing debt position or by selling assets. If balance sheet 
flows are prominently covered by portfolio flows it can lead to (exponential) 
expansion of loans in the economy and/or short drop of asset prices. 
Remember that credit demand is always in place and the credit market is 
rationed by the supply of credit (see section 2.1 What do banks do?). Once the 
financial system stops being able, or does not want, to supply credit to the 
economy the demanders of credit must find other ways of financing their 
financial positions and meet their contractual cash outflows.  
With this in mind, the following variables and ratios should be considered when 
estimating the cash-need of investors within the economy and the ability of the 
financial system to supply that cash. The list is not meant to be exhaustive. 
Indicators of credit expansion 
Minsky emphasised that credit expansion was an unmistakable part of the 
boom that later would turn into a bust. Keen argues the same (Keen, 1997, 
2009b, 2011a). Empirically, credit expansion has been shown to be an indicator 
of upcoming financial stress (Babecký et al., 2013; M. Goldstein et al., 2000). 
This makes it a prime candidate in measuring financial instability. 
 (Short term debt + interest expenses – net income)  / outstanding debt 
This would give an estimate of how much of the outstanding debt must be 
refinanced in the near future, taking into the account the coverage that the net 
income flow provides and the impact of interest expenses on long term and 
short term debt. This should be done for all the economy’s major pillars. This is, 
in short, a crude measure of liquidity needs. 
New issued debt / (matured debt + interest expenses – income) 
This would estimate the credit creation of the financial system that is used to 
meet the maturity of older debt contracts which are not covered by income flow. 
If this ratio is high it could signal either an impending credit bubble or excessive 
reliance on credit creation (portfolio flow) to cover balance sheet flows. 
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The amount of protected assets / short term debt of financial institutions 
This ratio gives an estimate of how easily financial institutions can find REPO 
applicable assets in the market when seeking liquidity from the central bank, 
without the central bank having to accept unfavourably high credit risk by 
making corporate bonds REPO applicable. During liquidity stress, high quality 
and protected assets (treasury bonds and notes) give a “convenience yield” due 
to their high market liquidity (see e.g. Longstaff (2002), Vayanos (2004) and 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007)). Minsky (2008b) underlines this, 
noting that the time of relative financial tranquillity after the second World War, 
up to 1966, was to a large extent traceable to the high amount of war bonds in 
the financial system, representing and constructing a save base of highly liquid 
assets. Furthermore, one of the reason why the 1966 liquidity squeeze in USA 
was smothered in the beginning was the prominence of this safe asset base 
compared to short term debt and other non-protected assets (Minsky, 2008b).  
Finally, Margeirsson (2009) pointed out that during the October 2008 banking 
crisis in Iceland, the banks had run out of treasury bonds while trying to get 
liquidity assistance from various central banks, The European Central Bank and 
Central Bank of Iceland in particular. This prompted the Central Bank of Iceland 
to expand its base of repo-applicable assets to include the bonds and bills of 
financial institutions, assets later nicknamed “love letters” (i. ástarbréf). 
The amount of repo agreements from the central bank 
 As the amount of repo agreements of the central bank mounts, the higher the 
imminent liquidity demand of the financial system. This variable is a sign of a 
more imminent threat to financial stability in the short term than the others that 
have been listed since it signals that banking institutions have stretched 
themselves as far as possible in utilising other cheaper refinancing possibilities 
(such as interbank borrowing, deposit hoarding etc.) than repo agreements. 
This is a clear sign of imminent stress. A clear example of this is the 
development of repo agreements between the Central Bank of Iceland and the 
Icelandic banks before the banking system finally collapsed in October 2008 
(figure A2.1). 
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Figure A2.1 Outstanding REPOs (ISK billions) with banks, Central Bank of Iceland 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland 
A2.1.3 Behavioural factors 
Behavioural factors must be considered as well. Asymmetric information can 
influence market participants’ behaviour, leading to increased financial 
instability (Hakkio & Keeton, 2009). Behavioural factors can also add to 
uncertainty about the future, which will influence liquidity preferences amongst 
people in the economy (Keynes, 1936).  
Hakkio and Keeton (2009) pointed out five characteristics of investors’ 
behaviour when financial stress increased and they had to rely on portfolio flows 
in the form of asset sales to raise cash. Those characteristics are: 
Increased uncertainty about the fundamental value of assets: investors become 
doubtful about the (discounted) value of future cash flows that assets were 
previously expected to yield. 
Increased asymmetry of information: buyers and sellers of assets have no 
longer the same level of information about what influences the price of the 
asset. This can e.g. be investor A’s inside information about the upcoming 
financial trouble of investor B who is holding the same asset as A. A will then 
have the incentive to use this information to sell the asset to C before B will 
have to sell it, which would lead to a drop in the asset value. It can also happen 
that buyers and sellers of an asset class start to emphasise the fact they do not 
have the same information, i.e. the asymmetry of information was always there 
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but it was largely ignored during the good times. When it is finally emphasised, 
the market experiences instability. Moral hazard and adverse selection 
increase, increasing the cost of borrowing and lowering the price of assets.  
Elevated uncertainty about other investors’ behaviour: investors can, and do, 
profit from “jumping on the bandwagon” whenever they can guess which band 
wagon to jump on; asset prices rise because of investors’ confidence of being 
able to find the “greater fool” once they want to sell out their position in the 
relevant asset class. When financial stress hits, investors do not “read” other 
investors’ as easily as they were able to, therefore finding it tougher to find the 
correct bandwagon to jump on. This is Keynes’s “beauty contest” argument. 
Flight to liquidity: investors prefer assets that are easier to sell than others 
(closer to being cash-equivalent) since that eases their worries about holding 
assets (cash, bank deposits) that are acceptable when meeting contractual 
payment obligations. This applies especially in times of great uncertainty about 
the future and investors seek asset classes that are more liquid than others, 
protecting the nominal value of their asset. 
Flight to quality: Those assets that have clear, transparent and safe cash flows 
are preferred over those where there are doubts about what they will yield in the 
future.  
Variables that can grasp those behavioural factors are e.g. the following (see 
Hakkio and Keeton (2009) and Illing and Liu (2003)): 
The spread between LIBOR and T-bill yields 
Interest rate swap yield spread 
Yield spread between off-the-run and on-the-run treasury bonds 
The yield spread between highly rated corporate bonds and treasury 
bonds 
The yield spread between highly rated corporate bonds and low rated 
corporate bonds 
The yield spread between “junk bonds” and low rated corporate bonds 
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The yield spread between consumer asset backed securities (CABS) and 
treasury bonds 
The correlation between stock returns and treasury bonds returns 
Volatility of stock prices 
Individualistic volatility of bank equity prices 
Dispersion of returns on bank stocks 
(Stock) trading volume and margin calls 
(Real) exchange rate volatility 
A2.2 Indicators in the long term index 
The major deciding factor of long term financial stability is the sustainability of 
the financial structure of the economic units within the economy. This is not the 
same as the “panic phase” of Minsky’s FIH, which is more the focus of the short 
term index: the long term index should focus on how sustainable and robust the 
current underlying financial structures of economic units truly are.178 Following 
Minsky’s FIH we can say that this largely depends on the size of (net) income 
flows compared to balance sheet flows and the prospect of how those flows will 
develop for the long term: hedge financing should dominate the financial 
structures of economic units. If, as time passes, there are risks that future 
balance sheet flows must be serviced with portfolio flows, long term financial 
stability is threatened as such financial structures can lead to pressures on 
asset prices and uncertainty, having the effects of increases in short term 
instability. 
Current balance sheet flows are inheritance of financial contracts made in the 
past that are maturing and coming into effect today (Minsky, 1984). This means 
that they are a flow variable that is a function of a stock variable. Interest cost is 
e.g. a flow variable that hinges on the stock of outstanding debt. Measuring the 
sustainability of the financial structure of the economic units within the economy 
will therefore to a large extent be a comparison of not only flow variables to 
                                            
178
 See 3.4 Applying Minsky’s FIH to measure financial stability for further discussion on “short term” 
and “long term” financial instability. 
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other flow variables (such as current account balance/GDP) but also stock 
variables relative to flow variables (such as debt/GDP).  
The following variables and indicators would be valuable in estimating the 
fragility of the underlying financial structure of the economy. This list is not 
meant to be exhaustive. 
Debt (public and private) / GDP 
Income-debt ratios yield valuable information about whether the balance sheet 
flows of maturing debt can be met with income flows or not. High debt burden 
can also have negative effects on financial stability if interest rates rise: smaller 
rise in the rate of interest is needed to cause cash-flow mismatches if the stock 
of debt is large.  
In the macroeconomic context, the value of gross domestic production is a 
proxy for income of the nation. The ratio of debt, private and public, to GDP is 
therefore informative on its own. A sectoral focus – i.e. focusing on the debt of 
households, firms and government in comparison to the income of those groups 
– would be valuable as well. Minsky himself used sectoral focus in his analysis 
(Minsky, 2008b). He also noted that “in a heavily indebted economy” (Minsky, 
1995, p. 198) the stability of the economy is more fragile and lesser change in 
flow variables, such as interests and wages, is needed to cause cash-flow 
mismatches and instability  
Long term interest rates compared to GDP growth 
Interest rates compared to income growth [sectoral] 
When estimating whether financial structures are sustainable or not we can look 
at the rate of change of income in comparison to the rate of interest. The 
argument is obvious: credit is used to invest and those investments create 
capital goods that are used for production that yields income which is used to 
repay the initial debt plus accrued interests. If the rate of interest is higher than 
the rate of increase in income there will be a shortfall in inflow of cash 
compared to total outflows of cash. This shortfall can be temporarily covered 
with new credit. But in the long run, such financial structure cannot be 
sustained: debt-to-income ratios would grow exponentially.  
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A sectoral focus would be valuable as well, where the interest cost of 
households, firms and even the government would be compared to the rate of 
growth of income. Tily (2010, p. xii) nicely sums up the reason why a high rate 
of interest can have a negative impact on the stability of the economy, 
especially when focusing on the sectoral levels: 
High interest rates are problematic because it is difficult for 
businesses to earn sufficient profit to cover future repayments. 
(Households have difficulty when interest payments become too large 
as a share of income, especially following redundancy.) 
Foreign or external debt (compared to e.g. GDP, [net] exports or 
foreign assets) 
There are numerous examples of economies being hit hard by distress because 
of troubles paying for external debt and some of those episodes are amongst 
the most famous financial crises in the history: Mexico 1994, Asia 1997, Russia 
& Brazil 1998, Argentina 2001, Iceland 2008 to name but a few. During such 
episodes, the exchange rate of the currency can take a hit as external liabilities 
mature and the capital leaves the economy. The Icelandic currency e.g. lost 
50% of its value versus the USD in 2008 (according to data from the Central 
Bank of Iceland).  
External debt, 179 especially for countries that are subject to the “Original Sin”, is 
often denominated in foreign currency.180 Foreign currency is needed to service 
such debt, just as certain assets (cash or bank deposits) are needed to meet 
contractual payments in domestic currency. The main source of foreign 
currency that does not create liabilities in the future, like foreign borrowing does, 
is exports. 
External debt has shown itself to influence the probability of a crisis: the higher 
the debt, the higher is the risk of distress (Kraay & Nehru, 2006). Sectoral 
                                            
179
 Foreign debt is all debt of domestic units in foreign legal tenders, no matter who owns that debt. 
External debt is all debt of domestic units that is owned by foreigners, no matter the currency the debt is 
denominated in. 
180
 The Original Sin refers to (Eichengreen & Hausmann, 1999, p. 3) “a situation in which the domestic 
currency cannot be used to borrow abroad or to borrow long term, even domestically. In the presence of 
this incompleteness, financial fragility is unavoidable because all domestic investments will have either a 
currency mismatch (projects that generate pesos will be financed with dollars) or a maturity mismatch 
(long-term projects will be financed with short-term loans).” 
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indicators, such as banks’ foreign liabilities as a share of foreign assets, can 
also be valuable when estimating the underlying fragility of the economy (M. 
Goldstein et al., 2000). Looking at the situation of other sectors (households’ 
foreign debts, firms’ foreign debts) could bring value as looking at the banking 
sector would.  
Interest rate on foreign debt compared to growth of exports 
The argument for the use of this indicator is the same as looking at interest 
rates (on domestic liabilities) compared to the growth of income – see previous 
discussion.  
Terms of trade (exports/imports) 
This signals the competitiveness of the economy in comparison with other 
economies. The terms of trade variable  has been shown to accurately (92% of 
crises accurately called) signal an oncoming banking crisis (M. Goldstein et al., 
2000). 
To some extent, using the terms of trade to estimate whether the income flow 
from exports is on a fast-growing path or not, relative to other economies, is an 
application of Thirlwall’s law (Thirlwall, 1979). Given that economic growth is 
balance-of-payments constrained, the long run economic growth of an economy 
is the growth of exports relative to income elasticity of demand. If Thirlwall’s law 
is true (which some research does support see e.g. Bairam (1988), Atesoglu 
(1993) and Britto & McCombie (2009)), the terms of trade gives a valuable 
estimate of the path of exports-income for the long run. 
The real exchange rate 
The volatility of the real exchange rate is an important input in measuring 
financial stability for the short term as it can be a part of the panic-phase of 
Minsky’s FIH. The real exchange rate can also be informative when looking at 
the underlying financial structure of the economy and how sustainable it is as it 
can be used to see if currencies are overvalued or not, like Burkart and Coudert 
(2002) did. This is not the same as the terms-of-trade variable as it focuses 
more on the exchange rate rather than the relative value of exports to imports, 
which can e.g. change due to commodity price changes without any changes in 
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the real exchange rate. Too strong exchange rate can lead to current account 
deficits and shortage of foreign currency income. M. Goldstein et al. (2000) 
highlight the real exchange rate as an indicator that is one of the first ones to 
signal an oncoming currency crisis.  
The current account balance 
Current account deficits are common in the early-warning literature on financial 
crises and crashes. M. Goldstein et al. (2000) find that its accuracy in predicting 
a currency crisis is good but (Kaminsky et al., 1998) find the indicator 
“insignificant” in most studies. However, later research has argued that the 
indicator is valuable in both predicting a crisis (Frankel & Saravelos, 2012) and 
in relation to the severity of the crisis (Babecký et al., 2013). From a Minskyian 
point of view, the variable signals the accumulation of external debt, which, in 
the end, creates contractual cash flows. Therefore, the current account deficit 
should be considered when estimating the sustainability of the underlying 
financial structures of the economy. 
Indicators of profitability and productivity of non-financial and 
financial corporations 
Low profitability of corporations impairs their ability to repay debt. This, 
effectively, is the other side of the argument why a high rate of interest is 
detrimental to financial sustainability. Profits from operations are cash flows that 
are, amongst other things, used to meet financial obligations according to the 
underlying debt contracts (Minsky, 2008a). Low profits of non-financial and 
financial corporations could therefore signal upcoming stress in the financial 
structures of the economy. Likewise, low productivity of firms can impair profits 
since more costly inputs are needed to produce the same output if productivity 
is low.  
Equity indicators of non-financial and financial corporations 
Usage of external funds in investment projects 
An unmistakable part of Minsky’s FIH is that leverage builds up as bankers and 
investors become confident about the future. However, high level of leverage 
makes the operations of firms vulnerable to unforeseen cash flow mismatches. 
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High leverage, i.e. low equity ratio, is therefore an important indicator of the 
strength of the underlying financial structures of the economy. 
Minsky also noted that during the phases of high hopes of the future, high 
leverage would be applied in investment projects in an attempt to increase the 
return on equity in the relevant projects. Borrowed external funds are needed 
for this increase of leverage. Low margin of safety of investment projects is 
associated with high level of reliance on external funds. High ratio of borrowed 
external funds in investment projects therefore signal a risk of lack of resilience 
in the underlying financial structures of the economy.  
The structure of the yield curve 
A flattening or even downward sloping yield curve is also a sign of the liquidity 
squeeze development in Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis. A certain 
turning point in the development of the financial system and its stability, 
according to the FIH, is when the build-up of leverage and ignorance of liquidity 
needs has pushed interest rates on liquid financial assets upwards; their prices 
have fallen.  
A flat or even a downward sloping yield curve is therefore a sign of the turning 
point in Minsky’s FIH. Once this turning point is reached, the interest rate costs 
of economic units that finance themselves especially on the short end – such as 
banks and units that trust being able to find available refinancing when needed 
– but hold assets with longer maturity will push them into losing money. Short 
term instability is by then not far away. 
A downward sloping yield curve should therefore have negative impacts on 
financial stability and overall economic performance. This is confirmed, on 
average, by e.g. Bordo and Haubrich (2008), Campbell (1995) and Ang, 
Piazzesi and Wei (2006). In light of this, the structure of the yield curve could be 
a valuable indicator in the long term financial instability index. 
Debt-financed aggregate demand 
Keen (2009b) defined aggregate demand as the sum of gross domestic product 
and the change in debt. He also noted that as the change in debt represents a 
larger share of the aggregate demand, the financial structure of the economy is 
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more unstable, making recessions that come after periods of high debt-financed 
growth in aggregate demand more severe than others. The correlation between 
debt contribution to demand and unemployment is especially high; shortly after 
debt-financed aggregate demand diminishes, unemployment increases and 
more so where demand was increasingly debt-financed.  
The intuition is simple. Define net savings as: 
 Income – Expenditures = Net Savings 
Or: 
 Expenditures = Income + Net Increase in Debt 
From a macroeconomic point of view this can also be put forward in the sense 
of aggregate demand:  
 Aggregate demand = Gross Domestic Production + Net Increase of Debt 
Taking the first differential, one can see that: 
 Change in Aggregate Demand = GDP growth + Change in Net Increase of Debt 
Or: 
∆&B = ∆fBg + ∆∆BPhU 
By measuring how much share of aggregate demand is represented by gross 
domestic product, one can see the contribution made by change of debt (which 
can be negative). Therefore, based on Keen, we can argue that an important 
input variable in estimating the long-term sustainability of the economy’s 
financial structure is to monitor how large share of the aggregate demand is 
debt financed, or, equivalently, how much the share of GDP is of aggregate 
demand in the sum here above. The higher the share of GDP is then the nature 
of the economy’s financial structure is less fragile. 
The responsiveness of the government safety net 
Minsky (2008b) argued that a Big Government – i.e. a government big enough 
to have considerable effects on the cash flows of the economy – “stabilizes not 
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only employment and income but also business cash flows (profits) and as a 
result asset value”. And how big should Big Government be? “Big Government 
must be big enough to ensure that swings in private investment lead to 
sufficient swings in the government’s deficit so that profits are stabilized. This 
means that government must be of the same order of magnitude or larger than 
investment” (Minsky, 2008b). 
However, there is a limit to the size of Big Government. Not only can Big 
Government be inflationary (Minsky, 2008b) but government expenditures must 
be responsive enough: when private investment expands government 
expenditures should contract to decrease the threat that too strong cash flows 
of private corporations create an exuberant environment, which pushes for an 
increased use of leverage instead of equity in financing a business’s operations 
and investments.  
Figure A2.2 Investment, budget balance (BB) and government expenditures in 
Iceland 
 
Figure A2.2 is a case in point. It shows how government expenditures in Iceland 
did not react (contract) quickly enough in the run up of the crisis in 2008. 
According to Minsky, the budget balance should have been more positive still to 
dampen the expansionary effects of increased credit expansion and private 
investment. This did not happen to a high enough degree: the red line creeps 
up. This added fuel to the fire, making the bubble even worse. The same 
problem but the opposite side of it emerges after the crash in 2008. Then the 
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government expenditures are expanded but not sustained as private investment 
collapses: the red line drops below unprecedented levels. Both the expansion 
and the contraction are therefore made worse by the lack of responsiveness in 
the government expenditures in Iceland. 
 
 
  
350 
Appendix 3 – Data Appendix 
The following tables detail the regressions summed up in tables 4.14-4.15 
further. Many regressions in those tables are not to be found in tables 4.14-
4.15. The reason why is e.g. non-stationarity problems (as in the case of short 
term financial instability in the UK) or statistical non-significance.  
A3.1 UK tables 
Table A3.1 What causes Long Term Instability in the United Kingdom? 
 
LT, 1st diff. [I(1)]
Coeff. P-
value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
Outward Flow of Financial FDI [I(0)] 19.760 0.000 0.000 0.701
Outward Flow of Financial FDI [I(0)] 15.646 0.002 0.000 0.465
15.655 0.106
Outward Stock of Financial FDI [coint.] 4.049 0.037 0.037 0.201
Outward Stock of Financial FDI [coint.] 8.841 0.025 0.002 0.664
-3.918 0.388
Inward Flow of Financial FDI [I(0)] 11.465 0.117 0.117 0.407
Inward Flow of Financial FDI [I(0)] 18.164 0.000 0.000 0.956
14.196 0.139
Outward Flow of Fin. FDI, 1st diff [I(0)] 11.696 0.174 0.174 0.962
Outward Flow of Fin. FDI, 1st diff [I(0)] 14.003 0.032 0.023 0.753
17.659 0.023
Outward Flow of FDI, 1st diff [I(0)] 3.660 0.019 0.019 0.566
Outward Flow of FDI, 1st diff [I(0)] 3.396 0.044 0.120 0.839
0.731 0.501
Outward Stock of Fin. FDI, 1st diff [I(0)] 11.017 0.031 0.031 0.606
Outward Stock of Fin. FDI, 1st diff [I(0)] 8.496 0.101 0.103 0.508
7.943 0.129
Inward Stock of Fin. FDI, 1st diff [I(0)] -1.800 0.835 0.835 0.551
Inward Stock of Fin. FDI, 1st diff [I(0)] 5.827 0.470 0.059 0.674
21.119 0.022
Nom. GDP gr [I(0)] 2.473 0.675 0.675 0.952
Nom. GDP gr [I(0)] 12.440 0.027 0.071 0.958
2.879 0.346
GDP real growth [I(0)] 6.879 0.000 0.000 0.505
GDP real growth [I(0)] 6.858 0.001 0.001 0.245
1.778 0.631
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Table A3.2 What causes accelerations of Long Term Financial Instability in the UK? 
 
LT, 2nd diff. [I(0)]
Coeff. P-
value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
Outward Flow of Fin. FDI, 1st diff [I(0)] 12.964 0.146 0.146 0.795
Outward Flow of Fin. FDI, 1st diff [I(0)] 14.983 0.062 0.002 0.418
18.370 0.015
Outward Flow of FDI, 1st diff [I(0)] 3.643 0.005 0.005 0.817
Outward Flow of FDI, 1st diff [I(0)] 4.355 0.000 0.000 0.718
2.555 0.015
Inward Flow of Fin. FDI, 1st diff [I(0)] 6.825 0.431 0.431 0.688
Inward Flow of Fin. FDI, 1st diff [I(0)] 9.983 0.047 0.082 0.740
8.843 0.388
Outward Stock of Fin. FDI, 1st diff [I(0)] 8.328 0.143 0.143 0.657
Outward Stock of Fin. FDI, 1st diff [I(0)] 8.606 0.066 0.023 0.821
5.243 0.547
Inward Stock of FDI, 1st diff. [I(0)] -2.586 0.098 0.098 0.690
Inward Stock of FDI, 1st diff. [I(0)] -0.644 0.775 0.952 0.791
-0.057 0.975
Nom. GDP gr [I(0)] 14.883 0.038 0.038 0.916
Nom. GDP gr [I(0)] 18.245 0.012 0.028 0.828
1.380 0.856
GDP real growth [I(0)] 5.008 0.175 0.175 0.529
GDP real growth [I(0)] 14.177 0.000 0.000 0.167
-7.353 0.007
Real GDP growth, 1st diff. [I(0)] 7.233 0.025 0.025 0.743
Real GDP growth, 1st diff. [I(0)] 10.438 0.001 0.001 0.795
4.628 0.180
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Table A3.3 What causes Short Term Financial Instability in the UK? 
 
Table A3.4 What Granger-causes Outward Financial FDI Flow from the United 
Kingdom? 
 
Table A3.5 What Granger-causes Inward Financial FDI Flow into the United 
Kingdom? 
 
ST, 1st diff. [I(1)]
Coeff. P-
value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
Outward Flow of Financial FDI [I(0)] 56.407 0.088 0.088 0.151
Outward Flow of Financial FDI [I(0)] 42.133 0.040 0.024 0.232
81.265 0.034
Inward Flow of Financial FDI [I(0)] 78.187 0.036 0.036 0.552
Inward Flow of Financial FDI [I(0)] 89.681 0.072 0.172 0.789
40.740 0.402
Inward Flow of Fin FDI, 1 st diff [I(0)] 37.963 0.152 0.152 0.099
Inward Flow of Fin FDI, 1 st diff [I(0)] 49.245 0.023 0.026 0.798
65.548 0.028
Outward Stock of Fin FDI, 1st diff [I(0)] 59.886 0.018 0.018 0.243
Outward Stock of Fin FDI, 1st diff [I(0)] 58.028 0.035 0.073 0.670
21.888 0.438
Outward Financial 
FDI Flow [I(0)]
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
Nom. GDP gr [I(0)] -0.133 0.020 0.020 0.555
Nom. GDP gr [I(0)] 0.122 0.271 0.059 0.991
-0.296 0.069
Inward Financial FDI 
Flow [I(0)]
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
LT, 1st diff. [I(1)] 0.012 0.001 0.001 0.765
LT, 1st diff. [I(1)] 0.003 0.651 0.102 0.939
0.016 0.172
GDP real growth [I(0)] 0.101 0.018 0.018 0.876
GDP real growth [I(0)] 0.127 0.022 0.034 0.677
-0.020 0.792
GDP real growth [I(0)] - w.trend 0.079 0.094 0.094 1.000
GDP real growth [I(0)] - w.trend 0.058 0.503 0.680 0.921
0.000 1.000
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Table A3.6 What Granger-causes Inward FDI Flow into the United Kingdom? 
 
Table A3.7 What Granger-causes changes in the Outward Financial FDI Flow out of 
the United Kingdom? 
 
Table A3.8 What Granger-causes changes in the Inward FDI Flow into the United 
Kingdom? 
 
Inward FDI Flow [I(1)] P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST [I(1)] -0.070 0.003 0.003 0.312
ST [I(1)] -0.067 0.022 0.025 0.655
0.022 0.524
ST, 1st diff. [I(1)] -0.066 0.007 0.007 0.808
ST, 1st diff. [I(1)] -0.057 0.076 0.164 0.932
-0.022 0.575
GDP real growth [I(0)] 0.312 0.019 0.019 0.431
GDP real growth [I(0)] 0.222 0.275 0.131 0.401
0.152 0.486
Outward Financial 
Flow, 1st diff. [I(0)]
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST [I(1)] -0.008 0.589 0.589 0.161
ST [I(1)] -0.021 0.050 0.063 0.849
0.018 0.032
Nom. GDP gr [I(0)] -0.040 0.500 0.500 0.093
Nom. GDP gr [I(0)] 0.222 0.201 0.030 0.791
-0.248 0.034
GDP real growth [I(0)] -0.049 0.564 0.564 0.099
GDP real growth [I(0)] 0.138 0.076 0.007 0.193
-0.201 0.002
Real GDP growth, 1st diff. [I(0)] 0.125 0.058 0.058 0.124
Real GDP growth, 1st diff. [I(0)] 0.183 0.009 0.025 0.253
-0.046 0.5357
Inward FDI Flow, 1st 
diff. [I(1)]
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST [I(1)] -0.042 0.269 0.269 0.363
ST [I(1)] -0.097 0.031 0.003 0.816
0.070 0.002
ST, 1st diff. [I(1)] -0.079 0.002 0.002 0.594
ST, 1st diff. [I(1)] -0.083 0.007 0.020 0.769
-0.026 0.479
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Table A3.9 What Granger-causes changes in the Outward Stock of Financial FDI 
from the United Kingdom? 
 
Table A3.10 What Granger-causes Inward Stock of Financial FDI into the United 
Kingdom?  
 
Table A3.11 What Granger-causes changes in the Inward Stock of Financial FDI in 
the United Kingdom? 
 
Outward Stock of Fin 
FDI, 1st diff. [I(0)]
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST [I(1)] -0.031 0.015 0.015 0.344
ST [I(1)] -0.013 0.276 0.059 0.599
-0.034 0.162
Nom. GDP gr [I(0)] -0.108 0.262 0.262 0.906
Nom. GDP gr [I(0)] 0.028 0.933 0.067 0.965
-0.217 0.439
Inward Stock of 
Financial FDI [I(1)]
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
LT, 1st diff. [I(1), cointgr.] 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.827
LT, 1st diff. [I(1), cointgr.] 0.008 0.245 0.031 0.695
0.007 0.478
Inward Stock of Fin 
FDI, 1st diff [I(0)]
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
LT, 1st diff. [I(1)] 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.775
LT, 1st diff. [I(1)] 0.005 0.387 0.010 0.860
0.011 0.128
ST [I(1)] -0.010 0.225 0.225 0.610
ST [I(1)] 0.007 0.346 0.041 0.498
-0.020 0.018
ST, 1st diff. [I(1)] 0.005 0.586 0.586 0.835
ST, 1st diff. [I(1)] 0.012 0.198 0.085 0.316
-0.010 0.407
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Table A3.12 What Granger-causes changes in Inward Stock of FDI in the United 
Kingdom? 
 
Table A3.13 What Granger-causes Nominal GDP Growth in the United Kingdom? 
 
Table A3.14 What Granger-causes Real GDP Growth in the United Kingdom? 
 
Inward Stock of FDI, 
1st diff [I(0)]
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
GDP real growth [I(0)] 0.425 0.001 0.001 0.827
GDP real growth [I(0)] 0.284 0.149 0.022 0.612
0.208 0.590
GDP real growth [I(0)] - w.trend 0.366 0.022 0.022 0.829
GDP real growth [I(0)] - w.trend 0.039 0.901 0.551 0.349
0.253 0.507
Nominal GDP Growth 
[I(0)]
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST [I(1)] -0.026 0.000 0.000 0.202
ST [I(1)] -0.031 0.026 0.003 0.834
0.026 0.060
ST, 1st diff. [I(1)] -0.032 0.000 0.000 0.782
ST, 1st diff. [I(1)] -0.028 0.002 0.005 0.505
-0.012 0.347
GDP real growth 
[I(0)]
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST [I(1)] -0.021 0.001 0.001 0.682
ST [I(1)] -0.028 0.009 0.020 0.669
0.037 0.196
ST, 1st diff. [I(1)] -0.029 0.006 0.006 0.900
ST, 1st diff. [I(1)] -0.023 0.008 0.022 0.426
-0.011 0.417
Inward Flow of Financial FDI [I(0)] -1.309 0.009 0.009 0.704
Inward Flow of Financial FDI [I(0)] -1.363 0.014 0.035 0.674
-0.381 0.599
Inw. Flow of Fin. FDI [I(0)] - w.trend -1.641 0.009 0.009 0.900
Inw. Flow of Fin. FDI [I(0)] - w.trend -1.564 0.015 0.040 0.801
-0.555 0.425
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A3.2 US tables 
Table A3.15 What Granger-causes changes in Long Term Financial Instability in the 
United States? No time trend 
 
Table A3.16 What Granger-causes Long Term Financial Instability in the US? With 
time trend. 
 
1st Diff LT 8 P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
Inward Flow of Financial FDI 96.634 0.028 0.028 0.817
Inward Flow of Financial FDI 110.674 0.014 0.002 0.832
35.151 0.367
Inward Flow of FDI 20.741 0.028 0.028 0.949
Inward Flow of FDI 11.267 0.368 0.006 0.981
14.796 0.147
Inward Stock of FDI, 1st diff 16.890 0.016 0.016 0.987
Inward Stock of FDI, 1st diff 10.180 0.131 0.016 0.752
16.209 0.074
ST 0.201 0.151 0.151 0.435
ST 0.540 0.000 0.000 0.083
-0.439 0.002
ST, 1st diff. 0.487 0.000 0.000 0.058
ST, 1st diff. 0.577 0.000 0.000 0.911
-0.386 0.002
1st Diff LT 8 P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST 0.153 0.189 0.189 0.719
ST 0.460 0.000 0.000 0.264
-0.363 0.003
ST, 1st diff. 0.453 0.000 0.000 0.395
ST, 1st diff. 0.479 0.000 0.000 0.474
-0.214 0.142
Nominal GDP growth 0.000 0.358 0.358 0.984
Nominal GDP growth 0.000 0.010 0.018 0.830
0.000 0.006
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Table A3.17 What Granger-causes Short Term Financial Instability in the United 
States? No time trend. 
 
Table A3.18 What Granger-causes Short Term Financial Instability in the United 
States? With time trend. 
 
ST 8 1st diff P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
Inward Flow of FDI 35.233 0.010 0.010 0.621
Inward Flow of FDI 43.273 0.003 0.010 0.502
-0.169 0.991
Inward Flow of FDI, 1st diff 26.745 0.033 0.033 0.807
Inward Flow of FDI, 1st diff 14.978 0.339 0.034 0.628
39.033 0.080
Inward Stock of FDI, 1st diff 39.844 0.048 0.048 0.618
Inward Stock of FDI, 1st diff 42.112 0.054 0.142 0.476
8.706 0.478
LT, 1st diff. -1.010 0.015 0.015 0.323
LT, 1st diff. -0.295 0.535 0.806 0.826
0.133 0.766
GDP nom. growth 22.142 0.000 0.000 0.634
GDP nom. growth 16.415 0.012 0.036 0.658
1.927 0.817
GDP real growth, 1st diff 19.290 0.086 0.086 0.403
GDP real growth, 1st diff 9.393 0.225 0.426 0.699
1.938 0.827
ST 8 1st diff P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
GDP nom. Growth 25.452 0.005 0.005 0.799
GDP nom. Growth 20.751 0.017 0.021 0.657
7.861 0.407
GDP real growth, 1st diff. 19.239 0.078 0.078 0.401
GDP real growth, 1st diff. 9.604 0.224 0.428 0.707
1.986 0.825
LT, 1st diff. -1.344 0.006 0.006 0.794
LT, 1st diff. -0.609 0.284 0.516 0.781
-0.066 0.871
358 
Table A3.19 What Granger-causes changes in the Outward Financial FDI Flow from 
United States? No time trend. 
 
Table A3.20 What Granger-causes Outward Financial FDI Flow from United States? 
With a time trend. 
 
Table A3.21 What Granger-causes Inward Financial FDI Flow into the United 
States? No time trend. 
 
Outward Financial FDI 
Flow
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST -0.001 0.015 0.015 0.818
ST 0.000 0.877 0.047 0.616
-0.001 0.247
GDP real growth, 1st diff 0.049 0.053 0.053 0.969
GDP real growth, 1st diff 0.048 0.057 0.147 0.994
0.004 0.895
Outward Financial FDI 
Flow
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST -0.001 0.013 0.013 0.751
ST 0.000 0.827 0.016 0.376
-0.002 0.188
GDP real growth, 1st diff 0.001 0.062 0.062 0.976
GDP real growth, 1st diff 0.001 0.078 0.186 0.948
0.000 0.845
Inward Financial FDI 
Flow
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST, 1st diff. 0.001 0.063 0.063 0.924
ST, 1st diff. 0.001 0.327 0.151 0.853
0.001 0.681
GDP real growth, 1st diff 0.035 0.051 0.051 0.946
GDP real growth, 1st diff 0.037 0.081 0.206 0.943
0.003 0.908
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Table A3.22 What Granger-causes Inward FDI Flow into the United States? No time 
trend. 
 
Table A3.23 What Granger-causes Inward FDI Flow into the United States? With a 
time trend. 
 
Table A3.24 What Granger-causes changes in the Inward Financial FDI Flow into 
the United States? No time trend. 
 
Inward FDI Flow P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST 8 -0.003 0.024 0.024 0.302
ST 8 -0.001 0.723 0.536 0.897
-0.001 0.843
GDP nom growth 0.143 0.049 0.049 0.237
GDP nom growth 0.106 0.306 0.564
-0.035 0.663
GDP real growth, 1st diff 0.165 0.023 0.023 0.633
GDP real growth, 1st diff 0.140 0.093 0.230 0.794
0.074 0.469
Inward FDI Flow P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST -0.003 0.016 0.016 0.334
ST -0.002 0.644 0.353 0.729
-0.001 0.843
GDP nom growth 0.209 0.011 0.011 0.356
GDP nom growth 0.148 0.181 0.357 0.786
0.025 0.767
GDP real growth, 1st diff 0.166 0.028 0.028 0.668
GDP real growth, 1st diff 0.143 0.109 0.262 0.659
0.077 0.447
Inward Financial FDI 
Flow, 1st diff.
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
GDP nom growth -0.011 0.750 0.750 0.734
GDP nom growth 0.019 0.689 0.072 0.920
-0.078 0.035
GDP real growth, 1st diff 0.052 0.049 0.049 0.553
GDP real growth, 1st diff 0.064 0.057 0.087 0.684
0.002 0.933
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Table A3.25 What Granger-causes changes in the Inward Financial FDI Flow into 
the United States? With a time trend. 
 
Table A3.26 What Granger-causes changes in the Inward FDI flow into the United 
States? No time trend. 
 
Table A3.27 What Granger-causes changes in the Outward Financial Flow from the 
United States? No time trend. 
 
Table A3.28 What Granger-causes changes in the Outward FDI Flow from the 
United States? No time trend. 
 
Inward Financial FDI 
Flow, 1st diff.
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
GDP real growth, 1st diff 0.053 0.050 0.050 0.537
GDP real growth, 1st diff 0.067 0.053 0.091 0.681
0.003 0.917
Inward FDI Flow, 1st 
diff.
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST -0.004 0.011 0.011 0.903
ST -0.004 0.088 0.018 0.765
0.001 0.834
GDP real growth 0.176 0.186 0.186 0.632
GDP real growth 0.234 0.056 0.027 0.640
-0.130 0.266
GDP real growth, 1st diff 0.192 0.019 0.019 0.581
GDP real growth, 1st diff 0.225 0.013 0.039 0.818
0.122 0.218
Outward Financial 
Flow, 1st diff.
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST 8 1st difference -0.001 0.067 0.067 0.563
ST 8 1st difference -0.001 0.408 0.404 0.474
-0.001 0.631
Real GDP growth -0.008 0.845 0.845 0.516
Real GDP growth 0.029 0.413 0.047 0.180
-0.109 0.015
Outward Flow, 1st 
difference
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST 8 -0.002 0.072 0.072 0.250
ST 8 0.000 0.986 0.480 0.308
-0.002 0.663
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Table A3.29 What Granger-causes changes in the Outward FDI Flow from the 
United States? With a time trend. 
 
Table A3.30 What Granger-causes changes in the Inward FDI Stock in the United 
States? No time trend. 
 
Table A3.31 What Granger-causes Changes in Outward Stock of FDI from United 
States? With a time trend. 
 
Table A3.32 Does financial instability Granger-cause Nominal GDP growth in 
United States? No time trend 
 
Outward Flow, 1st 
difference
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST 8 -0.002 0.085 0.085 0.219
ST 8 -0.001 0.817 0.173 0.257
-0.002 0.750
Inward Stock of FDI, 
1st diff
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST 8 0.000 0.790 0.790 0.570
ST 8 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.572
-0.006 0.002
ST 8 1st difference 0.004 0.015 0.015 0.607
ST 8 1st difference 0.005 0.059 0.001 0.653
0.003 0.576
Outward Stock of FDI, 
1st difference
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST 8 0.002 0.186 0.186 0.474
ST 8 0.009 0.009 0.027 0.973
-0.006 0.066
ST 8 1st difference 0.006 0.053 0.053 0.202
ST 8 1st difference 0.007 0.115 0.056 0.999
0.001 0.832
GDP nom growth P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST -0.999 0.096 0.096 0.247
ST -2.800 0.001 0.002 0.061
2.566 0.003
ST, 1st diff. -2.615 0.001 0.001 0.126
ST, 1st diff. -3.273 0.000 0.000 0.924
1.838 0.007
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Table A3.33 Does financial instability Granger-cause Nominal GDP growth in 
United States? With a time trend.  
 
Table A3.34 Does financial instability Granger-cause changes in the real GDP 
Growth in the United States? No time trend 
 
Table A3.35 Does financial instability Granger-cause changes in the real GDP 
Growth in the United States? With a time trend. 
 
GDP nom growth P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST -0.831 0.146 0.146 0.304
ST -2.469 0.003 0.010 0.112
2.374 0.006
ST, 1st diff. -2.457 0.001 0.001 0.106
ST, 1st diff. -3.127 0.000 0.000 0.884
1.717 0.028
GDP real growth 1st 
diff.
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST -0.192 0.771 0.771 0.748
ST -2.497 0.000 0.002 0.152
2.493 0.004
ST, 1st diff. -2.441 0.001 0.001 0.166
ST, 1st diff. -2.988 0.000 0.000 0.413
2.358 0.001
GDP real growth 1st 
diff.
P-value
P-value, 
F test
Ljung-Box 
P-value
ST -0.216 0.708 0.708 0.761
ST -2.716 0.002 0.007 0.160
2.530 0.006
ST, 1st diff. -2.521 0.004 0.004 0.140
ST, 1st diff. -3.006 0.000 0.000 0.418
2.342 0.001
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A3.3 Net FDI data 
Graph A3.1 Net Outward FDI Flows 
  
Graph A3.2 Net Outward FDI Stock 
  
The graphs above show that main stock and flows of FDI have their source in 
rich and developed countries while the receivers of that FDI are developing 
countries.  
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Appendix 4 
The following rests, to a large extent, on the analysis of Harkness (2014). The 
reader will see that the argumentation is quite similar to that of IMF and Wray. 
A certain amount of money has a certain purchasing power in the economy. 
The creation of bank credit and the endogenous creation of money is therefore 
the creation of purchasing power. Schumpeter pointed this out when he called 
banks “manufacturers” of purchasing power (Schumpeter, 1934).  
We will use BA to signify the purchasing power created from gross domestic 
credit creation. Gross purchasing power also comes from gross national income 
(NA = C + I + G + X + PI + SI) and from gross capital inflows from abroad, KA. 
Here, PI and SI represent gross primary income from abroad and gross 
secondary income from abroad. Finally, current gross purchasing power can be 
attained via a transfer of purchasing power. This transfer will either be between 
time periods or to another domestic party within the same time period. 
Transferring domestic purchasing power between two different domestic units 
does nothing to the gross available national purchasing power within that time 
period. We can therefore ignore that factor. But accumulated stock of savings is 
purchasing power that has been transferred from the past to the now. 
Liquidating those savings, partially or fully, gives the owner a spendable 
amount, i.e. purchasing power. This gross liquidation of existing savings will be 
signified with LA. We can now express available gross national purchasing 
power, PA, as: 
PA = NA + BA + LA + KA 
Purchasing power can be spent or stored, i.e. saved, for a rainy day. 
Expenditures of purchasing power can be recorded as a domestic income, N, or 
foreign income. Foreign income is domestic expenditures on imports (M) and 
primary and secondary income from abroad, which for the domestic economy 
are expenditures. We signify those variables with PE and SE respectively. The 
domestic economy can also spend its domestic purchasing power by acquisition 
of foreign assets or by repaying outstanding foreign debt, i.e. gross capital 
outflows. We will signify this variable with KE. Purchasing power will also be 
used to repay outstanding bank debt, BE. Spent purchasing power is therefore 
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going to be used in one of the three: NE = C + I + G + M + PE + SE, BE or KE. 
Finally, if purchasing power is not spent, it is stored, i.e. saved. This is addition 
to existing savings and represents the act of transferring purchasing power from 
now to the future. We will signify this gross transfer of available purchasing 
power to the future with LE. Therefore, we can write that the purchasing power 
spent and stored, PS, is: 
PS = NE + BE + LE + KE 
Available purchasing power must be either spent or stored between periods, it 
is logically impossible to not have it so: if you hold a dollar bill in your hand, 
which you acquired one way or the other, you must spend it or not spend it. 
Therefore, PA = PS by definition, i.e.: 
PA = NA + BA + LA + KA = NE + BE + LE + KE = PS 
And therefore: 
X + PI + SI + BA + LA + KA = M + PE + SE + BE + KE + LE 
X – M + PI – PE + SI – SE + BA – BE + LA – LE + KA – KE = 0 
PI – PE is BPI, i.e. balance on primary income from abroad. Likewise, SI – SE 
is BSI, i.e. balance on secondary income from abroad. KA – KE is net capital 
flows from abroad, K. And BA – BE is net domestic credit expansion, B. And LA – 
LE is net liquidation of existing savings, L. Remember (International Monetary 
Fund, 2011) that X – M + BPI + BSI = CAB where CAB is current account 
balance. Therefore, we get: 
X – M + BPI + BSI + B + L + K = 0 
CAB + B + L + K = 0 
Which is the same as (3), see section 5.2.1 Domestic credit expansion and 
current account deficits. 
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